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EAST INDIA (NORTH-WEST FRONTIER).

PAPERS REGARDING

I. ORAKZAIS: Request of certain Clans to be taken under British Administration.

II. ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS: Operations.

III. MOHMANDS: Operations.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

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

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PART I.

ORAKZAIS: REQUEST OF CERTAIN CLANS TO BE TAKEN UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 18th August, 1904. Received 5th September, 1904.

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward copy of a letter from the Honourable the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province, submitting a proposal to extend protection to certain of the Orakzai clans on the Kohat border. The clans in question are the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Sipaia, Abdul Aziz Khel, Ibrahimzai, and Chappar Mishtis, whose total fighting strength is estimated at 2,710 men. Of these clans, the Chappar Mishtis only are Sunnis, the others are Shias. The tract which these sections occupy is approximately 30 miles in length, with a maximum breadth of some 14 miles. It extends over both slopes of the Star Ghar range from the Oblan Pass on the east to Dāppa on the west, just short of the point where the road made in 1897 crosses the Sampagga Pass. On the north, the boundary is the Mastura River, with the exception of the portion between Zera and Osi, where land on both banks is owned by the Sipaia; on the south, their territory runs down to the broken and undulating country within the limits of Kachai and Marai, in British territory. The Orakzai clans are divided into two religious sections, of Shias and Sunnis, between whom exists a long-standing animosity, easily fanned by a fanatical leader into bitter conflict. This was the case last summer, when a Muhammadan fanatic, coming, it is believed, from Ghazni, and known as the Malang Fakir, created disturbances in the Orakzai country, and preached a *jihad* against Shias. Several Orakzais joined him, till he had a large following, which had several conflicts with the Shias, in one of which the Fakir was wounded. The Shias in adjacent British territory asked for permission to help their co-religionists, but were not allowed to do so, though probably some of them crossed the border. The organised attack on these Shia clans caused also great excitement amongst their co-religionists in Kurram; and, if matters had proceeded to extremities, it would perhaps have been difficult to have prevented them from joining in the fray in large numbers. The Shias applied for assistance from Government, which was not given them, and declared their intention of asking, in a body, after the termination of the fighting, to be taken over by Government. In August, 1903, owing, it is said, partly to treachery on the part of the Aka Mulla, who, jealous of the ascendancy acquired by the Malang Fakir, gave secret intimation of their plans, the Sunnis were defeated by the Shias. This weakened the influence of the Fakir, though he subsequently managed to raise a general Afridi jirga to carry on the war. The Shias defeated this combined attack, and burned or mutilated the bodies of the Sunnis whom they had killed. This defeat led to the break-up of the jirga, amid mutual recrimination, and to the termination of hostilities. The Orakzais openly denounced the Malang Fakir as an impostor, and he departed from the country, after a futile attempt to raise another jirga. It is rumoured that he returned in June of this year from Afghanistan, and is again trying to raise another gathering to attack the Shias. While the fighting was still in progress last year, the

Chappar Mishtis applied to be taken over by the British Government. They were told that Government could not interfere in a religious dispute, and that no petition could be entertained until peace had been restored. At the end of the year, after the restoration of peace, the Shia clans commenced to sound the local authorities as to whether, if they petitioned Government to take them over, there was any chance of Government agreeing to do so; they suggested that their tract should be taken over on the lines of Kurram, and expressed their readiness to pay tribute or revenue. It is stated that the so-called religious attacks on the Shias have their real foundation in the desire of the Afridis to annex their neighbours' rich lands; and though the Shias on the last occasion proved that they were able to defend themselves, their wish to be brought under British protection is undoubtedly genuine. The question is constantly mentioned by the tribal jirgas at their meetings with the local political officers, and it is desirable to come to some decision as to the reply to be given to the tribes. Colonel Deane considers that there are many advantages from this extension of control; to take over the country—he says—would definitely stop this so-called religious war, thus affording a very substantial guarantee for the peace of the border; while, if we leave things as they are, and if the persecution of these clans by the Afridis and Orakzais, under the cloak of religion, is persistently carried out, there must be a risk of the clans being gradually weakened and ousted, or of their being compelled to throw in their lot with the Afridis, in which case their attitude towards us, which has been hitherto uniformly friendly, will be changed, rendering the administration of this portion of the frontier more difficult than it is even at present. Colonel Deane further points out that, if we take over the tract, it will facilitate a greater political control over adjacent Afridi sections, notably the Zakka Khel and Aka Khel, and the undesirable contingency of the Afridis making a settlement right on the Kohat border will be avoided, while there will be the obvious strategical gain of obtaining a position in rear of the Afridi country, whence troops could act, when necessary. He admits that the arrangement would be unpalatable to the Afridis, but he thinks that this may be disregarded. He accordingly recommends that we should give to the clans named the protection which they are anxious to secure, and administer the tract somewhat on the lines of the Kurram, by a Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, collecting a cess of four rupees per house, and raising for the actual protection of the border a corps of 200 local levies, to be affiliated to the Samana Rifles. The subject has already been considered by the Government of India, in connection with somewhat similar proposals to the present one. In 1894, the Bar Muhammad Khel, one of these Shia sections, submitted a petition to be taken under the control and protection of the British Government. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, believed that the offer was a genuine one, but expressed the opinion that it would be absolute folly on our part to accept it in any shape or form. In 1895, some of the leading men of the Baba Nmasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan also petitioned to be taken over by Government, and the Lieutenant-Governor expressed the same opinion as he had in regard to the Bar Muhammad Khels. The Ali Khel lands form an isolated block in the west of Tirah which in existing circumstances could hardly be taken over. The Government of India accepted His Honour's views in both instances. We enclose a copy of the correspondence which then took place, as Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's opinion, which was fully concurred in by Mr. Udny, states the case very strongly against the extension of our responsibilities in the tribal tracts beyond the Kohat District. So matters remained until the frontier disturbances of 1897-98, during which these Shia clans maintained an uniformly friendly attitude towards us. At the close of the disturbances the lines on which our frontier policy should be conducted were laid down in Lord George Hamilton's despatch, dated 28th January, 1898.* The leading principles, inculcated in this despatch, were that no new responsibility should be taken, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities, and the protection of the British border; that interference with the tribes must be avoided, where possible; that we must not give any countenance to the idea that Government intended to administer the tribal country, or to enclose it within provincial limits, since the extension of direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities; while annexation would imply a still larger addition to our civil and military establishments, with a very serious and

* *See* Cd. 496 of 1901, p. 5.

growing burden upon our financial resources. It was further stated that the demarcation of the Durand line had aroused suspicion and misgiving among certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of Government, and that "to gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future actions." It was laid down that "the immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehensions of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence." We do not at this stage propose to discuss the details of Colonel Deane's scheme, since, while the proposal itself involves *pro tanto* a departure from the principles of the frontier policy which were laid down for our guidance in Lord George Hamilton's despatch, dated the 28th January, 1898, in the discussion which has arisen on the proposal the applicability of those principles in their entirety to existing circumstances has been directly challenged. Should His Majesty's Government be prepared to reconsider the principles therein indicated, we would probably be ready to take action somewhat on the lines now suggested by Colonel Deane, which have undoubtedly much to commend them; but before doing this, we desire, without committing ourselves to any definite expression of opinion, to lay before you the arguments for and against adopting a departure from the the policy to which we are at present committed. We are impelled to take this step, partly because we are not unanimous as to the desirability or necessity of extending our responsibilities, and partly because His Excellency Lord Ampthill, who is only in temporary charge of the office of Viceroy, considers that a definite recommendation on an issue which, in view of the light in which it is put forward by some of his advisers, involves a vitally important question of frontier policy, could best be made when permanent arrangements for the Viceroyalty have come into existence. It is urged by opponents of the present proposal that, besides being in contravention of the policy laid down for our guidance, the scheme is calculated to cause excitement among the Afridis; it entails our assuming responsibility for protecting the sections concerned; it will cost not less than a quarter of a lakh of rupees a year, plus a considerable initial expenditure, in return for which we are to receive, by way of tribute, a cess of four rupees per house, or about Rs. 8,000 per annum. Those in favour of the scheme contend that the present proposals differ materially from those before Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in 1894. Then only one of the sections concerned, and that not the section adjoining British India, had applied for arms or protection; now all the sections, owning a compact block of territory, and running down to within four miles of Kohat itself, have repeatedly asked to be incorporated in British India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, then, could hardly have foreseen the great success which has attended the taking over of the Kurram in 1893, under similar but perhaps more unpromising conditions, as the Turis were hopelessly broken, and this success is cited as an example of what we may expect in the present instance. The cost involved is declared to be small in comparison with the results to be achieved. Further, it is urged that, as these tribes have been consistently friendly to us, and have shown that they possess a considerable power of resistance against aggression, it would be as unchivalrous as impolitic to leave them to be crushed by an overwhelming coalition of their Sunni enemies who have been almost as consistent enemies to us. It is also obvious that if we can hold this tract, and so secure in friendly territory a good road to the heart of Tirah, we shall acquire a most potent lever against the Afridis and Orakzais. In fact, passing from the comparatively petty case in question, our military advisers, while fully recognising that this involves a departure from the policy hitherto laid down for our guidance, consider that the time has arrived when the essential principles of that policy should come under reconsideration. In brief, they are of opinion that our general frontier policy should contemplate the gradual and peaceful extension of our close control over the tribes as far as the Durand boundary, at any rate, where this is necessary on strategical considerations. Lord Kitchener, after a prolonged tour along the whole length of the frontier, during which he penetrated, with a small Militia escort only, into tracts hitherto almost entirely closed to our officers, is convinced that the policy of peaceful penetration is working admirably, and that in the Militia forces that we have raised we have not only reliable bodies for the work that they have to perform, but most valuable instruments of pacification that in the course of time will bring the whole of the tracts, in which they are employed, under our full control. The instance of Baluchistan is adduced to show how the tribes have settled down wherever the direct influence of our officers has been introduced, and even allowing for differences in the Pathan tribes north of the Gomal and those to the south of that

river, it is held that the same results are rapidly following, where, as in Kurram and the Tochi, our officers are dealing with the tribes from within. The tribesmen look to them for guidance in their disputes and difficulties, and our practical interference with the administration of the tracts concerned of necessity increases as time goes on, and is even now much greater than when the country was held by purely military garrisons. It may take longer to bring the Afridis into line, but it is impossible to predict how long it will take until a beginning is made, and if we reject so excellent a chance of making that beginning as is offered to us by the spontaneous and repeated offer of these Shia clans, we can hardly hope that other tribes elsewhere will elect for that closer union with us, which is so essential in the event of military operations, while the Afridis will infallibly attribute our refusal to extend our protection to tribes asking it of their own free will, to our dread of themselves, which will render them even more difficult to deal with in the future. The main objections to this policy are indicated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch already cited. There is the additional objection that the occupation of the tribal territory up to the Durand line brings us into direct contact with a large section of the Afghan frontier, across which raids and counter-raids are of frequent occurrence, for the continuous settlement of which we have not yet found any adequate means. If we eventually bring all the tribes that now lie between British and Afghan territories under our administrative control, we shall become immediately and directly responsible, both for protecting them against attack from, and for restraining them from excursion across, the Afghan border. Then, if the policy of peaceful penetration is actively pursued all along the border, we shall add seriously to our responsibilities. The weaker tribes who have come over to us have undoubtedly benefited largely, and are contented with their position, but it is doubtful if the stronger tribes would view the matter in the same light. The Pathan tribes are greatly attached to what they regard as their independence, that is to say, their freedom to manage their own affairs in their own way, and their exemption from the payment of revenue to any suzerain Power. It seems doubtful whether the stronger tribes would ever voluntarily consent to such relinquishment of their independence as would be involved by inclusion within our administration; and if, by force of temporary circumstances, such a tribe were to agree to absorption in British India, it is probable that, when the special circumstances had passed away, they would regret the action which they had taken, and desire to return to their former status of limited independence. In such an event, serious trouble might arise, if not immediately, at any rate in time of difficulty; and our position, when we were compelled to advance, might become weaker rather than stronger, owing to their discontent. Turning now again to the definite proposal which has given rise to this correspondence, news that the Shias are contemplating making over their country to the British Government has already reached the Afridis, where the question has aroused great interest:—as one emissary graphically expresses himself, "there is not a tree in Maidan under which you will not find three or four men discussing the Shia affair." Some argue that, if the Shias wish to give up their country, the Afridis have the first right to it; others are in favour of making an alliance with the Shias, binding themselves never again to attack them or interfere with them, and the general idea is that, if the Shias can be induced to withdraw from the step which they were about to take, the Orakzais and Afridis would make a united protest against the occupation of the tract. It is considered doubtful whether the Afridis and Orakzais generally would proceed to extremities, but the feeling amongst them against annexation is undoubtedly strong. The question of the annexation of the Shia Orakzai tract is also closely connected with the proposal to withdraw the troops from Fort Lockhart, on the Samana, and to replace them by military police, a proposal to which we attach great importance, but to which the military authorities have hitherto been opposed. In view of the great strategical importance of the tract, giving as it does a stronger political and military control over most of the Afridi and Orakzai sections, our military advisers would be prepared, in the event of it being taken over, to concur in the withdrawal of the regular troops which, by removing a visible armed menace to Tirah, might go far to reconcile the tribes to the altered position in the tract in question. This undoubtedly is a strong argument in favour of this small extension of our closer control. Such are the arguments for and against Colonel Deane's present proposals, and for a partial change in the policy laid down in 1898. The force of circumstances has led to a gradual extension of the direct influence of our officers throughout the greater portion of

the tract south of the Safed Koh, and to this extent there has quietly grown up a certain amount of interference with the administration of the border tracts there. None of us is in favour of unduly forcing the pace or of forcible interference with the tribes anywhere, but we are not entirely in accord as to the absolute necessity of availing ourselves of every suitable opportunity, such as that now offered, of extending our friendly control more closely over those tribes whom it is, for strategical reasons, necessary to bind firmly to us in times of peace, so that we may not be leaning on a broken reed when the stress of war is upon us. We therefore think it best to state all the facts and arguments for your consideration at once. Circumstances may render it necessary to arrive at an early decision on the particular case that has given rise to this discussion, and it will doubtless be convenient that it should have been fully reported in advance. Otherwise, we propose to leave our decision on the particular matter over until the autumn, by which time we shall have had further proof of the real wishes of the Shia clans, and shall also be perhaps in a better condition to judge of the probable effects of our acceptance of their offer, if it is again made. On the general question of the desirability of a more active prosecution of our present policy of extension of friendly influence and control over the tribes on the British side of the border up to the Durand line, where this is desirable for strategical reasons, we are content to await the decision at which His Majesty's Government may arrive after full consideration of the weighty arguments that our military advisers have now adduced.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 26th September, 1894.

(Extract.)

I am directed to submit, for the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy of letter, dated 5th September, 1894, and enclosures, from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, on the subject of the wish of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan to put their country under the control and protection of the British Government, and to convey the following remarks and observations of the Lieutenant-Governor. The Muhammad Khel tract, of which the Bar Muhammad Khel tract is a portion, lies in the south-eastern part of Tirah. It is a Shia patch in a Sunni country and its inhabitants are hard pressed by their neighbours. An idea prevails among the people of those parts that our Government entertains aggressive designs on Tirah, as some of its subordinate officers undoubtedly do, and it is accordingly the most natural thing in the world that the Bar Muhammad Khels should offer us a footing in their country in return for protection against their enemies, especially as they see how we have recently delivered the Turis from their Sunni persecutors. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick accordingly quite agrees with the local officers in thinking that the offer is a genuine and *bonâ fide* one, and with them he should be quite prepared to find that the other sections of the Muhammad Khels would soon join in it. But His Honour thinks at the same time that it would be absolute folly on our part to accept it in any shape or form. From the point of view of the maintenance of peace with the tribes on our border, there may be something to be said in favour of establishing a position for ourselves there, provided it was an overwhelmingly strong position. Such a position would give us a powerful hold over the Afridis as well as the Orakzais, and would place our arrangements in the Khyber on a more secure footing than they stand at present, but the cost of establishing and maintaining such a position would, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks no one can doubt, be out of all proportion to the advantages to be derived from it. Any movement forward in advance of our present position on the Samana would excite against us the bitterest animosity of the Orakzais and Afridis, and if such a movement was to be made at all, it would have to be made in very great strength. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, therefore, that any idea of establishing for ourselves in Tirah any really strong position in which we would be able to hold our own and dominate the country may be dismissed from consideration. There remains the

suggestion that we should put in what may be called "the thin end of the wedge," that we should start some sort of tribal militia in the tract in question, to be paid and armed by us, which would give us some sort of footing in that tract and would to some extent strengthen the inhabitants of it against their enemies. But the Lieutenant-Governor is just as strongly opposed to this. It would no doubt cost little to start the thing, but it would, in His Honour's opinion, be worse than useless to start anything of the kind; for it would give us no real hold on Tirah and would create such an amount of suspicion and irritation in the minds of the people of that country as would most detrimentally affect our relations with them everywhere and in particular in the Khyber. Moreover, it would be vain to imagine that we could stop, for any time to speak of, at what is proposed. Our protégés would be attacked, and we should have to send a force of regular troops to defend them and would inevitably end by keeping it there, which, as already observed, would be a most serious burthen on us. It is all very well to say at starting that we would not guarantee protection to any one. It would be impossible, with any regard to our own credit, to adhere to that. It cannot be too often repeated, when proposals of this sort are under consideration, that it is absolutely impossible to get a hold over any section of a tribe or any tract of country on the frontier in this way without at the same time giving it a hold over us. These observations would apply to a proposal of the nature now before us in regard to any tribe or section of a tribe in Tirah, but there is an additional reason, and a very weighty one, against adopting any such proposal in the case of these Bar Muhammad Khels, namely, that they as Shias are regarded with fanatical hatred by the great mass of the people of the country round, who are Sunnis, and that to go in there on their invitation and as their protectors would be about the very worst introduction we could possibly have. It must be remembered that we have already established with these Shia communities friendly relations of the same sort that we have established with their Sunni neighbours, that is to say, we employ them on certain frontier services and give them allowances for those services, and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick feels assured that we had better be content with that, at least till we have disposed of the Waziristan question and the other large questions that may arise out of the demarcation. In conclusion, I am to say that the Lieutenant-Governor has mentioned what has been proposed to Mr. Udny, and that he agrees with His Honour in thinking that it is altogether inexpedient to make any move of the sort suggested.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 5th September, 1894.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward, for the information and orders of Government, copy of a letter of 30th August, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reporting that the jirga of the Bar Muhammad Khel have represented that the clan desire to put their country under the control and protection of the Government of India, finding themselves cut off from local supplies of arms and ammunition, owing to the influence of the preaching of Sunni Mullas, and fearing that they will be unable to hold their own against the more numerous and powerful Sunni clans in Tirah. From the Deputy Commissioner's report there seems no doubt that their fear and the wish that is born of it are genuine. Like their brethren of the Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel sections of the Muhammad Khel division of the Orakzai tribe, the Bar Muhammad Khel are Shias, and consequently an object of hatred to the surrounding clans; but the physical advantages of their country have enabled them, though outnumbered, to maintain their position. These Shia clans hold the hills between Afridi Waran on the north and the Samilzai ilaqa of Kohat on the south, and are interposed between settlements of the Daulatzai clans and the Mastura Towi Valley. They command one of the shortest routes to the centre of Tirah from the Kohat side, by the Landuki Pass. From their country there is access by the Maturi Pass or the Uchpal Pass to the Bara Valley, and by Waran to the Khyber Afridi settlements in Rajgal and Maidan on the west. Their position overlooks the Hamsaya clans, Mishti, Shekhan and Malla Khel, and lies in rear of the Ismailzai sections, Rabiya Khel, Akhel and Mammuzai. The Deputy Commissioner represents the advantage which control over the Bar Muhammad Khel country would secure to us in the event of operations in Tirah, and the same view is expressed in the article on Tirah in the North-Western Frontier "Gazetteer." Major Leigh is not explicit as to the manner in which our control would be exercised or protection afforded if Government should desire to take any action upon the offer of this clan. It will be noted that the Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel, who are in a similar position, are likely to come forward with the same petition. His view apparently is that we might extend the Border Military Police system so as to raise a tribal Militia holding certain posts in their country, and by this

means protect them from their neighbours. The most detailed expression of the views of Government in regard to extension of control over a trans-border clan that I can quote at present will be found in the instructions which were issued by the Foreign Department of the Government of India in connection with the expedition of 1891 against the Black Mountain tribes. The system approved is there described as one "of tribal management, in which the co-operation and goodwill of the tribal chiefs would be enlisted on the side of peace and order by the grant of tribal allowances in return for service rendered," with the object "by means of allowances and the entertainment of levies to strengthen the authority of the headmen sufficiently to enable them to protect and escort British officers visiting their country, and ensure their attendance when required in the settlement of tribal disputes or tribal outrages." We have here then an opportunity of extending control over the Muhammad Khel Orakzais at a cost perhaps of a few thousand rupees in pay of tribesmen enlisted in a militia as a kind of adjunct to the Border Military Police. The control would no doubt ensure protection of British officers visiting their country, if Government still consider that an object of importance, but in return the tribe ask for some assistance for their own protection. It is, I presume, unlikely that Government would care to guarantee the protection of an independent clan against its neighbours, but it does not seem necessary that we should bind ourselves to do more than to pay and perhaps arm a small tribal militia; ammunition, if not arms, could be given in lieu of money allowances. It is quite possible that when the Sunni clans hear the step which the Bar Muhammad Khel have taken, they may think it worth while not to bully their Shia neighbours to the point of desperation; and this offer may have been actuated by some such hope. I do not suggest that Government should accept anything which would involve responsibility for the protection of the Shia clans, but if with the aid of a purely tribal militia paid by us, but not as servants of Government, and of some assistance in the shape of supply of ammunition, they can hold their own, and in return for that are willing to open their country to us, the offer which they have made should be worthy of consideration; and as they are actuated by the strongest of all motives, self-interest, there is some assurance that the offer is genuine and may be trusted. More detailed proposals would be premature until it is known whether Government consider the advantage worth the expenditure of some few thousand rupees per annum.

Annexure 2.

Letter from Major H. P. P. Leigh, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, dated 30th August, 1894.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward a report from Mr. D. Donald, Assistant Political Officer, by which it will be seen that the Bar Muhammad Khel clan are anxious to be afforded British protection for the reason that, owing to the edict issued by the Mullas of Tirah, their supply of arms and ammunition has been cut off, and they will be unable in the future to protect themselves from the attacks of their Sunni enemies. I interviewed the Bar Muhammad Khel jirga on the 18th instant at Mastan, and they confirmed what they had already stated to Mr. Donald, and said that they were willing and anxious that their country should be taken over by us. I said that I would report their wishes for the orders of higher authority, but that it was out of the question that we could at present supply them with arms and ammunition. If it be agreed that we should not lose the opportunity now offered it would not be necessary to occupy the country with troops. The Bar Muhammad Khel, in common with the Mani Khel, receive a fairly large allowance for service, and we could easily extend our Border Military Police system to their country, when, with an unlimited supply of ammunition, the positions would be practically impregnable. That this is so is proved by the fact that the Shia Saiyids have up to the present time always held their own when attacked by largely superior numbers of Sunnis. If the Afridis were ever arrayed against us the possession of the Bar Muhammad Khel hills would be most important for us. If you agree that this is a matter for serious consideration (and I personally am of opinion that the benefits which will accrue will be great), I can have a rough survey of the country made showing the boundaries of Shia territory. The Mani Khel and Abdul Aziz Khel (the remaining sections of the Muhammad Khel clan) too would probably soon ask for our protection in the same way as their brethren have done, and it would be easy at any time for myself or Mr. Donald to visit the country and come to a definite conclusion as to what localities would be the best for towers for the defence of the Shia border, manned by their own people enlisted as Border Militia. It might be necessary eventually to give allowances to the Abdul Aziz Khel, which they do not now get, but with this exception a magnificent piece of country would become accessible to us at practically no cost whatever. The Shia clans have always been friendly to us: they gave us material assistance during the Miranzai expeditions, and I think it would be a calamity if they were now driven from their hills by the Sunni tribes, who would thus greatly strengthen their own position, while the Shias would have no course open to them but to flee to British territory, where they would be a source of trouble, and we should not know what to do with them.

Annexure 3.

Report by the Assistant Political Officer, Kohat.

On the 16th August a representative jirga of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan of Orakzais came to see me and requested that I should obtain through you the sanction of Government to help them with arms and ammunition, which would enable them to hold out against the attacks of the Sunnis. The jirga represented that they could not now obtain arms and ammunition from the Afridis, as the Mullas had issued edicts threatening to deprive all Sunnis who sold arms, &c., to Shias of funeral and other religious rites. I informed the jirga that the Government would not grant a request of this kind. The jirga then requested that their tribe may be allowed to come under British rule as they could not defend themselves much longer against the Sunnis as their chief source of supply of arms, &c., had now been cut off by the edict of the Mullas. The jirga also stated that the second request was made with the approval of the whole clan. I brought the jirga up before you on the Samana on the 18th August where the Maliks repeated their request of their clansmen being allowed to become British subjects.

I am of opinion that it is in the interests of Government that this clan should in some way be protected, as the Bar Muhammad Khels have always behaved well and seem well disposed towards Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 27th October, 1894.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 26th September, 1894, regarding the Bar Muhammad Khel clan on the Kohat Border.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Government of India think that no action should be taken to meet the desire of this clan that their country should be put under the control and protection of the British Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 19th August, 1895.

I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated 30th July, 1895, and of its enclosures, received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, giving cover to a petition from some leading men of the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan, praying to be taken under British protection and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor recommends that, as in the case of the similar request of the Bar Muhammad Khel clan, no action be taken on the petition.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, to the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 30th July, 1895.

I have the honour to forward copy of an endorsement, dated 27th July, 1895, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, with translation of a petition from some leading men of the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel clan, imploring to be taken under British protection.

After the orders of Government upon the similar request put forward last year by the Bar Muhammad Khel, it seems unnecessary for me to say anything about this petition.

Annexure 2.

Endorsement by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, dated 27th July, 1895.

The following translation of a petition presented to me by the Baba Numasi and other Shias of the Ali Khel tribe on the 17th July is forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, for information.

On a previous occasion I recommended that the petition of the Shia inhabitants of the Bar Muhammad Khel country should be favourably listened to by Government, and that they should be recognized as British subjects. The suggestion, however, was not considered feasible. This petition is of a similar nature, and I have told the petitioners that though, as they wished it, their request would be forwarded, yet there was not the least chance of its being acceded to. In the former case the tract of country offered to us was an undivided stretch of hills with no inhabitants save Shias. In the present case, although some of the villages concerned are large and powerful, yet they are mixed up with Sunni communities, and their annexation would be impracticable, even if desirable.

Annexure 3.

Translation of the petition from Shias of Ali Khel, dated 16th July, 1895.

(Extract.)

Although we Baba Numasis, of Talai, Ali Khel and Mirwas Khel, number 1,000 armed men and possess rich tracts of Ali Khel, Chango Channa and other hilly tracts of Ali Khel, yet we are so hardly oppressed by the Sunnis and their mullas that we are much more inclined than before to submit ourselves to the yoke of the British Government and to obey its commands cordially. We have been making this request for some years past, and now hope that our request to be taken over by the British Government may be accepted. The 1,000 men of our tribe promise on oath that they will furnish supplies required by the British Government and will fight against the enemies of Government if ordered to do so. At present we are quite independent and shall be most grateful if taken over by Government. If we are taken over by Government, there would be no inconvenience to Government, nor would there be any opposition. We assure Government that we will pay revenue and render any services required of us, even if the Government do not take the trouble of occupying our country. We, therefore, first of all declare on oath that these 1,000 men are ready to sacrifice their lives for the British Government, and again beg to request that our old standing petition may once more be laid before Government, and that we may be made British subjects, which is the only course open to us to enable us to escape the tyranny of the Sunnis, and for this act of benevolence we shall ever pray for the prosperity of Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, dated 6th September, 1895.

I am directed to reply to your letter, dated the 19th August, 1895, regarding a petition presented to the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat by certain Shias belonging to the Ali Khel clan of the Orakzai tribe, in which they pray to be taken under British protection.

2. The Government of India agree with His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor that no action need be taken on the petition.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 14th May, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with the letter dated the 6th September, 1895, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, on the subject of extending protection to certain clans on the Kohat Border. The question has again arisen, and as circumstances have entirely changed since the time of the letter under reference, I deem it advisable again to lay the question before the Government of India. A reference to the diaries and reports of the summer of

1903 will show the detailed history of the religious war which was waged on the Kohat border. The Orakzai clans are divided into the two religious sections of Shias and Sunnis. The latter, assisted by the Afridis under the leadership of the Fakir, attacked the Shia clans in force. The nominal object was the conversion of the Shias, but the real inducement was the desire of the Afridis to annex their rich lands for themselves. The Shia clans showed themselves able to defend their own borders and the fighting ended in the discomfiture of the Sunnis. While the fighting was still pending, a Sunni clan, the Chappar Mishtis, applied to be taken over. They were told that Government could not interfere in a religious dispute, and that no such petition could be entertained until peace had been assured. In addition to this clan, the Shia clans of the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Abdul Aziz Khel, Sipaia and Ibrahimzai are now also making overtures to be taken over. They express their desire to come under Government control somewhat on the same lines as the Kurram clans, but are unwilling to make a formal petition, as on the former occasion, until assured that such a petition will not be rejected. The fighting strength of these tribes is approximately—

Mani Khel	600
Bar Muhammad Khel	1,500
Sipaia	350
Abdul Aziz Khel	80
Ibrahimzai	80
Chappar Mishtis	100
Total	2,710

but these numbers will increase considerably if the security of the tract is assured by occupation. The entire tract is approximately 30 miles in length, with a maximum breadth of some 14 miles, containing about 70 villages of the various clans. The soil itself is generally of an excellent nature. There are large irrigated tracts, especially down the valley of the Mastura, while the lands dependent on rainfall have always within experience rendered abundant harvests. Fruit cultivation is extensively practised. There can be no doubt that, with a continuity of peace, all the conditions of the country point to a growth of wealth. There are many advantages to be derived from this extension of control. To take over the country would be definitely to stop this so-called religious war, thus affording a very considerable guarantee to the peace of the border, as our numerous Shia subjects within the adjacent border must become involved in the feud should it show any signs of substantial recrudescence. The same remark applies to a certain extent to our Sunni subjects. If this persecution of these clans under the cloak of religion by the Afridis and Orakzais is persistently carried out, there must be a risk and danger of the present clans being gradually weakened and ousted or of being driven to throw in their lot with the Afridis; in which case their attitude, which has hitherto been uniformly friendly to Government, will be changed, rendering the administration of this portion of the frontier more difficult even than it is at present. The occupation of this tract would aid materially in the protection of the settled area within the Kohat border. The position is one which would render practicable a certain amount of political control over the adjacent Afridi clans, notably the Zakka Khels and Aka Khels, while the undesirable contingency of the Afridis making a settlement right on the Kohat border would be averted. There is, moreover, the obvious strategical gain in obtaining a position near the Afridi country, from which troops could act when necessary. As regards the objection that this advance will have an unsettling effect on the Afridis and other clans, I am not inclined to regard this seriously. The Pathan custom whereby a weaker seeks the protection of a stronger is so clearly defined and so frequently acted upon among the clans themselves that its extension to Government protection affords no reasonable ground for discontent. In return for this protection, if afforded, I would propose a cess of four rupees per house, which ought to yield about Rs. 8,000 annually. The tract might be administered somewhat on the lines of the Kurram, by a Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat. For the actual protection of the border, a locally raised Corps of approximately 200 levies, affiliated to the Samana Rifles and occupying 4 posts, should be sufficient to guard against outside aggression. The

initial cost of this establishment would be roughly Rs. 24,000 and the annual cost Rs. 36,000. It is, however, to be noted that, in the event of these proposals being sanctioned, it would probably be possible later to do away with the Border Military Police posts at Marai, Kachai, Alizai and Danozai Tang, at an annual saving of approximately Rs. 4,000. As these clans constantly bring up the question at the meetings of their Jirgas with the local officers, I consider it my duty to refer it for orders. The policy of the Government of India, is, I understand, a forward one only when necessity compels, and stationary where circumstances permit. In the present proposals, political advisability and strategic advantage are clear. Actual necessity at the present time cannot be urged. But it is a question whether it is not better to act now, at the desire of the tribes concerned, rather than to run the risk of the difficulties which would be involved by the extension of Afridi influence and power over these clans. The present position may be compared with that in the Kurram, where aggression, with the real object of obtaining possession of their lands, carried on under the guise of religious war, compelled the Turis to seek Government protection rather than throw themselves on the mercies of their persecutors. After careful consideration, I have come to the opinion that to accede to the desire of these tribes and bring them under Government protection would be advantageous both to themselves and to Government.

No. 2.

Despatch from the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, dated 28th October, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have considered your Excellency's Letter in the Foreign Department, dated the 18th August, 1904, as to the proposal submitted by the Chief Commissioner in the North-West Frontier Province to take under our political control certain clans of the Orakzais on the Kohat border, who have applied for the protection of the British Government. The reasons in favour of Colonel Deane's proposal are clearly stated in his letter of the 14th May, 1904, and it is further claimed for the step which he contemplates that, if successfully accomplished, it would render practicable the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Lockhart and their replacement by military police. Colonel Deane expresses the opinion that the proposed extension of our control will not have any seriously-unsettling effect on the Afridis and other tribes adjoining the district in question. On the other hand, your Excellency states that the action of the clans in applying for our protection has already caused considerable excitement in Tirah, and you recognise that the feeling on the subject among the Afridis and Orakzais generally is undoubtedly strong, though you consider it doubtful whether they would proceed to extremities, if effect is given to the proposed policy. I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the question must be considered not as an isolated one, but in connection with the general lines of policy laid down in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch of the 28th January, 1898, to govern our relations with the tribes along the frontier. It appears from your letter that those members of your Excellency's Government who are most strongly in favour of Colonel Deane's proposal advocate it on the ground that, for strategical reasons, the principle of avoiding, where possible, interference with the tribes must be abandoned, and that we must contemplate the necessity of extending our control as far as the Durand boundary on this section of the frontier, so as to obviate the danger which would arise, in time of war, if the tract of country between the Kurram and the Khyber should be left in the occupation of practically independent tribes, over whom we have exercised no direct influence. Lord Salisbury's Government, however, when they arrived at the conclusions formulated in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch, were fully alive to the force of the arguments in favour of a policy of gradual and continuous extension of the field of our political control, and to the anomalies arising from the absence of such control. But they were convinced, by the experience of the tribal risings of 1897, that the policy they laid down was the sound one; and the history of the last five years does not appear to His Majesty's Government to afford grounds for modifying it in any material

sense. His Majesty's Government also attach great weight to the view, expressed in your letter, that, even if we eventually bring the tribes which lie between British and Afghan territories under our administrative control, the result will be to add seriously to our responsibilities. His Majesty's Government are therefore unwilling, after full consideration of both sides of the case as presented in your letter, to authorise, in present circumstances, any material departure from the general policy laid down in Lord George Hamilton's Despatch; and they see no sufficient reason, on the information now before them, for incurring the risks attaching to the proposed extension of the tribal area under our control.

PART II.

ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS: OPERATIONS.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 17th November, 1898. Received 5th December, 1898.

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the settlement effected with the Khyber Pass Afridis.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, Landi Kotal, dated 26th September, 1898.

(Telegraphic.)

The Government of India expect to be able shortly to issue to you and to Mr. Cunningham, who will be associated with you, instructions as to the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with the Khyber Afridis, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber Pass. Please summon the jirgas of Kuki, Kambar, Malikdin, Zakka, Sipah and Kamrai to meet you at Peshawar, and to hear these terms and the orders of Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

From the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 29th September, 1898.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 26th. After consulting with Mr. Cunningham, I have summoned the jirgas therein mentioned to be at Peshawar on the 22nd October, with a view to the announcement of terms on the 24th.

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

Letter from General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 3rd October, 1898.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram of the 29th September, I have the honour to forward, for your information, a translation of the summons which has been issued to the jirgas of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Zakka Khel, Sipah and Kamrai sections of the Afridis, in accordance with your telegram of the 26th ultimo.

Annexure.

Translation of orders issued by the Political Officer, Khyber, dated Peshawar, the 28th September, 1898.

(Extract.)

The Government of India being now prepared to announce to your clans the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with you, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber Pass, I have been ordered by the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to summon you to attend with a full and representative jirga of your clan to hear the same from him and Mr. Cunningham in Peshawar on Monday, the 24th October, 1898, *i.e.*, the 8th Jamadi-us-Sani, 1316 H. You are particularly to bear in mind that your jirga which attends must be a full and representative one. You are accordingly summoned to attend on Saturday, the 22nd October, *i.e.*, 6th Jamadi-us-Sani, 1316 H.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

Letter from Secretary to the Government of India, to the General Officer Commanding the Khyber Brigade, dated 7th October, 1898.

(Extract.)

The Governor-General in Council has decided to associate Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., with you for the purpose of communicating to the full jirga of the Afridi clans* with whom the Khyber agreement of the 17th February, 1881, was concluded the terms upon which the Government of India have decided to renew friendly relations with them, and to deal with the Khyber Pass. The jirga has been summoned by you to assemble in Peshawar on the 24th October, 1898, and I am now to convey instructions as to the manner in which you and your colleague will announce the Government terms and explain their nature and intention. The announcement to be made is to the following effect:—*First.*—The Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements, forfeited all allowances, and forced the British Government to take and hold the Pass, which, as already announced by Sir William Lockhart, will be managed and controlled as the British Government think most desirable. *Second.*—The Pass will be kept open for trade. The British Government will build a fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads, and, if they want it, a railway, and will take such measures as they think fit to punish offences and preserve order on road and railway, in the fort and posts, and in the neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes. *Third.*—The Afridis will have no dealings with any power but the British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country; but, in the Khyber Pass, they are responsible to the British Government that they will co-operate to preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway, and within the limits of the Pass. *Fourth.*—The British Government will give allowances as formerly to the Khyber Afridi clans for discharging this duty, and will maintain a militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake always to keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting the Militia if circumstances require. *Fifth.*—Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the Militia will be used for guarding traders. *Sixth.*—The allowances granted by the British Government will commence to reckon from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by the Government of India; but they are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the Pass, in British India, or against the friends or allies of Government.

* Kuki Khel. | Zakka Khel.
Kambar Khel. | Sipah.
Malikdin Khel. | Kamrai.

Enclosure 5 in No. 1.

Translation of written statement of acceptance of orders of Government handed in by Maliks, elders and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in full jirga.

To Mr. F. D. Cunningham, Commissioner, dated 26th October, 1898.

We, headmen, representatives, and men of the Afridi clans, Kuki Khel, Malikdin, Sipah, Zakka Khel, Kamrai and Kambar Khel, represent that on the day of the Darbar,† six terms (or conditions) laid down by Government were read out to us, and after that copies

† *i.e.*, 24th October.

of a Pashtu translation were given to us, we have thoroughly understood them; we now declare by this writing that we accept and acquiesce in these six terms which are attached to this paper, and this "jirga" for itself, and as representing all the clans concerned, agrees to these terms unconditionally.

(Here follow seals and attestations of over 200 *Maliks, elders, and representative men.)*

No. 2.

Letter from the Government of India, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 5th January, 1905. *Received 23rd January*, 1905.

(Extract.)

We have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the Afridis.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 25th September, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Party of about 15, consisting of Zakka Khel, Kambar Khel, and Orakzais, committed a raid at Darshi Khel in Teri tahsil of Kohat district on night of 3rd September, looting shop of Bhamain Das and killing owner and wounding a Bannuchi Mulla, and breaking other houses. Village pursuit party turned out at once, and pursued raiders, who had retired into hills. Mr. Reid, of Salt Department, was first officer to arrive, and rendered valuable services in directing pursuit. Raiders finally succeeded in evading pursuit after killing five and wounding six villagers, and carrying off four Snider rifles from the villagers. Of the raiders one was wounded and captured, and another shot dead. Tribe mainly implicated in raid appears to be Zakka Khel, and it is reported that this tribe considers that it has committed itself too far, and intends to do further mischief on a large scale, and it is said revenge itself on Mr. Reid for action taken by him. Every possible precaution is being taken to guard against this, and Political Agent, Khyber, has warned Zakka Khel Maliks of absolute responsibility of tribe, and reports that Maliks are making genuine efforts. If further threatened raid takes place, a serious situation regarding the Zakka Khel will be created.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 28th September, 1904.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to refer to my telegram, dated 25th September, 1904, reporting a raid on the village of Darshi Khel, in the Kohat District, by a gang, consisting mainly of Afridis, mostly of the Zakka Khel Section. Later information goes to show that this was not a raid of an ordinary character, but rather an act of defiance to Government, and of hostility to the two Zakka Khel Maliks. Owing to an outlaw, Multan, harboured by the Zakka Khel having taken part in the dakaiti at Jangal Khel in the Kohat District, last spring, two Zakka Khel Maliks had gone to Tirah to try to obtain security for the future good behaviour of this outlaw. In their efforts they found themselves confronted by the partisans of Khwas Khan, who succeeded so well that, on the very day the Maliks left Maidan, a raiding party, headed by this very outlaw, started for the Kohat border, and committed the raid at Darshi Khel. The value of the actual damage inflicted in this raid including compensation for men killed and wounded amounts to approximately Rs. 6,000, while the allowances due to the sections implicated amount to only

Rs. 4,500, of which Rs. 1,000 is already due as fine for their complicity in the Jangal Khel dakaiti. The position thus appears to be exactly that desired by Khwas Khan and his agents. They have induced the Zakka Khel to commit themselves beyond their ordinary means of settlement, and to hope to extricate themselves from this difficulty by continuing their depredations on such a scale as to commit the entire Afridi tribe. An exactly similar point of view is that of the elders who have taken a leading part in organising or accompanying deputations to Kabul. A report has been received that, on the 16th September, a meeting was held at Bagh attended by all Afridis hostile to the British Government, who could be collected, as well as by agents of Khwas Khan. After discussing the situation, this jirga came to the conclusion that apart from this Darshi Khel raid, it was certain that some measures would be taken to punish those who had gone to Kabul this year, and that the best course lay in an attempt to commit the entire tribe to a common cause. To this end it was suggested that the raiders who had already committed the Darshi Khel raid should be induced to commit further raids, as the resulting fines would be so large as to necessitate their collection from the entire Afridi tribe, which would thus be rendered hostile to Government, and possibly blockaded from British territory. The raiders agreed to adopt this course, though whether they will do so remains to be seen. It was also suggested that, as efforts had failed to remove by violent means Major Roos-Keppel and Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, other measures should be tried. The question was discussed of addressing a petition to His Excellency the Viceroy against both these officers, but it was finally decided that there was no prospect of success in the case of a petition against Major Roos-Keppel, but that it might be tried in the case of Sahibzada Adbul Qaiyum. The situation has already been discussed with the Zakka Khel Maliks, who suggest that they should summon a jirga of the whole clan, which might then be arrested by the Political Agent on the ground that he did not summon it. This is, of course, not possible, but the expedient suggested by these Maliks is evidence that they feel they are losing control of their clan. As an alternative these Maliks suggest that the whole of the Afridis should be excluded from British territory this winter, or that Bazar should be taken and retained. Up to the present time the leading Maliks and elders have been doing their best to ensure the maintenance of peace. Their efforts are, however, being constantly frustrated by Khwas Khan, who is employing all his energies to give trouble, and who finds little difficulty in leading the more turbulent element of the Afridis in the direction in which it is already inclined to go. There can be no doubt that the state of affairs, which is due to the efforts of Khwas Khan, has become very serious, and that, if the raids contemplated do occur, Government may find itself committed to hostilities with the Afridi tribe. The case of the Darshi Khel raid will be taken up in the ordinary course with the jirgas, and endeavours will be made to come to a settlement regarding it, but in view of the serious state of affairs in the Afridi tribe, I deem it advisable to place the Government of India in possession of the facts with as little delay as possible.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 8th October, 1904.

I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter of 5th October, 1904, from the Political Agent, Khyber, in which he proposes at the next distribution of allowances to the Afridi tribe to withhold the shares of those who this year have either themselves gone to Kabul or have sent representatives, and to distribute the money thus saved among those who have supported Government.

2. I agree with the view expressed by Major Roos-Keppel, and recommend sanction being given to his proposals.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th October, 1904.

I have the honour to point out that, by the existing system of distribution of tribal allowances to the Afridis, every head of a family or "kandi" receives his share direct from me, less fines recoverable from individuals whom he represents.

Before 1897 the allowances were paid to the Maliks who kept a large share, and divided the remainder among those who supported them. The present system came in at the settlement of 1898 owing to the absence of many of the Maliks. At present men who are known to be hostile to Government, who visit Kabul and receive large sums of money, share equally with those who have supported us, and who have resisted the very great temptations held out to them from Kabul. This naturally makes the latter very discontented and inclined to join the Kabul party, and I propose, if the Honourable the Chief Commissioner has no objection, to withhold the shares of those who have this year either been to Kabul, or have sent representatives, and to distribute the money thus saved among those who have supported us.

It is, I think, absolutely necessary to encourage these men, as they are getting disheartened and gradually detached from us.

There are no Government orders regarding the distribution of the subsidy, and the Political Officer has always distributed it as seemed best to him, but I am now asking for orders on this point, as my proposal involves the punishment of those who have gone to Kabul.

Enclosure 4 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 8th October, 1904.

In continuation of my telegram, dated the 25th September, 1904, I have the honour to forward a detailed report of the raid on the village of Darshi Khel on the night of the 3rd September.

2. The raiding party which, it is believed, consisted of thirteen Afridis of the Kambar Khel and Zakka Khel sections, and two Mishti Orakzais, met at Bagnak Masjid within the limits of the Ali Khel Orakzai country. Here an Ali Khel Orakzai was induced to join the party on the pretence that the real object of the enterprise was the murder of a private enemy who was proceeding from Tirah to British territory. The party then proceeded viâ the Chargu Pass, near Kot and Ramdan, two Ali Khel Orakzai hamlets in Khanki, and from there to Saidarrai, a village belonging to the religious sect of Khadazai Orakzais, and thence viâ Bullula Tseri, to Askha Darra, some three miles from the Shinawari post, in Zaimusht territory. Here the party was seen by some Zaimushts, and the villages of Sperkot and Mauzabhi turned out to bar the raiders' passage. However, the Ali Khel Orakzai already referred to repeated the story told to him, and assured the Zaimushts that no harm was intended to them. The Zaimushts took the Ali Khel's rifle as security for his statement, and returned to their villages. The raiding party then proceeded on their way, with the exception of the Ali Khel who, being now weaponless, judged it best to retire from the enterprise. The raiding party then crossed to the Karboga Hills, and from there to the Manzalai Range, south of Anon Kot; then, leaving the Sperkai Border Military Post to the west, they hid in the hills and ravines north of Darshi Khel. They appear to have travelled by night, and, after their meeting with the Zaimushts, to have had no dealings with, or assistance from, persons in British territory.

3. On the afternoon of the 3rd September, three of the party came unarmed into the Darshi Khel village, and purchased some flour and other provisions at the shops of Bhawani Das and two other Hindus. This they had cooked in the village, and while waiting were doubtless enabled to familiarise themselves with the place without arousing suspicion. At about 8 p.m., the whole party came down armed, and sacked Bhawani Das's shop, shot the owner dead, and wounded a Bannuchi Mulla, who came to his assistance. They then proceeded to break into the adjoining houses of Hindus, and to rob the women of the jewellery they were wearing. The village alarm drum was at once beaten, and messengers ran off to warn the Bahadur Khel Thana and Border Military Police Post. It is to be noted that Darshi Khel consists of a small village with a large number of hamlets situated from a quarter of a mile to a mile-and-a-half from the parent village. The villagers turned out as promptly as the distance would allow, and those who possessed arms continued to fire on the raiders. The Police and the Border Military Police turned out sharply, but the raiders had left before they reached the village.

4. Mr. Reid, Superintendent of the Northern India Salt Department at Bahadur Khel, hearing the news, galloped up the village, and was able to render valuable services. At first, the pursuit party thinking the raiders to be Waziris, started towards the west. Mr. Reid, however, finding tracks leading to the north and

north-east, recalled the pursuit party, and directed them to follow these up. The night was dark; but with the aid of torches, the pursuit party, augmented from Bahadur Khel, Nur, and Kurram followed these tracks to the foot of the Surtang Range, and thence up a very steep and narrow hill-track which leads to the Surtang Salt post: here the raiders had evidently made use of the Salt Department hill-path.

5. At about 2 a.m., the pursuit party were surprised by a volley fired from above at a distance of 150 yards by the raiders, who were concealed in a ravine: this volley killed two men and wounded two others. In spite of this reverse, the villagers armed with Snider and Enfield rifles continued to oppose the Martini-Henry rifles of the raiders, who gradually retreated to the highest point of the range which stands some 3,000 feet above the plain, and is inaccessible from the south. The raiders retired by sections from this point, and were careful to take good cover.

6. The pursuit of the retiring raiders was continued throughout the day, but the superiority of their armament kept the pursuit party at a distance. In the afternoon a shot fired by a sepoy of the Surtang Salt post broke the thigh of one of the raiders. His comrades attempted to carry him off, but finding this impossible, took his rifle and cartridges, and left him concealed in a bush. He was subsequently captured and found to be a Zakka Khel Afridi, Khairabaz, a reservist of the 26th Punjab Infantry.

7. About 6 in the afternoon, the Khan of Teri's party and the Police of Teri joined the pursuit party, bringing with them a Lee-Metford and a Martini-Henry rifle, and this doubtless increased the speed with which the raiders then retired. The pursuit slackened off at dusk, when it is was found that the casualties among the villagers were two shot dead and six severely wounded; while four Government Sniders had also been taken. The raiders' tracks were followed during the night into the next day as far as Mardan, where they were obliterated by heavy rain. In the morning it was found that three of the villagers were missing; search parties went out and found their dead bodies in the Surtang Range.

8. Subsequent enquiries show that the raiders marched the whole of the night, and entered Zaimusht territory before dawn on the 5th September, thus escaping the parties of the Border Military Police and the Samana Rifles, who closed the passes as soon as they were in possession of information as to the direction taken.

Some days later a wounded dakait, who was subsequently identified as Dilbar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, was found on the Surtang Range with a Lee-Metford rifle by a patrol of villagers and shot dead. The casualties among the raiders were then one killed and one wounded and captured, while two others are known to be wounded. The casualties among British subjects were six killed and seven wounded, in addition to the loss of property valued at Rs. 2,000 and four Snider rifles.

9. The facts themselves and subsequent enquiries show that the inhabitants of British territory had not only not connived at this raid, but had, on the other hand, done all in their power to arrest the raiders, and in face of serious difficulties showed indomitable pluck and bravery with their inferior weapons. The question of suitably rewarding them is engaging my attention. I would also bring to the notice of the Government of India the prompt and practical services of Mr. Reid, superintendent, Northern Indian Salt Department. That officer's readiness and assistance enabled the pursuit to be carried on, and two of the raiders to be captured or killed; but for him they would have probably escaped scot free. This, indeed, is recognised by the raiders themselves, who are said to have vowed to be revenged on him for his action. I have directed the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to see that suitable measures are taken for Mr. Reid's protection.

10. I have already in my letter, dated the 28th September, dealt with the case as regards the Afridis implicated in this raid. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, is investigating the case as regards the Orakzais, of whom two belonging to the Mishti section are said to have actually taken part in the raid, while the Ali Khel section is being called upon to explain the passage of the raiders through its country. On the conclusion of the investigation, suitable action will be taken against these sections.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 8th October, 1904.

(Extract.)

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter, dated 8th October, 1904, regarding the raid on the village of Darshi Khel, in the Kohat District, on the 3rd September, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter, dated 5th October, 1904, from the Political Agent, Khyber, regarding the measures which it is proposed to take on account of this offence. I have already pointed out the serious position in which Government has been involved with the Afridis by the intrigues of Khwas Khan. The case of this raid on Darshi Khel is such that it is impossible to obtain full redress from the Afridi sections concerned, and I can suggest no other means of meeting the case than by having it placed, as Major Roos-Keppel suggests, before a jirga of the whole Afridi tribe, and by seeing whether this jirga can, or will, continue to enforce peace and order on the border. The tribe should be specially called in for this purpose, and I consider it necessary that, pending their decision in the matter, the Afridi tribal allowances should be withheld. If the combined jirga take action in the matter, and render proper assistance in the maintenance of order, I see no reason to impose a heavy fine in addition to the redress which would be obtained for this raid. The imposition of such a fine would and must mean its recovery from all the Afridi clans, and to do this would be to achieve the result aimed at by those responsible for the raid, namely, to commit the whole tribe with Government. If the combined jirgas do make honest efforts to keep the Zakka Khels in order, it would be impolitic to make them discontented by the enforcement of tribal responsibility. On the other hand, if they refuse to give honest assistance, the hands of Government will be forced, and it will be necessary to deal with the Afridis as a whole. If the Government of India approve of the above views, which I have put forward as in my opinion the best calculated to avoid general trouble with the Afridis, I would solicit early orders, so that timely instructions may issue to Major Roos-Keppel.

Annexure.

Letter from Major G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th October, 1904.

I have the honour to state, with reference to the recent raid at Darshi Khel, that it has been ascertained that this raid was committed by a party of Afridis and Orakzais numbering about 15 or 16 men. The Afridis were greatly in the majority, their clans implicated being the Anai Zakka Khel, the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, and the Shalobar Kambar Khel in about equal proportions.

The amount of damage done in the raid (including blood-money for the twelve British subjects killed and wounded) is variously estimated at from Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 8,000, and if a fine is imposed, its amount would be, judging by fines imposed in former and less serious raids, not less than Rs. 6,000. Thus the total amount to be recovered from the relatives of fellow-tribesmen of the offenders is Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 14,000, or, say, Rs. 13,000. I have given throughout the lowest possible figures and the Honourable the Chief Commissioner may not consider this amount to be sufficient, but it is necessary for the purposes of this report to name a definite sum, and arguments for and against the imposition of a fine of this amount will apply proportionately to any greater or less sum that may be decided upon.

I do not, of course, know in what proportion the Honourable the Chief Commissioner would wish to impose this fine upon the Afridis and Orakzais, but may safely assume that the share of the Afridis will be not less than one-half, or Rs. 6,500.

The Afridi allowances are paid half-yearly, and the autumn share ($\frac{7}{12}$th) is payable in November or December next. The following amounts will then be payable to the three clans concerned in the Darshi Khel raid, after deducting a sum of Rs. 1,000 due from the Anai Zakka Khel on account of a fine already imposed, but not yet recovered.

	Rs.
Anai Zakka Khel	1,800
Zia-ud-din „	350
Shalobar Kambar Khel	2,100
— Total ...	4,250

The share of the Zia-ud-din is so small that it is impossible to equalise the incidence of the fine, and even if the whole of the allowances of the three clans were forfeited, the amount realised would be Rs. 2,250 short of that required. The general conduct of the Anai

and Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel has been so bad that there would be no injustice in forfeiting the whole of their allowances, although to do so would be to alienate those of their elders who have hitherto supported us.

The case of the Shalobar Kambar Khel is different, as they are in general a well-conducted clan, and this is the first time that any of them have joined the Zakka Khel in raiding. In any case, the whole fine cannot be recovered from the three clans concerned and, as the matter is too serious to be passed over, we shall be forced to deal with the Afridis as a whole. The Zakka Khel Maliks have suggested the exclusion of all Afridis from British territory and the stoppage of all tribal allowances until the Afridis have brought the Zakka Khel to reason. This remedy would, I have no doubt, be effectual, but a paper blockade would be useless, and an armed blockade is almost certain to develop into an expedition. That we are bound to have an Afridi expedition sooner or later I am convinced, as no one could hope that the settlement of 1898 would be final, but, if Government for reasons of higher policy are not at present prepared to sanction strong measures, I would suggest, as an alternative to the Malik's proposal that I should summon at the end of November or the beginning of December a jirga of all the Afridis, and inform them that they must come to some understanding to punish the Zakka Khel, that they are responsible for their behaviour, and that payment of the tribal allowances will be withheld until they have brought the Zakka Khel to order or have at least done their best to do so.

That they will succeed on any large scale I do not expect, but it is possible that they may settle this last raid and may stop Zakka Khel raiding for a time.

It is also possible that they may try and fail, and may then ask us to deal with the Zakka Khel ourselves. In this case the only way to gain a permanent hold over this troublesome clan is to take and occupy the Bazar Valley.

I would not propose to suspend Maliki or special allowances, as the recipients have been and are working honestly in our cause, and it would be a mistake to discourage them.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 15th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter, 8th October. Pending experience of effect of announcement of forthcoming Mission to Kabul, authority to make which we hope will shortly be sent you, Government of India still think it undesirable to take strong measures against Afridis. Within reasonable period of announcement of Mission, you should report effect on Afridis, when your proposals for dealing with Zakka Khels will be reconsidered. In the meantime no allowances should be paid except maliki and special allowances to men who have done service.

Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 18th October, 1904.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 8th October, 1904, in which you furnish a detailed report of the raid by Zakka Khels and others on the village of Darshi Khel, in the Kohat District, on the 3rd September last.

2. The general views of the Government of India as to the necessity of refraining for the immediate present from taking strong measures against the Afridis, have been explained to you in my telegram, dated the 15th October, 1904. I am now to add that Mr. Reid, Superintendent, Northern India Salt Department, is being informed through the head of his Department that in the opinion of the Government of India his prompt and plucky initiative in organizing and conducting the pursuit of a well-armed gang of raiders is worthy of high commendation.

3. His Excellency the Viceroy has observed with satisfaction that the inhabitants of British territory had not only no concern with the outrage, but, on the other hand, in the face of serious odds, showed great bravery in their efforts to arrest the raiders. Your proposal to suitably reward them is approved, and His Excellency the Viceroy trusts that this will be done with the least possible delay.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th October, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram October 15th. You are now authorized to publicly announce despatch of Mission to Kabul in following terms:—

Begins: Since the accession in 1901 of the present Amir of Afghanistan there has been no opportunity hitherto for a meeting for the discussion of general topics between His Highness and a representative of the Government of India. The Amir has now proposed to send his eldest son, Sardar Inayat Ulla Khan, to meet Lord Curzon on his return to India, and will receive at Kabul an official of the Government of India authorised to discuss with His Highness questions concerning his relations with the British Government. Mr. Louis Dane, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, who has been selected for the purpose, will proceed to Kabul at the end of November. *Ends.* Please closely watch and report effect of this announcement.

Enclosure 9 in No. 2.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th November, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram October 20th. Government of India will be glad to learn effect on border tribes of announcement of Kabul Mission.

Enclosure 10 in No. 2.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 14th November, 1904.

(Extract.)

In continuation of the correspondence ending with your telegram of the 13th November, I have the honour to state that, since the announcement of the forthcoming mission to Kabul, there has been a lull in the going of tribesmen to Kabul and the general attitude of the tribes is now one of expectation. The effect of the announcement has been much as I expected; and so far as I can judge at present the announcement has put a stop to active restlessness, as the tribesmen are waiting to see the results of the Mission.

No. 3.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

On the 28th ultimo Afridis raided police post at Matanni, carrying off nine rifles and other property. Matanni is between Peshawar and Kohat.

No. 4.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 3rd instant. It is now reported that it was a gang of outlaws from Afghan territory that raided the police post at Matanni.

No. 5.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Deane reports another raid at Garhi Shahdad near Peshawar-Mullagori border on 8th March. One Hindu and two villagers killed, three wounded, and property looted. Same gang of outlaws mentioned in my telegram of 7th instant apparently implicated.

No. 6.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Raids recently made in Peshawar district. My telegram of the 13th March. Kaddam, Kuki Khel village, two miles from Jamrud, was successfully surprised yesterday morning by Roos-Keppel. No opposition was encountered. Leader of raiders was captured and his house burnt. Some clothing and jewellery which had been looted was recovered.

No. 7.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable St. John Brodrick, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 25th May, 1905. Received 13th June, 1905.

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch dated the 5th January, 1905, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding offences committed in British territory by Afridis and by a gang of well-known outlaws and dakaits who reside at Hazarnao, in Afghan territory. The Afridi jirga has behaved well in inflicting severe punishment on the offenders concerned in the serious raid on the Darshi Khel in the Kohat district on the 3rd September last, and in recognition of the attitude of the tribe as a whole, we have waived the realisation of a fine from them in this instance, and the tribal allowances which had been temporarily withheld have been paid. We directed, however, that no payments should be made to those who went to Kabul last year or this, or who sent representatives there. We invite your attention to Colonel Deane's report on the more recent raid at Matanni on the 28th February, 1905, which was organized at Hazarnao by Shakar, the notorious dakait and rifle thief, and carried out by members of his gang, comprising several Afghan subjects and others who are harboured in Afghanistan in close proximity to Afridi limits.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending Saturday, the 17th December, 1904.

All the Bazar Zakka Khel came to Chora on the day of the *Id* (9th December, 1904) to pay their respects to Khan Bahadur Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel. During the course of conversation, the Malik told them that they had, owing to their own misconduct, displeased the British Government; and that, unless they repented and gave good securities not to commit themselves again, they would suffer one day very heavily. They said that they had already held jirgas among themselves, but had arrived at no definite understanding owing to the intrigues of the ex-Malik Khwas Khan, and that they intended on their return to settle

matters with their bad characters, if possible. The Malik gave them sheep, and they returned highly pleased with him. On 9th December, 1904, after the *Id* prayers, the Sipah elders held a jirga with the Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, and Zakka Khels, in the Kajuri Maira, for the punishment of the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel concerned in the Kohat raid case, and elected 60 elders from among themselves to go to the Zia-ud-dins, and to ask them to show cause why they should not be made to give up the offenders. The Kambar Khel also intend to collect a lashkar for the punishment of Mirza Ali, accused in the Kohat raid case. A party of the Zakka Khels of Karamna, assisted by some Shinwaris of Loargi, are reported to have raided and taken to Karamna about 200 Kuchi sheep grazing near Kam Dakka. Certain Ghilzais while coming down to India from Ningrahar, *viâ* the Bara Valley, attempted to kidnap a three-years old son of Mulla Said Akbar, Aka Khel, but they were pursued by the Mulla's men and arrested near Shin Kamar and taken back to the Mulla, who ordered them to be sent to the Sarhang of Dakka with a letter, stating the facts and asking him to have them suitably punished.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 7th January, 1905.

A large jirga of Afridi Maliks and elders, representing every clan and section of the tribe, waited on the Political Agent, Khyber, on the 2nd January, 1905, and asked to be paid their autumn allowances. They were told that, besides breaking their agreement with Government by sending jirgas to Kabul during the summer, some of their bad characters were concerned in some very serious raids in the Kohat district; and that, unless they thoroughly punished Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel, Multan, Zamir, and Amal Shah, Anais, Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din, and Chaman, Khusrogi, six of the leading raiders and dakaits, they could not be paid their allowances. After a long discussion, the jirga asked to be allowed a day or two to think over the matter and give a final reply. They held jirgas among themselves in the city for two days, and decided to punish the offenders. They saw the Political Agent on the 5th January, 1905, and informed him of their decision. Their lashkars have since left for Tirah and Bazar.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 12th January, 1905.

In continuation of my letter of the 8th October, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 5th January, 1905, from the Political Agent, Khyber, reporting the results of an interview with the Afridi Jirga who visited him with regard to the holding up of the tribal allowances.

2. It is satisfactory to note that the Afridi Jirgas are making some attempt to prevent raiding into British territory. At the same time, owing to the want of combination amongst the Afridis, it would be too sanguine to expect that they will arrest and hand over the men implicated in the Darshi Khel raid, but if, by destroying the houses of the men concerned and confiscating their lands, they prove their intentions of maintaining peace with Government, a great point will have been gained, and a reasonable fine imposed as compensation for the loss occasioned in the Darshi Khel raid will be all that is necessary to secure adequate redress.

3. The point raised by the Afridis and mentioned in Major Roos-Keppel's letter is one which they have no grounds for complaint. The only occasion during the last three years on which an Afridi clan has been held responsible for allowing another tribe to pass through its limits, is one which occurred two years ago, when an Aka Khel raiding party collected in the Sipah village of Ilm Gudar close to the Bara fort, and from there raided into the Peshawar District. On this occasion, in addition to the fine imposed on the Aka Khel tribe, the Sipah also were fined Rs. 1,000 for the direct complicity of Ilm Gudar. On the other hand, the Daulatzai and other Orakzai clans on the Kohat border, and again lately the Zaimusht clan, have been held responsible on the principle of the enforcement of territorial responsibility for the passing of Afridi raiders through

their limits. On the occasion of my late tour on the Kohat border, the Orakzai and Zaimusht clans protested against being held responsible in all these cases, when, in many instances, full satisfaction had not been obtained from the Afridis, and they urged that such pressure should be put on the Afridi clans as would ensure their controlling their bad characters. The Zakka Khel, and more particularly the Zia-ud-din section of the Zakka Khel, are mainly responsible for so-called Afridi offences, both on the Peshawar and the Kohat borders; and though lately, as pointed out by the jirga to Major Roos-Keppel, there has been a considerable improvement in respect of such offences, the case of the Darshi Khel raid is one which calls for special notice, inasmuch as almost every Afridi clan must have known of the intention to commit that raid. It was openly hatched in Tirah, and committed, in defiance both of the Zakka Khel Maliks and of Government, by the party who were benefiting by the intrigues of Khwas Khan at Kabul, at a time when the Afridi clans generally were breaking their agreement with Government by visiting Kabul.

4. Although there were many threats that the Darshi Khel raid would be followed by others, it is satisfactory to note that none such have occurred. It is true that, in the Kohat district, two small salt posts were lately raided and six old Enfield rifles looted, and that this was attributed by the Khan of Teri to Zakka Khels. So far enquiries do not support the assertion that this offence was committed by Afridis at all, and there appears to be reason to believe that it was the work of local bad characters. The case, however, is still under enquiry.

5. It remains to be seen how far the Afridi Jirgas take definite steps to punish the individuals and families of those concerned in the Darshi Khel raid. Should satisfactory action be taken, it will afford some guarantee against future raids, and at present it is believed that the Afridi Jirgas have a genuine intention of putting pressure on the men concerned.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th January, 1905.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, that the Afridi Jirgas came in in large numbers during the Christmas week to ask for payment of their autumn allowances. They had not come in before, as they were waiting to be sent for.

On the 2nd instant, I interviewed a representative jirga, comprising all the Maliks and a number of representative elders of each clan. They asked why they had not been summoned as usual in November to receive their allowances, and when these allowances would be paid. I replied that, by their behaviour throughout the summer and autumn, they had deliberately broken the agreement which they came to with Government in 1898, and that besides their misconduct in sending jirgas to Kabul, some of their number had committed a raid in the Kohat district, in which six men, British subjects, were killed and six wounded; that this was practically an act of war, and could not be settled in the ordinary way, *i.e.*, by the imposition of fines upon the actual offenders. That the Afridis, as a whole, would be held responsible for this very grave offence, and that, until they had given us satisfaction, I should withhold their allowances.

The elders, in reply, put forward many arguments. They said that the difference between the state of the Peshawar border now and formerly was sufficient proof that they did their best to prevent any raiding into British territory. That as the British Government had not in sixty years succeeded in stamping out crime in settled districts or in cities like Peshawar, so they, the elders, could not make it impossible for individuals or small gangs to commit offences in British territory.

They complained that, when other tribes, *e.g.*, the Aka Khel, passed through Afridi limits to raid into the Peshawar district, the Afridis were held to their territorial responsibility, and were punished for the offences of others; but that, when individuals or gangs of Afridis joined Orakzais in the commission of offences in the Kohat district, the Afridis were again held responsible, though it was quite impossible for them to guarantee the peace of the Orakzai border.

After a long discussion, the elders asked if this Kohat raid case, which they did not deny, could not be settled by the imposition of fine, either upon the offenders' clans, or upon the whole tribe, and were told that this could not be accepted, as no fine upon the tribe would deter from further raiding the half-a-dozen men, who were ringleaders in all these cases. The elders then asked what terms would be accepted, and were told that they should hand over for punishment the following six men:—

Multan, Anai Zakka Khel,
Amal Shah, Anai Zakka Khel,
Zamir, Anai Zakka Khel,
Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel,
Chaman, Khusrogi Zakka Khel,
Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel,

who were the leaders and organisers of every raid which had taken place during the last few years.

At first the elders replied that this was quite impossible, but after some discussion said that the six men named would probably either fight or bolt to Ningrahar or to the Orakzai country, where they could not follow them. They were told that, if six men and their near relations fought against a combined lashkar of the whole tribe, they would almost certainly be killed, and that this would be sufficient; and that if they fled to Ningrahar or to other tribal country, the elders should make it impossible for them to come back to Tirah by destroying their houses, confiscating their lands and cattle, and giving a heavy security against their return.

Some of the younger men said that they would never comply with such demands, but they were silenced by the elders, who, after talking the matter over among themselves, asked for time for consideration. They were given until the 4th, but, on the morning of that day, they had not come to any agreement, and I saw them again to-day.

They were in a quiet and business-like mood, and had agreed that the elders of the two Gara clans, the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel, should leave Peshawar at once for Tirah, raise a lashkar, and, if possible, capture Mirza Ali and bring him in. The Samil clans, *i.e.*, the Malikdin Khel, Sipah, Kamrai, and Zakka Khel elders had come to similar agreement with regard to the five Zakka Khel offenders. A truce has been made for all feuds, both tribal and personal, and there is no doubt that the bulk of the elders are in earnest. They have agreed that any man not joining the lashkar shall be fined twenty rupees, that any man siding with the offenders shall have his house burnt, and have asked that, in the event of the Zakka Khel taking sides with the offenders, all Zakka Khel in British territory may be arrested. I have told them that I will arrest any Afridi whom they may point out.

I asked them what they would do if the whole Zakka Khel clan were to oppose them, and they replied that in this case they would not be strong enough to coerce them, but would assist us to do so either actively or by giving hostages who should remain in our custody while we punished the Zakka Khel of Bazar and Bara. The Maliks privately urged me to continue to withhold the allowances until the matter is settled, as this is the only hope of keeping the clans together.

The Maliks and elders and the bulk of the tribesmen are thoroughly tired of being constantly punished for the misconduct of a small handful of their tribe, and are now in earnest. There is no doubt of this, but how long the mood will last it is impossible to say, as once the lashkars meet in Tirah the Mullas and other mischief-makers will do their utmost to sow dissensions among them. The Zakka Khel will have a strong inducement to settle matters, as they will find the entertainment of the three other Samil clans a very heavy tax.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 14th January, 1905.

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated the 18th October, 1904, regarding the raid on the village of Darshi Khel in the Kohat District.

2. The proposals for rewarding suitably the villagers who took a prominent part in following up the raiders have been under consideration, but could not be framed earlier, as the announcements of revenue under the new assessment were made only in November, and the intervening time has been taken up in the preparation of the Bachh statements in the villages concerned.

3. The villages which took part in the pursuit of the raiders were those of Darshi Khel, Bahadur Khel, and Nar, while the lambardars of Kurram also rendered valuable assistance. The revenue of these villages is credited, not to Government, but to the Khan of Teri, and the Khan has stated that he himself desires to join in rewarding the villagers, and asks to be allowed to bear one-half of the expense of any reward which Government deems suitable.

4. The exact numbers of the villagers who joined the pursuit party have been ascertained. It is found that the revenue for Kharif 1904 paid by these, excluding local rates and cesses, amounts to Rs. 910-9. I propose, therefore, that, in recognition of their good work, the revenue payable by these villagers for Kharif 1904 be remitted. As the revenue to be remitted is paid to the Khan of Teri, who is bearing the expense of one-half of the reward, I recommend that the other half Rs. 455-4-6 be adjusted by deduction from the annual payment of Rs. 18,000 presently made to Government by the Khan.

5. As regards compensation for the villagers killed and wounded, I would refer to my letter dated the 12th January, 1905, regarding the action to be taken by the Afridis against the perpetrators in this raid. Whatever be the result of the action taken, it will be necessary to impose a fine sufficient to cover the loss actually inflicted in the raid, and from this fine the wounded and the heirs of those killed can be compensated.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 21st January, 1905.

The Samil Afridi jirga was interviewed by the Political Agent, Khyber, on the 20th January, 1905. They handed over Amal Shah, one of the five Zakka Khel bad characters, in person, and surrendered Sher Ahmad, Anai, who had stood surety for the good behaviour of Multan and Nur Abbat, a near relation of Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din, as prisoners; and said that, owing to the severity of the winter and the heavy snowfall in Maidan and Tirah, they could not go beyond Bazar to punish the bad characters who had crossed to Ningrahar; but that, as soon as the weather was a little warmer, they would take a lashkar against the offenders, and would either bring them in or punish them thoroughly to the satisfaction of the Political Agent. After a long discussion, they volunteered to leave the leading Anai and other Zakka Khel elders as hostages to show that they really meant to punish the offenders, and also as a proof of their good faith; so twelve Anai elders were selected as hostages for Multan and Zamin, six Zia-ud-din for Mir Akbar, and four Khusrogis for Chaman and handed over by the Samil jirga with the three prisoners. They all were sent to the Political *havilat*. The jirga promised to take action against the offenders after the *Id-ul-zuha* (beginning of March), and did not press for the payment of the allowances.

Enclosure 6 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 31st January, 1905.

In continuation of my letter dated the 12th January, 1905, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, of 21st January, 1905, reporting the action taken by the Afridis in regard to the men concerned in the Darshi Khel raid. By their action the jirgas have shown their desire to put a stop to these depredations in British territory, and it is to be hoped that this end will to some extent be secured. Further, the action taken will enable the case of the Darshi Khel raid to be settled up by a fine in payment of compensation in the usual manner. Major Roos-Keppel deserves great credit for the manner in which he has conducted this matter.

2. I ask for sanction to pay to the Afridis the allowances which have been withheld in accordance with the Government of India telegram dated the 15th October, 1904. I also ask for instructions as to the line to be taken in regard to the breach of their agreement with Government by the Afridis in their visits to Kabul. The matter might be taken up when the jirgas attend to receive the allowances which it is not proposed to distribute until the instalment in spring also falls due.

3. Admittedly, it is practically impossible for us to prevent the Afridis from paying visits to Kabul. In my letter of the 8th October I recommended that Government should mark its disapproval of these visits by paying to other members of the tribe the allowances of such men as had gone to Kabul. I still recommend that this course be adopted, and ask for definite orders. I would recommend further that the subject be discussed in open Durbar, and the jirgas be told that Government has a right to expect that the Afridis should in future adhere strictly to their agreement. An announcement to this effect will, to some extent, strengthen the hands of the well-affected Maliks.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 21st January, 1905.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report, in continuation of my letter of 5th January, 1905, that I interviewed to-day the jirgas of the Samil Afridi clans (*i.e.*, the Malikdin Khel, Kamarai, Sipah, and Zakka Khel); all the Maliks were present, and the jirga was a thoroughly representative one, the total number being about 1,100. They informed me that they had taken

the united Samil lashkar to Bazar and Bara, and had lived at the expense of the Zakka Khel for some time, and had brought pressure upon the five men wanted and upon their relations. Of the five men, (1) Multan and (2) Zamin (brothers) had fled to the hills beyond Maidan, where it was impossible now to follow them owing to the heavy snow and to the difficulty of feeding the lashkar. The lashkar propose, however, to go after them again as soon as the snow melts. They handed over, as a prisoner, Sher Ahmad, an elder, who had stood surety for Multan's good behaviour, and agreed to hand over, as hostages for Multan's good behaviour and for his eventual production, as many Anai elders as I might wish to keep. Amal Shah (No. 3) they had brought in as a prisoner, and handed him over unconditionally. As regards Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din (4), who had fled at once on hearing of the jirga, they handed over his uncle, Nur Abbat, as a prisoner, and said that they would give us hostages from the Zia-ud-din elders. Chaman Khusrogi (5) left for Dakka with some other bad characters. The jirga say that he cannot escape them, as he owns land in Bara, and that they will arrest and bring him in sooner or later, and in the meantime will hand over elders of his section as hostages. The net result is therefore:—

(1) Amal Shah—brought in and handed over as a prisoner.

(2) Multan, (3) Zamin } Sher Ahmad brought in and handed over as a prisoner; Anai elders, including the leading men in the section, and one Shan Khel, a friend and connection of Multan, handed over as hostages.

(4) Mir Akbar—his uncle, Nur Abbat, handed over as a prisoner and six Zia-ud-din elders as hostages.

(5) Chaman—four Khusrogi elders handed over as hostages.

All the prisoners and hostages have been sent to the *Havilat*. The Gara jirgas, that is, the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel, who had gone after Mirza Ali, have not yet returned, but with this example it is probable that they will bring him in, as it is believed that they had been waiting to see the result of the Samil lashkar before taking action. I would bring to the notice of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner the very good work the Samil Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan, Sher Muhammad Khan, Hafiz Samandar Khan, Nur Ahmad Khan, and Jabbar Khan have done during the whole of the negotiations, during the despatch of the lashkar to Bazar, and in the handing over of the prisoners and hostages.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 4th February, 1905.

The Garai Afridi jirga, consisting of the Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel elders, who had been to Maidan to punish Mirza Ali, returned on the 1st February, 1905, and were interviewed by the Political Agent on the following day. They stated that, on hearing of the arrival of the Kambar Khel lashkar, Mirza Ali collected a party of 8 Kambar Khels, 4 Aka Khels, and 2 Orakzais, shut himself up in his garhi, and defied the lashkar, and that firing went on all the day without any result. The lashkar closely invested the village; but owing to a heavy fall of snow, the lashkar could not maintain its position, and the next morning they found that the village was deserted, and that Mirza Ali had fled to the Aka Khel country with his companions. The lashkar were unable to capture him, but burnt his garhi completely and destroyed all his property. They considered that they had done enough to punish him. It was, however, explained to them that it was not sufficient to burn his garhi, and that further efforts were required. After a long discussion they agreed to leave the leading elders of Mirza Ali's section (the Zena Khel) as hostages, and to make a fresh attempt to catch him. Mirza Ali has taken refuge at Lawata on the Aka Khel-Sturi Khel (Orakzai) border, and the Kambar Khel find it rather difficult to bring any effective pressure to bear upon him in foreign limits, but several of his relations have been pointed out by the jirga in villages near Peshawar and have been arrested. It is hoped that through them Mirza Ali may be forced to come to terms.

Enclosure 8 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 11th February, 1905.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar held a jirga on the 10th February, 1905, and decided to wait on the Political Agent, after the "Id," to arrange for the exchange of hostages. They think that, unless the elders among the hostages are replaced by their younger near relations, such as brothers and sons, there will be difficulty in raising a lashkar to punish or making any other "sarishta" (arrangement) to capture the men whose surrender has been demanded.

Enclosure 9 in No. 7.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 21st February, 1905.

In reply to your letter dated the 14th January, 1905, I am directed to convey sanction to your proposals for rewarding the villagers who aided in the pursuit of the raiders on the village of Darshi Khel.

Enclosure 10 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 25th February, 1905.

The Garhi Afridi jirga of Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel attended on the Political Agent on the 24th February, 1905; and after discussing at length the question of the further punishment of Mirza Ali and his companions [see diary for the week ending 4th February, 1905], decided to take a lashkar against Hamidulla, a relation and friend of Mirza Ali, and to press him to exercise his influence in getting in Mirza Ali, whose *garhi* was burnt and who himself has taken refuge with the Aka Khel and the Sturi Khel Orakzais at Lawata, near Barkai. The jirga seemed prepared to do their utmost in awarding effective punishment to their bad characters, and will take the lashkar as soon as the weather improves. At present the roads to Maidan are impassable. The Afridis can now fairly realise the extent of their loss and trouble on account of the misbehaviour of their bad characters, and are determined to punish them if they can get hold of them. The Political Agent visited the Afridi hostages in the Peshawar jail on the 24th February, 1905, and, at their request, arranged to get in some of their relations from Bazar to raise a *sarishta* for taking action against Multan and others. So much pressure has been put on Multan by the relations of the hostages now in custody that he has sent messages to the hostages, offering to return all rifles and property taken at Darshi Khel, burn his village, leave his lands, and move to Afghan territory, if he can obtain their release on these terms.

Enclosure 11 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 1st March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Report received from Peshawar that Matanni Thana was entered by Afridis last evening, and nine Martini rifles, with ammunition, two horses, and other property, carried off. No further information received as yet.

Enclosure 12 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 7th March, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

In view of present satisfactory attitude of Afridi jirga, Political Officer, Khyber, may be given discretion to pay Afridi allowances when he considers it desirable, on understanding that no payments are made to those who either went to Kabul last year or this, or who sent representatives there.

Enclosure 13 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 10*th March*, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 1st instant. Another raid, supposed to be by the same gang as was concerned in Matanni Thana case, is reported to have occurred on 8th at Garhi Shahdad in Peshawar district, near Mullagori border. One Hindu and two villagers killed, and three wounded, and property estimated at Rs. 1,500 taken.

Enclosure 14 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 11*th March*, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of yesterday. Raid on Garhi Shahdad is found to have been work of six Kuki Khel Afridis from Kadam, near Jamrud, some Peshawaris, including one outlaw and two Khusrogis of China in Bazar, members of Hazarnao gang. Leading Kuki Khel raider, Sahib Gul, is now in Kadam, and it is believed that a wounded outlaw with him. Roos-Keppel proposes surrounding their village with Khyber Rifles, and to try and effect capture and burn house of Sahib Gul. He would want support of two guns in case of opposition. He is confident of success, and I support his proposal strongly, as otherwise these raids will increase. Please telegraph if Government of India agree.

Enclosure 15 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, dated 13*th March*, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram 10th March. Viceroy considers this succession of successful raids and dakaitis, in which apparently raiders get off unscathed, very unsatisfactory, and is disposed to doubt whether military police protection can be adequate. Please submit full report on the Matanni and Garhi Shahdad raids as early as possible.

Enclosure 16 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 11*th March*, 1905.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar held a jirga on Friday, the 10th March, 1905, and decided to take another lashkar against Multan Anai and Mir Akbar Zia-ud-din in Maidan. A "nagha" (fine) of Rs. 200 was fixed to be recovered from anyone failing to attend the lashkar. The whole lashkar is to assemble at Bazar on Friday, the 17th March, 1905. The Paindai Zakka Khel of Bazar sent a message to Usman, Khusrogi, to say that as he would not give up thieving and raiding in British territory, which must sooner or later lead to the occupation of Bazar by the British Government, they intended to invite the Government to take China which solely belonged to them (Paindais), and that if they asked the Political Agent to come up at once, the Khusrogis and other Bazar Zakka Khel should only thank themselves for it. Several raiding parties having passed near the village of Ilm Gudr, the Sipah Malik Sher Muhammad Khan again requested the Political Agent to put a post of Khyber Rifles in that village in order to satisfy himself that the inhabitants did not in any way harbour the raiders. With the approval of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner a post has been established in Sheikh Garhi, the furthest village of the group, no Sipah Sepoys being sent. Some threatening messages have been received from the Aka Khel, and from the Afridis living in Kajurai and Shin Kamr, but it is unlikely that they will take any overt action. A Shinwari, who was in Hazarnao on the 9th instant, reports that about 60 armed men were collected in Shakar's Garhi, about one-third of them being Khusrogi Zakka Khel. Great irritation was expressed at the measures being taken to punish the Darshi Khel raiders in Tirah, and it was suggested to retaliate by a determined attack on a

caravan in the Khyber or on the Kafila Serai guard at Landi Kotal. The guards have been strengthened. An exceptionally brutal raid was committed at the village of Shahdad Garhi on the night of the 8th and 9th instant, four of the villagers, who were quite unarmed, being killed. It has been ascertained that the raid was organised at the village of one Sahib Gul, a Kuki Khel of Kadam (about four miles from Jamrud), and that the raiders, about 18 in number, included Shakar's followers Turai (a Peshawari outlaw), two Khusrogis of China in Bazar, Sahib Gul and some of his hamsayas and some five Peshawaris. Some Zakka Khel of Bazar who are at feud with Usman recently committed a raid into Dakka limits in order to get Usman into trouble with the Sarhang. They carried off a flock of sheep. This has annoyed the Sarhang so much that he has collected at Dakka a large number of Kuda Khel Mohmands nominally to defend his shepherds. It is, however, believed that these men should raid the flocks of the Shinwaris of Landi Kotal in order to recover his losses.

Enclosure 17 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13*th March,* 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram 11th March. Viceroy concurs in proposal to surprise Kadam. You can arrange with General Officer Commanding for guns.

Enclosure 18 in No. 7.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14*th March,* 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Surrounded Sahib Gul's village at dawn with Khyber Rifles. Cavalry and guns in support. Infantry in reserve. Village completely surprised. Arrested Sahib Gul. Searched village, finding clothing and jewellery, probably obtained in recent raids. Burnt Sahib Gul's house completely. No opposition.

Enclosure 19 in No. 7.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to Political Agent, Khyber, dated 15*th March,* 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Viceroy desires to congratulate you on successful surprise of Kadam village.

Enclosure 20 in No. 7.

Extract from Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 18*th March,* 1905.

On the morning of Tuesday, the 14th March, 1905, a small force surprised a village of Kadam to arrest Sahib Gul, a Zora Khel Kuki Khel, concerned in the Shahdad Garhi dakaiti case [see last Diary]. The village was surrounded at dawn and searched, and Sahib Gul was arrested. The house of one, Naimulla, a notorious bad character, was also searched, and some jewellery and clothes found in the houses of Sahib Gul and Naimulla, and suspected to be stolen property were brought in with the prisoner. Everything went off quietly, and there was no occasion to use force. The Zakka Khel of Bazar took a lashkar against Multan and Mir Akbar on the 16th March, 1905, but the news of the advance of the lashkar having been received by them prior to the arrival of the lashkar in Maidan, Multan managed to escape to Ningrahar with his family, and the lashkar could only burn his garhi. Mir Akbar had, meanwhile, collected about 20 Aka Khel and some Feroz Khel and other Orakzais in his garhi, and offered opposition to the lashkar which surrounded the garhi. Firing went on during the night of the 18th March, and Mir Akbar himself was shot in the morning. Full details will not be known until the return of the

lashkar. Akbar Khan, a nephew of ex-Malik Khawas Khan, came to Kahi from Mama Khel on 13th March, 1905, and having summoned Borai and some other Zakka Khels from Bazar told them that his uncle had deputed him to ask them either to do mischief in British territory in order to disgrace the Maliks and others engaged in punishing the offenders or to try to create dissensions among the lashkar going to Maidan. The Zakka Khel replied that they were too few to be able to do anything against the will of the rest of the tribe who had surrendered hostages to the Sarkar, but that they would do their best to carry out the wishes of their old Malik. They, however, returned to Bazar on the 17th March, 1905, by which time the lashkar had started for Maidan.

Enclosure 21 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 24th March, 1905.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my telegram of the 11th March, 1905, I have the honour to submit the report called for in your telegram of the 13th March, 1905, regarding the recent raids at Matanni and Garhi Shahdad. The raid on the Matanni Police Station took place between 6 and 7 p.m. on the 28th of February, 1905. At the time of the raid the police station was in charge of a sergeant, the Deputy Inspector being in Peshawar on duty. The sergeant, moharrir, and three village watchmen were at work in one of the towers: three other constables were in their barracks and one constable was on sentry duty inside the post over the gate which was closed. Some men came to the gate, and demanded admission saying they were village watchmen, come to report their departure on patrol. The sentry opened the wicket gate, and two men entered who at once fell upon him, and overpowered him. A number of other men then rushed in and shut up the rest of the occupants of the police station in the rooms in which they happened to be. The raiders then broke open the malkhana from which they obtained 9 Martini-Henry carbines, 1 sword, 1 double-barrelled gun, 6 bayonets, 1 saddle, 241 rounds of ammunition, and Rs. 33 in cash. They then went off taking with them two horses, the property of the Deputy Inspector, and a sowar. The alarm was raised, and the Matanni villagers turned out in force. It had been raining heavily, and tracking was simple. The tracks were followed to a spot within a few hundred yards of the ford over the Bara river between the Sipah villages of Ilm Gudr and Garhi Sheikh Ismail. Here the pursuit was abandoned, as unprotected Afridi territory had been reached. Enquiries show that this raid was planned and organized in Hazarnao in Afghan territory by Shakar, the well-known dakait and rifle thief. The raid was led by Shakar's brother Ilm Din. With Ilm Din were three Peshawari outlaws who live at Hazarnao, and 15 other men, residents of Hazarnao and Afghan subjects. This party of 19 proceeded from Hazarnao direct to China in Bazar. Here they were joined by Usman Khusrogi of Bazar; they were also joined by four more Khusrogis and by Mursil Khusrogi. Later six more men, three Orakzais and three Aka Khels, joined the gang. It is significant that while halting at Narhadai the gang sent for Multan, Zamir, Mir Akbar, and Mirza Ali to join them. These men, who have taken refuge at Lawata to escape the Afridi tribal *lashkars*, who are endeavouring to punish them for the Darshi Khel raid, refused to join, or even to visit, the raiders on the ground that all their relatives were in jail in Peshawar as hostages for their good behaviour. The raid on Garhi Shahdad took place at about 9 p.m. on the 8th March. A Hindu, Chaju Mal, was with his family and two chaukidars in his house, which is on the outskirts of the village, when suddenly the door was broken in, and a party of raiders, numbering some 18 or 20 men, entered. Some of the inmates of the house climbed on to the roof and raised the alarm. The raiders then commenced firing promiscuously, shooting Dhani Ram, Chaju Mal's son, dead on the roof where he had taken refuge. The villagers turned out in strength, but they had with them only one *jezail* in the way of fire-arms. They, however, resisted the raiders to the utmost as is shown by the fact that they lost two men killed and three badly wounded. The raiders who were strongly armed got away taking with them all the

jewellery, clothes, and cash which they found in Chaju Mal's house, the total value being about Rs. 1,500. Enquiries show that this raid was not, as was at first suspected, the work of the same gang as committed the raid on Matanni Thana, but that it was planned at Kadam in the Garhi of Sahib Gul, Kuki Khel. In the party were Torai, Peshawari outlaw, living with Shakar at Hazarnao, two Zakka Khels of China in Bazar, Sahib Gul, Kuki Khel, with some other Kuki Khels and Zakka Khels and Peshawari outlaws. Subsequently, on 14th March, Kadam was surrounded by the Political Agent, Khyber, and Sahib Gul arrested and his house burnt, as reported in the Political Agent's telegram of the 14th March, 1905. Since the end of November last, in order to cope with raiders, six special patrols, three of the Border Military Police, and three of the Regular Police, have been organized: and the Border Military Police posts upon the Afridi section of the border have been strengthened. There have also been ordinary Border Military Police patrols both day and night between villages and between posts. The work has been onerous and difficult and the men have had little rest and very great hardships in the matter of food and shelter. That they failed to encounter any gang is due to the elaborate system of espoinage employed by trans-border raiders, and to the fact that the numbers of the Border Military Police render it an impossibility for them to guard and patrol every route traversed by raiding gangs. Owing to the wide sketch of country and its physical features it is perfectly easy for a gang to avoid villages, patrols, and posts. To capture or even to encounter a gang is an exceedingly difficult matter, and must in view of the above facts be a matter of chance, rather than a result to be normally expected. Moreover, Border Military Police and police protection to be effective requires the support of the inhabitants of the district, and these have been practically disarmed. Rifles and pistols are now denied to them except under licence, so that villages which formerly could and did hold their own, can now turn out armed only with *jezails*, swords, and sticks to combat a gang armed with weapons of precision and reckless of life. The number of Government rifles distributed to villagers on security is not great, and these rifles are merely Enfield muzzle-loading weapons of antique pattern and doubtful utility. The abject helplessness of our own villagers in respect of armament is well known across the border, and is a subject of widespread complaint by the people of the district. When large gangs, such as have recently been formed, decide to embark upon a series of dakaities within the border, their success may be held to be assured unless and until villages are armed with weapons which enable them to defend themselves. In view of the urgency of the matter I have directed the temporary issue on security of the smooth-bore Snider carbines discarded by the police, and I now ask that I be allowed to retain these weapons to arm the villagers. To prevent raids like that on the Matanni Thana, the main chance of success lies in gangs of this nature being stopped across the border. The Afridi Maliks, however, have pointed out their inability, so long as Bazar is in its present state, to cope with what are really gangs from Afghanistan. In the case of the raid on Garhi Shahdad, the robbery was planned close under the walls of Jamrud fort and was carried out from Kuki Khel territory which lies close to the village attacked. Blame can hardly attach to the Border Military Police that they received no information regarding this raid. The raid on Matanni Thana, however, raises a much larger question. This raid differs materially from ordinary raids in the fact that it was organized in Afghan territory by Afghan subjects. During the last three months there have been within the Peshawar district ten other dakaities and robberies, some of them serious and some of lesser importance, which have now after police and political enquiry been attributed to members of this gang from Hazarnao, and while members of that gang may not have been actually concerned in all of these, there can be no doubt that they have taken part in most, with the assistance of the bad characters in the villages themselves who take advantage of the state of unrest, which the presence of such a gang naturally creates, to act as their spies and assistants. While enquiries point to these dakaities being the work of this gang, it will at the same time be difficult to obtain absolute proof. It is known that rifles and horses obtained in these robberies are now with Shakar at Hazarnao. In one case in which a robber supposed to be a member of this gang was shot by the police, his companions cut off his head and carried it away with them to prevent identification, throwing the stripped body into the river. The body was recovered, but, as anticipated by the raiders, identification was impossible.

This new development of raids from Afghanistan is far more serious and more difficult to deal with than tribal raids on however large a scale. The originators of raids from Afghan territory are beyond our reach, and no arrangements we can make can be depended upon to prevent these gangs passing through the sparsely inhabited hills between the Sassobi pass and the British border. That tribal raiding can be stopped to a large extent has been proved by the absence of any such raids since that on Darshi Khel in September last and by the fact that the measures adopted by the Afridis against the leaders in that case led to the latter's refusing the invitation to join the Hazarnao gang. The Afridi Maliks the measures adopted by the Afridis against the leaders in that case, led to the that the *eclat* which must necessarily accompany the success of this gang, which has sprung into fame in so short a time, will secure the adhesion to the gang of every malcontent Afridi. It is, of course, hopeless to expect that the officials in Ningrahar will do anything to discourage this gang. The Political Agent, Khyber, has expressed the opinion that nothing but the closing of the Sassobi pass can prevent raiding from Afghanistan, and that in taking this measure Government would have the support of all the Afridi Maliks and of most of the elders. I have personally discussed matters with the leading Afridi Maliks, and their view is that troops should be sent into the Bazar valley. They state that after this is done they themselves, with tribal levies from the clans generally, are ready to occupy any post which may be built. This measure would of course lead to expense in the payment for the levies, and the troops would certainly encounter opposition not only from the Zakka Khels but from the malcontents of all Afridi sections.

Enclosure 22 in No. 7.

Extract from Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 25th March, 1905.

The Zakka Khel lashkar, who had been ordered to go to Maidan to punish Mir Akbar Zia-ud-din, Multan Anai, and Zamir Anai, returned to Peshawar on the 24th instant. They went first to Multan's village, but he, on hearing of their approach, fled with his family to Afghan territory. The lashkar destroyed his village and crops, and levelled the walls and towers of the village after burning it. They then went on to Mir Akbar's village, and found him there. As he refused to surrender himself, the lashkar attacked the village and captured it and killed Mir Akbar. They then went to Bara and captured Zamir, whom they brought in and handed over to the Political Agent. On the 25th instant, the Political Agent interviewed the lashkar, who were accompanied by the Samil Maliks and elders, and told them that, as they had now carried out their promises to punish the Darshi Khel raiders, he would release their hostages and open payment of allowances. He pointed out that, during their absence, Usman, Khusrogi, had joined an Afghan band of raiders, and had, with them, committed serious dakaitis in the Peshawar District, and told them that it was absolutely necessary that they should, in their own interest, take steps to at once punish Usman, and any other Zakka Khel of Bazar who might help or harbour Afghan raiders. Reference diary for the week ending 11th March, 1905. On the 19th instant, the Sarhang of Dakka sent a message to the Khusrogis of Bazar, through a son of Madak Fakir, asking them not to raise a lashkar to punish his friends, Chaman and Usman, but the Khusrogis replied that the question of punishing the Afridi offenders had been taken up by the whole *ullus*, and that they had no power to stop it. The surprise of Kadam on the 14th instant has had an effect out of all proportion to its importance. The Afridis say that it is a very serious matter, as it is the beginning of a system of punishment by counter-raiding. It was at first suggested by some that the Political Agent had exceeded his powers in taking the force to Kadam, and would incur the displeasure of Government, but, at a large meeting held in Maidan to discuss the situation, the leading elders informed the people that it was a strict rule that "cannons could not be taken from their houses without the orders of the company," so all were forced to believe that the raid had the sanction of Government. The Afridis, who have recently returned from punishing the Darshi Khel raiders, have come in for a good deal of abuse in Peshawar city, where the people say that the Afridis are "Kafirs" for killing a Musulman at the bidding of a "Kafir."

Enclosure 23 in No. 7.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 28th March, 1905.

In continuation of my letter, dated 31st January, 1905, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter, dated 25th March, 1905, from the Political Agent, Khyber, reporting the further action taken by the Afridis against the leaders in the Darshi Khel raid.

2. The action which has been taken is in every way most creditable to the Afridis and to Major Roos-Keppel, the Political Agent.

In regard to the last paragraph of the Political Agent's letter, in which he asks what fine, if any, should now be recovered from the Afridis on account of the Darshi Khel raid, I am now of opinion that, after the exceptional action taken by the Afridis, to realise any fine from them for the Darshi Khel raid would be injudicious and impolitic, and I am instructing the Political Agent to this effect.

The compensation due for the villagers killed and wounded in this raid can be realised from the Orakzai clans through whose limits the raiders passed.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 25th March, 1905.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner, that the Zakka Khel lashkar, who started on the 7th instant to punish Multan, Zamir, and Mir Akbar for their share in the Darshi Khel raid, have now returned.

They went from Peshawar to the Bara and Bazar in two bodies; and hearing there that the three men wanted had gone to Maidan, the lashkar joined forces in the Upper Bara and went after them.

They decided that the only effective way to punish Multan and Mir Akbar, the two leaders of the Darshi Khel raid, was to kill them, and determined to do this. They first went against Multan's village, but Multan just succeeded in escaping them and getting to Hazarnao, leaving, however, all his property.

He, with his nephews, Taza Khan and Zamir, owned a very fine garhi with several towers; the whole was valued at Rs. 4,000, British, which estimate, I am told by the Maliks, is approximately correct. The lashkar not only burnt the whole village and all the property in it, but levelled the walls and towers to the ground. They made every man of the lashkar take a share in this, in order that the responsibility of all towards the tribe might be equal.

They then went off to Mir Akbar's village and found him there. They demanded that he should give himself up, but he refused to do so. The lashkar then encircled the village and bivouacked round it for the night. In the morning they made a determined attack and killed Mir Akbar.

Hearing that Zamir had not gone to Hazarnao, but was in the Bara, the lashkar went after him, caught him, and have handed him over unconditionally to me to-day.

I have told the jirga that the behaviour of their lashkar has been eminently satisfactory, and that their hostages will be immediately released and their allowances paid in due course.

I have, however, warned them that, as long as they continue to own the Bazar Valley, it is necessary to hold them responsible for the passage of Afghan raiders and for the behaviour of Usman and the other Khusrogis who have joined Shakar's gang, and have impressed upon them that, in their own interest, they must punish the latter although this is outside the original orders, for the carrying out of which they had given hostages. They are quite prepared to do this, and will take their lashkar to Bazar and settle with Usman.

The really astounding success of their expedition to Maidan has, although only a few days' old, had a crushing effect upon the Bazar bad characters. Usman is hastily removing his property to the Sassobi villages, in Afghan territory, and his neighbours are grazing their cattle in his crops. He had sent me several messengers, asking for forgiveness, and begging that the lashkar may not be sent against him, and many less notorious men have sent messages to the Maliks and to the lashkar, offering to give securities for good behaviour if they can be spared.

The punishment for the Darshi Khel raid has now been inflicted in full. Mir Akbar has been killed, Multan has been driven out of the country, and his house, together with those of Mirza Ali, Zamir, and Taza Khan, have been totally destroyed. Amal Shah and Zamir, well-known Anai bad characters, have been handed over, and the Gara lashkar, after burning Mirza Ali's village, are trying to catch or kill him. He has, however, taken refuge with the Aka Khel and Sturi Khel and is protected by them. If the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, who has been asked to get him turned out, can effect this, he will either be killed or captured.

I have the honour to ask what fine, if any, should now be recovered from the Afridis on account of the Darshi Khel raid, pointing out that the fine can now only be recovered from the men who have punished the raiders.

Enclosure 24 in No. 7.

Extract from the enclosures of a letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary on Deputation with the Kabul Mission, dated the 23rd March, 1905.

(1.)

Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, to L. W. Dane, Esq., dated 15th Muharram, 1323 H. (22nd March, 1905).

(Extract.)

You also mentioned the movements of frontier people and made a friendly complaint that recently their intercourse (with Kabul) had increased. I write to say that in this matter, please God, I will not exceed my father's principles.

(2.)

Translation of a letter from L. W. Dane, Esq., C.S.I., to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, dated the 23rd March, 1905.

(Extract.)

I am glad to receive Your Highness's assurance that, in regard to the too frequent comings and goings of British frontier tribesmen, you are prepared scrupulously to adhere to the engagements of your father.

Enclosure 25 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 1st April, 1905.

The Gara jirga, who after burning Mirza Ali's garhi had been to bring pressure to bear upon his relations in Maidan to get him in from Lawata and surrender him, returned on the 29th March, 1905. They stated that, as Mirza Ali's uncles, Hamidulla and Nasimulla, failed to get their nephew in, although they were able to recover the rifle fallen to his share in the Darshi Khel raid case, they burnt their garhis also. They handed over the rifle to the Political Agent, and requested that the Kohat authorities might be asked to expel Hamidulla and others from the Aka Khel country, where they had taken shelter with some bad characters: Hearing that the Zakka Khel lashkar were coming to Bazar to punish them, Chaman and Usman, Khusrogis, have removed most of their property to Dakka, and are, it is said, prepared to resist the lashkar.

Enclosure 26 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 8th April, 1905.

Reference diary for the week ending 25th March, 1905. On arrival at Bazar, the Zakka Khel lashkar, which had been despatched to punish Usman, found that he and Chaman, Khusrogis, had shut themselves up in Usman's garhi at China, and had been joined by their friends, Ilmdin, brother of Shakar of Hazarnao, Ghani, Sangu Khel Shinwari of Nazian, Jafar, Rasul, Torai, Peshawar outlaws, Hazrat Shah, Aka Khel, and about 30 Ningraharis, Orakzais, and Aka Khels. The Ningrahar contingent were in favour of a desperate resistance, but Usman did not wish to finally debar himself from any chance of returning to Bazar and opened negotiations with the lashkar, who did not like the idea of attacking so well-defended a garhi and were very glad to let him go. He went with his family and portable property to Dakka, and the lashkar then burnt his share of the village, two houses, and some stack of bhoosa. The lashkar then went to Bara to the village of Sher Baz, uncle of Chaman, another Khusrogi bad character. and not finding Chaman there, burnt his uncle's village. The Kambar Khels were paid their allowances for the past year on 5th April, 1905. There were no serious cases against them except that of Mirza Ali's complicity in the Darshi Khel raid case, for which he has been thoroughly punished. All petty cases were settled on the spot. The shares of those who had been to Kabul during the year were cut from the tribal nowajib, and are being paid to deserving elders who did not go to Kabul and who rendered service to Government.

Enclosure 27 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 15th April, 1905.

Allowances for the past 12 months were paid to the following Afridi clans on the dates given below:—

Kamarais, Malikdin Khel	... ...	11th April.
Kuki Khel	... ...	12th April.
Pakhai, Shan Khel	... ...	13th April.
Anai	... ...	15th April.

There were no cases against the Kamarais and Shan Khel, and very few of them had been to Kabul. The Malikdin Khel, Kuki Khel, and Pakhais had gone in large numbers to Kabul and the shares of all who had been were cut. The Anais, though guilty of several serious offences in British territory, had done exceedingly well in punishing their offenders, and very few of them had been to Kabul during the year. They paid Rs. 1,000 on account of the fine imposed on Multan and Zamir in the Jangal Khel raid case of last year. All petty cases were settled on the spot. Mulla Said Akbar has convened all the Mullas of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes to a meeting at the beginning of next month (Muhammadan calendar). He has merely informed them that it is urgently necessary to make a very important "sarishta." His action has caused widespread speculation as to his intentions. A probable explanation is that the Mulla is much frightened at the action of the Afridi lashkars in punishing the Darshi Khel raiders, and, fearing that a lashkar may be sent against him, wishes to excite the tribes against their leaders of the lashkars.

Enclosure 28 to No. 7.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th April, 1905.

(Extract.)

I am directed to refer to your letter, dated the 24th March, 1905, regarding the recent raids at Matanni and Garhi Shahdad. You have therein pointed out that these raids were either deliberately planned and carried out by men living in Afghan territory, or were participated in by such men; that such raids are more difficult to cope with than ordinary tribal raids; and that the tribesmen within our sphere of influence are powerless to prevent them. You have not yourself proposed a remedy, but report that the Political Agent, Khyber, is of opinion that nothing but the closing of the Sassobi Pass will prevent raiding from Afghanistan, and that the Afridi Maliks and most of the elders would lend their support to this measure. Their view, which you have personally ascertained, is that troops should be sent into the Bazar Valley, and that thereafter any post, which might be built, could be held by tribal levies. At the same time you have pointed out that the troops would encounter opposition, not only from the Zakka Khel, but from the malcontents of all Afridi sections, and that the plan would lead to expense in the payment of levies. With this warning before them the Government of India are not inclined to consider the despatch of troops into the Bazar Valley, except in the last resort. His Excellency the Viceroy has already congratulated Major Roos-Keppel on the successful surprise of the Kuki Khel village of Kadam and the capture of the leader of the Garhi Shahdad raid. The question of arming the border villages with the smooth-bore Sniders discarded by the Border Police is under separate consideration.

Enclosure 29 in No. 7.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th April, 1905.

I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 28th March, 1905, reporting the further action taken by the Afridis against the leaders in the Darshi Khel raid.

2. The Government of India agree with you that the action taken is most creditable to the Afridis, and not less to Major Roos-Keppel, who has handled a very difficult situation with great ability, and has achieved a remarkable success. In recognition of the attitude of the Afridis as a whole, your instructions to Major Roos-Keppel not to realise any fine from them for the raid in question are approved, and the Darshi Khel villagers may, as you propose, be compensated from the fines to be realised from the Orakzais, through whose limits the raider passed.

Enclosure 30 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 22nd April, 1905.

Allowances for the past 12 months were paid to the Paindais, Sipahs, and Khusrogis on the 17th, 20th, and 21st April, 1905, and all pending cases settled. On the 17th instant Multan, Anai, returned to Bazar, and asked Dadai, Miras Khan, &c., elders, about the fate of his nephew, Zamir. Dadai informed him that Zamir was in jail in Peshawar, and told him that he could not remain in Bazar, upon which Multan went to the village of Sinjab Khan of Barkai, where he was joined by Mirza Ali, another of the Hazarnao gang. They stayed there for four days and returned to Ningrahar. Mulla Said Akbar and other Mullas in Tirah were approached by a deputation from the Zakka Khel bad characters recently expelled to Ningrahar, asking them to take up their cause, and to induce the Afridis to allow them to return to their homes. The Mullas said that they would do all in their power to help them as soon as the Afridi Kaddas returned to Tirah from the plains. It is reported that the Afridis will hold a big jirga as soon as they arrive in Tirah to discuss the question of whether to go to Kabul this year or not. Torai, the Peshawari outlaw, came on the 22nd April, 1905, to the Sipah Village of Dora, and asked Sarmast, Sipah, to allow him to cook food in the village for about 25 men, who, he said, were waiting at the Gandao Pass; but Sarmast replied that the Sipah allowances had been cut by the Khyber authorities for harbouring bad characters, and that he could not help him. Torai then went to the Miri Khel Aka Khel caves.

Enclosure 31 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th April, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

A dakaiti occurred last night at about 3 a.m., at the tonga chauki, near Matanni Police Station. Twenty raiders are reported to have taken off five tonga ponies. No lives were lost. It is not yet known who raiders were, but they are supposed to be the Hazarnao gang.

Enclosure 32 in No. 7.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 28th April, 1905.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 26th instant. Village chigha followed up raiders to Barkai limits, and recovered the stolen horses. The identification of the raiders is not yet established. Political Agent, Khyber, now reports another raid on the 24th near Jamrud, supposed to be by the same gang.

Enclosure 33 in No. 7.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 29th April, 1905.

On receipt of information that Torai, outlaw, a leading member of the Hazarnao gang, was in the Kajuri plains, in Sipah limits, the Political Agent, accompanied by Assistant Political Officer and some Khyber Rifle sepoys and

Sipahs, left in search of him on the evening of the 28th April; but failing to find him, returned the next morning, leaving some Sipah of Tandai to arrest him if he returned later. They lay in wait for him above the Gandao Pass, and tried to arrest him, and, as he resisted, shot him through the body. They were bringing him in to the Khyber Rifle post at Sheikh Garhi when they were attacked by a pursuit party of Sturi Khel from Barkai and Bini Garhi. They succeeded in making their escape, bringing with them Torai's rifle, but were obliged to leave him. The rifle has been handed over to the Political Agent, and has been identified as one of those taken from Matanni police post. Torai was taken to Bini Garhi, a hamlet of Barkai, by Jumma Khan and other Sturi Khel. The Sipah jirga went to Bini Garhi, and threatened to punish the Sturi Khel for having violated their limits by the taking away of the wounded man and demanded his surrender, but unfortunately Mulla Mir Ahmed, Akhundzada, Sultan Khel Aka Khel, of Bara, happened to be at Barkai at the time with a large following of Mullas. The Mullas came to Bini Garhi, and took away Torai to Barkai, thence to Vaisaki, Barwan, &c. It is reported that the outlaw cannot recover.

No. 8.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 16th January, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels. Letter from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 3rd December, 1906, and other papers sent home by mail of 13th and 20th ultimo.* It is presumed that previous reference will be made to me before any action is taken other than baramta and stopping allowances.

No. 9.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st January, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels. Your telegram dated the 16th instant. We are sending you all papers as they are received. Reference will be made to you before any definite action is taken against tribe. After March next, question of further action will be considered in light of their behaviour between then and now; up to that time we have decided, as far as possible, to ignore tribe. Another raid is reported near Peshawar, probably by the same men as those who conducted the Pabbi raid, in which latter complicity of Zakka Khel has been proved. When British Agent made representations to Amir on the subject, latter replied that Zakka Khels were subjects, if of anybody, of the British Government, and that he had nothing to do with them.

No. 10.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th January, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram dated the 21st instant. On the 14th instant another raid was committed by gang believed to consist principally of Zakka Khel on serai at Matanni. Raiders escaped uninjured, carrying off 43 camels as booty. One Border Police horse wounded.

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* These papers are printed as enclosures 1–7 in No. 11.

No. 11.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 7th March, 1907. *Received 23rd March,* 1907.

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 25th May, 1905, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of papers regarding the hostile attitude of the Zakka Khel section of the Khyber Afridis. It will be remembered that in September, 1904, Sir H. Deane brought strongly to notice the attitude of the Zakka Khel, and warned us of the possibilities of our finding ourselves committed to hostilities with the Afridi tribe. The conclusion of the Convention at Kabul was followed by a cessation for a time of the serious raids upon British territory, and so no further action was taken, in the hope that the tribesmen would in the future behave with more regard for their engagements. In this hope we have been disappointed, so far as the Zakka Khels are concerned. Visits of the tribesmen to Kabul, though perhaps not in such large numbers as before, have continued, and while the conduct of the Afridis as a whole has, generally speaking, been good, the Zakka Khel have become more and more troublesome and defiant. The present position of affairs is summed up in the Chief Commissioner's letters of the 3rd December, 1906, and the 13th February, 1907. These formulate a very grave series of charges against the Zakka Khel. The offences outstanding against them have been tabulated by the Political Agent, in the enclosures of his letters to the Chief Commissioner, dated 26th November, 1906, and 7th February, 1907, and their hostile attitude towards Government is shown with great clearness in the correspondence. During the period that has elapsed since the first of Sir H. Deane's letters cited was written, four more serious raids have been committed in the Peshawar District. On the 5th December, the village of Badbher, eight miles from Peshawar, was attacked by a gang of 40 men, most belonging to the Zakka Khel. The raiders, besides lifting 2 ponies, 14 camels, and other live-stock, carried off 7 men, including 2 police constables. The two constables were ransomed by a Kamarai Afridi Malik, acting on his own initiative, but two Hindus are still retained as prisoners in Afghan territory. The seizure and detention in Afghanistan of these Border Military Police constables has caused a considerable stir along the frontier, which renders it very difficult, if not dangerous, to overlook the incident. On the 15th December, a gang attacked and looted the Pabbi Police Post, about 14 miles to the east of Peshawar, securing 5 rifles, and fired on a British officer and detachment of troops who were in the vicinity. There is no doubt that this gang also consisted mainly of Zakka Khels. On the 11th January, four bullock-drivers were seized on the road between Peshawar and Matanni, by thirty armed raiders, of whom half were Zakka Khels, and taken to independent territory, whence the men were allowed to return, their eight bullocks being held up to ransom. On 14th January, the same gang attacked the Serai at Matanni in the vicinity of a Police Station, and carried off 31 camels and other property after firing on a Border Military Police patrol. Other raids were contemplated during the dark nights at the beginning of February, but the raiders captured a large herd of camels owned by men of the Peshawar District, just across the administrative border, and so did not actually enter the district. It must be also remembered that, in addition to these specific offences committed mainly by the Zakka Khel at the end of a long course of misconduct which we have vainly tried to ignore or hush up by *pro formâ* settlements, we have to deal with the fact that, while the clan solemnly agreed in the spring of 1905 not to allow certain outlaws to return to Zakka Khel limits and to prevent the passage of raiders from Afghanistan, they have violated their promises in the most flagrant manner. One headman did try to carry out his promises as regards preventing the passage of raiders. The result was that the whole of the clan went against him and burnt his village and killed the headman and his brother and turned out his relations. This shows that the clan can act effectively when they choose, and they ought to be made to act for, instead of against, Government. We cannot hope to secure the support of well-disposed men of the tribe, if we ignore so open an act of hostility towards the British Government and their well-wishers as this.

Fortunately, a day or two after the Badbher raid, the local authorities were able to make reprisals and made prisoners of 21 Zakka Khel—of these, 11 belong to the Zia-ud-din subsection, with whom the Badbher raiders put up, both coming and going—and this promptly had the effect of bringing in the Zia-ud-din section to beg for the release of the prisoners. This success, satisfactory so far as it goes, cannot be expected to have any lasting effect upon the real problem. In order to minimise the risk of the Zakka Khel causing trouble while the Amir was on his way to India, either in the Khyber, or in Afghan territory, we brought the fact of the Pabbi and Badbher raids, and the general misconduct of the Zakka Khel, to the notice of the Amir, through the British Agent at Kabul. The Amir replied to the British Agent that the Afridis were under the Government of India, that he had no concern with them, and was not responsible for their acts. In conversation with our Foreign Secretary the Amir again disclaimed any connection with the Zakka Khel. Notwithstanding this, however, a great many of the Zakka Khel went to Basawal and Dakka in the hope of being recognised by the Amir on his journey to India; they argue that they are independent and can choose whether they shall be our or the Amir's subjects. In our telegram of the 13th December, 1906, we warned the Chief Commissioner against taking any action which was likely to lead to an open rupture, till after the Amir had gone back to Afghanistan. If the Zakka Khel continued thereafter to raid in British territory, and to maintain their defiant attitude, we were of opinion that it would be impossible any longer to avoid taking active measures to bring them to submission. Sir H. Deane represented that it would be useless to call in the Zakka Khel when the other sections of the Afridis came in for their allowances, and to patch up another settlement. Forbearance was regarded as weakness, promises given were broken as soon as made, and the section had, moreover, taken up an attitude of deliberate defiance. He proposed, therefore, not to call in the Zakka Khel, and, if possible, to ignore them till March. To ignore the Zakka Khel would have no worse effect than to call them in and stop the whole of their allowances for the payment of fines and the settlement of cases; and we therefore authorised Sir Harold Deane to adopt this course. It was not anticipated that this would bring the Zakka Khel to their senses, and though they might realise that the patience of Government was exhausted, and under pressure from other sections might possibly mend their ways, the probability was that they would continue to commit offences as before, in which case, Sir Harold Deane pointed out, the only course would be that recommended by the loyal Afridi maliks themselves, viz., the occupation of the Bazar valley. In putting forward this proposal, the Chief Commissioner explained that occupation entailed, first, the subjugation of the people by troops, and thereafter the establishment of posts in the country. The attitude of the Zakka Khel has not improved. The tribe regard themselves as committed to an attitude hostile to Government and have picketted all the roads and passes leading from the Khyber to the Bazar Valley, and it is reported that they are only waiting an opportunity to commit further serious raids. But, even should there be for the moment a cessation of raids, the clan alrealy owe, in the shape of fines and compensation for raids an amount which would not be covered even by the stoppage of their allowances for the next three years, a measure which would be undesirable as tending inevitably to lead to further disturbances. It would be manifestly unjust to make the other clans of Afridis, who have behaved well, responsible in any way for the misconduct of the Zakka Khel, and any such course would have the effect of driving the whole of them to make common cause with the Zakka Khel and consolidate the already weakening bonds of Afridi union. The immunity of the Zakka Khel from punishment is, it is reported, having the worst effect on the border tribes; and it is confidently expected that, if we do not speedily adopt severe measures, we shall be called upon, sooner or later, to undertake punitive operations on an extensive scale. The Amir, apparently, has genuinely changed his policy towards the Afridis and forbids his officers to intrigue with them. If this attitude is strictly maintained it will give us a much freer hand and relieve us of some anxiety in dealing with tribal territory on the Afghan frontier; and we are confident that, so far as our relations with the Amir and the tribes are concerned, better and more lasting results are to be expected by our taking a bold course and by holding the western exits from the Bazar Valley than by any minor temporary punishment of the tribe that might be inflicted. We should, as was done in the case of the Mohmands in

1897, give the Amir full information of our intentions and of the causes that have compelled us to take action, and would request him to prevent his bad characters from joining in, so that our operations may be confined to the territory of the Zakka Khel. The present would appear a very suitable time for carrying the project into execution, as the Amir has twice repudiated any connection with the Zakka Khel and has indicated clearly that the duty of keeping them in order lies with us. In ordinary circumstances we should have no difficulty in recommending to you a punitive expedition against this clan, or a blockade of their country. But the geographical position in which they are placed gives rise to several important considerations. Should we enter the Bazar Valley with a punitive expedition, only to retire from it as has previously been done in numerous instances, both there as well as in other parts of the frontier, we should merely raise a possible hornet's nest and a fresh outburst of hatred against us. The openings from the Bazar Valley over the passes into Afghanistan, and southwards into Tirah, would enable all the fighting-men and bad characters of the tribe to escape with ease, leaving only women, children, and the better disposed inhabitants to suffer the punishment that would be inflicted on their country; and, when we had withdrawn, the present raids and disorders would recur in an aggravated form. Whereas, if we were to remain and administer the Bazar Valley, we could, by making roads, develop it, protect the law-abiding portion of the population, and prevent further intrigues with Afghanistan. We cannot, however, place these considerations before you without letting you know that there is a possibility of the other Afridi clans taking part with the Zakka Khel, in which case the expedition would become one of greater dimensions. But we do not consider that such action on the part of the other Afridis is probable, as their sympathies are evidently not with the Zakka Khel in their misbehaviour and hostility to Government; and, if an expedition struck sharply and without long warning, the remainder of the tribes would probably agree entirely that the punishment meted out to the section was justly deserved. In any case, our position in the Bazar Valley would be an excellent one both from the political and military point of view, protecting the Khyber line and with easy communication with the settled districts we now occupy. If we remained in the Zakka Khel country the position we should hold would be strictly limited to the Bazar Valley alone, bounded on the North-West by the range crossed by the Sassobai and Thabai passes and on the South-West by the range dividing it from the Bara Valley. These natural boundaries would give clear lines of demarcation between our posts and Afghanistan on the one side and the remainder of the Afridi country on the other. If, after due examination of the facts and considerations placed before you, you agree with us that an expedition against the Zakka Khel is now advisable in order to maintain our prestige and authority amongst the tribes on the North-West frontier, we shall be glad to receive early instructions, as such an expedition should be undertaken in the spring and the necessary preparations will have to be made. If, on the other hand, you do not consider that any interference with tribal country is at present justifiable, we fear that, owing to the wild and mountainous country on our border line marching with Afridi country, it will be impossible by any extension of local guards or patrols adequately to protect our territory from nightly raids by the Zakka Khel. It seems to us that the only course we can follow in these circumstances will be to wait until the Zakka Khel have by their hostile acts rendered military operations of the nature we have discussed indispensable. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that we are thus running a considerable risk of other tribes on the frontier joining the Zakka Khels, which would no doubt entail military operations on an extensive scale in order to maintain the position we now hold.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 3rd December, 1906.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward copies of the marginally noted correspondence regarding the future treatment of the Zakka Khel section of the Afridis, and to submit the following remarks for the consideration and orders of the Government of India. Ever since the settlement of 1897 the record of this section has been consistently unsatisfactory. The Khyber Diaries give continuous evidence of the misdemeanours of the Zakka Khel, and for the last three years their misconduct has on more than one occasion been tantamount to open hostility to Government. In my letter, dated 28th September, 1904, I was constrained to call attention to the attitude of open defiance assumed by the Zakka Khel in conection with the Darshi Khel raid case. But for special reasons it was impossible at that juncture to recommend strong measures against them. The following year showed no improvement. Indeed the accumulation of offences committed by the Zakka Khel between April, 1905, and January, 1906, was of so grave a nature that the Political Agent pressed for drastic action against them. A list of these offences is enclosed. After a very full consideration of the whole circumstances of the case I came to the conclusion that the time was not suitable to press Government to adopt measures which might lead to punitive operations on an extended scale. I accordingly asked Major Roos-Keppel to do his utmost to effect a settlement on the usual lines, and to induce the Zakka Khel by political methods to mend their ways. The result was the settlement last spring, which, while reflecting great credit on the diplomacy of the Political Agent and his Assistant, was obviously little better than a makeshift for the maintenance of peace. There was one element in it, however, which gave some hope that there was genuine wish on the part of the Zakka Khel not to break with Government, namely, that they definitely disclaimed all connection with the Hazarnao gang, and repudiated any idea of sympathy or co-operation with these marauders. The sequel, however, has been not only a continuance of raiding on the part of the Zakka Khel themselves, but an open declaration of their intention to support the Hazarnao gang against Government. The list of offences enclosed with Major Roos-Keppel's letter dated 26th November, 1906, shows that this section have no intention whatever of abiding by their promises made last spring, while the action of the section in combining to kill publicly the persons believed to have helped Government against a gang from Hazarnao, in which no Zakka Khel was included, is sufficient evidence of the intention of the tribe to support raiders from Afghanistan by all means in their power against Government. The actual execution of Zakka Khel by Zakka Khel is a matter with which Government, *ipso facto*, is not concerned; but where such execution is tantamount to an open declaration to Government of the adoption of a line of action directly opposed to Government, emphasised by the re-admission into the country of Multan and other bad characters, the matter cannot, I think, be ignored. The fact must be faced that the Zakka Khel have dared openly to take up an attitude of defiance to Government, and, as shown by Major Roos-Keppel, they and all other Afridi clans are waiting to see the result. It is impossible to ignore this factor in the case. Our information is very definite regarding the visits of Zakka Khel elders to Kabul. In view of the present position as described above Major Roos-Keppel has again pressed for definite action. I have personally discussed the whole question with Major Roos-Keppel and with Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan, his Assistant, and have given the question very full consideration before deciding to address Government. But I think the time has come when Government must decide whether things are to go on as before or whether definite action is to be taken against the Zakka Khel. I am the more ready to bring the matter forward, as I am of opinion that whether Government decide, as proposed, to decline to call in the Zakka Khel and forfeit the allowances, or whether they prefer another settlement on the old lines, raiding and misconduct will continue; and indeed that inaction on the part of Government is more likely to encourage such offences than the forfeiture of the

(1) Political Agent Khyber's letter dated 18th November, 1906.
(2) Secretary to Chief Commissioner's letter dated 24th November, 1906.
(3) Political Agent Khyber's letter dated 26th November, 1906, and enclosures.

allowances. An exercise of patience is not likely to be more successful in future than it has been in the past. Indeed, the Maliks of the tribe themselves have long realised this; and I need only refer to the opinion given me by responsible Afridi Maliks, and reported in my letter, dated 28th September, 1904, to the effect that the only remedy was to be found in the occupation of the Bazar Valley. This alone will effectually protect British subjects in the adjoining settled districts against the constant depredations from which they have so long suffered. I think, therefore, that the least that should be done is to direct the Political Agent not to call in the Zakka Khel for their allowances, and to explain to the other sections when they attend for their allowances the reason. As already stated, I do not anticipate that this will effectually bring the Zakka Khel to their senses. It is possible that they may realise that the patience of Government is exhausted, and under pressure from other sections may mend their ways. It is more probable that they will continue to commit offences as before. In this case the only course will be that recommended by the Afridi Maliks themselves, viz., the occupation of the Bazar Valley, which will not only finally close this back-door for raiding, but will secure, what is infinitely more important, this flank of the Khyber. Such action would have the full punitive and deterrent effect which the Tirah Expedition of 1897-98 so signally failed to produce on this section. By occupation of the Bazar Valley, I must explain, is meant first, the subjugation of the people by troops, and then the building of posts at important points in the country to be held by the Khyber Rifles. It would be unnecessary to take further steps than this beyond disallowing the erection of fortified towers anywhere in the valley. I believe that such occupation would be speedily followed by the Zakka Khel settling down to the peaceful cultivation of their lands. In his reply to my letter, dated 24th November, 1906, Major Roos-Keppel suggests that, in the event of Government being driven to use force against the Zakka Khel, there is the possibility of an outbreak of what we call fanaticism, but which the tribesmen call patriotism. In cases of this nature, where not only our own subjects, but trans-border men as well, admit that Government is driven to use force, owing to the misbehaviour of a tribe, there is little fear of an outbreak of fanaticism, while with the Afridis generally the feeling of patriotism, which, I venture to say, is an entirely different thing from fanaticism, is far more calculated to keep other sections from taking part with the Zakka Khel. They have nothing to gain by so doing. And if the other sections are given clearly to understand that the action of Government is directed against the Zakka Khel alone, they will think twice before committing themselves to action which might lead to another invasion of Tirah. The fighting strength of the Bazar Zakka Khel is only 600 men, and while doubtless individual members of other sections might join them, I do not think it probable that they would do so in large numbers. I have thought it right to lay the whole facts as clearly as I can before Government, and to state, as far as possible, what seems the probable results of the course proposed; and I would ask for early orders as to the action, if any, approved by Government. In the meantime I propose to direct the Political Agent, in view of the fact that the allowances are paid early in January, not to call in the Zakka Khel pending the decision of the Government of India on the case. I would ask that the approval of Government to this course, if given, may be intimated to me by telegram.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 18th November, 1906

(Extract.)

I have the honour, as the Afridi jirgas will shortly be coming to Peshawar to receive payment of their annual allowances, to ask for an expression of the Honourable the Chief Commissioner's wishes regarding the manner in which the Zakka Khel section is to be treated. Throughout the seven years during which I have held charge of the Khyber Agency the most troublesome and difficult question to be annually decided has been the treatment of this intractable clan. Everything that it is humanly possible to do by kindness, liberality and patience to show the Zakka Khel the error of their ways has been done, but to their minds liberality spells blackmail and patience fear or weakness. Bitterly hostile as they are to everything and every person connected with British rule, they would prefer to remain in savage isolation and to have no relations with us, but owing to the barrenness of their country and to their poverty and cupidity they are forced to pay bi-annual visits to Peshawar to receive their allowances and to purchase the necessaries of life. Each year there is a

long tale of accusations against Zakka Khel for offences committed in British territory, and each year those offences which are considered proved are settled, or, to speak more truly compromised, and the clan gets a fresh start, with a clean sheet, on its career of mischief. The jirga of the tribe professes at each interview the greatest goodwill towards Government and a keen desire to live on good terms with us. As case after case comes up for discussion the elders point out that the offence has been committed by individuals, and that just as the police cannot prevent the commission of such offences in British territory, so it is unreasonable to expect that a community without head and without organization can restrain its individual members. There is something in this argument, but there would be more but for the fact that every man, woman and child in the clan looks upon those who commit raids, murders and robberies in Peshawar or Kohat as heroes and champions. They are the crusaders of the nation; they depart with the good wishes and prayers of all, and are received on their return after a successful raid with universal rejoicings and congratulations. Should a raider be killed during a raid, as has happened several times during the past year, he is pronounced to be a martyr, and is mourned as such. On the other hand his victims die as "Kafirs," and are condemned to eternal damnation for no crime but that of being British subjects. This feeling not only extends to members of the clan but to outsiders, Afghans and outlaws; in fact to any one who will openly defy and challenge the British authorities. Year after year the evil has grown, and each year the necessity of punishing the Zakka Khel has become more pressing. Circumstances, larger questions of policy, and the natural dislike of Government to strong measures, have saved the clan from the punishment which it so richly deserves. As long as these frontier tribes—hungry, heavily armed and hostile to us—continue to exist on our immediate border we must, of course, expect offences to be committed in British territory, and had nothing more serious occurred during the past year I would not have troubled the Honourable the Chief Commissioner with this representation, but would have, as usual, patched up some sort of a settlement to carry us on to next year, waiting for the day when the Government of India will decide to end a situation which cannot be a source of pride or satisfaction. I will therefore not refer to the usual list of raids, murders and robberies. It is not greater than usual, and is capable of settlement according to the precedents of the last seven years. This year the Zakka Khel have *as a whole* broken all their promises to us, have committed themselves to a deliberate demonstration against Government, have openly taken sides with our avowed enemies, and have formally inflicted a tribal punishment upon men who have ventured to serve us. All this has been done to avenge the deaths of three Peshawar outlaws, members of the "Hazarnao gang," and to crush out from amongst the Zakka Khel any remnant not actively hostile to us. Whenever the question has been raised of the "Hazarnao gang" and of the responsibility of the Afridis through whose country its members have passed when on raiding expeditions, the Zakka Khel elders have always protested that they were the greatest sufferers by the gang, being always unjustly punished for the offences of men, their enemies, who lived in Afghanistan and were able to cross the uninhabited hills between that country and Peshawar without observation. Under great pressure, and with the fear before their eyes of the loss of their allowances, they, in 1905, cleared themselves of complicity with these foreign raiders by burning the houses of some Afridis who were members of the gang, by driving them out of the country, and by giving a written agreement that these men would never be allowed to return. They have all returned, have rebuilt their houses without let, hindrance, or objection of any kind, are now stronger than ever, and take a leading part in the politics of the clan. The Zakka Khel elders also promised to do all in their power to prevent the passage through their country of raiders from Afghanistan, to resist them by force if necessary, and to co-operate in their capture. In July this year a Zakka Khel elder named Lal Baz gave information regarding the movements of a detachment of the Hazarnao gang, and he and his brothers, Inzarai and Sher Baz, and nephew, Kachkol, were induced to co-operate in the capture of the detachment. A most successful sortie by Captain Bickford resulted in the killing of two Peshawar outlaws, the arrest of one Peshawari outlaw, and of one Afghan subject, all members of the "Hazarnao gang." Although none of these men were Afridis, and though they had no connection with the Zakka Khel, their capture caused throughout the clan the greatest sympathy with them, and the greatest indignation against those who had been instrumental in their downfall. Within a few days of the return to Bazar of the men who had helped us it was resolved to take a jirga and lashkar of the whole clan to mete exemplary punishment to those traitors to the national cause who had dared to keep their promises and to aid the British authorities. The complete lashkar of the clan (excluding only the two Maliks and the Pakhai section who live in the Khyber and have little concern with affairs in Bazar) proceeded to the village of Lal Baz, the Elder who had helped us. Lal Baz was first ordered to pay a fine or "nagha," which he at once agreed to do, but this did not satisfy the avengers of the Peshawari outlaws. Both he and his brother Inzarai were shot dead, their village sacked, and their relations and dependents driven out of the tribe to take refuge with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, the Malikdin Khel Chief of Chura. The Zakka Khel are now watching to see what action we will take in the matter. They have deliberately broken their engagements, have defied Government, and have executed and banished members of their clan for the offence of assisting the British authorities. If we pass over this matter it will be obvious to all that we do so out of fear of the consequences, and the other Afridi clans, who are closely watching this test case, will be encouraged to defy us. We can, of course, never hope to induce any individual Zakka Khel elder to help us again now that all have seen the consequences of such action, but we still have an important party and many loyal Maliks and Elders amongst the other Afridis. If we do nothing in support of the men who have died and been ruined in our cause, we shall destroy our only machinery for controlling the Afridi clans and shall make a great step towards open war with them, as all restraint will be removed by the loss of the influence now exerted by the loyal party. The only way to effectually and finally

punish the Zakka Khel is to occupy and hold Bazar with posts at China, Mangal Bagh and Sassobi. This was recommended by all the Afridi Maliks in 1904, and it remains, and will remain, the only completely satisfactory solution of the problem. If, however, Government are not yet prepared to take strong action, I can only recommend that the allowances now due to the Zakka Khel (excluding the Pakhai) amounting to Rs. 5,950 shall be forfeited, and that compensation be paid to the families of the two men who were executed for assisting us after we have settled up the claims against the clan for offences in Kohat and Peshawar. Every opportunity will be taken to carry out the Honourable the Chief Commissioner's instructions regarding punishment by "baramta," but the Zakka Khel do not migrate to the plains in any large numbers as do the other Afridis each winter, and the men we want to get hold of seldom venture within the border except under the safe conduct of a jirga.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Political Agent, Khyber, dated 24th November, 1906.

With reference to your letter dated 18th November, 1906, regarding the future treatment of the Zakka Khel Afridis, I am directed to say that before definitely deciding what, if any, action should be taken in the matter, the Chief Commissioner would be glad of further information on the following points, viz.:—

(1) In the event of the Zakka Khel allowances being forfeited as suggested in your letter, what attitude may this section reasonably be expected to adopt? Is the immediate result likely to be a considerable increase in raiding and lawlessness on the part of the Zakka Khel?

(2) If so, and if the misconduct of the tribe is such as to force Government to adopt the only effectual measure possible to check it, *viz.*, the occupation of the Bazar Valley, what do you consider would be the attitude of the other Afridi clans? Would they openly join the Afridis in resisting Government, and thus necessitate another general Afridi war?

2. I am also to ask you to furnish a statement of the important cases now outstanding against the Zakka Khel.

Annexure 3.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 26th November, 1906.

I have the honour, with reference to your letter of 24th instant, to state in reply to your queries:—

(*a*) It is difficult to prophesy regarding the attitude of the Zakka Khel under and after serious punishment. This clan has no equal in unruliness and we have no precedent to guide us, as they have never been really punished. You will remember that even after the Tirah Expedition the Zakka Khel escaped, as their share of the Afridi fine was paid by the other clans, who have not yet succeeded in recovering any part of it.

Now that nearly all the Zakka Khel have committed themselves to a deliberate demonstration against Government (as explained in my letter of 18th instant), that some of their most powerful elders, such as Dadai and Sherzada, who were formerly in favour of peaceful relations with us, have openly thrown in their lot with the anti-British party in Tirah, and that the Afridi leaders of the late "Hazarnao gang" have returned to their country, we may, I believe, expect during the coming winter raiding on a more extensive scale than usual whether it is decided to forfeit the allowances or not. The Zakka Khel as a tribe are, I believe, cowards at heart, and if they take the forfeiture of their allowances to mean that the patience of Government is really exhausted and that their long delayed punishment is really coming, it is possible that they may be frightened into comparative quiescence for a time. On the other hand they may think that by repeated raids they may frighten Government into buying them off. They now feel that they have committed themselves almost beyond forgiveness, and are waiting in considerable trepidation to see what we will do.

If we send for them as usual, they will take it that their punishment is to be again indefinitely deferred, and will be proportionately elated. Their offences have been so serious that after deducting the compensation due to sufferers by their raids and fines imposed for their misconduct there will be no balance to pay, and this will irritate them all the more on account of the high hopes raised by receipt of the summons to come in. They would, of course, drag out every case and force us to feed their huge jirgas for so long that they would probably go away feeling that they had received allowances in fact, if not in name, but they would have the grievance that all, or nearly all, their allowances had been cut, and would proceed to "call attention to this grievance," as they put it, by raiding.

(*b*) If we call the elders of the other Afridi tribes, explain the whole case to them, and assure them that unless they deliberately join the Zakka Khel we have no quarrel with them, and have no intention of going beyond Bazar or of interfering with them in any way, it is probable that they will acquiesce in our action, though they will not be able to prevent individuals joining the Zakka Khel in their resistance. But if we go in without warning they

may believe that our advance on Bazar is but the first step to the occupation of Tirah, and in that case they would assemble to defend the glacis of their position.

There is, of course, the possibility of an outburst of what we call fanaticism and what the tribesmen call patriotism, and this might unite all sections in a last struggle against us, but the dominating characteristic of the Afridi, his overpowering selfishness, gives reason to believe that he would sacrifice his neighbour to save himself.

2. I enclose a statement of the more important cases against the Zakka Khel, from which you will see that the estimate of compensation to be recovered from them is Rs. 6,058-8-0, and of fines Rs. 4,875, a total of Rs. 10,933-8-0.

This estimate is, of course, very rough. We have not yet heard the defence in any of the cases. Some it may not be possible to prove, and some of the claims for compensation may be exaggerated. On the other hand more claims may be sent in before the time comes for the distribution of the allowances. The amount for the past seven months due to the Zakka Khel (excluding the Khyber Pakhai) is Rs. 5,950, so there can be nothing to be paid to them, but by forfeiting their allowances, instead of sending for the jirga and going into each case separately, we shall save so much, by not having to feed them for ten days or a fortnight, that we should still be able to pay compensation to the families of Lal Baz and Inzarai, who were killed by the Zakka Khel jirga, if it is considered expedient to do so. In the list of cases I have not included the very serious raid by the Hazarnao gang on the village of Chogne on 21st March, 1906, in which property worth Rs. 15,722 was carried off, although it is said that some Zakka Khel were of the party, and although, according to Afghan and tribal custom, the Zakka Khel have now by their protection of the members of the Hazarnao gang acknowledged their responsibility for them.

Nor have I included any fine or "nagha" on account of the return to Tirah of Multan, Usman, Raktao, Mirza Ali, Khealai and other Afridis of the "Hazarnao gang," although the Zakka Khel were forgiven heavy fines in 1904 in return for expelling these men from their country and for swearing that they would never allow them to return.

Annexure 4.

Statement of serious offences of which Zakka Khel Afridis are accused since the settlement of 31st March, 1906.

No.	Date of occurrence.	Note of case.	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks.
			Rs. A. P.	Rs.	
1	28th March, 1906...	Alam Shah, Anai, Muhammad Asghar, Zia-ud-din, some other Zia-ud-din, Multan and some outlaws of the Hazarnao gang raided the grazing grounds of Masho Khel, Peshawar District, and carried off six buffaloes and six bullocks.	400 0 0	500	Information as to the offenders in this case was not received until after the settlement of 31st March, 1906. The owner of the animals, Usman, of Shahab Khel, went to Dakka and paid the Sarhang Rs. 50 to help him, paid Rs. 10 to Sadbashi Moghal, and Rs. 40 to Multan at Hazarnao. He eventually recovered three buffaloes and six bullocks through the assistance of the above. Putting the three buffaloes he lost at Rs. 100 each, he spent directly Rs. 400, besides incidental expenses. The offenders must be fined for violating British territory.
2	2nd May, 1906 ...	Sadozai Paindai, Azmat, Muhammad Asghar, Muhammad Afzal, Gul Mir, Mir Ahmad, Zia-ud-din; Multan and Rakhtu, Anai; Majid and Khawas Khan, Pakhai, of Bara, and other Zakka Khel kidnapped two Hindus, Indar Singh and Mangal Singh, of Lahore in Orakzai country, and held them to ransom.	500 0 0	—	The Hindus were eventually ransomed by their friends for Rs. 1.000 Kabuli = about Rs. 500 British. No violation of British territory occurred, so it is not necessary to impose any fine.
3	28th May, 1906 ...	A band of about 27 men, including Chaman, Khusrogi, and other Zakka Khel of Bazar, some Peshawar outlaws, and some Zaka Khel Afridis, attacked the village of Shahab Khel in the Peshawar District. The villagers defended themselves and drove the party off. Two of the villagers were killed and one wounded, and one raider, a Zakka Khel, is said to have been slightly wounded.	1,500 0 0	1,500	This is a very serious case as an armed violation of British territory, and as including two murders and one attempted murder. The third person wounded eventually died from the wounds received.
		Carried forward ...			

No.	Date of occurrence.	Note of case.	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks.
		Brought forward ...	Rs. A. P.	Rs.	
4	7th June, 1906 ...	Usman and a band of Zakka Khel of Bazar kidnapped a Hindu named Jaimal Singh from the border near Jola Talab, Peshawar District. The Hindu was passed from hand to hand to Nazian, where he was held to ransom.	407 8 0	300	Jaimal Singh was eventually ransomed for Rs. 250 (British), and claims Rs. 157-8-0, value of a mule and other property stolen.
5	5th July, 1906 ...	Muhammad Asghar and other Zia-ud-din, with Multan, Anai, and some Hazarnao outlaws, attacked the village of Marai Bala, but the villagers were on the alert, and the raiders were driven off after some shots had been exchanged.	—	500	No damage done, but an armed violation of British territory.
6	6th July, 1906 ...	The same gang as No. 5 raided the village of Kajai Marai in the Kohat District. They killed two men and carried off two Government rifles—one Enfield and one Snider.	1,300 0 0	1,200	A clear case. The rifles were with the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, and have now been sent to Nazian for sale. The market value of a Snider rifle is about Rs. 200 and of an Enfield is Rs. 100.
7	29th/30th June, 1906	Usman, Gudai and Babai, Khusrogi Zakka Khel, with a band of Peshawar outlaws and Aka Khel, murdered three men of Matanni, Peshawar District.	375 0 0	375	In this case there were three Zakka Khel concerned out of a band of twelve. Putting compensation for the three men murdered at Rs. 1,500 and fine Rs. 1,500, the Zakka Khel would be liable for one-fourth of this sum.
8	29th August, 1906...	Amir Shah and other Zakka Khel of Bazar and Ghandal and other outlaws of Hazarnao raided the village of Urmur and carried off 31 donkeys and Rs. 336 in cash.	1,576 0 0	500	A violation of British territory. Urmur donkeys are worth from Rs. 40 to Rs. 80 each. Taking the lowest figure, the 31 would be worth Rs. 1,240.
		Total	6,058 8 0	4,875	

Annexure 5.

Statement showing cases pending against the Zakka Khel Afridis since the 1st April, 1905.

Serial No.	Date of occurrence.	Place of occurrence.	Complainants.	Accused.	Nature of offence.	Remarks on the case.	Value of property still to be recovered.	General Remarks.
							Rs. A. P.	
1	9th April, 1905 ...	Ashtarzai, Kohat District.	Baz Gul of Ashtarzai ...	Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel	Theft of seven bullocks valued at Rs. 210.	—	210 0 0	
2	24th April, 1905 ...	Near Wazir Talab...	Mir Ahmad of Kabul, Muhammad Rafiq, Zakha, of Barg, and Akbar, Kuki Khel, of Sarakas.	Mir Husain, Bandrai, Angrezai and Sarfaraz, Khusrogis, and Gul Badshah, Anai.	Plunder of property worth Rs. 216-9-0.	—	216 9 0	
3	Ditto ...	Banda Marai Bala, Kohat.	Madghani, Ali Muhammad, Bagh Ali, Mani Khels, now of Banda Marai.	Yar Ghulam, Haidar, Sahib Alam, Dedak, Zia-ud-dins, and three Pakhai Zakka Khel of Bara.	Theft of 16 sheep... ...	The sheep were eventually recovered.	—	
4	25th/26th April, 1905	Matanni	Shahzalla of Matanni ...	Hasan Gul, relation of Multan, Anai; Mehrab Shah and Abdul Wahid, Aka Khel.	Theft of five dak tonga horses.	Hasan Gul is accused of having fed the offenders. The horses were recovered by the chigha party.	—	
5	9th/10th May, 1905	Adezai (Peshawar)	Crown through Bhagwan Das, son of Harji, of Adezai; Rohel Singh, Mahmud and Mozaffar, wounded.	Usman and Niazai, Khusrogis; Kachkol, Akbarai; Sher Ali and Lal Mast, Paindais; and some Aka Khel and Hazarnawis.	Dacoity with plunder of property worth Rs. 901; one Enfield rifle, and wounding of the three complainants.	—	1,001 0 0	This does not include blood money for three men wounded at Rs. 180 each.
6	31st May, 1905 ...	Kezar (Marai, Kohat District).	Villagers of Kezar ...	Multan, Anai; Jafar, outlaw; Ismail, Mishti; Sher Ahmad, Feroz Khel; and some Hazarnawis.	Plunder of 162 goats ...	The goats were recovered	—	
7	9th/10th June, 1905	Spin-Varai (Kohat)	Nand Ram, son of Bojah Ram, of Dara, Mani Khel.	Sarmast, Zia-ud-din	Rs. 42 on account of bhunga money for a mule.	—	42 0 0	
8	12th June, 1905 ...	Matanni (Peshawar)	Crown through the villagers.	Usman, Babrai, Gul Samand, Mazdur, Niazai, Muhammad, Gul Hasan and Shahmard, Khusrogis; Kachkol, Anai, hamsaya of Shino, brother of Santak, Shan Khel.	Theft of 16 camels ...	—	1,600 0 0	
9	20th/21st June, 1905	Shahab Khel ...	Crown through Haidar Khan of Shahab Khel.	Nur Ghulam, Shan Khel	Abduction of two women and theft of property worth Rs. 1,230.	—	1,230 0 0	
10	21st June, 1905 ...	Kohat border near Mishti.	Fateh Khan and Gulab Din of Hangu.	Said Nur, Mehr Haq, Muhammad Asghar, Mir Rahman, Sher Asghar, Zia-ud-din.	Theft of four bullocks and property worth Rs. 188-9-0.	—	188 9 0	
11	8th July, 1905 ...	Sadda (Kurram) ...	Ghain-ud-din, Salim, Mulla Umar, Nur Muhammad and Dharmu, Hindu, of Sadda.	Shah Mir, Shan Khel, Zakha Khel	Theft of two mares with two colts and kidnapping of two men.	The men effected their escape from Tirah.	200 0 0	
12	5th August, 1905 ...	Matanni (Peshawar).	Fahim and others of Matanni.	Usman, Nazar Gul, Dar Samand, Ahmad and Shino, Khusrogis, and Mir Khush, Anai.	Dacoity with plunder of 135 goats and 2 donkeys.	—	600 0 0	

13	30th/31st August, 1905.	Shahi Bala (Peshawar).	Crown through Maulvi Abdul Rahim Khan, retired Extra Assistant Commissioner.	Yar Shah, Gul Raza and Akhtar Shah, Pakhais, of Barg: Kachkol, Inzar, Daulat, Paindais; Dar Samand, Khusrogi; Mehr Gul, Karigar, of Kadam.	Dacoity with plunder of property worth Rs. 700 and cash Rs. 40.	—	740 0 0	
14	4th September, 1905	Marai Bala and Payan (Kohat border).	Malik Babrai; Gul Din of Dara Sarakai.	Said Mir, Baz Mir, Payo Nur, Mir Akbar Muhammad Afzal, Asgharai Zia-ud-dins.	Theft of eight camels valued at Rs. 1,600.	—	1,600 0 0	Value of property as estimated by owners. Probable real value about Rs. 700 or Rs. 809.
15	26th September, 1905	Urmur Payan (Peshawar).	Lodi Khan, son of Arsalla, Mishti, of Mishti Darra, Kohat District.	Inzar and Akbar Shah, Paindais; Sabai of Bazar; Miran Shah of Bara.	Theft of four camels ...	—	400 0 0	
16	27th September, 1905	Hills near Maira Matanni (Independent territory).	Bazai, &c.; 25 men of Matanni (Peshawar).	Rakhtu, brother of Multan, Anai; Amir Shah, brother of Yar Shah, Ghandal outlaw; Ismail and Lall Khan, Mishtis; Sher Khan, Mir Badshah, &c., Aka Khel.	Dacoity with plunder of nine bullocks, three Snider rifles, and murder of one man.	Though the actual scene of occurrence was in independent territory, the accused committed the offence regardless of British or independent territory.	600 0 0	This does not include blood money for one man Rs. 360.
17	3rd/4th October, 1905.	Spin Khak (Peshawar).	The villagers	Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel; Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad Asghar and Waliz Khan, Zia-ud-din; Yasin Gul, Sher Aslam, Niqab Shah, &c., Aka Khel.	Theft of seven ponies with gunny bags.	—	350 0 0	
18	21th October, 1905	Maira near Jamrud Railway Station.	Dad Shah, son of Akbar Shah, of Lund Khowar, ilaqua Mardan.	Yar Shah, Pakhai, of Barg, with his hamsayas Aurang Shah and Muhammad Shah, Mians, of Barg.	Dacoity with plunder of six camels.	The camels have been recovered and restored to the complainants.	—	
19	28th October, 1905	Daulat, Rai Banda, Kohat border.	Izzat Khan, Sohbat Khan and Wali Khan, sepoys of 21st Infantry.	Saidak, son of Sherzada, Anai; Zar Gul, son of Taza, Paindai; and Ismail and Lal Khan, Mishtis, and others.	Kidnapping of three men	The complainants effected their escape by killing the two Zakka Khels in Tirah.	—	
20	7th November, 1905	Kachai (Landai, Kohat).	Gulab Sher, Shah Anwar Gul, and Miru.	Ghandal, Peshawari outlaw; Gul Samand and Bibrai, Khusrogis; Said Nur, Mir Asghar, Muhammad Afzal and Pahalwan, Zia-ud-din.	Kidnapping of Shah Anwar Gul and Miru, complainants, and plunder of clothes, &c., worth Rs. 35.	The two men managed to escape from Bazar.	35 0 0	
21	14th November, 1905	Mackeson Bridge on the Khyber road below Fort Maude.	Muhammad Zaman, son of Malik Afridi Khan, of Malazai.	Usman and Mursal, Khusrogis; Santak, Shan Khel, with ten others, and a Pakhai of Karamna.	Dacoity with plunder of eight camels.	—	800 0 0	
						Total	9,813 2 0	

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 8th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

On night of 5th instant party of some 40 raiders appeared near Badbher eight miles from Peshawar, and carried off four Hindus, one Muhammadan, two tonga ponies, fourteen camels, eight bullocks, two donkeys. A patrol of two police sepoys supposed to have come across the gang are missing. Raiders are reported to be gang headed by Multan, Zakka Khel, and Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel. Village chighas and Border Military Police pursued, but failed to come up with raiders. This case should be considered, in connection with proposals contained in my letter dated 3rd December.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 11th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 8th December, raid on Badbher. The police constables carried off by the gang are said to be alive, and at present detained at Nakhtarnao, between Nazian and Hazarnao, but we have no certain information as yet on this point. We have made a baramta of 21 Zakka Khels, of whom 11 are Zia-ud-dins, with whom the raiders put up, both coming and going, and this may assure safety of men carried off.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter 3rd December. In view of necessity of avoiding disturbance in Khyber direction during Amir's visit to India, and of baramta reported in your telegram of 11th December, do you still propose that Zakka Khel should be called in next month? It is essential to take no action likely to lead to open rupture till after Amir has gone back, and if Zakka Khel must be excluded from payment of allowances, might it not be better on some suitable ground to defer payment of all Afridi allowances until March?

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 11th December. Report now confirmed that two captured policemen are detained at Nakhtarnao, Nazian, in Afghan territory. Gang consisted of 40 persons, mostly Zakka Khel, but including some twelve Sangu Khel of Nakhtarnao.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 13th December. Payment of Afridi allowances has already commenced; anyhow to defer payment would only lead to general misapprehension. Baramta has had effect of bringing in Zia-ud-din section to beg for release of prisoners. They admit entertaining raiders but offer no restitution. We cannot deal with Zia-ud-din without remainder of Zakka Khel, who are unlikely to come in as majority of them have started for Jalalabad in hopes of securing

recognition by Amir. I adhere to the opinion that Zakka Khel should not be summoned and, if possible, should be ignored until March. To this end I have given orders to Roos-Keppel to omit all mention of them to other jirgas, and if Zakka Khel approach him, to put them off till March. It is imperative in interests of British subjects to show Zakka Khel that their defiance followed by raid reported will not be overlooked.

Enclosure 7 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 16th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Information received that on 15th instant gang of raiders attacked Pabbi and looted Police Post taking five Police rifles. At request of villagers Major Miles, who was in vicinity with Military Detachment, proceeded to village and was fired on by raiders who retired. Enquiry is proceeding as to constitution of gang and details of damage done and route taken. The gang was evidently a trans-border one.

Enclosure 8 in No. 11.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 20th December, 1906.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 14th December. In circumstances reported, your proposal not to summon Zakka Khel and, if possible, to ignore them till March next, is approved.

Enclosure 9 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 3rd January, 1907.

In continuation of my telegram of the 16th December, 1906, regarding the raid on Pabbi, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter dated 24th December, 1906, from the Political Agent, Khyber, on the subject.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 24th December, 1906.

I have the honour to report that the result of my enquiries regarding the raid on Pabbi on the night of the 15th instant tends to show that the raiding party was composed as under:—

1. Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi,
2. Rakhtu, brother of above,
3. Khialu, brother of above,
4. Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel Afridi,
5. Usman, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi of Bazar,
6. Babbari, brother of Usman,
7. Gudai, brother of Usman,
8. Dawar Khan, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi,
9. Madak (Fakir), Paindai Zakka Khel Afridi of Bazar,
10. Azghari, Paindai Zakka Khel Afridi of Bazar,
11. Saddozai, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi,
12. Mian Gul, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi.
13. Ibrahim, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi,
14. Mirullah, Sipah Afridi,
15. Muhammad Akbar, Sipah Afridi,
16. Nikab Shah, Meri Khel Aka Khel,
17. Hasham Shah, Meri Khel Aka Khel,
18. Wali Jan Shah, Meri Khel Aka Khel,
19. Zarghun Shah, Madda Khel Aka Khel,
20. Mullagai Shah, Madda Khel Aka Khel,
21. Nur Shah, Bizoti, a Hamsaya of Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel,
22. Sher Rahman, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Bara,

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

23. Zari Shah, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Lawatta,
24. Muhammad Afzal, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Barwan,
25. Khairullah Khan, Sturi Khel Orakzai of Barwan,

with about six or seven Shinwaris of Nazian, Afghan subjects.

This party is reported to have been collected in the neighbourhood of Barkai before and after the raid and to have been entertained by Malik Sanjab. As they brought no cattle or other loot which could not be hidden, the case is not clearly proved against them, but it is generally believed that they committed the raid. None of my informers has seen the Police rifles taken at Pabbi, but it is probable that they would not have recognised them had they done so. In the event of my obtaining any more definite information I will report further.

Enclosure 10 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 5th January, 1907.

Large numbers of Zakka Khel went to Basawal and Dakka to pay their respects to the Amir, but could not find an opportunity of doing so. They lined the roads by which he was to pass, but no notice was taken of them. Some *rukhsatana* was, however, paid them by His Highness's orders, which did not exceed Rs. 2 Kabuli per man. They were much disappointed with the not-at-all warm reception they met with. A serious quarrel has risen between Dadai and Sher Ahmad, Anai Zakka Khel elders. Dadai seems to have incurred the displeasure of the majority of the Anai elders for having embroiled the whole Zakka Khel clan in *badi* (trouble) with the Sarkar, and there are some indications of a rupture among the Bazar Zakka Khel elders. They are sending in messages to be sent for, but so far with no definite proposals to settle anything. The Zakka Khel cattle that had been made *baramta* of last month were sold by public auction in Shilman during the week and fetched over Rs. 600 British. The money will be sent to district authorities to pay as part of compensation in the several cases pending against the Zakka Khel.

Enclosure 11 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 12th January, 1907.

The Zakka Khel are showing no signs of settling their cases, and are perhaps under the belief that sooner or later Government will release their men and patch up a settlement of the old type with them. The mischief-makers among them are not slow in holding out to them all sorts of hopes and vague promises of support, and it is not seldom that self-deputed messengers arrive in Bazar from Ningrahar with summons for *jirgas* or invitations for individual elders.

Enclosure 12 in No. 11.

Endorsement by Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 14th January, 1907.

Copy of the following is forwarded to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department for the information of the Government of India.

Annexure.

From the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 13th January, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Report received from Fort Mackeson, 12th instant, states that at 7, evening, on 11th instant, while Hayatulla and Wahid and Sultan and Taj Muhammad, bullock drivers, of Dagi Banda, Taru Thana, were travelling from Peshawar to Matanni, they were seized near Haidu Talab by thirty armed Afridis who carried off then and there eight bullocks westward. When near independent territory some went towards Badbher, while six were left to look after the prisoners, who were released two hours later. Bullocks were carried off. This occurrence was reported at Matanni Police Station at 3 a.m. on 12th.

Enclosure 13 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 19th January, 1907.

Multan, Mirza Ali, and other members of the Nazian gang were seen lurking about in the neighbourhood of Barkai during the week. They are reported to have raided some bullocks on the Matanni road on the 11th instant, and having deposited the same in some caves near Barki, they returned and raided 43 camels from the Serai at Matanni on the 14th instant. They were assisted by some Zakka Khel and Aka Khel Afridis. In all their recent operations they have been freely passing through the Aka Khel, Barki, Sturi Khel, and Bazar Zakka Khel limits, and unless territorial responsibility is enforced against these clans, especially at this season of the year, when all their *Kaddas* are on the spot, there is no likelihood of their lifting a finger to stop the free use of their countries by the raiders day and night.

Enclosure 14 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 22nd January, 1907.

With reference to my endorsement, dated the 14th January, 1907, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 17th January, 1907, from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, reporting the commission of a raid upon the Matanni Serai on the night of the 14th instant.

Annexure.

Letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar District, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 17th January, 1907.

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Chief Commissioner, the commission of a raid upon the Matanni Serai on the night of the 14th instant. As far as has been ascertained, it appears probable that this raid was the work of the same gang as that which carried off the four men and eight bullocks from the Kohat road on the evening of the 11th instant, as reported in this office telegram, dated 13th January, 1907, and as that which raided Pabbi and Badbher in December last. The raiders carried off 43 camels from the Serai; they were seen by two Border Military Police sowars, who accosted them; the raiders in reply fired upon the sowars and shot one of the horses in the neck; the sowars at once gave warning at the Police Station and the village. A *chigha* turned out, but failed to come up with the raiders.

Enclosure 15 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 2nd February, 1907.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 22nd January, 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters noted in the margin, from the Political Agent, Khyber, regarding the raids on Matanni on the 11th and 14th January, 1907.

(1) Dated the 26th January, 1907.
(2) Dated the 29th January, 1907, and enclosure.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 26th January, 1907.

I have the honour to report that our enquiries regarding the raids on Matanni on the 11th and 14th instant, show that these raids were committed by a mixed gang of Afridis and outlaws, Sangu Khel Shinwaris (Afghan subjects), Aka Khel, and Sturi Khel, the raids being led and organized by Zakka Khel.

About the 8th instant a party left Nakhtarnao (Nazian) in Afghanistan for Bazar; it consisted of the following men:—

(1) Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
(2) Rakhtu, brother of Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
(3) Khialu, " " " "

(4) Taza Khan cousin of Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
(5) Zamir, nephew of Multan, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
(6) Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel Afridi.
(7) A brother of Mirza Ali, Kambar Khel Afridi.
(8) Fakir Shah, Kambar Khel Afridi.
(9) Malang, Kambar Khel Afridi.
(10) Ismail Khan, Mishti Orakzai.
(11) Samand Khan, „
(12 to 17) Six Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Nazian.

They came to Bazar *viâ* the Tabai Pass and spent the night with Dadai, Anai Zakka Khel, at Halwai, where they were joined by—

(18) Sahibdad, Anai Zakka Khel Afridi.
(19) Alam Shah, „ „ „ „
(20) Babri, brother of Usman, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi.
(21) Niazai, Khusrogi Zakka Khel Afridi.

Thence they went to Barkai in the Lower Bara, where they were joined by—

(22) Muhammad Asghar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi.
(23) Muhammad Afzal, „ „ „
(24) Nur Akbar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel Afridi.
(25) Mehr-dak, „ „ „
(26) Ibrahim, „ „ „
(27) Baz Muhammad, Mada Khel Aka Khel, Lower Bara Valley.
(28) Khagai, Mada Khel Aka Khel, Lower Bara Valley.
(29) Mehrab Shah, Mada Khel Aka Khel, Lower Bara Valley.
(30) Zari Shah, Sturi Khel Orakzai, Lower Bara Valley.
(31) Muhammad Afzal, Sturi Khel Orakzai, Lower Bara Valley.

The party then went to the Aka Khel country limits opposite Mamani.

On the 11th instant, they went in the direction of Matanni and, having come across some cartmen on the Matanni road, carried off 8 bullocks and some property. They brought the looted bullocks and property to Benai Garhi and having deposited the same with Juma Khan, Sturi Khel, again proceeded towards Matanni on the 14th instant. On their way to Matanni they came across two Border Military Police sowars whom they fired at. They then entered the Matanni Serai and carried off 31 camels, which they took to Nazian together with the bullocks and other property deposited by them at Benai Garhi on the 11th. Both on their way to and from Matanni they were entertained by Aka Khels, Barki Sturi Khels, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel of Shin Kamar, and by the Zakka Khels of Bazar, and as usual they followed the route passing through Aka Khel Maira, Mamani, Shin Kamar, Wala Kandao, Bazar and Tabai Kandao, a route absolutely safe from our interference.

Annexure 2.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 29th January, 1907.

I have the honour to forward copy of a statement of a man who has just returned from Nakhtarnao after ransoming his bullocks which were carried off from Matanni on the 11th instant. This statement supplies clear proof, if such be needed, that these recent raids have been the work of Zakka Khel of Bazar and that all the prisoners and loot of these raids are regularly deposited at Nakhtarnao in Afghan territory and there disposed of.

Annexure 3.

Statement of Niamatulla, son of Aminatulla, of village Dagai-Banda, Nowshera tahsil, dated 29th January, 1907.

About 20 days ago eight head of cattle belonging to me and to three others were taken by Zakka Khel raiders from Matanni, where we were working with carts for hire.

I and Mosam and Sultan of my village went to ransom them

We first went to the house of Muhammad Rafik, Zakka Khel, in Walai village in the Bazar Valley. He told us that the cattle had been taken from Bazar to Nakhtarnao in Afghanistan.

He went with us to Nakhtarnao, where we were met by Multan, Zakka Khel, and after some negotiations we ransomed our cattle for Rs. 520.

We saw in Nakhtarnao 31 camels taken from Matanni the day after our cattle were taken and we also saw two Hindus and two policemen who had been previously carried off from Badbher.

The Hindus gave us messages for their relations to the effect that the Zakka Khel demanded one thousand rupees for their ransom and begged that their relations would send the money soon.

The policeman said that they had no relations who could pay ransom for them and asked whether Government were not doing anything to obtain their release.

I saw in Nakhtarnao the six rifles which were taken from Pabbi and the Zakka Khel asked how many police were in Pabbi now.

Finger-print of Niamatulla.

Enclosure 16 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 2nd February, 1907.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar have sent various messages to the Political Agent to the effect that they are willing to send in a *jirga* to discuss cases and to take oaths of innocence. They have been informed that they will be sent for when wanted, and that in the meantime it will be seen whether they take any action to stop the constant raids into British territory committed by members of their tribes, as the tale of these outrages is growing so rapidly that it is difficult to see what satisfactory settlement they can offer. The Zakka Khel consider themselves in a state of war with Government, and are apprehensive of attack by us. They have permanent pickets on all the roads and passes leading from the Khyber to Bazar and these pickets are detailed on a regular roster. Their raiding parties are now practically permanently out and in the neighbourhood of Kajurai, Gandao, Mamani, and Barkai, on the look-out for cattle grazing near the border, and it is understood that they are only waiting for dark nights and accurate information to commit more large raids. Reference diary for the week ending 19th January, 1907: Niamatulla, the owner of the bullocks carried off from Matanni on the 11th January, 1907, by Zakka Khel raiders, went to Nakhtarnao in Nazian to recover the bullocks and returned on the 29th ultimo. He states that he had ransomed his cattle on payment of Rs. 65 per head as *bhunga*. Yar Khan and Tor Khan, the owners of the raided camels, who had also been to Nakhtarnao to recover the camels, returned on the 31st ultimo, and stated that they had ransomed their camels on payment of Rs. 156 per camel as *bhunga* through Nur Ghulam, Sipah, who escorted them through the Afridi country. They stated that they could not get back their remaining two camels as the raiders said they were lost on the way on the night of occurrence. The two policemen and the two Hindus kidnapped from Badbher were also reported to be with Multan and others at Nakhtarnao, and Niamatulla was shown the police rifles carried off from the Pabbi post on the 15th December, 1906. Multan and party are reported to have carried off 53 camels belonging to Mian Biaz, Kaka Khel, and Lal Chand, Hindu (Peshawari), from near Barkai on the 2nd instant, and to be still lurking about in the neighbourhood, having despatched the camels to Nakhtarnao in Nazian in charge of two men.

Enclosure 17 in No. 11.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 9th February, 1907.

The Pakhai Zakka Khel attended on the Political Agent on the 4th instant, and petitioned that they had no connection with the Bazar Zakka Khel, and hoped they might be dealt with and paid separately. They were told that until they had made an agreement to hold themselves responsible for the conduct of all the Pakhai section, wherever they might be, they could not be separated. On the 9th a full Pakhai *jirga*, including the Pakhais of Burg, Karamna, Ilacha, &c., again attended on the Political Agent and presented an agreement duly signed by them all that the *jirga* would be answerable in future for the conduct of any Pakhai wherever he might be, and that any member of the section would be liable to arrest, &c., for the misdeed of other. On the 4th instant the telegraph wire in the Khyber was cut between Jamrud and Ali Masjid and several yards of wire taken away. The offenders are said to be Zakka Khel.

Enclosure 18 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 11th February, 1907.

(Extract.)

With reference to previous correspondence I have the honour to report that from information received it appears that the two policemen and the two Hindus who were carried off are still at Nakhtarnao, where they are said to live in a mosque and enjoy a certain amount of freedom except that they are placed in the stocks at night. They are reported to have sent letters to their friends, through the men who went to Nakhtarnao to ransom the live-stock carried off in this and other raids. The

raiders are willing to release the two Hindus for Rs. 1,060 (Kabuli). It has also been reported that they are willing to release the two policemen for Rs. 100 each, and this sum the members of the District Police are said to have subscribed among themselves to obtain their brother constables' release. In justice to the two constables and in view of the widespread feeling amongst the members of the Police Force and on the Peshawar border generally, it is a question whether advantage should not be taken of any opening for ransoming the men who are constantly asking if Government will do nothing for them.

Enclosure 19 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 13th February, 1907.

In continuation of my letter, dated the 3rd December, 1906, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 7th February, 1907, with its enclosure, from the Political Agent, Khyber, on the subject of the future treatment of the Zakka Khel section of Afridis, and to say that I have nothing to add to the view of the situation which I have already fully set forth in my letter dated the 3rd December, 1906, and which is now before the Government of India, except that I think that it would be a grave mistake to attempt to enforce responsibility for the Zakka Khel against the other Afridi clans, which would involve the risk of their all assuming a similar attitude. At the same time I agree with the Political Agent as to the desirability of the issue of early orders on the subject. The steady misconduct of this troublesome section is illustrated by the fact that during the last seven years no less than 32 British subjects have been murdered, 29 wounded, 37 kidnapped and help up to ransom by members of this tribe, either alone or in conjunction with the Hazarnao gang, while the value of property of British subjects carried off by them is estimated at over one lakh of rupees. In redress for all this only Rs. 14,000 have been realised from the tribe during this period.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 7th February, 1907.

I have the honour to report, in continuation of my letters of 18th and 26th November, 1906, that the situation in regard to the Zakka Khel Afridis has not in any way improved—in fact that it is now worse than it was three months ago.

In my last letter I estimated the amount to be recovered from the Zakka Khel to be—

	Rs.	a.	p.
On account of compensation	6,058	8	0
On account of fines	4,875	0	0

I now enclose a list of further cases, and in this list the amount to be recovered is—

	Rs.	a.	p.
On account of compensation	13,713	4	0
On account of fines	8,900	0	0

or a grand total of Rs. 33,546-12-0, of which Rs. 19,771-12-0 is on account of compensation and Rs. 13,775 on account of fines.

The annual allowance of the Zakka Khel Afridis (after deducting the share of the Pakhai section, with whom we have no quarrel) amounts to Rs. 10,200 per annum; so, even if we have no more raids in February and March, the clan is already liable for nearly two years' allowances for compensation alone, and for over three years' allowances if we exact the very moderate fines estimated in the various cases.

It is obvious that nothing can be paid to the Zakka Khel at the spring distribution, and if Government decline to take in hand the punishment of this incorrigible clan, the only logical course will be to recover the balance from the other Afridis, as it would be absurd to allow the Zakka Khel to continue to mortgage their allowances for years to come. The effect of punishing the other Afridis for the offences of the Zakka Khel would be to range them upon the side of the latter, as they would argue that, if they are to receive the same punishment whether they misbehave or not, they may as well join in the very lucrative pursuit of raiding the defenceless villages and roads of the Peshawar and Kohat Borders. The Afridi clans have behaved remarkably well under great temptation; only one man (a Kambar Khel named Mirza Ali) has, as far as is known, joined Multan's gang of Zakka Khel raiders and for his complicity the Kambar Khel paid a fine of one month's allowances

(Rs. 600) without hesitation. Men of other tribes—Aka Khel, Orakzai Sturi Khel, &c.—are joining the raiders and the temptation to the Afridis of all sections to do so is becoming overpowering as they see that, week after week, villages, police posts, caravanserais, and main routes, can be attacked with impunity, that cattle, camels, horses, women, and men, even Government servants, can be carried off and sold or held to ransom, while the authorities appear to regard the matter with indifference. The evil has, as I have said, already spread to the Aka Khel, Sturi Khel and others, and I venture to prophesy that if we persist in the present policy of drift we shall have shortly to deal with the whole of the Afridis and with a large proportion of the Orakzai instead of, as at present, with the Zakka Khel section alone.

Even the Zakka Khel are astonished, in spite of their long experience of the forbearance of Government, at our inaction and more and more of them are joining Multan and the "war party," while the other clans are watching closely the course of events and are learning from it an undesirable lesson.

It is most desirable that I should be informed as early as possible of the wishes of Government, as, if it is decided that the Zakka Khel are not to be punished and that a compromise of some sort is to be made with them, the sooner that is done the better. We cannot now compromise with dignity or with any hope of real improvement, but if we leave the matter alone much longer it will not be possible to arrive at any compromise at all.

Annexure 2.

Cases which occurred prior to, but were reported by Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, after, despatch of this office letter of 26th November, 1906, to Secretary, North-West Frontier Province.

No.	Note of case.	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	
1	On 5th June, 1906, some villagers of Alizai, Kohat District, were robbed of cash and goods, value Rs. 60-4-0, in Sipaia Country on the Kohat border, by Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel.	60 4 0	Nil	A trifling case. Complainants can claim to recover their property by *Baramta* of Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel, in British territory, but no fine need be imposed as the offence was committed across the border.
2	On 16th June, 1906, a band of 11 Zakka Khel carried off ten bullocks from the village of Marai-Bala in the Kohat District. On their way back the raiders were attacked by a party of the villagers who recovered all the stolen animals.	Nil	500 0 0	No compensation due, but an armed violation of British territory.
3	On the 5th October, 1906, a band of seven Zakka Khel carried off one man and three women of Sher Koh, Kohat District, and recovered for them a ransom of Rs. 1,000, Kabuli.	500 0 0	Nil	The prisoners were carried off from Independent Territory, so no fine is necessary; but the amount paid as ransom is recoverable.
4	On the 5th November, a band of eight Zakka Khels carried off from Marai village, Kohat District, seven men and eight bullocks. The men were eventually released without ransom and claim the value of the bullocks and other property stolen from them.	293 0 0	500 0 0	Compensation and fine for armed violation of British territory.
5	On the 24th November, a band of about 21 men consisting of Zakka Khel, Sturi Khel, and Afghan Shinwaris, the whole under the leadership of Multan, Zakka Khel, carried off 100 goats from the village of Jangal Khel, Kohat District.	500 0 0	1,000 0 0	This is a more important case than the previous ones as the band was an organized raiding party coming from Bazar and Nazian, and not merely a party of armed prowlers as in the above-mentioned four cases—a bold violation of British territory.

Offences committed since despatch of this office letter of 26th November, 1906, to Secretary, North-West Frontier Province.

1	On the 5th December, 1906, Multan, Zakka Khel, with a gang of about 40 men—about half of whom were Zakka Khel—attacked the caravanserai of Badbher on the main road between Peshawar and Kohat, and carried off four Hindu and one Muhammadan villagers and two sepoys of the District Police, also 14 camels, two tonga horses, eight bullocks, and two donkeys.	3,100 0 0*	2,000 0 0	The Muhammadan and two of the Hindus escaped *en route* or were released, eight camels were ransomed by their owners on the 19th January for Rs. 1,240, Kabuli. The two remaining Hindus (for whom a ransom of Rs. 500 each is asked), the two Police sepoys, and the remainder of the looted property are still in the hands of Multan, Zakka Khel, at Nakhtarnao, Nazian, Afghanistan. A very grave and bold violation of British territory, including the abduction of two Government servants in the execution of their duty. * Includes Rs. 1,000 ransom for the two Hindus. This is being collected by their relations.
	Carried forward ...	4,453 4 0	4,000 0 0	

No.	Note of case	Amount of compensation due.	Approximate fine to be imposed.	Remarks.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	
	Brought forward ...	4,453 4 0	4,000 0 0	
2	On the 16th December, 1906, the same band as in case No. 1 attacked and captured the Police Post at Pabbi, on the Grand Trunk Road, 25 miles from the border, carried off all the arms (six rifles) of the post, and proceeded to loot the village. They were disturbed by a party of 53rd Sikhs, so got no plunder from the village.	600 0 0	2,000 0 0	As grave a case as can be conceived. But for the accident of the presence of regular troops at Pabbi the flourishing bazar of Pabbi would have been sacked.
3	On the 12th January, 1907, Multan, Zakka Khel, with a party of about 30 raiders, of whom about half were Zakka Khel, attacked a caravan of traders on the Peshawar-Kohat road near Matanni, captured and carried off the traders, whom they released on arrival at the border, and carried off eight bullocks valued at Rs. 300.	260 0 0	500 0 0	The eight bullocks were eventually ransomed by the owners from Multan, Zakka Khel, at Nakhtarnao, Nazian, Afghanistan, for Rs. 260. These men saw and conversed with the two Hindus and two Policemen mentioned in case, and were shown the rifles mentioned in case 2.
4	On the 14th January, 1907, the band mentioned above (case 3) after depositing their loot at Barkai in Independent territory again entered British territory and attacked the Caravanserai of Matanni on the Peshawar-Kohat road. They fired upon a Border Police Patrol, shooting one horse, and carried off 31 camels and miscellaneous property valued at Rs. 550. On their way back they cut the telephone wire near Jola Talao, Border Police Post.	3,100 0 0	2,200 0 0	Twenty-nine camels were ransomed by the owners for Rs. 4,500 Kabuli, and one stray camel has been brought in by a Zia-ud-din. This is a grave case, including as it does armed violation of British territory, dakaiti, cutting the telephone wire and firing upon the Police.
5	On the 2nd February, Multan Zakka Khel, again brought his gang as above to Barkai, doubtless to raid into British territory. He happened, however, to find 53 camels belonging to Lal Chand, Hindu, of Peshawar City, and Biaz Mian, Kaka Khel, of Nowshera, grazing across the border, and carried them off to Nakhtarnao.	5,300 0 0	Nil	The case occurred across the border, so no fine is imposed, but the losers have a claim to compensation either from allowances or by *baramta*.
6	On 4th February a party of Zakka Khel cut the telephone wire three miles above Jamrud, and carried off some of the wire.	—	200 0 0	
	TOTAL	13,713 4 0	8,900 0 0	

Enclosure 20 in No. 11.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th February, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my letter dated 11th February. Two policemen have been ransomed by a Kamarai Afridi Malik and brought in to Political Agent, Khyber. Report follows.

Enclosure 21 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 15th February, 1907.

In continuation of my telegram dated 14th February, 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a letter dated 12th February, 1907, from the Political Agent, Khyber, reporting the particulars of the release of the two Policemen who were carried off by raiders from Badaber on the 5th December, 1906.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 12th February, 1907.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to report that the two Police Sepoys captured by Zakka Khel on the 5th December, 1906, were to-day brought in to me by Malik Hafiz Samandar Khan, Kamarai, who obtained their release by a payment of Rs. 200 Kabuli to Multan, Zakka Khel, at Nakhtarnao, Nazian, in Afghanistan. The two Hindus who were abducted from Badbher at the same time as the Sepoys are still awaiting release at Nakhtarnao.

Enclosure 22 in No. 11.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 15th February, 1907.

In continuation of my letter dated 2nd February, 1907, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter dated 5th February, 1907, from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, regarding the raid committed on the Peshawar-Kohat tonga road near Matanni on the 11th January, 1907.

Annexure.

Letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th February, 1907.

With reference to my telegram, dated 13th January, 1907, reporting that four men and eight bullocks were carried off by armed Afridis at about 7 p.m. on the 11th January, 1907, from a point on the Peshawar-Kohat tonga road, close to and north of Matanni, I have the honour to state that further enquiry shows that the raid was committed by a gang of about 30 Zakka Khel and Sangu Khel Shinwaris, assisted by one or two outlaws and, perhaps, some Aka Khels, and that the raiders returned through a corner of the Sultan Khel, Mada Khel, and Miri Khel limits of the Aka Khel, and thence to Nakhtarnao, *viâ* Shin Kamar and the Bazar Valley.

2. The four bullock drivers were released in British territory near the frontier. The bullocks were taken to Nakhtarnao. Two of the owners proceeded to Bazar Valley and persuaded Alla Dost, Bash Khel Zakka Khel of Walai, to accompany them to Nakhtarnao, where they arranged to ransom the eight bullocks for Rs. 520, Kabuli. Alla Dost stood surety for the payment of this sum. The bullocks were then sent down to the Bazar Valley and kept there while the money was being fetched from Peshawar. The money was paid over to Alla Dost and his cousin, Muhammad Rafik, at Walai, and the bullocks reached Peshawar on the 30th January, 1907.

No. 12.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th March, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

See my despatch of 7th instant regarding Zakka Khel. As less hostile attitude on the part of some of Zakka Khel elders seemed to be indicated by entries in Khyber diaries, we requested Deane on the 17th instant to give his views as to present attitude of the section as a whole, and as to prospects of amicable settlement being effected. Telegram from Deane, dated 18th instant, states that an attempt to induce hostile party to settle with Government has been made by those among the Zakka Khel who have gained nothing by raids, but anticipate that if section is punished they may incur loss. Defiant attitude is, however, maintained by hostile faction. Police tower was raided on night of 15th by a gang of 15, mostly Zakka Khel; three rifles, ammunition, and some property were carried off, and a constable was severely injured. Further raid is reported by Roos-Keppel to be in contemplation. Chief Commissioner says he is compelled by situation to adhere to recommendation made in his letter of 3rd December last, as desire of section is to escape punishment, without giving up offenders or making adequate reparation for offences committed. It is satisfactory to learn that the Amir pointedly ignored those Zakka Khel who went to Basawal to meet him on his return from India.

No. 13.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 31*st March*, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Please see my telegram of 24th March. Zakka Khel. Two villagers and fourteen head of cattle were carried off from Khaizara, near Marai in Kohat, by ten well-armed raiders on 20th March. Raiders stated, on reliable authority, to be members of Zakka Khel tribe. The villagers were released in independent territory nine miles beyond the border.

No. 14.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th April, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels. My telegram of 31st ultimo. Release reported of one of Hindus kidnapped on 5th December from Badbher. Zakka Khels, in despair of getting ransom, have now released him themselves. Other Hindu, who is old and ill, is still in Nazian.

No. 15.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 10th April, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khels. Your despatch of the 7th ultimo. I should be glad to know the strength and constitution of the force you would employ in the event of operations, probable duration of the latter, and latest date to which it is possible to defer starting. Having regard to present attitude of Amir and the pressure of other sections of tribes, I am not satisfied of expediency, under present circumstances, of immediate resort to punitive measures.

No. 16.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22*nd April*, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated the 10th instant. Two brigades of infantry with usual complement of mountain artillery, sappers and miners, &c., would constitute force to be employed in the event of sanction being given to operations against the tribe. A reserve of one brigade of infantry would also be held in readiness. The 1st May is latest date to which commencement of operations can be deferred. Two weeks' operations would probably suffice for permanent establishment of our troops in the Bazar Valley, unless other sections of Afridis should join against us. Lord Kitchener considers that postponement of operations till October next would be preferable, and we accept his advice. We would propose in September next to re-submit case for your consideration.

No. 17.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 1*st May*, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated the 22nd ultimo. Proposal to defer operations and re-submit case for consideration in September is entirely approved.

No. 18.

Letter from Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 30th May, 1907. Received 17th June, 1907.

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch dated the 7th March, 1907, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of further correspondence on the subject of the behaviour of the Zakka Khel Afridis. In accordance with the decision conveyed in your telegram, dated the 1st May, 1907, consideration of the question of punishing the Zakka Khel will be deferred till next September.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 16th February, 1907.

The policemen kidnapped in Badbher raid were brought in by Malik Hafiz Samundar Khan, Kamarai, from Nakhtarnao in Nazian and sent to the Superintendent, Police, Peshawar, on the 12th instant. They stated that the Hindus kidnapped along with them are still at Nakhtarnao. Certain Zakka Khel elders, headed by Kazi Sheikh Karim of Bara, visited Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel, at Chora, on the 12th instant, and requested him to intercede on their behalf and ask Government to forgive their past offences in return for promises that they would behave well in future, but the Malik replied that he would not approach the authorities with any request on their behalf, since they had so often broken promises and violated securities, and that, unless they thoroughly punished their bad characters for past offences, there was no hope of Government making any settlement with them. The elders returned disappointed and went to Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, in Bara.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 23rd February, 1907.

The Zakka Khels are now holding daily jirgas and consultations in Bazar and this occupation has caused a temporary cessation of raiding into British territory. They look upon an expedition to Bazar as inevitable and the occupation of the valley as probable. The tribesmen appear to be living in a state of some discomfort, with all portable property packed and all women, children, and cattle prepared for instant flight to Tirah or to Afghanistan. Each visit of the Political Agent to Landi Kotal causes a stampede from the nearer villages of Bazar and the inhabitants of these villages are feeling some of the inconveniences which they have caused to the villages of the Peshawar Border during the last eight years. Messengers from Bazar visit the Political Agent from time to time to ask when the tribe will be summoned to "settle" cases and to receive allowances. They are informed that the matter has been referred to Government and that any orders on the subject which may be received will be communicated to them.

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 2nd March, 1907.

On the 27th February a deputation of eight Zakka Khel elders of Bazar visited the Political Agent to sound him as to the intentions of Government regarding the tribe. There were no men of note among the party. They stated that the Zakka Khel were willing to make peace with Government on the usual terms, *i.e.*, the deduction of a reasonable fine from their allowances and the return of a few

articles of stolen property. They professed inability to accept responsibility for Multan or his gang, but said that they were prepared to take oaths as to the innocence of other members of the tribe. They stated that they could not punish by tribal action any of the leaders in the numerous raids committed last year. They were informed that the question of their treatment had been referred to the Government of India, and that as soon as any orders were received they would be communicated to them.

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 9th March, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel sent a deputation to the Fakir in Tirah to ask him to gain the support of the Afridi and Orakzai tribes in their dispute with Government, but they received a very discouraging reply from the Fakir who stated that, while he was ready to join and lead them himself, he could not guarantee the assistance of the tribesmen, who were angry with the Zakka Khel for wantonly forcing on a quarrel in which all stood to lose. Some of the more far-sighted of the Zakka Khel elders are urging their fellow tribesmen to send in to the Political agent a jirga with a few rifles and some stolen property, as they argue that if they can stave off punishment until the hot weather something will probably occur to distract the attention of Government from them and they will escape with the loss of their last year's allowances, which they already regard as forfeited. A few days ago a few Aka Khel bad characters went to Bazar and told Usman and other Zakka Khel that they were prepared to assist the Zakka Khel in case Government took any active measures against them and that the Bazar people might depend on their help.

Enclosure 5 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 16*th March*, 1907.

For the last month discussions have been going on among the Zakka Khel as to the best means of evading the punishment which they know that they have earned. Each elder is anxious to sacrifice his neighbour lest he should suffer himself and some of those who have received no share of the booty gained in the raids of the past six or eight months have suggested that some of the leading raiders should be arrested by the tribal jirga and handed over for punishment to Government and that some of their property should also be given in. Unfortunately, they appear to have reckoned without their hosts. The raiders, and their friends and supporters, who were taken by surprise by this proposal, agreed, in order to gain time, to hold jirgas with their fellow tribesmen to discuss the question and sent re-assuring messages to the effect that they were prepared not only to make full restitution but to sacrifice their liberty, and if necessary their lives, to the salvation of the clan. After interminable discussions with their fellow tribesmen, during which they had been privately sounding every man of note to know how far they could depend upon them, the leaders of the raiding party came to the conclusion that they were strong enough to defy the tribe. They announced to the jirga that they would do nothing to carry out their promises and that they meant to keep what they had got and to gain more. They then held forth to the effect that the best course was to continue to raid, and Dadai, the most influential man in the tribe, sent off messengers to the Zia-ud-din urging them to commit a raid and promising to send men to join them. If the tribe really wished to put a stop to raiding and to punish the raiders they could of course do so by taking a lashkar against them, as they did in the case of Lal Baz and Inzarai last summer, but their utmost desire was to patch up matters by a nominal restitution and now even this seems unlikely at present. On the night of the 15th instant, a raiding party of about 16 men attacked the Police post of Jangli Burj on the Kohat road, severely wounded one policeman and carried off the rifles, ammunition and clothing of the guard. According to our information the gang was composed of about ten Zakka Khel and six Aka Khel, the whole under the leadership of the notorious Muhammad Asghar, Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel. It is reported from Bazar that the Zakka Khel intend to carry off, if

possible, some man of importance, Khan, Malik, or Native Police Officer, from the Peshawar border and to offer to exchange him for the prisoners taken in the *baramta* of 9th December, 1906.

Enclosure 6 in No. 18.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 17*th March*, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your letter, dated 15th February. With reference to Khyber Diaries weeks ending 2nd and 9th March, which appear to indicate less hostile attitude on part of some of the Zakka Khel elders, Government of India would be glad of your opinion as to present attitude of section as a whole and of the prospects of effecting satisfactory amicable settlement with them. Do you see anything in present situation which would lead you to desire to alter recommendation submitted in your letter of 3rd December last?

Enclosure 7 in No. 18.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 18*th March*, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram, dated 17th March. Those amongst the Zakka Khel who have gained nothing by raids but anticipate loss if section is punished have tried to induce hostile party to settle with Government. Their endeavours have ended in defiance on part of hostile party, who on night of 15th raided Jangli Burj police tower, one constable being badly hurt, and three rifles and ammunition and property carried away. Report just received from Khyber that this was work of gang of 16, mostly Zakka Khel. Roos-Keppel reports further raid intended. Present attitude of section as a whole is that they wish to escape punishment without making any adequate reparation for offences committed or give up any offenders. Therefore difficult to see what settlement is possible, and I regret that the situation compels me to adhere to recommendations submitted in my letter of the 3rd December last. Zakka Khel, who went to Basawal, lined road as Amir passed; he averted his head and ignored them.

Enclosure 8 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 23*rd March*, 1907.

On the 20th instant some six or seven Zakka Khel came to Lala China bringing with them one of the Hindus carried off from Badbher on the 6th December, 1906. They consulted one of the Kuki Khel headmen as to the possibility of exchanging the Hindu for one or more of the Zakka Khel prisoners taken in the *baramta* of the 9th December, 1906. The Kuki Khel, however, refused to make any such request for them, as he knew that it would be refused. The Zakka Khel then went to Kajurai, taking the Hindu with them. They asked the elders of the Malikdin, Kambar and Kamarai Afridis to make a truce among themselves in order to hold *jirgas* with the Zakka Khel who were anxious to obtain their support and assistance. This the elders refused, after some deliberation, to do. The Zakka Khel were taking the Hindu to Bara, but the other Afridi elders objected, saying that the man was now in their limits and that they were not going to share in the blame attaching to the Zakka Khel. After some argument the latter, who were tired of keeping and feeding the Hindu for so many months and were despairing of getting any ransom for him, let him go, and he was brought in to the Political Agent by Subadar Anar Gul, a Kamarai Afridi, late of the Khyber Rifles. The other Hindu, Ganga Ram, of Badbher, is still imprisoned in Nakhtarnao, Nazian. He is a very old man and ill, and will probably die. On the 18th instant, information was received that a strong raiding party of Zakka Khel had gone in the direction of Kohat and Hangu, and a warning was wired to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat. The raiders carried off a herd of cattle

and two men from the neighbourhood of Hangu on the 20th. They were pursued by Border Police and villagers and released the men, but got away with the cattle. The well-known raider Multan, Anai Zakka Khel, has left Bazar for Tirah but it may be presumed that he intends to commit mischief. The report that the attack on the Jangli Burj Police Post was made by Zakka Khel is now fully confirmed.

Enclosure 9 in No. 18.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 24th March, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Reliable information received that raid on Marai near Hangu on 20th was committed by Zakka Khel. Report that raid of 15th on Jungli Burj was committed by Zakka Khel now fully confirmed.

Enclosure 10 in No. 18.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 28th March, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reports that about 6 p.m. on 20th instant, two villagers of Khaizara, a hamlet of Marai, while returning with their 14 cattle from grazing, were set upon close to border, but within British territory, by ten armed men who kidnapped the villagers and drove off cattle to Torapkha pass to the west of Zera pass, where they were joined by further party of ten armed men. Whole gang then apparently travelled in northerly direction through Tirah Sturi Khel limits as far as Kukukadda hill, some eight or nine miles across border, where the two villagers were released. Our two villagers say they recognized one of the offenders, namely Phalwan Zia-ud-din. They also say that one of raiders was addressed as Mir Azam, and that from talk and appearance whole gang appeared to be Afridis. Gang were well armed with rifles, including two Lee-Metford rifles. Border Military Police failed to come up with raiders. This is the raid alluded to by Political Agent, Khyber, in his telegram addressed to you on 24th instant.

Enclosure 11 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 30*th March,* 1907.

A deputation of 150 Zakka Khel elders went to the Kajurai Plain on the 28th instant and asked the Malikdin Khel to intercede on their behalf with Government, but the latter replied that they had done so so often and that the Zakka Khel had never kept their promises of good behaviour and that now the Zakka Khel must prove that they were in earnest by punishing their bad characters, recovering the stolen property and surrendering Multan, Usman, Dadai, and three or four other leading bad characters to Government for trial before they could again intercede with Government on their behalf. They further said that they had themselves petitioned the Political Agent not to hold them responsible for the misdeeds of the Zakka Khel and would not now mix themselves up in Zakka Khel affairs. The elders are still in Kajurai, trying to secure the sympathies and co-operation of the Afridis, but with little success.

Enclosure 12 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 6*th April,* 1907.

Reference last diary. The Zakka Khel elders who had been to Kajurai to effect a reconciliation between the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel, failed in their endeavours and returned to Bazar on the 4th instant. They threatened to take sides with the Malikdin Khel in fighting and, to stop the Kambar Khel *Kaddas* from passing through their limits, but neither of these threats could frighten the Kambar Khel. The two clans have fortified themselves in *sangars*

at different places in Kajurai and fighting is going on between them. The Kambars are assisted by the Sipahs and the Malikdins by the Kamarai, but the former have the sympathy of the majority of the Khyber Afridis and are numerically stronger than the latter. On the 5th a fight took place between them in which two men were killed and several wounded. The result would have been disastrous had not the Kuki Khel of Jam and Kadam intervened and put a truce between them for a few days. The period of truce is about to expire and both parties are making preparations to resume hostilities. The Malikdin Khel have applied to the Aka Khel and Zakka Khel for assistance and the Kambar Khel are begging their Gara brethren, the Kukis, to save their honour. Some Zakka Khel elders have remained in Kajurai to make a second attempt to mend matters, but with no great hope of success. The Zakka Khel seem to think that, if peace is made between these two leading clans, there will be more chance for them to move the Afridis to take sides with them against Government, but the Afridis do not at present appear to be inclined to do anything of the sort, as they themselves are tired of the Zakka Khel, who are showing no signs of improving their behaviour, and who have taken no steps to punish their bad characters. They are simply hoping to see fortune turn in their favour by a change in the tide of Afridi politics. Their raiding parties came twice to the neighbourhood of Barkai during the last few days, but the tribal feuds going on in the Kajurai absorbed their attention so much that they did not raid.

Enclosure 13 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 13*th April*, 1907.

A few days ago a party of about 60 Zakka Khel headed by :—

(1) Usman, Khusrogi,
(2) Niazai „
(3) Dadai, Anai,
(4) Gulistan „
(5) Rahdar „

went to Jalalabad to pay their respects to the Amir before his departure for Kabul, but they were not granted an interview by His Majesty and returned to their homes during the week.

Enclosure 14 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 20*th April*, 1907.

The Kuki Khel jirga was received on the 16th instant and allowances for the past half year were paid. They have behaved well and there were only a few trifling cases to settle. They are at present much incensed with the Zakka Khel and pressed to know whether the latter were to be punished, offering to assist in every way. They were informed that, unless the Zakka Khel made reparation and reformed, they would eventually have to be punished, but that Government was at present occupied with more important matters and no orders regarding the Zakka Khel had yet been received. The Malikdin jirga was received on the 19th instant, a truce for four days having been put for the purpose. They had committed no offences of any sort and their allowances were paid in full. It was known that they had promised the Zakka Khel that they would ascertain the intentions of Government towards them, but the only reference made to Zakka Khel was a request that two political prisoners in the Peshawar jail might be released. This request, however, led to some discussion during the course of which the Malikdin Khel were told that, if they really wished to help the Zakkas to a settlement with Government, they should stand security for their future good behaviour. This suggestion produced a storm of protest, all the Malikdin elders saying that the quarrel of the Zakka Khel with Government was no concern of theirs, that they would not be mixed up in it at all, that they would not help the Zakka Khel either by standing security for them or in any other way, and that they would never pay any fine for them as they had not recovered a penny of the amount which they paid on behalf of the Zakka Khel fine in 1898. No messages of any sort have lately been received from the Zakka Khel, and

according to report they are waiting for the conclusion of the payment of allowances to the other clans to see whether their allowances are to be paid or not. The leaders of the tribe, Dadai, Usman, Sheikh Ahmad Nur, and others, are in Kajurai enjoying the opportunity of exercising their talents for intrigue in a profitable manner by acting as intermediaries and arbitrators in the feud, and Multan has gone to Maidan with the whole of his family and possessions.

Enclosure 15 in No. 18.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 27th April, 1907.

The Kambar Khel, Sipah and Kamarai jirgas came in for their allowances during the week and were interviewed by the Political Agent on the 23rd and 24th instant. All cases pending against them were settled and their allowances for the past five months were paid. They were paid Rs. 1,300 as compensation for land taken up for the doubling of the Khyber road. None of these clans made any petition on behalf of the Zakka Khel. The Zakka Khel held a jirga in Bazar on the 27th April, 1907, and decided to turn out from their "garhis" at China the families and children of the near relations of Lal Baz and Inzarai who were killed by the Zakka Khel for giving assistance and information to the Political Agent last year. The jirga destroyed their crops and are threatening to burn their villages, for no other fault except that they happen to be the near relations of the unfortunate men killed.

No. 19.

From Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 31st October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

On 28th October last, at 6.30 p.m., band of Afridis, estimated number 12 to 30, appeared at Pabbi, on railway between Naushera and Peshawar, and seized three Hindus and proceeded with them towards Peshawar, capturing on the way two Hindu patwaris. Village pursuit party turned out and followed; near railway station, raiders came upon detachment of 45th Sikhs camped there. The Havildar in command enquired what was happening. Raiders replied with a volley, wounding severely one sepoy and a Zamindar. Sikhs fired in reply, causing raiders to abandon Hindus and retreat by Cherat Road. On receipt of news at Peshawar, police and sepoys were sent out in several directions to intercept party, raiders proceedings to Nasargarhi, where they robbed 10 cartmen, thence to Turnab, where Hindu Revenue Extra Assistant Commissioner was in camp; they wounded latter with knife, and would have carried him off, but he could not ride or walk. They looted his tents and carried off his three horses towards Hazar Khani; they were challenged about 3 a.m. by a force of police on Kohat road about 2 miles from Peshawar. They replied with a volley, wounding two constables, and a running fight ensued in which one raider was apparently wounded, and horses and heavy loot had to be abandoned near Siahband. Raiders escaped in darkness. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, telegraphs that he has no definite information as to the identity of raiders, but in view of Khyber reports they were probably Zakka Khels.

No. 20.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Please see my telegram of 31st ultimo. Situation as regards Zakka Khel is reported by Chief Commissioner as very unsatisfactory. Adequate protection of our frontier against raids by this section of the Afridis has been found to be impossible, as was anticipated in our despatch of 7th March last. Besides the raid on Pabbi, which was reported in my telegram of 31st October, other serious raids, detailed below, have been committed by Afridis belonging mainly to the Zakka

Khel section, instigated apparently by Dadai and Multan. The following are raids referred to:—

(1.) An attack was made on the village of Samarai in the Kohat District on the 5th October. Two Hindus were abducted and one villager killed.

(2.) The village of Lachi in the Kohat District was attacked by a gang of 30 men on the night of the 13th November. The post office was looted, one villager was killed, and three were wounded. A party of Border Military Police were intercepted by the raiders, who killed two of the police and wounded two others, one of whom has since died. The raiders carried off loot, including jewels, and much greater damage would have been done had it not been for the conduct of the villagers. Although the frontier was guarded, the raiders made good their escape with the loss of two men, one of whom was killed by the Lachi Border Military Police and the other by a picket of the 56th Rifles near Hangu.

(3.) On the 7th November a similar raid, which involved the abduction of three Hindus and considerable loss of property, was committed at Banda Daud Shah in the Kohat district. The perpetrators of this raid have not, however, been yet fully traced. The places where the foregoing outrages were committed are all far from the frontier.

(4.) On the night of 22nd November, some shots were fired at Bara Fort by a similar band. The garrison of Border Military Police, which turned out, fell into an ambuscade 200 yards from the fort. At the first discharge four of the police were wounded. One of the raiders was wounded.

A new feature in these raids is the practice of abducting Hindus. The attack on Bara Fort is regarded by the Chief Commissioner as a very deliberate act of hostility against Government. Immunity of the Zakka Khels from punishment may, in his opinion, lead to other sections and tribes joining them, unless we take prompt action; and for this purpose he can only recommend the measures already proposed for the occupation of the Bazar Valley. I am afraid that it will soon become necessary to punish the Zakka Khels, and I cannot at present devise alternative measures to those which have already been submitted to you, as the policy of inactivity and reliance on pressure from other tribal sections has not, as I anticipated, been attended by success. I will address you again as to the actual measures which we consider necessary. In the meantime, I have forwarded to you copies of the letters and telegraphic reports which have been received from the Chief Commissioner.

No. 21.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

The following is in continuation of my telegram of 25th November as to Zakka Khel raids. Chief Commissioner reports two further raids,—(1) in Peshawar on cattle at Matanni, when post of Border Police was fired on, and (2) a raid in Kohat near Marai. Damage caused was not serious. In the Marai case the raiders were followed up by parties of regular troops, Border Police, and villagers, and two of the raiders were killed, both of whom are believed to be Zakka Khels. Bodies have been sent to Kohat for identification. The behaviour of the villagers was very good, and the chigha of one section of Bar Muhammad Khel Orakzai, across the border, co-operated by holding one of the lines of retreat. It is said that a larger body of raiders under Multan is in waiting in the Aka Khel country. The Chief Commissioner once more respectfully urges that we should not defer action against this tribe, as he anticipates that lawlessness will spread. He pronounces the position of the villagers, police, and Border Military Police to be intolerable. The Zakka Khel tribesmen have declared a feud against the Border Military Police. There has been a show of opposition by Khuda Khel and Khwaizai Mohmand Afghan subjects to the examination of the railway alignment at Smatzai and Shinpokh by Mr. Johns, of the Public Works Department, with an escort of 100 Khyber Rifles.

Chief Commissioner attributes this also to the continued impunity of Zakka Khel, whereby lawlessness along the frontier is being encouraged. No damage has been done in this case, and adequate measures for the protection of the party and of the British villages concerned have been taken by the Political Agent, Khyber.

No. 22.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 3rd December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

With reference to your telegram of 30th, please let me have information on following points:—(1) Is it certain that raiders into Kohat were Zakkas; (2) were the two men killed found to be Zakka Khels or were they not?

No. 23.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 4th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams of the 25th and 30th ultimo as to the Zakka Khel. Please keep me fully informed as to course of events.

No. 24.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram on the subject of Zakka Khel, dated 3rd instant. There seems to be no doubt that raids reported were all the work of gangs mainly composed of Zakka Khel. The Political Agent, Khyber, reports that the two raiders who were killed in the Marai affair were Rokhan Khusrogi and Yardin Zia-ud-din, both Zakka Khel. The former, usually called Rokhan Karigar, was a very notorious raider.

No. 25.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 11th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports that on 5th December a gang of 16 persons, of whom most have been recognised as Zakka Khels, made a raid on the village of Masho Khel near Bara. A bania was killed, and his shop looted. Some Zakka Khels, on the same day, captured 12 mules working on the Khyber road near Fort Maude, and carried them off to Bazar.

No. 26.

Papers transmitted by the Government of India by the mail of 5th and 12th December, 1907. Received 21st and 28th December, 1907.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Captain Brown, who is with Mr. Johns at Bar Ugda, wires to-day to Political, Khyber:—*Begins.* Two hundred Mohmands appear holding hills opposite Kuz Ugda rendering passage down river impossible. They refuse to send jirga or treat in any way. Mohmands are firing on Smatzai and Shinpokh. Have sent for Hasmzai Jirga. Camp stops at Bar Ugda till situation clears or other orders are received. Mohmands reported holding position opposite Narai. *Ends.* If Mohmands maintain attitude of opposition Johns will be unable to examine this portion of river route. He will meanwhile examine Harington's line. Our arrangements are confined to ensuring safety of Shilman.

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Captain Brown reports, dated Camp Bar Ugda this morning, that Smatzai and Shinpokh have been under constant fire from across the river for the last three days. He started for Kuz Ugda yesterday and, on getting near the river, came under a very heavy fire from the hills on the left bank. Captain Brown saw one party of about 120 men, and according to local information the Mohmands numbered three to four hundred Khwaizai and Khuda Khel. Captain Brown did not reply to their fire, as he hoped to arrange matters peaceably. He sent a Shilmani Mulla across to speak to the enemy, who stated they would not treat until their full jirga had assembled in two days' time. The Mulla behaved with great gallantry, swimming the river under a heavy fire.

Enclosure 3 in No. 26.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 29th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 27th November. Roos-Keppel wires 28th instant:—*Begins.* Camp Loi Shilman, 28th November. Mr. Johns states that if he can see river at Shinilo Gudr he will not require to go down from Kuz Ugda. I will arrange for him to go to Shinilo to-morrow, and it is improbable that he will be interfered with. This will complete his work, as he has seen line from Smatzai to Kuz Ugda and from mile 300 to Warsak, besides completing his inspection of Harington's line. Strong force of Khuda Khel and Khwaizai Mohmands holding left bank of river from Palosi down. They are determined not to allow railway survey, but are not otherwise aggressive. It is reported that firing on Smatzai and Shinpokh has ceased. I have three hundred men here to-day and am expecting two hundred more to-morrow, but I shall now order these to stand fast at Landi Kotal, as I do not think they will be required here. The Khwaizai sent a message to Captain Brown last night that they would treat with him if he would send a jirga across the river to them, and he replied that they had fired upon us without provocation and that if they had any explanation to give or representation to make they could come to Shilman. It does not appear necessary now to

treat with them in any way, so as soon as Mr. Johns' work is completed I shall make such arrangements as may be required for the safety of Shilman and then withdraw the force here as quickly as possible, when the Mohmand gathering will probably fade away. *Ends.* I have wired directing Mr. Johns to return to Peshawar after seeing Shinilo, and Roos-Keppel to withdraw Khyber Rifles from Shilman as soon as practicable. I have heard direct from Mr. Johns that he has collected all data necessary for his report.

Enclosure 4 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Mr. Johns has left Shilman, and all the Khyber Rifles are returning to Landi Kotal to-day.

Enclosure 5 in No. 26.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 2nd December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram of 29th November. Mr. Johns has returned to Peshawar and proceeds to Lucknow, whence he will send his report. Roos-Keppel with all Khyber Rifles returned to Landi Kotal on 30th November, there being no apparent necessity for his remaining longer.

Enclosure 6 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 4th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Messenger from Jamal of Smatzai arrived here yesterday evening, and stated that yesterday morning a large body of men, estimated at five hundred, appeared opposite Smatzai and without warning opened fire on the people. Two cows were killed and the people took refuge in the village. It is stated that the force attacking Smatzai consists of Shinwaris of Ningrahar, Lalpura and Khuda Khel Mohmands and a few Khwaizai. The Mohmand Lashkar who were holding the left bank of the river from Palosi down, dispersed on the 1st instant.

Enclosure 7 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 4th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Messenger from Smatzai reports that firing on Smatzai was kept up from dawn till dark yesterday. No firing last night and no sign of enemy up to 8 o'clock this morning, though it is believed that they have not left.

Enclosure 8 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 5th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Number of Lashkar opposite Smatzai appears to have been much exaggerated, and Lashkar is believed to consist mainly of Mohmands. Messenger from Smatzai reports a little firing this morning.

Enclosure 9 in No. 26.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 6th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Jamal of Smatzai has arrived and reports that Lashkar opposite Smatzai has broken up and gone to Lalpura. They called out to Shilmanis that they had fired on Smatzai by mistake, having been informed that it was occupied by troops. They may return, but this seems improbable.

No. 27.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following dated 4th January from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—

"Transport post at Jalozai in Peshawar district was attacked last night by large raiding gang, and one duffadar and one driver were wounded and 41 Government mules carried off."

Jalozai is half-way between Pabbi and Cherat.

No. 28.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 4th January. Raid on transport post, Jalozai. Raiders comprised 15 Zakka Khel and a few others. The wounded Duffadar and driver have since died.

No. 29.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 9th January, 1908. *Received 25th January*, 1908.

(Extract.)

In continuation of our despatch, dated the 30th May, 1907, we have the honour to forward further correspondence on the subject of the Zakka Khel Afridis. In our despatch of the 7th March, 1907, we gave an account of the situation as it then presented itself, pointing out that the conduct of the tribe had for a long time previously been most contumacious, that they had adopted an openly hostile attitude towards Government, and that their immunity from punishment was reported to be having the worst effect on the frontier tribes. We described the disadvantages of merely sending a punitive expedition into the Bazar Valley and thereafter retiring, and the advantages which we foresaw would result from our remaining and administering the valley, and we said that, if you were unable to agree with us that an expedition against the Zakka Khel section was advisable, and if you did not consider that any interference with tribal territory was at the time justifiable, we were afraid that it would be impossible adequately to protect our territory from raids by the Zakka Khel, and that it seemed to us that the only course that we could follow was to wait until the Zakka Khel should by their hostile acts render military operations indispensable. On his return from India to Afghanistan the Amir openly discouraged the advances made to him by the Afridis, and during March, 1907, there were indications of slight improvement in the

attitude of some of the Zakka Khel elders, and we asked the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province his opinion as to the prospects of effecting a satisfactory amicable settlement. He replied on the 18th March that those among the tribesmen who had gained nothing by raids, but anticipated loss if the section were punished, had tried to induce the hostile party to settle with Government, but their endeavours had ended in defiance on the part of the hostile party, and the object of the section as a whole was to escape punishment without making any adequate reparation for past offences or giving up any offenders. He was therefore compelled to adhere to his recommendation for the occupation of the Bazar Valley, entailing the subjugation of the people by troops, and the building of posts at important points in the country to be held by Khyber Rifles. We informed you of Sir Harold Deane's views in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 24th March. Before the end of the month two more raids had been added to the list of Zakka Khel offences: in the first, on the night of the 15th, a gang of 15 men raided the Jangli Burj police tower, severely injuring a constable and carrying off three rifles and other property: in the second, on the 20th, two villagers and some cattle were carried off from near Marai in the Kohat district. The villagers were subsequently released. On the 10th April, you telegraphed to us asking, in the event of operations being sanctioned, what were the constitution and strength of the force to be employed, the latest date to which starting could be postponed, and the probable duration of operations. You added that in the existing circumstances you were not persuaded that it was expedient immediately to resort to punitive measures. We replied to you by telegraph on the 22nd April, furnishing the information called for, and stating that, in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, it would be preferable to postpone operations until the month of October. We stated that we proposed to re-submit the case for your consideration in September. During the summer raids by the Zakka Khel temporarily ceased. The allowances due to them in June amounted to Rs. 11,900; the fines outstanding aggregated Rs. 13,775, and the claims against the section totalled Rs. 19,771-2-0, though the latter were probably exaggerated. On finding that there was no intention to call their jirga in along with the other Afridi sections to receive their allowances, a Zakka Khel jirga came in uninvited to Landi Kotal on the 2nd June, and announced that they had come to make peace with Government, to hear the charges against the section and to settle the cases. On being informed of the claims against them, they said they were absurd and could not be entertained. They were prepared to restore any stolen property which accused men might acknowledge to be in their possession, and to return three of the rifles taken from the Pabbi police station. They said that the system of deducting fines from the allowances must be stopped; that their oath must be accepted in all cases; that they would accept no responsibility for raiders passing through their country to Afghanistan; that in no circumstances would they surrender offenders for punishment; and that all restrictions on members of the tribe going to Kabul must be removed. Their attitude, in short, showed that they had no real desire to come to a settlement, and they returned to Bazar without matters having in any way advanced. During July and August many Zakka Khels, including all the most notorious raiders, visited Kabul. Within a few days of their return from Kabul, offences began to be reported with unceasing regularity. Among the more important may be cited the following:—On 5th October a gang of some 30 Zakka Khel under Dadai raided the village of Samarai in the Kohat district, killing one Muhammadan and carrying off two Hindus and property to the value of Rs. 600. On 28th October a gang of 30 Afridis, manly Zakka Khel, attacked Pabbi in the Peshawar district and seized five Hindus. They fired on a party of troops at the station, seriously wounding a sepoy and a zamindar. At Tarnab they attacked and wounded the District Revenue Officer in camp and carried off his Chuprassi and horses. *En route* they robbed ten cartmen. Near Peshawar they encountered a party of police and fired on them, wounding two constables. Here they had to abandon most of their heavy booty and retreated into tribal territory. On 13th November the village of Lachi in the Kohat district was attacked by 22 men, mainly Zakka Khel. The Post Office was looted and one villager killed and three wounded. The raiders met a party of Border Military Police and fired on them, killing two and wounding two others. They carried off four rifles, jewels, and other property. On 20th November a similar gang under Dadai fired on a village near the Bara Fort. The garrison of Border Military Police turned out and

were at once attacked, two men being killed and two wounded at the first discharge. On 24th November a large gang of Zakka Khel attacked the Marai village in Kohat, but were driven off by the troops and villagers with a loss of two men killed and three wounded, all Zakka Khel. One of the men killed was Rokhan Karigar, Khusrogi, a well-known raider of the Dadai faction. On 25th November Multan with some 35 Zakka Khel carried off 400 goats from Matanni and attacked a police post, where they were repulsed. On 5th December the village of Masho Khel in the Peshawar district was attacked and a bania's shop looted and the owner killed by a gang of 16 persons, mainly Zakka Khel, and on the same day 12 mules working on the Khyber Road near Jamrud were carried off to Bazar by the Zakka Khel. It must not be supposed that these raids are mere border affairs such as might reasonably, in the circumstances of the frontier, be passed over without very serious notice or dealt with by local reprisals. Many of them, and those the most important, are organised raids by large and well-armed bodies of men on peaceful villages far in the interior of our administered districts or direct attacks upon Government posts and property, a fact which, in our opinion, necessitates much more stringent action on our part. Meanwhile the attitude of the Zakka Khel remains defiant. The position, in short, seems to us to have arrived, when the conduct of this truculent section leaves no alternative but to adopt punitive measures. On the 17th December, we enquired from Sir Harold Deane what, in his opinion, would be the effect on the Afridis and border tribes in Afghanistan, if we now took action again the Zakka Khel and occupied the Bazar Valley. He replied on the same day as follows:—"Judging from the present attitude of the Afridis there is no disposition on the part of other section to identify themselves with the Zakka Khel, and there is no reason to anticipate that they would join in opposing our advance into Bazar. Until the punishment of the Zakka Khel has been carried out, it is impossible to predict the future attitude of other Afridis, to whom the occupation of Bazar will doubtless be distasteful, but who, at the same time, have no desire to give Government cause for again entering Tirah. The only Afghan border tribe of any importance, viz., the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, have no interest in Bazar or Tirah, and I see no reason to anticipate trouble from them." Telegraphing again, three days later, Sir Harold Deane suggested that he should be permitted to summon the Afridi jirga, and clearly tell the clans that, unless they put an end to the present state of affairs created by the Zakka Khel, Government had decided to punish that section at once. If, he said, the Afridis express inability or unwillingness to coerce the Zakka Khel, and to take responsibility for their future behaviour, it would be tantamount to a public expression of our right to adopt coercive measures ourselves, and would deprive them of any excuse for joining the Zakka Khel. It may be that action in this direction may obviate the necessity for punitive measures, and though we confess that we do not anticipate this with confidence, we agree that every possible alternative should be exhausted before having recourse to such measures ourselves. We accordingly ask your sanction to authorise Sir Harold Deane to call in a jirga of the Afridi clans, and to announce to them that, if the tribe as a whole refuse actively to insist on the Zakka Khel affording reparation for the past and behaving in a proper and orderly manner, or if, after undertaking to do this, they fail to carry out their engagements, the Government of India will be compelled to take whatever steps they may consider advisable to punish the Zakka Khel section at such time as may be considered best. We should explain that we do not contemplate the despatch of a punitive expedition on the old lines, which included the burning of villages, blowing up houses, cutting down and ringing fruit trees and other acts of destruction. The action that we would propose to take would probably include the following measures:—The recovery of a fine and the disarmament of the section. The capture and trial of the ringleaders and those implicated in the recent raids. The construction of a road which would in the future contain this section and prevent their escape into the inaccessible regions to which they now resort. The road would be maintained on lines similar to those prevailing with regard to the Khyber, so far as they are applicable. The actual offenders in the recent raids and their supporters, if captured, would be dealt with by suitable tribunals locally assembled. It would be undesirable for Sir H. Deane to announce definitely that it is intended to send a force into the Zakka Khel country. If the other sections refuse or fail to keep them in order, he would report the fact, and the military authorities would then be requested to put into action the scheme which they have prepared. We ask,

however, that, in the event of the failure of the reference to the Afridi jirga, we may be allowed discretion to order the advance into the Bazar Valley whenever this may seem desirable. It is most desirable that the movement should be made suddenly and without previous notice or discussion which may lead to premature disclosure of our plans, and possibly involve other sections in opposition to the advance. We think it desirable, as was done in the case of the Mohmands in 1897, to inform the Amir of our intentions before we take coercive measures against the Zakka Khel. As the most favourable season for military operations is drawing near, we should be glad to receive an answer to this despatch by telegraph.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 4th May, 1907.

The Zakka Khel are reported to have held a meeting at China on the 28th April to discuss their future course of action. They decided to do nothing definite until the completion of the harvesting of their crops, which will take place in the latter half of May. One of the regular messengers of the Political Agent brought in a letter without signature or seals, purporting to be from the Zakka Khel Jirga, in which they referred vaguely to services they had previously rendered to Government, and stated that they had recovered some stolen property from thieves. The bearer of the letter brought a verbal message to the effect that the Zakka Khel Jirga was willing to come in to visit the Political Agent and make peace with Government if formally summoned and guaranteed honourable and liberal treatment. The messenger was told to reply that the Political Agent did not purpose to summon the jirga, but that he intended to go to Landi Kotal within a week, and that the Zakka Khel might visit him there if they had any serious proposals to advance for the settlement of the numerous cases against them. A later messenger reports that the receipt of this reply has again unsettled the tribe, as the majority consider that by holding out and refusing to make any settlement, Government will be forced to condone their past offences and to pay their allowances.

Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 11th May, 1907.

Reference diary for the week ending 2nd February, 1907. Of the camels raided by the Zakka Khel, 19 were ransomed by the owners through Khan Bahadur Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel of Chora, during the week.

Enclosure 3 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 18th May, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel are threatening the relations of Lal Baz and Inzarai, who were killed last year for giving assistance to the authorities in capturing outlaws at Tandai, that, unless they can induce the Khyber authorities to pardon the Zakka Khel for their misbehaviour, they will burn their villages and turn them all out of the country. Usman went so far as to occupy one of their *garhis*, but the jirga subsequently decided that they would wait for a month more and take up the case again if not sent for by the Political Agent. The Zakka Khel exacted a large number of sheep from the Afridis passing through their limits on their way back to Tirah with their *kaddas*, as transit duty. Now that the Afridis have returned to their homes in Tirah, they have re-opened their private feuds and are prosecuting them vigorously. No less than five men, including one Payao, a leading Anai Zakka Khel elder, were killed during the week. On the 18th instant, Muhammad Asghar, the notorious Zia-ud-din raider. who had been for many years the leader of raids into the Kohat District, was killed at Shin Kamar by a Zia-ud-din in the course of a jirga. It is stated that the elders wanted him to come down and settle his cases with the Political Agent, but as he persistently refused to do so, and they could not bring him in by force, they shot

him dead. Some say that he was killed in a private feud and the real reason for his murder is being enquired into. Dad Shah, one of the Zakka Khel prisoners taken in the *baramta* of December last, was waylaid by his enemies in Bazar and killed on his way to his home on release.

Enclosure 4 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 1*st June*, 1907.

The Zakka Khel Afridis have been holding jirgas in Bazar almost every day for the last week or two to decide what they should say to the Political Agent, at Landi Kotal, where they propose to visit him. Much tall talk was indulged in and many defiant resolutions passed. The tribesmen seem to have quite recovered from the fear of punishment which they felt in the spring. Their jirga arrived in the Khyber villages on the 1st June *en route* to Landi Kotal. The murder of Muhammad Asghar, the Zia-ud-din raider, has caused a great stir in Tirah. Muhammad Asghar was a man of note in the tribe and was a bold and daring leader of raids. He had amassed much property by raiding, and was generally respected and liked. The way of his murder was that three men with whom he had a hereditary feud had given security that they would suspend the feud for a certain time. Feeling secure in this, Muhammad Asghar relaxed his caution and came to a tribal assembly at Shin Kamar without followers. His three enemies had hired a fourth man who openly shot him in the assembly. As the people did not know how many of those present were interested in the murder, no one moved or protested until the meeting broke up in the usual way, when Muhammad Asghar's relations went hot foot to Tirah and seized two villages belonging to Yar Ghulam, uncle of Ghulam Muhaiy-ud-din, the assassin. Yar Ghulam's family took refuge with Sahib Alam, a friend and neighbour. The Mullas then took a hand, and preaching that Ghulam Mohaiy-ud-din had been hired by the *Feringhi* to murder Muhammad Asghar, drove out all his relations and occupied their villages after burning Yar Ghulman's property. His relations, about 40 in number, have taken refuge in the Aka Khel country. An old feud between the notorious Zakka Khel Dakait, Multan, and one Santak, a Shan Khel Zakka Khel, was revived during the week, and is being vigorously prosecuted. Some of the Zakka Khel elders have volunteered to arbitrate between the rival parties.

Enclosure 5 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 8*th June*, 1907.

The Zakka Khel jirga, which arrived in the Khyber on the 1st instant, visited the Political Agent at Landi Kotal on the 2nd and 3rd. They announced, on arrival, that they had come to make peace with Government, but their attitude was independent, and it was obvious that to come to any sort of settlement with them, all concessions must be on our side. The proceedings of the jirga have been separately reported. The jirga left on the evening of the 3rd instant, saying that they would discuss matters among themselves in the Khyber villages and return next day, but on the 4th they all left for Bazar on the transparent pretext that they feared arrest. The leaders of the "War party," Dadai, Usman, Multan, Zamir, and others, had refused to accompany the jirga to Landi Kotal but were waiting its return on the Bazar border. On arrival in Bazar on the morning of the 5th instant the jirga dispersed, but a number of the leading elders proceeded to Chura to discuss matters with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel. Yar Muhammad's attitude is curious, as he has always taken the lead among the Afridi Maliks in pressing for the punishment of the Zakka Khel and for the occupation of Bazar, but he is intensely jealous of the two Zakka Khel Maliks who have been working well to bring their tribe to reason and he sees that any settlement in which they are concerned must result in strengthening their position to an extent which will be distasteful to him. It is possible also that it may have dawned upon him that an occupation of Bazar, or a settlement which would strengthen our hold on the Zakka Khel, might be inconvenient to him and might lower his importance. He is anxious that negotiations with the Bazar tribes should be conducted through him and not through the Zakka Khel Maliks.

Enclosure 6 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 14th June, 1907.

With reference to the previous correspondence, I have the honour to forward, for the consideration of the Government of India, a copy of letter, dated 5th June, 1907, from the Political Agent, Khyber, dealing with the present attitude of the Zakka Khel and proposing that the allowances now due to the clan, amounting to Rs. 11,900, should be confiscated and utilised in settlement of the claims for compensation made by British subjects on account of losses suffered in the raids committed by the Zakka Khel during the last twelve months. These claims amount to Rs. 19,771-12-0, but, as pointed out by the Political Agent in his letter, are doubtless exaggerated.

2. The present position of affairs, as described by Major Roos-Keppel, more than confirms my report on the attitude of the tribe, submitted in my telegram dated 18th March, 1907, and it is evident from the Political Agent's letter that the attitude of the Zakka Khel continues unconciliatory and uncompromising. There appears to be no probability of a satisfactory settlement with a clan who, instead of offering redress for their offences, put forward a number of preposterous and impossible proposals. The fact that the principal offenders were present at the jirga held before the Zakka Khel attended at Landi Kotal and that they openly refused to be bound by any agreement which the tribe might come to with Government, is in itself sufficient indication that there is at present no hope of a satisfactory settlement.

3. There seems to be no immediate necessity for finally confiscating the accumulated allowances and for paying them to the injured parties, until Government have definitely decided what action, if any, is to be taken in regard to the Zakka Khel. I would, however, ask for sanction to the accumulated allowances being placed meanwhile in deposit, with a view to meeting claims for compensation later.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 5th June, 1907.

(Extract.)

In continuation of my letter of the 7th February, 1907, I have the honour to report, with regard to the Zakka Khel Afridis, that in February and March last, rumours were widely current in Peshawar and on the border that a punitive expedition was to be sent against the tribe. This rumour put the Zakka Khel on the defensive and deterred them from raiding for the time, as they feared that any night the Bazar Valley might be surprised. They organised a syetem of defence and for many weeks, in all weathers, their pickets occupied the numerous passes leading from the Khyber to the Bazar Valley. By the beginning of April, when the fear of invasion had begun to pass away, the usual messages were sent to all the other Afridi tribes to come in to receive their annual allowances, and the Zakka Khel waited to see whether they would be sent for or not, as they still hoped that we would be anxious to patch up some sort of a "settlement" by which they would retain their gains by paying a nominal fine in return for a free pardon. During this month they had approached each clan of the Afridis in order to induce them to take their part, but without success, and at the distribution of the allowances none of the jirgas expressed any sympathy with the Zakka Khel, while some openly said that they would be glad to see them punished. Early in May it became obvious to the Zakka Khel that it was not intended to summon them, so they began to send messages asking why they had not been invited, and enquiring whether they might come in to discuss matters. As the sending of an invitation to them would have implied that it was intended to pay their allowances, their messages were invariably given the reply that no invitation would be sent, but that the jirga could come in at any convenient time to see the Political Agent, to ask any questions, or to make any proposals. A lingering fear of attack induced them to cause delays until the crops of the Bazar Valley were harvested and threshed, and this interval was employed in sending childish messages regarding the nature of their reception. To these messages, which were sent with the object of gaining time, no replies were given. By the 25th May a fully representative jirga, including all the leading dakaits, had assembled in Bazar, and a week was spent in discussions as to the demads to be put forth by the jirga and the extent of concession to be made by them. On the 1st June, the jirga crossed into the Khyber villages, but the more notorious raiders and organisers of raids, such as Multan, Usman, Zamir, and Dadai, refused to accompany it or to be bound by its decisions. The jirga came to Landi Kotal on the 2nd, and that and the following day were spent in discussions with them. The jirga announced that they had come to make peace with Government, to hear the charges against the tribe, and to settle

the cases. They were informed of the claims against them, and they replied that these claims were absurd and that they could not entertain them. They went on to explain that they were prepared to restore any stolen property which accused men might acknowledge to having in their possession, and that they would return three of the smooth-bore rifles taken from the Pabbi Police Station. Fines, they said, were irrecoverable, as they had decided to insist upon reverting to the "old system" (which they state was in force before 1897) by which stolen property was claimed from the tribe, who then decided, by questioning the actual accused, whether in their opinion the claim was or was not a valid one. They also said that their allowances must in future be paid in full, as the system of deductions on account of fines, which had been introduced of late years, was, in their opinion, unfair and must be stopped; that their oath must in future be accepted as settlement in all cases; that they would acknowledge no responsibility for raiders passing through their country from Afghanistan or for property taken to Afghanistan, and that all restrictions on members of the tribe going to Kabul must be removed. As regards the punishment of notorious offenders, they said that they would never, under any circumstances, give them up for punishment, but would, if they considered their guilt proved, punish them in their own way, *i.e.*, by a demonstration and a feed at the expense of the culprit. Unfortunately this mild remedy can only be applied to a very weak man. From the above it will be seen that their desire for a settlement was not very real, nor their attitude promising. Had they seriously wished to settle their cases they could have done so by the deposit of half the rifles they had brought with them, until recovery of the value from the raiders, but in their then mood no settlement would have been satisfactory to them which did not involve the abandonment of practically all our claims. I do not suppose that all their terms and demands need be taken literally. For several months they have had a very real fear of actual punishment before their eyes and now that this fear is removed the revulsion is proportionately great. By the afternoon of the second day of discussion they had talked themselves out, and they left for the Khyber villages saying that they would discuss the matter amongst themselves and return next day. Next morning, however, they did not come but sent messengers, followed by the two Zakka Khel Maliks, with frivolous messages asking for formal invitation, guarantees of safe-conduct, &c. No answer was sent and by the time the Maliks returned to the Khyber villages in the afternoon the jirga had left for Bazar. What the result will be it is not possible to say. The jirga may decide to come in again with more reasonable suggestions, the tribe may remain quiet in the hope that things will blow over, or there may be a recurrence of raiding. Of the three alternatives the latter seems the more probable. It is clear that in the present mood of the tribe there is no hope of any settlement unless Government is willing to pay blackmail by abandoning its claims and those of the unfortunate sufferers by the raiding of the last year, and even such a settlement as this would only wipe out past offences while encouraging the tribesmen to further outrage. The Zakka Khel believe that they have tried their strength with us and that we have shirked the issue and the result is that their mood is now anything but conciliatory. The allowances due to the Zakka Khel up to the 31st May total Rs. 11,900. I propose to send this amount to the Deputy Commissioners, Kohat and Peshawar, for *pro rata* distribution to the sufferers by the raids of the past twelve months. The claims amount to Rs. 19,771-12-0, but they are doubtless exaggerated, and Rs. 11,900 should settle them. The claim of Government for Rs. 13,775 on account of fines can stand over for the present, and can be enforced or remitted in the autumn according to the behaviour of the Zakka Khel in the meantime.

Enclosure 7 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 15th June, 1907.

Messengers from Tirah state that Muhammad Asghar's brothers [diary for the week ending the 1st June, 1907] are being pressed by the Zia-ud-dins to give up Yar Ghulam's *garhi*, but that they are supported by Multan and several other Zakka Khel and are offering opposition to the tribe. The Mohib Khel section of the Zakka Khel sent in a message to the Political Agent during the week to say that there were no serious cases against them and that they were prepared to make peace with Government if their similar offences were pardoned. No reply was sent, as it is quite impossible to deal with the clan piecemeal. It is reported that a few days ago a party of Zakka Khel headed by Usman, Khusrogi, while on one of their ordinary visits to Ningrahar, kidnapped a Hindu, with a donkey load of miscellaneous goods from Battikot, and brought him to the Bara Aka Khel country. The Hindu managed to escape from Bara and took refuge with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan at Chura and has sent a message to his relations to come and take him back to Ningrahar.

Enclosure 8 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 22nd June, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel held a meeting at China on the 17th instant to discuss the question of their future behaviour towards Government, but with no definite result. The majority of them were of opinion that they should make no

overtures for peace until the autumn when they will have learnt more about the intentions of Government, and that, if they then found the Government firm in their demands for full restitution and for the thorough punishment of their bad characters, they will decide what to do. The old feud between the Zarif Khel and Hatim Khel sections of the Khusrogi Zakka Khel was finally disposed of by the former killing three of their own men to settle up their account with the Hatim Khel. The Zarif Khel had also the inheritance of the large estates of the deceased for their second object in view. Sher Baz, Paindai, whose brothers Lal Baz and Inzarai were killed by the Zakka Khel *lashkar* last summer for assisting us in the Tandai affair, and who had taken refuge at Chura, returned to China on the 19th instant, and with the assistance of Mir Ahmad Shah, Pakhai of Barg, occupied a *garhi* at China which he is still holding against Usman and other Khusrogis who had taken a leading part in the murder of his brothers. Usman has applied to Dadai and other Zakka Khel elders for help, reminding them that it was they who had put him up to the mischief and that they should therefore support him through thick and thin. Saiyid Mir and Jabbar, two of the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel tried by jirga, were found guilty of being members of a notorious gang of dakaits and sentenced to seven and four years' rigorous imprisonment each.

Enclosure 9 in No. 29.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 3rd July, 1907.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 14th June, 1907, in which you recommend that the accumulated allowances (amounting to Rs. 11,900) withheld from the Zakka Khel on account of their misconduct, may be placed in deposit, pending a settlement as to the line of action eventually to be followed in regard to the Zakka Khel. The proposal is made with a view to the sum confiscated being available hereafter to meet claims for compensation preferred by those who have suffered loss at the hands of Zakka Khel raiders during the past twelve months.

2. I am to inform you that the procedure proposed is irregular and cannot be sanctioned. The unpaid allowances, if they have been drawn by the Political Agent in the Khyber, should be recredited to Government, and if, hereafter, sanction is given to the payment of compensation to sufferers at the hands of the Zakka Khels, the expenditure must be met from general revenues.

Enclosure 10 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 6th July, 1907.

The visit of the Bazar Zakka Khel jirga to the Political Agent seems to have temporarily quieted the tribe as, although the raiding season has begun, no movements are reported.

Enclosure 11 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 13th July, 1907.

The Zakka Khel of Bazar having finished the sowing of their kharif crops have started with their Kaddas for Tirah. They have as usual left behind a guard of 30 men to guard their villages. Before leaving for Tirah they held a jirga in which they discussed the question of their future dealings with Government. Some of them were in favour of not committing any mischief in future in British limits, others suggested the resumption of hostilities, but nothing definite was arrived at, and the jirga decided to go into the question again on their arrival in Tirah in consultation with the Zakka Khel of Maidan, Bara, and Waran. The usual Afridi visits to Kabul have commenced.

Enclosure 12 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 16th July, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Reference correspondence ending with my letter dated 15th February, 1907. Political, Khyber, reports that Ganga Ram, the Hindu who was abducted from Badbher in December, has been brought in by a Kambar Khel jirga.

Enclosure 13 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 27th July, 1907.

(Extract.)

With reference to the release of Ganga Ram, who was abducted from Badbher in December last, I have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a letter dated 15th July, 1907, with its enclosures, from the Political Agent, Khyber, from which it will be seen that the Hindu was ransomed for Rs. 64, Kabuli, by a Kambar Khel.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 15th July, 1907.

I have the honour to report that to-day a jirga of the Shalobar Kambar Khel brought in to me Ganga Ram of Badbher, who was carried off by a raiding party on the 5th December, 1906, and who has since been kept a prisoner in Nakhtarnao, a hamlet of Nazian village, in Ningrahar, Afghanistan.

Mirza Ali, the only Kambar Khel member of the band of Zakka Khel raiders, who so harassed the Peshawar border last summer and winter, was instrumental in obtaining the release of the prisoner and in handing him over to the jirga of his tribe.

When the autumn allowances of 1906 were paid to the Kambar Khel Afridis on the 15th December, 1906, the tribe paid a fine of one month's allowances as a settlement of Mirza Ali's share in recent raids, and bound themselves to either reform him, or permanently expel him from their country. Since then Mirza Ali has entirely severed his connection with the raiders and the unconditional bringing in of the Hindu is a hopeful sign of his reformation, and the jirga seem quite determined that they will not allow him to compromise them further.

The Kambar Khel jirga made a petition for Mirza Ali's pardon, and were informed that his past offences would be so far condoned that no further action would be taken on this account against him through his tribe, but that if he were to enter British territory he would be liable to trial for the dakaities in which he had taken part. The jirga were quite satisfied with this reply.

I enclose translation of the petition of the jirga and of the Hindu's statement.

Annexure 2.

Translation of a statement by the Shalobar Kambar Khel Jirga, dated the 15th July, 1907.

We harassed Sadr Ali, brother of Mirza Ali, the Kambar Khel outlaw, very much, and told him that, if the latter would cease to raid in British territory and would hand over to us the Hindu carried off from Badbher, we would allow him to return to his country and at the same time would recommend him to Government for pardon. Sadr Ali, who has since been killed in a feud, communicated our words to Mirza Ali who consequently settled the Nakhtarnao Shinwaris' claims regarding the Hindu, handed him over to us and promised before us that he would never henceforth commit any mischief whatever in British territory. We then brought the Hindu with us and proceeding *viâ* Samana reached Kohat where we reported the matter to Mr. Donald. He detailed a sepoy with us to avoid our being interfered with in the way. We reached Peshawar the day before yesterday, and as you were not present there we have now brought the Hindu before you here, and beg to request that, as Mirza Ali has not offered any excuses in the restoration of the Hindu, has paid a large sum of money to the Nakhtarnao Shinwaris in effecting his release, and has moreover promised never to commit any mischief in British territory, his past offences may be pardoned.

Annexure 3.

Translation of a statement by Ganga Ram, son of Nand Kaur, of Badbher, dated the 15th July, 1907.

(Extract.)

About seven months ago when I was going to my village after closing my shop in the Badbher serai at about 9 p.m., a raiding party of about 21 men arrived there. At first they made me, Ramji Mal, and two other Hindus, prisoners. Before this they had seized two Police sepoys. Six of the raiders took us to a distance and seated us there, and the rest went to attack the serai from where they raided 11 camels, two horses, six bullocks, and two donkeys. They then returned to their homes and took us too with them. Early in the morning we reached Shin Kamar. The raiders released one of us named Hukma in the way as he was ill, and the other, who was dumb, they released on arrival at Shin Kamar. Next day the raiders took me, Ramji Mal, and the two Police sepoys, also the looted property, to Lakarai Ziarat, and the following day they got us to Nakhtarnao. The raiders had robbed me of a *khes*, valued Rs. 10, and cash, Rs. 11. The ringleaders of the party were Multan Anai Zakka Khel and Nur Rahman Afghan Shinwari, of Nakhtarnao, and the other members of the gang were either their relations or fellow-tribesmen. During may stay at Nakhtarnao, Multan, with a gang consisting of his brothers and other Zakka Khels and of Shinwaris of Nakhtarnao, had twice left Nakhtarnao for British territory with intent to raid. In the first raid they sacked Pabbi and carried off six rifles and other miscellaneous property, and in the second they attacked the Matanni serai and carried off 31 camels and eight bullocks. Sheikh Ahmad Nur, of Bara, ransomed the two Policemen for Rs. 160, Kabuli, and brought them in, while the Kamarai, Malikdin Khel, and Sipah Jirga, effected the release of Ramji Mal and brought him in to Peshawar. Mirza Ali paid Rs. 64, Kabuli, to Nur Rahman Shinwari, of Nakhtarnao, on my account, and thus effected my release and handed me over to the Kambar Khel jirga, who brought me to Peshawar *viâ* Kohat, and from there they brought me here and presented me before you. Mirza Ali has now given up raiding, as his enemies have killed his brother Sadr Ali in a feud, and he himself has been prevented by the Kambar Khel from committing raids.

Enclosure 14 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 24th August, 1907.

A Hindu and a Musalman, who were abducted from the Kohat border on the 11th ultimo, are reported to be the prisoners of Mir Khawas (a Sangu Khel of Naktarnao in Nazian, Afghanistan), who has held them to ransom. Enquiries made into the case show that the men were originally kidnapped by Gulab Sher and other Orakzais who handed them over to Taza Khan and other Zakka Khels for disposal. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, has been informed.

Enclosure 15 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 14th September, 1907.

A party of 24 men, Sangu Khel Shinwaris of Nazian and Zakka Khel of Bazar, is reported to have carried off from near Basawal in Ningrahar about 30 camels belonging to some Peshawaris, who were taking goods to Kabul, and to have brought the camels to Bazar. They are also said to have robbed the camel-drivers of Rs. 300 in cash. The Peshawaris are arranging to ransom their camels in Bazar.

Enclosure 16 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 21st September, 1907.

The theft of a drove of camels from near Basawal by a party of Sangu Khel and Bazar Zakka Khel raiders was reported in the Khyber Diary for week ending the 14th September, 1907. The Zakka Khel elders, headed by Dadai and Usman, called out the tribal *lashkar* and completely destroyed the villages of some of the Zakka Khel who had taken part in the raid.

Enclosure 17 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 9th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, wires 8th instant:—*Begins.* A serious raid occurred about 8 p.m. on night of 5th instant at Samarai village in Lachi Thana limits. The Officiating Superintendent of Police, whose report has reached me to-day from Samarai, reports that the raiders appeared to be Afridis and were well armed with Lee-Metford and Martini-Henri rifles. The raiders, said to be about 20 in number, divided into two parties and attacked the houses of two Hindus, namely, Kishan Ram and Moti Ram, who allege that goods to value of about Rs. 300 were taken from each house. The villagers tried to hold up the raiders at Moti Ram's house, but the raiders were too well armed and succeeded in getting out of the village, taking with them Shankar, son of Kishan Ram, and Ganga Ram, son of Moti Ram, and property to the value of Rs. 600; but as the raid was very quickly over it seems probable that complainants have exaggerated their losses. Villagers attacked raiders with stones and swords, upon which one villager named Muhammad Jan was shot dead. Eighteen empty Lee-Metford cartridges and 15 empty Snider cartridges were found on the scene of the occurrence. Kishan Ram, who is a rich Hindu, is trying to ascertain whereabouts of his son in order to pay ransom. Officiating Superintendent of Police reports that raiders are believed to be Zakka Khels, and it seems probable that some of this gang were Zakka Khels. The raiders made good their escape before special patrols could be sent out and the place where they crossed into independent territory after committing raid is not yet known.

Enclosure 18 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 10th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 9th October, 1907. Political Agent, Khyber, wires 9th instant:—*Begins.* A party of 27 Zakka Khels, headed by Dadai and Yar, left Maidan on 4th instant saying that they were going to raid. They have not yet returned, and it seems probable that they committed raid on Samarai in Kohat district; enquiries are being made. *Ends.*

Enclosure 19 in No. 29.

Letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 10th October, 1907.

(Extract.)

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter dated the 27th July, 1907, I am directed to request that you will furnish the Government of India with a report on the present position as regards the Zakka Khel Afridis. I am to enquire, with reference to the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 24th August, 1907, whether the Hindu and Muhammadan who were abducted from the Kohat border on the 11th July last, and held to ransom by Mir Khawas of Nakhtarnao, have yet been released.

Enclosure 20 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 24th October, 1907.

In continuation of my telegram dated the 10th October, 1907, regarding the occurrence of a raid on the night of 5th instant at Samarai village in the Kohat district, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the Political Agent, Khyber's letter dated the 19th October, 1907, on the subject.

Annexure.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 19th October, 1907.

Reference Deputy Commissioner, Kohat's, telegram of 8th instant, to your address.

I have the honour to report that the raid of 5th instant upon Samarai village in the Kohat district was committed by a gang of about 27 Zakka Khel, including the following men:—

(1) Dadai, Anai.
(2) Tut, cousin of No. (1).
(3) Randu „
(4) Saidanai „
(5) Nurbai, Paindai.
(6) Yar Shah, Anai.
(7) Mir Akbar, brother of No. (6).
(8) Amber Khan, cousin of No. (6).
(9) Saiyid Akbar „ „
(10) Sarfaraz Khan, Shan Khel.
(11) Shermadi, son of Khanukai, Anai.
(12) Sobai, Anai.
(13) Shinai, Anai.
(14) Nazar Gul, Anai.
(15) Saiyid Mir, nephew of Saiyid Khan, Anai.
(16) Pahlawan, Zia-ud-din.
(17) Gulzaman, brother of No. (16).
(18) Mir Azam „ „
(19) Rakhtu, brother of Muhammad Jan, Zia-ud-din.
(20) Nur Khalim, Zia-ud-din.
(21) Majid, cousin of Multan, Anai.
(22) Murak, Anai.
(23) Mulla Ghulam Muhammad, Zia-ud-din.

Dadai, who has recently returned from Kabul and who is now the most prominent of the "Kabul Elders" among the Afridis, has been urging the Zakka Khel to recommence raiding. Failing to induce his fellow-tribesmen to pull the chestnuts from the fire for him, he has been forced to take the field himself, and this is the first time for five years that he has actually taken part in a raid. Dadai was in doubt in which direction to raid, he personally being in favour of attacking some village in the Peshawar district, as he said that this would most annoy Government, but his followers preferred Kohat, as they said that the risk there was less and the chance of booty greater. While still undecided, Dadai received information from one Mir Akbar, a Malikdin Khel Afridi of Mirobak, in the Kohat district, with whom he is connected by marriage, and from Mir Azam, a Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, who is in the habit of visiting Kohat, that a rich Hindu at Samarai would be worth attacking.

Dadai consequently collected his gang at his house in Maidan on about the 3rd instant. He went first to Swaikot in the Bora to pick up his Zia-ud-din friends and from there proceeded *viâ* Zera and by Zangal Killi, in Shia limits, to Borakka and from there made his attack on Samarai. On his way he picked up two Firoz Khel Orakzai guides named Zarjhun Shah, Kasim Khel Firoz Khel, and Sher Ahmad, Haidar Khel Firoz Khel.

At Samarai they met with trifling opposition, killed one man, carried off what little loot they could find, captured two Hindus (one Shankar, son of Kishan Ram, and Ganga Ram, son of Moti Ram), and returned to Maidan *viâ* Kandauli and Ublan, thence through the Bizoti and Firoz Khel limits to Barki.

One of the raiders (No. 22), Murak, who is deaf, was left behind, and the raiders waited two nights and one day for him in the hills near Barkai, being supplied with food by Malik Sanjab Khan of that place. Murak eventually returned and the raiders broke up. Of the two prisoners, one is in the hands of Dadai, in Maidan, and the other is with Pahlawan, Zia-ud-din (No. 16), at Tseri-Kandao. The amount of loot actually taken appears to be small—it only gave each man Rs. 8.

I would suggest that the relations of the captured men should be dissuaded, if possible, from paying ransom, as to do so will only encourage this form of crime. There is no chance of the Hindus being killed or seriously ill-treated, and they will no doubt be released after a time if their captors find that there is nothing to be gained by keeping them.

The benevolent neutrality shown towards Zakka Khel raiders by all sections of the Orakzai has, in this as in all previous dakaities in Kohat, greatly contributed to their success.

Enclosure 21 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Raid on Pabbi on 28th reported. As raiders were carrying off two Hindus and Patwaris (subsequently released), they encountered party 45th Sikhs, and shots were exchanged. One Sikh sepoy wounded and probably one raider. Raiders, while retreating, passed, at Turnab, Camp of Native Revenue Assistant, whom they wounded slightly, carrying off his chaprassi and three horses. Chaprassi escaped and horses were recovered by Police near Badbher. No information yet as to identity of raiders, but in view of Khyber reports they were probably Zakka Khels.

Enclosure 22 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 30th October, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 30th instant. Following details of Pabbi raid now reported: About 6.30 p.m. on 28th, band of Afridis, numbering from 12 to 30, appeared at Pabbi and seized three Hindus (Aya Singh, Kifa Ram, and Natha Singh) and proceeded with them towards Peshawar. In addition, on the way, two Patwaris (Gobind Sahai and Ram Chand) were captured. Village Chigha turned out and followed. Near Railway Station they came upon detachment of 45th Sikhs camped there. Havildar Nand Singh, Commanding, enquired what was happening. Raiders replied with volley, by which one Sikh sepoy was seriously wounded and also Zamindar Ghulam Rasul, who happened to be in line of fire. Sikhs fired in return, causing raiders to abandon Hindus and retreat by Cherat road. Sergeant Crawford, 1st Mule Corps, camped at Pabbi, taking ten rifles, 45th Sikhs, and three policemen, proceeded in pursuit, but, owing to darkness, failed to come up with raiders. On receipt of news at Peshawar, 40 police were despatched by tum-tum to Badbher and 30 sepoys to Phandu, 15 to Pakhai, and 15 down Grand Trunk road, Border Police holding Bara-Janigarhi line. Raiders proceeded to Nasargarhi, where they robbed ten cartmen, thence to Turnab, where they found Revenue Extra Assistant Commissioner Bakhshi Ghani Sham Das in Camp. They wounded him with knife and would have carried him off, but he could not ride or walk. They looted his tents and carried off his three horses. Raiders apparently proceeded towards Hazar Khani and were met and challenged about 3 a.m. by body of police on Kohat road about two miles from Peshawar. They replied with volley, wounding two constables, and a running fight ensued, in which one raider was apparently wounded and horses and heavy loot had to be abandoned. Near Siaband the raiders escaped in the darkness.

Enclosure 23 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 2nd November, 1907.

On the night of the 28th October, 1907, a raid was committed at Pabbi (Peshawar District), in which one sepoy of the 45th Sikhs was wounded and an attempt was made to abduct some Hindus. An attempt was also made to abduct Ghani Sham Dass, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Revenue Assistant, Peshawar, who was in camp near Taru, but this failed, as the Police, who had received information of the raid, waylaid the gang and had an encounter with them, losing three men wounded. From inquiries made it appears that the party consisted of 16 Zakka Khel, 4 Aka Khel, and 6 Nazian Sangu Khel. Abduction, which was formerly rare, is now a feature of nearly every raid. It has been ascertained that a dacoity, which was committed at Patwar Bala (Peshawar District) on the 23rd October, was the work of a gang of Zakka Khel raiders headed by the notorious Mūltan. The gang only got about three hundred rupees and, not being satisfied with this, left for the Kohat border, whence they have just returned unsuccessful. On the 29th instant a Zakka Khel raiding party is reported to have entered the Loi Shilman valley viâ Dakka and Kam Dakka and to have had a fight with the Shilmanis, in which two Zakka Khel and one Shilmani were killed or wounded. Some say that the intention of the raiders was to attack the railway camp at Shahid Miana, but no details are yet known.

Enclosure 24 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 3rd November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 30th October. Political Agent, Khyber, reports that Pabbi raid was committed by gang of about twenty-six, the majority of whom were Zakka Khels, accompanied by six Shinwaris, Afghan subjects, and about four Aka Khels. He reports rumour that one of the raiders was wounded and lost his rifle, but this has not yet been confirmed.

Enclosure 25 in No. 29.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 7th November, 1907.

In compliance with your letter dated 10th October, 1907, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter dated 1st November, 1907, from the Political Agent, Khyber, and to submit the following remarks regarding the present position as regards the Zakka Khel Afridis, for the consideration of the Government of India.

2. Major Roos-Keppel's letter gives a full statement of the facts of the case up to date. The only other incident which perhaps deserves mention in this connection is a very deliberate attempt to derail the mail train, which occurred on the night of the 1st November. Several large stones were placed on the line near Taru, which luckily failed to upset the engine. It seems more than likely that this outrage was the work of one of the gangs mentioned in the Political Agent's letter.

3. I entirely agree with the Political Agent that the situation is even worse than it was last year. And, unless prompt and vigorous action is now taken, I anticipate that there will be a very serious epidemic of lawlessness on this border. One tribe is easily influenced by the bad example of another; and the fact that these Zakka Khel gangs are again harrying the Peshawar border with apparent impunity can only have the effect of encouraging other sections of the Afridis and adjoining tribes to follow suit. My recommendations for dealing with the situation have already been submitted to Government fully in the marginally noted correspondence, and I have nothing to add to the views there set forth, except that the present season is favourable for military operations, should such be sanctioned, as the cold weather migration from Tirah has commenced.

Letter dated 3rd December, 1906.
Letter dated 13th February, 1907.
Telegram dated 18th March, 1907.

Annexure 1.

Letter from the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 1st November, 1907.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to state that the resolute attitude of Government in the spring and the uncompromising reception of the Zakka Khel Jirga in June had so excellent an effect that we enjoyed the only quiet summer since 1897, and the peace of the five months from 1st April to 30th September was only broken by one offence, viz., the kidnapping of one Hindu and one Musulman from Hangu referred to in the Government of India letter of the 10th October last. I have received information that both have escaped. The Zakka Khel really believed in the spring that the time of their long-delayed punishment had arrived, and when this belief had begun to fade it was again revived by the reception of their Jirga in June, which convinced them of the firmness of Government. These beliefs, however, are not lasting, unless they are proved to be true by subsequent facts, and as time passed, the fear of punishment passed with it, with the result that a strong party, headed by Dadai himself, crossed the Miranzai Valley and attacked the village of Samarai, in the Kohat district, killing one man and carrying off two Hindu boys (who are still prisoners of the Zakka Khel) and some booty in cash—as detailed in my letter of 19th October, 1907. Since then five separate raiding gangs have been organised under the following leaders:—

(1) Dadai, Anai, Zakka Khel.
(2) Multan „ „ „
(3) Gul Baz „ „ „
(4) Muhammad Afzal, Zia-ud-din, Zakka Khel.
(5) Usman, Khusrogi, Zakka Khel.

On the night of the 23rd October, Multan's gang (No. 2) raided the village of Patwar Bala and carried off a small booty in cash after firing some shots. Disappointed with the result of this, they left for the Kohat border, whence they have just returned unsuccessful. I received reliable information in October of the intention of one of these gangs to attack the coolie-camp working at the Shahgai cutting on the Khyber road and was forced to move the camp to Fort Maude for protection. On the 28th October, Gul Baz's gang (No. 3), consisting of sixteen Zakka Khel, six Afghan Shinwaris of Nazian and some Aka Khel, committed a raid at Pabbi (about 25 miles inside the border) where they wounded a sepoy of the 45th Sikhs and carried off some Hindus. On their way back they attempted to carry off the Revenue Assistant, Peshawar district, and looted his camp; they were, however, intercepted by a party of Police, of whom they wounded three. I have just heard from Landi Kotal that a Zakka Khel raiding party had attacked Loi Shilman from Kam Dakka and had killed or wounded three of the Shilmanis. No details have been received. Dadai, a Zakka Khel elder who has just returned from Kabul and who poses as the leader of the Afghan party among the Zakka Khel,

has been preaching to his fellow-tribesmen that, if the worst came to the worst, they can always save themselves from punishment by declaring themselves Afghan subjects. So far as the situation has changed at all during the last 12 months it has altered for the worse. The Zakka Khel believed last spring that they were to be punished for their long misconduct, but they now believe that, although we had then decided to punish them, we were afraid at the last moment to do so. The Samarai and Pabbi raids of last month have equalled, if not surpassed, in boldness any previous records of such crimes, and the bill against the tribe has grown considerably. In February last I computed our claims against the Zakka Khel at Rs. 33,546, of which Rs. 19,771 was on account of compensation to sufferers and Rs. 13,775 on account of fines (see my letter of 7th February, 1907), and I now attach a list of offences which were not included in that letter or which have occurred since its submission. The present position as regards the Zakka Khel Afridis is that the tribe is openly hostile to us, that the tribesmen have got over their fear of punishment, that they believe that Government does not dare to attack them. As I stated in my letter of 18th November, 1906, the only possible solution of the problem is the occupation of the Bazar valley, and to this I have nothing to add.

Annexure 2.

Raids committed by Zakka Khel since submission of Political Agent, Khyber's letter of 7th February, 1907.

No.	Date of occurrence.	Place of occurrence.	Parties.	Nature of offence.	Remarks.
1	2nd January, 1907.	Khatak Banda, tahsil Hangu, Kohat district.	Crown *versus* Sher Ali, Sarfaraz, &c., Shen Khels; Niazai, Majid Sikandar Khan, Anai; Malang Shah, Mir Afzal, Zaafran, &c., outlaws.	Abduction of 3 Hindus, 2 Muhammadan boys and 6 donkeys.	Released on payment of ransom.
2	15/16th March, 1907.	Jangli Burj, Police Station, Peshawar.	Crown *versus* Gulbaz, Sahib Dad, Zamir, Rakhtu, Anai; Muhammad Afzal, Muhammad Asghar, and Mir Akbar, Zia-ud-din; Sher Ghulam, Zakka Khel (Kurrami); Zarghun Shah, Mehrab Shah, Zari Shah, Mir Afzal, and Malang, Aka Khel.	Robbery of 3 Martini-Henry rifles with some cartridges and Government uniforms.	—
3	20th March, 1907.	Mastu Lalma, Marai Bala, Kohat.	Crown *versus* Yar Shah, Anai; Mir Akbar, Pahlawan, Mir Azam Zia-ud-dins; and Habib, Peshawari outlaw.	Abduction of two Muhammadans and theft of 15 bullocks.	The men were subsequently released.
4	11th July, 1907	Jabai, tahsil Hangu, Kohat district.	Crown *versus* Multan, Khialu, Gulbaz, Sahib Dad, Amir Shah, Tarza Khan, and Mitha Khan, Anai; Sarfaraz, Shan Khel; Babarai, Nazar Gul, Nizam Gul, Mir Din, Khusrogis; Muhammad Afzal, Zia-ud-din; with four others, Baz Muhammad Aka Khel; Gulak Sher, Musalli Gulfaraz, Wali Sherzai, and Nadir Sher, Mishtis.	Abduction of one Muhammadan and one Hindu.	Since reported to have escaped from Nazian.
5	5th October, 1907.	Samarai, Kohat district.	Crown *versus* Dadai Tut, Randu, Saidanai, Yar Shah, Mir Akbar, Akbar Khan, Saiyid Akbar, Sher Madi, Sabi, Shinai, Nazar, Gul, Saiyid Mir, Majid, Nurakh, Anais; Nurbai Paindai; Sarfaraz, Shan Khel; Pahlawan, Gul Zaman, Mehr Azam, Rakhtu and Nur Khalim, Zia-ud-din.	Murder of a Mussulman and abduction of 2 Hindus and theft of property valued at Rs. 600.	—
6	24th October, 1907.	Patwar Bálá ...	Devi Das *versus* Multan, Zamir, Tarza Khan, and other Zakka Khel.	Dakaiti with theft of property valued at Rs. 334–10–0.	Shots were exchanged between the villagers and raiders, and Nanik Chand, son of the complainant, was wounded (with knife) on both hands.
7	28th October, 1907.	Pabbi	Crown *versus* Gulbaz, Sangar, Sahib Khan and 13 other Zakka Khels, four Aka Khels, six Sangu Khel Shinwaris, two Bárá Sturi Khels.	Dakaiti with attempt at abduction of Revenue Assistant Ghani Sham Das and some Revenue subordinates. Also wounding of one sepoy, 45th Sikhs, and three sepoys of the Police.	Full details not yet known.
8	29th October, 1907.	Loi Shilman ...	Zakka Khel raiding party	Cattle raid and wounding of 3 men.	Reported by telephone, detailed report not received.

Enclosure 26 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending the 9th November, 1907.

The Bazar Zakka Khel assembled at China on the 8th instant to celebrate the *Id* and freely discussed the question of their future behaviour towards Government. The majority were for war though some of the more sober-minded elders advised the *Kishara* that they could still avoid trouble with the Sarkar if they only abstained from committing further mischief in British territory. On the other hand Usman and others were arguing that, mischief or no mischief, Government were bent on taking Bazar, and that it was better to die in honour than to be vanquished in disgrace. No definite decision was however arrived at.

Enclosure 27 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 14th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reports serious raid committed on night of 13th instant at Lachi by Afridi gang of about fifty raiders. They broke into post office and looted cash chest and into Hindu's shop and took away jewellery, cash, and silks. Some men of Lachi kept up fire on raiders, otherwise losses would have been much heavier. Raiders shot one villager and wounded three others. Raiders cut telegraph wire on main road three miles north of Lachi. Party of Border Military Police, in three tum-tums, proceeding to Lachi to take part in search for Khatak outlaws in recent Banda Daud Shah case, were ambushed by these raiders with result that two sepoys were shot dead and two seriously wounded and four rifles and 160 rounds ammunition were carried off by raiders. Remaining sepoys acted with great presence of mind, lying flat on road under heavy fire, and opened fire on raiders, who dispersed westward. Every effort has been made to intercept gang and military at Hangu and Kohat have been asked to co-operate in stopping routes.

Enclosure 28 in No. 29.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 16th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 14th November. Lachi raid. You will no doubt inform us as soon as possible to what clans raiders belonged and if they were also responsible for Banda Daud Shah raid.

Enclosure 29 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 16th November, 1907.

The Tirah Zakka Khel held a *jirga* at Madato-Kass-Maidan on the day of the *Id* (Friday, the 8th instant) to discuss (like the Zakka Khel in Bazar) the question of their future behaviour, and the majority of the elders present voted for war. They said that it would be a great blow to their *izzat* if they took the initiative in suing for peace and that unless Government themselves invited them to a conference at Peshawar, and agreed to entirely wipe out the past, it would pay them to maintain their hostile attitude as no *gharib* tribe was ever treated with consideration by the British Government. There was hardly a dissentient voice among them. The majority are now busy in bringing their *kaddas* to Bazar. A very serious raid was committed at Lachi on the 12th instant. The raiders seized the Post Office, broke open a treasure chest, and entered some Hindus' shops and carried away a quantity of jewellery and silk. Some of the raiders came across a party of Border Military Police going out in *tumtums* in the direction of Lachi in search of some Khatak outlaws, who had kidnapped three Hindus from

Banda Daud Shah on the 7th instant, and fired on them, with the result that two of the sepoys were shot dead and two others severely wounded and four rifles and 160 rounds of ammunition were captured by the raiders. One of the raiders, a Shan Khel Zakka Khel, is reported to have been killed by the pursuit party and to have been left behind by the raiders. It is not yet known definitely who the raiders were, but it appears almost certain that they were Zakka Khel. They fled in the direction of Tirah and the man killed is reported to be a Shan Khel Zakka Khel, brother of a notorious raider.

Enclosure 30 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 18th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 14th November. Troops in Kohat garrison co-operated with Samana Rifles, Border Military Police and villagers in holding line between Kohat and Mirkhweli to intercept Lachi raiders. Raiders apparently retreated in two parties, one of which is hitherto untraced. Other party retreated west in direction of Orakzai country and broke through line of pickets held by 56th Rifles near Hangu on night 14th instant, losing one man killed, subsequently identified as Yamir, brother of Niazmir, Shan Khel Zakka Khel. One of police wounded near Lachi has succumbed to wounds.

Enclosure 31 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 21st November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

At 8.30 last night party of Afridis came to vicinity of Bara post and fired few shots in order to turn out garrison of Border Military Police. Border Police went out and were ambuscaded about 200 yards from post on road to Ilm Gudar, losing two men killed and two wounded. Raiders then retreated towards Ilm Gudar followed by border police and village chighas, who have not yet returned. Affair is very deliberate act of hostility to Government.

Enclosure 32 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 22nd November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 21st November. Following letter, dated 22nd instant, from Political Agent, Khyber, is repeated for information:—*Begins*. One of my Zia-ud-Din Zakka Khel messengers has just arrived and states that he met at Mamanai the party who attacked the Border Military Police at Bara on the night of the 20th instant and recognised among them: Anai Zakka Khels, (i) Dadai, (ii) Multan, (iii) Rakhtu, (iv) Zamir, (v) Amir Shah, (vi) Saidanai, (vii) Mastan, (viii) Gulistan, (ix) Mehr Jan, (x) Mehr Dast, Zia-ud-Din Zakka Khels, (xi) Shaghar, (xii) Mir Akbar, (xiii) Sher Alam, (xiv) Mir Afzal, (xv) Sher Khulam, Shan Khel. There were also about half a dozen Aka Khel and Sturi Khel of Bargdi. He states that the plan of the raiders was to lure the Border Military Police out of the Fort at Bara and, if possible, to kill them all—partly as an act of war and partly in revenge for the raider killed in the Pabbi raid of 28th October, 1907. Four of the Border Police fell at the first discharge, but two men stayed with the fallen sepoys and opened fire on the raiders, severely wounding Mehr Dast (No. x), a first cousin of Dadai and a man of importance. This loss upset the raiders' plans and they had to abandon their attacks on the Border Military Police and carry off their wounded comrade. They retired slowly in the direction of the Besai Spur, keeping back the chigha by occasional

shots. Their reason for going in this direction was that there is, at the south side of the Besai spur, a tower held by about 60 Kambar Khel, and they counted upon these men for support. Having arrived safely there, they swung to left and went to Mamanai, where they rested for some hours and got a charpoy on which they carried Mehr Dast up the Bara. Mehr Dast's shinbone is completely shattered and he is certain to die. The raiders said that as the Border Military Police had now killed their men they would revenge themselves upon every opportunity. Since writing this, other messengers have come in who fully confirm above. *Ends.* In the recent raids since 5th October, in which Zakka Khels were implicated, the tale of killed and wounded has been as follows:—

At Samarai, one villager killed.

At Pabbi, one sepoy, 45th Sikhs, two Police Constables, Revenue Extra Assistant Commissioner, and one villager wounded.

At Lachi, two Border Military Police and one villager killed and two Border Military Police sepoys and three villagers wounded.

At Bara, four Border Military Police sepoys wounded.

Enclosure 33 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 23rd November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 18th November. Lachi raid. Political, Khyber, reports that gang consisted of twelve Zakka Khels and about ten others, chiefly Orakzai and Aka Khel. Names of all Zakka Khel concerned are known. Gang started on day after *Id* from Maidan and proceeded viâ Sampagha Pass and Rabbia Khel Orakzai country, where they stayed three days. They left eight men to watch road while sixteen attacked Lachi. The eight men encountered the Border Police and one of them, Yar Mir, Zakka Khel, was killed on spot. Raiders got four rifles from the Border Police, of which three are now in Maidan in possession of Niaz Mir, Majid, and Jafar, Zakka Khel, while the fourth was left with the Orakzai. This information is all amply corroborated. Unless prompt action is taken to deal with these cases, I anticipate a spread of lawlessness to other tribes and consequent serious trouble.

Enclosure 34 in No. 29.

Extract from the Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 23rd November, 1907.

The Zakka Khel Afridis continue to preserve a warlike attitude. A Malikdin Khel Afridi who recently visited China in Bazar states that the peace party has practically disappeared and that all sections of the Zakka Khel are openly hostile to Government. The Zakka Khel have sent messages to the Malikdin Khel, Kuki Khel, Kambar Khel, and Sipah Afridis informing them that they (the Zakka Khel) have declared war against Government and that they wish to attack the Khyber if the other tribes do not object. The tribes have replied that this is too important a matter to be decided off-hand, and that they will reply after their *kaddas* have moved from Tirah and after they have had time to discuss the subject. On the night of the 20th instant a strong party of Zakka Khel, including almost every raider of note, attacked the Border Police Garrison of the Bara Fort. They sent a few men to fire shots in the offing and, having thus lured a part of the garrison out of the fort, fired into them at short range, killing two and wounding two sepoys. Some of the Border Police returned the fire, seriously wounding one of the raiders. This forced the raiders to retire and they retreated in the direction of the Besai spur, where there is a tower with a garrison of Kambar Khel Afridis whom the raiders counted on to cover their retreat if necessary. It is generally believed that the man wounded was one Mehr Dast, a cousin of the notorious Dadai, but there is a rumour that Dadai himself was wounded and that the fact is being kept dark so as not to discourage the tribe. Neither Dadai nor Mehr Dast has yet returned to Bazar or Tirah. On the evening of the 18th instant one Abdulla Jan, a cousin of Dadai, went to Chura and

spent the night with Malik Yar Muhammad Khan. The Malik sent in a letter, dated 19th, regarding the whereabouts of a horse recently stolen from Lieutenant Crosthwaite. On the 21st instant (the day after the attack on the Border Military Police at Bara) another letter was received from the Malik warning the Political Agent of an impending raid. Enquiries show that the Malik had had no other Zakka Khel visitor in the meantime, so it appears probable that he knew on the 18th of the departure of the raiding party and that he intentionally sent the information a day too late. The Malik's inveterate tendency to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds will inevitably bring him to grief before long. On the 23rd instant information was received that the party of raiders who attacked Bara Fort on the 20th had reassembled at the mouth of the Bara and intended to commit another raid. Precautions were taken and no raid occurred, but it is stated that the raiders actually started on the night of the 23rd, but that they had a dispute with the Aka Khel, who accused them of getting them into trouble by using their country as a raiding route and demanded that they should keep to their own side (the left bank) of the Bara. The raiders have asked the Kambar Khel and Malikdin Khel garrisons of the Kajurai Plain what will be their attitude if that line is used for raiding and have received a reply that this question can only be settled when the elders arrive from Tirah. In addition to the raider Yah Mir (a Shan Khel Zakka Khel) who was killed in the raid on Lachi on the 13th instant, two men, Yar Shah and Hazrat Gul, both Zakka Khel, have been missing. Yar Shah has just returned severely wounded, but nothing is known as to the fate of Hazrat Gul. Although the Afridi *kaddas* have not yet come down, the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel have very strong garrison in the Kajurai Plain. To the south of, and close to, the Besai spur the Kambar Khel have two towers held by about sixty men, while about a mile to the south the Malikdin Khel have a strong tower with a garrison of about the same strength. In the caves in the north-west corner of the plain there are about 150 Kambar Khel and further south are the Malikdin Khel caves with between 200 and 250 men. All these men are well armed, and are unencumbered by families or flocks and they are a source of anxiety, as there is always a chance of some of them joining the Zakka Khel in their raids. Hitherto they have been fully occupied with their own feud and on the 19th an engagement took place in which four men were wounded, but they have now arranged a truce until their *kaddas* arrived. Probably the nearness of the payment of their allowances will keep them steady; but the impunity with which the Zakka Khel have extended their operations far into the Peshawar and Kohat Districts makes the temptation to individuals of an adventurous disposition to take a hand, almost too great to be resisted. The Shinwaris of Lowargai are now excluded from Afghanistan on account of their loyalty to the British Government and of the complaints of the Zakka Khel with whom they are at feud.

Enclosure 35 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reports that sowar, proceeding on 24th from Marai to Kachi was fired on by raiding party. Sowar was unhurt. Pursuit parties turned out and engaged raiders said to be about fifty strong.

Enclosure 36 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Since the receipt of your telegram of the 25th November to Secretary of State, two further raids have been separately reported, namely, at Kachi and Matanni, and we hear Multan with gang of 100 raiders have been in Miri Khel cave in Aka Khel country for three nights, and have only been deterred from raiding by troops

sent out to different posts. Situation has become intolerable for villagers, police, and Border Military Police, against last of whom Zakka Khel have declared open feud. I must respectfully urge that action should not be deferred, as I anticipate spread of lawlessness with damage and loss of life to our subjects and servants, who are already suffering great feeling of insecurity.

Enclosure 37 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 26th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Report received of raid on cattle last night near Matanni. Some shots were fired at Ladaur Burj (small road post near Matanni), but no one was hit. The telephone wire was also cut.

Enclosure 38 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 27th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 26th November. Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, wires 26th instant:—*Begins.* Parties of Samana Rifles, Border Military Police, half troop 23rd Cavalry on foot, and large chighas from villages of Marai and Kachi, encountered raiders yesterday evening south of Marai and pursued them till dark. Raiders reported to have been in large numbers, but about 30 to 35 only were seen. No heavy firing took place, no casualties on our side, but raiders lost two men, whose corpses are being sent to Kohat for identification. Both are believed to be Zakka Khels and ring taken from one corpse bears impression "Rukhan." One Martini-Henry rifle also recovered from one corpse. Raiders retreated north-west towards Sturi Khel country, and it is believed that others are wounded and search will be made in the hills close to our border. Bar Muhammad Khel chigha of Karez (Independent Territory) turned out and gave great assistance and successfully held one line of retreat of raiders. Am sending this telegram from Marai, and on return to Kohat will submit a further report. Manner in which Militia, &c., turned out in pursuit most satisfactory and promptness and pluck of village chigha most commendable. *Ends.*

Enclosure 39 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 28th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to-day:—*Begins.* Owing to activity of raiders on this border the Samana Rifles and Border Military Police have, during past fortnight, had little rest and very few nights in bed, and hard work is telling on health of the men, many of whom are suffering from fever and pneumonia. With the Samana Rifles and Border Military Police at present strength, it is not possible, along such a long border line, to undertake proper and adequate measures for defence of our villagers and subjects in British territory from the attacks of Afridi raiders without calling upon the Military to afford greater assistance than I have hitherto asked for. I now propose asking General Officer Commanding, Kohat, to send half battalion Native Infantry to Raisan and half battalion to Chillibagh for co-operation, when opportunity arises, against raiders. This would be in addition to small detachments regular Infantry and Cavalry which I might require at Alizai and Muhammadzai posts. I have deferred making these proposals to General Officer Commanding, Kohat, pending receipt of orders of Chief Commissioner as to his concurrence and would request that his orders may be telegraphed to me. *Ends.* I have replied:—*Begins.* Your telegram of to-day. Chief Commissioner agrees to your asking General Officer Commanding for troops as suggested. We are informing Government of India accordingly. *Ends*

Enclosure 40 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 29th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 26th instant. Appears that Multan, with gang of about 35 Zakka Khel, came from Miri Khel caves on night 25th instant. Gang divided into two parties, one of which lifted 400 goats from Matanni and carried off herdsman as far as Shinkamar where he was released. Other party fired on Ladaur Burj, but fled on arrival of Matanni chigha. The telephone wire was cut in several places and about one thousand feet of wire carried off.

Enclosure 41 in No. 29.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 30th November, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 27th November. Viceroy has received with satisfaction report of satisfactory behaviour of troops, police and villagers on occasion of Marai raid. He regrets the strain imposed on all concerned by the present raids, but trusts that raiders may find that, with our border on the alert, these raids are more damaging to themselves than to us.

Enclosure 42 in No. 29.

Extract from Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 30th November, 1907.

In last diary it was noted that the raiders who attacked Bara Fort on the 20th November had re-assembled at the mouth of the Bara and on 23rd news was received that one raiding party had left for the Kohat District and that one intended to raid into Peshawar. This information was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner concerned, and the first party were so warmly received by the Kohat Border Police and villagers, on their arrival at Marai on the 25th instant, that they lost two killed and three wounded, while they got no booty and there were no casualties on our side. One of the men killed was the notorious "Rokhan Karigar," a Khusrogi, who has been a bold and determined raider for the past twelve years. The other party made a futile attack on a Border Police post named Ladaur in the Peshawar District, cut and carried off about 1,000 yards of telegraph wire and some herds of cattle. Raiding parties are still hanging about Barkai and the mouth of the Bara, but there are detachments of troops on the line Matanni-Peshawar, and it is difficult now for them to raid with comparative safety. It is stated, however, that their recent losses, viz., two killed and three wounded at Marai, one killed and one wounded at Lachi, one mortally wounded at Bara, and one mortally and one slightly wounded at Pabbi, have not discouraged, but have rather exasperated the Zakka Khel. In last diary it was noted that there was some doubt as to the identity of the raider shot at Bara. He turns out to be Mehr Dast, as at first reported, and it is stated that he expired in Bazar on the 30th November. Malik Sinjab, Sturi Khel, appears to have abandoned all pretence and to have now openly taken sides with the Zakka Khel. Almost every raiding party is lodged and fed at Barkai, Sinjab's men regularly join the raiders—in fact it is stated that his son, Abdulla Jan, has taken part in the Bara Fort affair and in other raids. Sinjab receives a share of all loot, openly gives out that he is at war with the Sarkar, and is now turning out many of his *hamsayas* to make room for Zakka Khel and Aka Khel mercenaries to defend Barkai in case of attack. This village has been a thorn in the side of the Peshawar district for years and is now a second Gumatti. The two Hindus carried off from Samarai on the 5th October last are still in captivity in Maidan, one is with Dadai's family, and one with the relations of Pahlwan, Zia-ud-din.

Enclosure 43 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 2nd December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 27th November. Following telegram from Political Agent, Khyber, to Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, dated 1st December, is repeated for information:—*Begins.* The two raiders killed were Rokhan, Khusrogi Zakka, a very notorious raider generally known as Rokhan Karigar, and Yardan, Zia-ud-din Zakka. Three men were wounded, Jemadar, Zia-ud-din Zakka, Ser Jan, Khusrogi Zakka, and Mandozai, Anai Zakka. *Ends.* Political Agent adds that Rokhan Karigar was one of the boldest raiders among the Zakka Khel, who has lived by raiding and receiving stolen goods for the last ten years, and he considers him equal in importance to Multan or Dadai.

Enclosure 44 in No. 29.

From the Political Agent, Khyber, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 6th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Twelve mules and donkeys employed on Fort Maude cutting carried off yesterday from Khyber Road at mouth of Pass by Zakka Khel raiders. Animals taken to Bazar.

Enclosure 45 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 6th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

On night of 5th instant a gang of about 12 raiders, said to be Afridis, broke into a bania's shop in Masho Khel in Peshawar district, and after ransacking boxes shot the bania dead and made off. Before leaving village they fired ten shots at Lambardar. Village Chigha turned out and met party of 57th Rifles, who had come out from Bara, and by mistake fired on them wounding an Afridi lance-naik, but not badly. The party of 57th Rifles and Border Military Police proceeded to Hamzarai Ender in search of the raiders, but returned without success this morning.

Enclosure 46 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 8th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Commandant, 17th Cavalry, Bannu, reports that four Afridi sowars of his regiment have deserted with four Martini-Lee-Enfield rifles and 80 rounds each ball ammunition from Squadron Training Camp, Laluzai, near Bannu.

Enclosure 47 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 9th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Continuation my telegram dated 6th December. From information received it appears that gang who raided Masho Khel and shot bania on 5th instant consisted of 16 persons, of whom 6 were recognised as Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel; namely, Sher Dil, Merak, Mir Azam, Pahlwan, Amir Shah, and Saiyid Khan. The remainder consisted of another Zakka Khel and persons unknown, possibly also Zakka Khel. They retreated viâ Mamari Gudar towards Barkai.

Enclosure 48 in No. 29.

From the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 17th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Please refer to your letter of 3rd December, 1906. What, in your opinion, would be the effect on the Afridi and border tribes in Afghanistan, if we now took action against Zakka Khel and occupied Bazar Valley?

Enclosure 49 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 17th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of the 17th December. Judging from present attitude of Afridis, there is no disposition on the part of other sections to identify themselves with Zakka Khels, and there is no reason to anticipate that they would join in opposing the advance into Bazar. Until punishment of Zakka Khels has been carried out, it is impossible to predict the future attitude of other Afridis, to whom occupation of Bazar will doubtless be distasteful, but who, at the same time, have no desire to give Government cause for again entering Tirah. The only Afghan border tribe of any importance, viz., the Sangu Khel Shinwaris, have no interest in Bazar or Tirah, and I see no reason to anticipate trouble from them.

Enclosure 50 in No. 29.

From the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 20th December, 1907.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of 17th December. If we are allowed to say definitely to the Afridi clans that unless they put an end to the present state of affairs with the Zakka Khels, Government have decided to punish Zakka Khels at once, I would ask permission to summon Afridi Jirga and put matters clearly before them. This course offers only possible alternative to use of troops. If Afridis express inability or unwillingness to coerce Zakka Khels and to take responsibility for future behaviour, we should, any way, obtain from them public expression of our right to do so and deprive them of any excuse for joining Zakka Khels. It would, however, be useless and only weaken our position to discuss matters with them unless we can express intention of Government definitely.

No. 30.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. See our Despatch of 9th instant. Telegram from Sir H. Deane states that Kacha Garhi railway station between Jamrud and Peshawar was attacked by 30 raiders on night of 24th instant; one of the station staff was severely wounded and another was carried off. Latter was subsequently released, on station-master raising cry of approach of Khyber Rifles, at which raiders took to flight. As regards composition of the gang that executed the raid, further inquiries are being made.

No. 31.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram dated 27th instant. Telegram from Sir H. Deane states that object of Zakka Khel gang which raided Kacha Garhi was to lure out and attack Border Military Police garrison of that place. Gang consisted of Anai and Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel, with some Aka and Sturi Khel.

No. 32.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 30th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My sense of the fundamental objections to a policy of occupation of Zakka Khel territory, which appears founded on assumption that strict limitation of operations to occupying Bazar Valley will be possible, is increased by definite proposals in your letter of 9th instant. It is impossible to regard your present proposals otherwise than as involving a reversal of the policy established by Lord George Hamilton's Despatch of 28th January, 1898.* Discussion of the subject from this wider point of view has not been considered necessary by you, and you have left for consideration after the event the question of what action to take should an Afridi rising, or possibly a general tribal rising on the scale of the 1897 rising, take place. This result the occupation of Bazar would tend to produce owing to the restlessness it would rouse in every tribe along the northern frontier, and the suspicion that it was only part of a scheme for the practical annexation of all of them in turn. His Majesty's Government are not prepared in these circumstances to approve measures inconsistent with the policy laid down in the despatch cited above, which my predecessor confirmed in his Despatch of 28th October, 1904. On that occasion it was decided that no reason for abandoning the principles fixed in 1898 was constituted by fact that certain Orakzai clans had expressed the desire to be taken over by us. You state, I observe, in your letter of the 7th March, that, but for geographical position of Bazar Valley, which made occupation preferable, you would have recommended punitive expedition or blockade. Though they must disallow any policy of permanent occupation or annexation, His Majesty's Government would be prepared, in view of grave situation which incessant Zakka raids have produced, to consider any proposals that you may think it desirable to submit, limited to blockade and punitive measures in Bazar Valley. Combination of blockade with punitive action seems to be favoured by experience of Mahsud operations of 1901. Please refer to telegram of 1st November, 1901, from Lord George Hamilton,† in which sharp sallies, limited to three or four days' duration, in addition to the passive blockade, were sanctioned. Please report for previous sanction terms of communication you think should be made to Afridi jirga regarding conduct of Zakka Khel section, bearing in mind restrictions on operations against Zakka imposed by these instructions; and also that neutrality of Afridis, not their active co-operation, seems to be all we can expect or reasonably claim.

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* *See* Cd. 496 of 1901, p. 5.

† *See* Cd. 1177 of 1902, p. 246.

No. 33.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated 29th instant, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"Peshawar city raided last night by gang of 60-80 men. There is no doubt that gang were Zakka Khel, as it was known they had left Bazar for purpose of raiding, it being given out that Nowshera was their destination. Casualties were: Two chaukidars wounded, one of whom is stated to be dying. Two police constables wounded, one killed. It is reported that property was carried off from house of a banker named Chela Ram, to the value of Rs. 1,00,000. Deputation complaining of the great state of insecurity has been sent up by Hindu merchants of the city. No successful action on part of troops and Khyber Rifles, who turned out after raiders, has been reported."

No. 34.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 31st January, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. Grave situation occasioned by latest raids on railway station at Kacha Garhi and in Peshawar city has been considered by me in Council. Our opinion is unanimous that vindication of our authority without delay and proof of our determination to protect life and property in British administered territory have become absolutely necessary, and that immediate action is required for credit of Government. To influence position by aid of jirga, as our Despatch of 9th instant suggested, is, in our opinion, no longer possible, but we propose that maliks of other sections of Afridis should be assembled, in order that the impossibility of the situation created by the insolence of the raids and unprovoked outrages of the Zakka Khels may be pointed out to them, and that they may be reassured that no injury to other sections of the Afridis, or interruption of our friendly relations with them is in any way intended by our punishment of Zakkas. We propose that, as soon as possible after assembly of maliks, expedition should start for Bazar Valley. Permission for immediate action on above lines is requested. Employment of two brigades from Peshawar and Nowshera respectively, with one brigade held in reserve at Nowshera, would, in our opinion, successfully accomplish operations.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

No. 35.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. My telegram of 31st ultimo crossed yours of 30th January regarding Zakka Khels. We do not think punitive expedition can be delayed, as the situation on the frontier is now so acute, and, notwithstanding our strong opinion that steps should be taken to open up Zakka Khel territory in

order to prevent a recurrence of similar events in future, we think the necessity for immediate measures is so great that we must act in any case; and we consider that, however restricted our subsequent action may be, punitive measures should at once be taken. A blockade on lines of Mahsud operations would, owing to geographical position of Zakka Khel territory, be impossible without the entry of our troops into territory of other sections of Afridis, whose friendship we seek to retain, and possibility of a general Afridi rising would doubtless be greatly increased by such action. Our proposals as regards jirga, which appear to be in accordance with your views on the point, were communicated in our telegram of 31st January.

No. 36.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 2nd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram, dated 31st ultimo. Subject to restrictions imposed in my telegram of 30th ultimo, viz., strict time limitation on punitive operations in Bazar Valley and no occupation or annexation, I approve your proposal for immediate action. Fact that there is to be no occupation or annexation should facilitate communication to be made to Amir and Afridis. In view of participation of Sturi Khel in raid on Kacha Garhi, it seems question whether communication should not be made to Orakzai jirga on same lines as to Afridis. I shall be glad to receive a statement of the details of operations contemplated as soon as possible. Reference in my telegram of 30th to Lord G. Hamilton's telegram of 1st November, 1901, will not escape your observation. It is a matter for your consideration whether, for purposes of actual punitive action in Bazar, most effective means of carrying out object would not be the employment of a small detachment from force you propose to mobilise, equipped to act with greatest celerity.

No. 37.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated 2nd instant. I would propose that question of summoning Orakzai maliks should be left to discretion of Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, it being intimated to him that Orakzai maliks should be summoned with Afridi maliks, unless there are reasons to the contrary. Instructions regarding communication to maliks in sense of your telegram have been sent to Chief Commissioner, but to inform Amir that we had no intention of annexing tribal territory would in my opinion, not be necessary. As regards proposed military action, great risk of a disaster to our men, which would undoubtedly set whole frontier in a blaze, would, in our opinion, be involved by small sallies of troops unsupported in the Bazar Valley. Fighting strength which Zakka Khel can produce in the Bazar Valley is about 6,000, and we propose to move into the valley at or near China two brigades, consisting of about a similar number of men, with two batteries, sappers, &c., one brigade being held in readiness

to support them should necessity arise. The force in the Bazar Valley, after occupying China, would take such measures, with a view to capture of ringleaders and those implicated in recent raids, as circumstances may require. Passes surrounding valley would be blocked during this period, and we propose that a force of selected Khyber rifles, who we are assured can be relied on for the purpose, should be used to assist in this.

No. 38.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 6th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Your telegram dated 4th instant. You do not, I gather, object to jirga being informed that no annexation of tribal territory is intended. It must be better that Amir should learn this from us at first hand, as it is sure to reach him through tribal sources. That Amir should clearly understand nature of our action against the tribes is plainly to our advantage. An explanation to him of this in friendly terms cannot surely present any difficulty. Employment of proposed force is approved. It must be clearly understood, I repeat, that end in view is limited strictly to punishment of Zakka Khel, and not occupation or annexation of tribal territory, either directly or indirectly, immediately or ultimately. In the event of escape of ringleaders leading to longer duration of operations this should especially be borne in mind, and any announcement of policy that you may make, whether to the tribes or otherwise, should on no account mention capture or surrender of ringleaders in such a way that we are committed to it as a condition of withdrawing. The chances of complications with other tribes will increase the longer you stay in Zakka Khel territory after inflicting punishment. Any opportunity of effecting a settlement with tribe that presents itself during or after operations will no doubt be taken.

No. 39.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports that on the night of the 5th February a gang, supposed to be Zakka Khel, raided Abazai village, in Peshawar District, and looted house of a Hindu, who was shot and stabbed. Raiders carried off a Government rifle.

No. 40.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

On the night of 3rd February last house of a Hindu named Ram Singh at Tirahi Bala, Peshawar district, was looted of cash and jewels, estimated value Rs. 800, by gang of Afridis. Ram Singh answered raiders' fire with his snider, and at least one of the gang was wounded. Raid was doubtless work of Zakka Khel, but no definite information on this point.

No. 41.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram dated 6th February, 1908. Amir could easily be informed in a friendly letter that we have no intention of changing present system of administering tribal territory owing to behaviour of Zakkas. As expedition will, we trust, be short, and Amir will we hope see troops withdrawn soon after he gets letter, we think, on the whole, it would be better that no reference as to our future action should be made to him. Instructions for expedition issued by us are precisely as stated by you. Necessity for surrender of leaders is not laid down. We shall come out, after capturing all we can and inflicting as severe punishment as possible.

No. 42.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 10th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Full details of force employed against Zakka Khel and of military operations should be furnished. I quite agree, with reference to your telegram of 9th instant, to Amir being informed in friendly terms that no change in present system of administering tribal territory is intended.

No. 43.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 12th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

I should be glad if reply could be expedited to my telegram of yesterday regarding details of force to operate against Zakka Khel. Estimate of cost of operations should be telegraphed.

No. 44.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 12th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Composition of expeditionary force against Zakka Khels as follows:—

Commanding, Major-General Sir James Willcocks, with full political control, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel as Political Officer.

General Commanding First Brigade, Brigadier-General Anderson, with following troops:—

1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force).
59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force).
2nd Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force).

General Commanding Second Brigade, Major-General Barrett, with following troops:—

1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
28th Punjabis.
54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).
45th Rattray's Sikhs.

Divisional and lines of communication troops:—

Two squadrons 37th Lancers (Baluch Horse).
Mountain Division, No. 3 Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Four guns 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).
No. 6 Company of 1st Prince of Wales's Own Sappers and Miners.
Three sections No. 9 Company of 2nd Queen's Own Sappers and Miners.
23rd Sikh Pioneers.
25th Punjabis.
19th Lancers (Fane's Horse), cover advance as far as border of Peshawar Valley.

Third Brigade in reserve stationed at Nowshera, General Commanding, Major-General Watkis, with following troops:—

1st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers.
1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles.
55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).

Strength of garrison Peshawar increased by 1st Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) from Brigade in reserve.

Troops will move lightly equipped, and followers have been reduced as much as possible. General Willcocks continues to command Peshawar Division during the operations. Information regarding composition of force has not been given out yet to any one. Force probably moves to-morrow, but this depends upon result of discussion with Maliks, of which we have not heard anything as yet from Deane. You will be kept fully posted, and all information will be sent to you before it is given out.

No. 45.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel operations. Estimate of cost. See your telegram of 12th February. From materials directly available following rough estimates have been framed. It is should be clearly understood that they are necessarily very rough.

(1) Something under Rs. 10,000,000 if operations are completed within three weeks.

(2) Cost will somewhat exceed Rs. 20,000,000 if operations extend to two months.

(3) Probably cost will be between Rs. 26,000,000 and Rs 30,000,000 if operations extend to three months.

No. 46.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State. dated 13th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Following received from Political Agent, Khyber, dated 12th February:—"Most of the Zakka Khel have moved their families, flocks, and moveable property to Ningrahar and the Bara, and have buried their grain. The majority have gone to Ningrahar. Dadai has taken his family to Kahi, Multan to Nakhtarnao, and Usman to the Bara. All fighting men have promised to return at once. Usman has returned the stolen camels to the Sarhang of Dakka. All is quiet on the Khyber road and here."

No. 47.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 14th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel. Chief Commissioner interviewed the Maliks and elders of the Afridi clans assembled at Peshawar on the 12th instant and addressed them to the following effect:—"Maliks and elders, you have seen for yourselves how the Zakka Khels have for some time past raided into British territory, robbing and killing and wounding subjects and servants of Government and carrying off people for ransom. On several occasions during the last four years I have asked you to combine to put a stop to this. Government have been very patient and unfortunately you have not succeeded in putting a stop to these raids. I have summoned you here to-day to announce to you that Government have decided to punish the Zakka Khels by force. You yourselves have adhered to your agreements and we have no quarrel with you. In sending troops Government has no desire or intention of annexing the territory of any one. What is desired is that an end be put to this misbehaviour of the Zakka Khels. We look to you to assist us in making satisfactory arrangements for the future. If you choose you can do so, for you can put pressure on the Zakka Khels in Tirah. Since some of you came in here I know that mischief-makers have tried to impress you with lies as to Government's intentions. They will certainly do so again when the troops start. I tell you not to believe them. If you have any doubts in your mind, come and ask me. After seeing you now I shall tell the General he can move the troops, and I advise you to go at once to your clan and assure them as to the intentions of Government and restrain your young men from joining the Zakka Khels against the Government troops. I also advise you to get together the Zakka Khels of Bara and Tirah, and with them make arrangements for future peace with the Bazar Zakka Khels. The sooner satisfactory arrangements are made, the sooner will Government be able to withdraw the troops. We hope to be able to do this quickly." Following received from Political Agent, Khyber, dated Landi Kotal, 13th February:—

> "Chief Commissioner's speech to Afridi jirgas has had excellent effect. Maliks and elders reached Kajurai plain yesterday evening from Peshawar, and have gone to Bara valley to-day re-assure their tribesmen. They propose to raise lashkar, take it to Zakka Khel villages in Upper Bara. and put utmost pressure on Zakka Khels. Attitude of younger men not yet known. Several messengers from Bazar arrived to-day and report wholesale exodus *vid* Thabai pass. Reported that Zakka Khels have not gone far, but are living in caves and camps on northern slopes of pass. Weather fine and warm; snow on the hills melting rapidly."

No. 48.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 14th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expeditionary Force. I should be glad if substance of military instructions issued to Willcocks be telegraphed fully to me. I should be glad to be informed at once by telegraph whether troops have been supplied with expanding bullets.

No. 49.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expeditionary Force. With reference to your telegram dated 14th February, Willcocks has received instructions to following effect:—*(Begins):* Full political control is vested in the General Officer Commanding the expedition. He will be accompanied by the Political Agent, Khyber, as Chief Political

Officer who, as such, will in political matters advise and give him every possible assistance. The General Officer Commanding must possess complete authority and responsibility, but the views of the Chief Political Officer as to any question of policy respecting the attitude of any of the Khyber tribes or adjacent country shall be forwarded to the Government of India if the Chief Political Officer, for reasons recorded, so wishes. The punishment of the Zakka Khels is the only object of the expedition, and no annexation or occupation of tribal territory will take place either directly or indirectly now or ultimately. In order to prevent extension of trouble to country outside Bazar Valley every possible precaution must be taken. Without previous reference to Government of India no terms, fine, or surrender of raiders should be imposed on Zakka Khel tribe. *(Ends.)* No expanding bullets are kept in store in this country and none have been issued to troops.

No. 50.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 16th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs 15th: "Left Lala China with Barrett's Brigade, half 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles, No. 3 Mountain Battery, and detachment No. 6 Company 1st Sappers and Miners at daybreak. All ranks carried three days' rations, no baggage or supply column accompanied. Arrived Walai near China in Bazar Valley, rear guard coming in at 7 p.m. After passing Tsar Kham our left flank was fired on, and left flank picquets were fired on the whole way into camp, guns covering them. Have no news of Roos-Keppel's column, but hope they have reached China in Bazar; am trying to get into touch with him. Most of Anderson's column is at Chora in fort in village and half battalion remained at Ghora Kotal. Everything tends to show I was not expected till to-morrow. Zakka Khels were taken by surprise and had not time to occupy their strongest position—the hill above Walai called Khar Gumba; 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders' picquets now hold this hill."

No. 51.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 16th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Fort Maude, 16th February. I left Lala China, near Ali Masjid, yesterday morning, with Second Brigade under General Barrett, and half battalion 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, No. 3 Mountain Battery, and detachment Sappers without any baggage, and all ranks carried three days' rations on person. Column reached Walai, near China in Bazar, last evening. Immediately after leaving Malikdin country, at Thar Chanai Kamai, column was opposed on left flank, and this continued through march. Heavy sniping during the night. Simultaneously with my advance, column under Roos-Keppel, consisting of wing 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas and 700 Khyber Rifles marched from Landi Kotal viâ the Bazar Pass. It is reported from Landi Kotal to have crossed the Bazar Pass without opposition and entered Bazar Valley. I expect to join hands with him to-day. Most of the First Brigade under General Anderson are at Chora. Our rapid advance completely surprised enemy, and enabled us to anticipate them gaining possession of the strongest position in the valley.

No. 52.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 17th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Fort Maude, 17th February. Joined hands with Colonel Roos-Keppel's column yesterday, 16th February. He reached China in Bazar on night of 15th without opposition, but his picquets were fired on during night. He has had no casualties. Moved my camp yesterday near to China in Bazar. 45th Rattray's Sikhs, which formed part of escort for large convoy coming here from Chora yesterday, whilst picqueting hills close to my camp were attacked by enemy in considerable strength. I ordered them to take the hill on which the enemy were posted, supporting them by the Seaforth Highlanders, two guns of No. 3 Mountain Battery, and the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery. The hill was carried. Wing of 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, which I had detached on 15th to hold commanding hill on line of communication, report they were sniped that night, but only a few mules wounded.

No. 53.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs from camp east of China in Bazar on 17th February last as follows:—"Sipah Malik Shah Mard and Kamarai Malik Anar Gul write from Bara that Bara Zakka Khels have stated that they will submit to any terms. The Zia-ud-din Zakka Khels have left Shinkadar and most have gone to the Khel country. Large numbers of Bazar Zakka Khel and many Sangu Khel Shinwari volunteers have collected at Thabai and Mangal Bagh passes. Strong lashkar of Zakka Khel assembled on 15th February at Darbund, as it was believed the Landi Kotal column would enter Bazar by that route. The Kuki and Kambar Khel Maliks are collecting their jirgas and assembling at Bukar in the Bara; they have not got in communication with Bazar Zakka Khel. Report of Mohmands joining Zakka Khel is untrue."

No. 54.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 19th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 18th February. Camps fired into last night. I to-day accompanied column under the command of General Barrett, and destroyed the fortified towers of China. On leaving to return to camp the column was persistently attacked by Zakka Khels.

No. 55.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 19th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 19th February. Column under General Anderson to-day completed the destruction of the towers at China. The Zakka Khel opposition was markedly less than it has been hitherto, and reliable information has been received that their casualties have been very heavy.

No. 56.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 20th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. General Willcocks telegraphed as follows on 19th instant from Bazar Camp east of China. "Confirmation received of news that Amir has issued a proclamation by which his subjects are forbidden to join and help Zakka Khel. No signs exist that other Afridis, in any numbers, are joining Zakka Khel. In the fighting of 15th and 16th February Zakka Khel are reported to have lost 8 killed and 17 wounded. Khel Jan (Shinwari), Saminulla and Ghani (Anais), and Khair Jan (Khusrogi) were among the killed. No accurate information has yet been received as to Zakka losses in yesterday's fighting, but they are believed to have been very heavy. No Mohmands have come through Bazar Valley although Zakka have sent messages to Mohmands urging them to rise. Full confirmation received of news that Dadai was dangerously wounded. We have as yet received no news of Kambar Khel and Kuki jirgas."

No. 57.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 20th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. Arrival at camp, yesterday evening, of Malik Shah Mard Siah, Sipah, and Anar Gul Azam, Kamrai, with 15 elders, is reported by General Willcocks. They state that Kambar and Kuki jirgas are momentarily expected, and that jirga of about 400 Malikdin Sipah and Kamrai has arrived at Halwai. Jirgas have been told to proceed as soon as possible to Chora; all are anxious for peace, with a few exceptions, but, until other tribes interfere, Zakka will continue to resist according to code of honour. It is believed by Maliks that they can obtain assurances from Zakka, which will enable them to guarantee their future good behaviour, if they are give sufficient time to collect jirgas and negotiate with tribe. Before committing themselves to definite pledges they require time for deliberation; and they say that, both for our sake and their own, matter must be settled while the support they have hitherto required is still afforded them by the presence of the troops. When jirga is assembled Willcocks says that he and Roos-Keppel will see them; they both consider tribesmen in a mood to make amongst themselves really binding agreement by which future responsibility for good behaviour of Zakka will be undertaken. Willcocks adds that unique opportunity to obtain lasting results from the expedition is thus offered. Question is only one of days, but elders will be unable to make arrangements, and all efforts on their part will disappear if troops are suddenly withdrawn without warning whilst deliberations are in progress. Instructions are solicited by Willcocks whether present arrangement to retire from valley on 23rd February should, in the circumstances, be adhered to. Telegram from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, states that to act through other Afridi jirgas while troops are still in Bazar is the only hope of effecting settlement with Zakka Khel; and that jirgas are not likely to do anything once troops withdraw. Following instructions have been sent to Willcocks:—"You should not consider yourself rigidly bound to date fixed for evacuation, as the importance of arriving at settlement is so considerable. At the same time this must not be regarded as in any way changing Secretary of State's orders, by which evacuation is required at earliest possible date compatible with as satisfactory results as can be hoped for. Meeting of jirga should be expedited, and early decision pressed for, and you should be very careful that our withdrawal from Bazar without in any way breaking faith with tribes is not jeopardised by these negotiations, should they fail or be unduly protracted." We are not aware what Willcocks considers will be duration of negotiations before such a settlement as would enable troops to retire is arrived at. Willcocks

has also been told that to get our troops out as soon as possible must be to advantage of Afridis generally, and Zakka in particular, and that it might be possible, working on this consideration, to arrange with Malik for troops to withdraw when general decision on the subject is arrived at by jirgas, and before all details of an agreement, arrangement of which might take time and much discussion, are formally settled by them. Your views on the situation that has arisen are solicited.

No. 58.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 20th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp, east of China, in Bazar, 20th February. Column under General Anderson moved to-day to reconnoitre Sassobi Pass. Towers at Khwar and Surmundo were destroyed. Advanced guard was fired on from hills on both sides of pass. Left flanking battalions were attacked by Zakka Khel on hills west of China. No casualties. Enemy are mainly in neighbourhood of Halwai and Nikai, where they have strongly sangared positions which I will attack to-morrow.

No. 59.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 21st February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. Extension of time limited to purpose named in your instructions to General Willcocks is approved. There seems promise of good result in situation. Bearings of discussion of details with jirga should be fully reported to me. General Willcocks should be instructed that any report to you on the subject should be repeated direct to me for my information. No operations which could be construed as infringing even debatable Afghan territory should be undertaken.

No. 60.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 21st February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp, east of China, in Bazar, dated 21st February. I attacked the enemy's position at Halwai to-day with two columns under command of General Barrett and General Anderson. Barrett seized hills north of China and occupied them with 28th Punjabis, sending Seaforths and Khyber Rifles up the Bazar River south of China, the 54th Sikhs being in support. Anderson moved up valley north of China hills, and, debouching through Kotal, west of China, delivered combined attack with Barrett. The enemy were in considerable strength and strongly sangared on the high hills over Halwai, but troops carried position without a check, and held them whilst towers were destroyed. On leaving Halwai to return to camp, distant seven miles, enemy were joined by considerable numbers from direction of Thabai Pass, and persistently clung to our flanks and rear to within a mile of camp, but could nowhere make any impression. The retirement was carried out with great coolness, particularly by the Seaforth Highlanders, 53rd Sikhs, and 59th Rifles, and was admirably supported by the guns of the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery. I attribute our small losses to the high state of efficiency in training which our troops have acquired. From personal observation I am convinced that the enemy lost very heavily. In Major Forbes-Semphill, who was killed during the day, the service has lost one of its best officers. He was killed whilst gallantly leading one of His Majesty's finest battalions. Troops in excellent health. All wounded doing well.

No. 61.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. Instructions have been sent to General Willcocks, in accordance with your telegram of yesterday. Report already received from him states that, in the opinion of Major Roos-Keppel and himself, there is every hope of a satisfactory settlement under discretion now given. Both he and Major Roos-Keppel consider that, as jirga would have no other incentive to settle business once pressure of troops is removed, it is imperatively necessary that any settlement arrived at should be signed and sealed by them before troops begin to move. Full jirga is expected at Chora to-day, and General Willcocks hopes that negotiations may be completed in three days. Supplies for a week are being arranged by him. Following instructions have been sent to General Willcocks in order to avoid delay:—"We give you free hand to make the best terms you can with tribe subject to conditions already laid down. Obliteration of past and guarantee for future have been stated by Sir H. Deane to be probably the only practicable line of settlement. If this will secure speedy settlement, which Secretary of State desires, we will accept it."

No. 62.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Zakka Khel expedition. Jirga of most important elders has now been collected, according to telegram from General Willcocks of to-day's date. Mulla Saiyid Akbar has gone to Waran in disgust, having failed to induce Afridis and Aka Khel to join Zakka.

No. 63.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 23rd February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 23rd February.

The Afridi jirga, totalling about 300, arrived in camp this evening. They include all the maliks and a majority of the representative elders, and form a satisfactory jirga. They state that owing to the expedition they have had no direct intercourse as yet with the Zakka Khel, but that they have received messages from many of them asking them to mediate and to ascertain the terms of Government. I have told them that we do not wish to tie their hands by announcing elaborate terms, and that it is for them to consider and decide the best manner of effecting a real settlement. They are discussing this question to-night, and I shall see them to-morrow. They seem to be in a reasonable and sensible mood and to have confidence in the success of their efforts. They deserve great credit for the way in which they have prevented their young men from joining the Zakka Khel in spite of the incitements of the Mullas.

No. 64.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 24th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 23rd February. Camp was heavily sniped last night. As usual some men pushed close between the pickets. Parties of Sangu Khel and other Shinwaris continue to arrive in Bazar and in Thabai. It is estimated that 500 have arrived to date. During the return to camp from Halwai, on

21st instant, parties of enemy dressed in khaki uniform pushed to within short distance of firing line of Seaforth Highlanders, at least five so dressed being shot close up to the line. As the enemy were observed yesterday to be collecting on the China hills, a column under General Anderson was sent this morning to disperse them. Only slight opposition was experienced, and although the Zakkas pursued their usual tactics in following up our return to camp, they did so in a half-hearted way, and no casualties occurred except two sappers and a follower who were injured during explosion of a remaining tower. Present information fully confirmed previous estimate of heavy losses inflicted on enemy. 300 elders of Afridi jirga are now in camp, including the maliks of the most important sections, and others are reported to be coming in. Propose to interview them to-morrow, and have hopes of satisfactory settlement.

No. 65.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 24th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar, 24th February. All quiet since last report. Only few shots fired into camp last night. To-day several columns under Colonel Buchanan, 54th Sikhs, searched country at south-east of Bazar Valley in neighbourhood of Jabagai. Only trifling resistance encountered, and few enemy seen. The column destroyed the low fortified tower at Jabagai, and returned without any casualty. In my message of 21st February, I omitted to mention that General Anderson's column, which made the frontal attack on the hill above Halwai, consisted of Royal Warwicks, 53rd Sikhs, 54th Rifles, and 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, with the 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery. I interviewed the leading Afridi Maliks to-day. They openly confessed the heavy and merited punishment inflicted on the Zakka Khel, and are desirous of effecting a settlement. But, although I have every hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement, the maliks referred to the necessity of receiving the moral support of the presence of our troops in case the Zakka Khel proved recalcitrant during the preliminary negotiations, as the accession to their strength from the Sangu Khel, reported in my previous telegram, which is now stated to be considerably increased, may possibly encourage the Zakka Khel to hold out for a time, at least against the pressure of the Afridi jirga. The maliks and elders of the other Afridis are most anxious in their own interests to arrive at a definite settlement, as they see trouble and danger to themselves in the future if the situation is prolonged. I consider that as we have called them in to help us in effecting a settlement we are bound to consider their wishes and opinions, and give them such sufficient time for their negotiations as will give a reasonable prospect of success. But for the complication introduced by the accession of strength referred to I should have been confident of almost immediate settlement, and I still hope that this may only cause slight delay. I feel, however, that it is my bounden duty, in the position in which I am then placed, to point out that any premature withdrawal will result in political deadlock and a certainty of renewed trouble on any scale. We are now here in a dominating position, and one in which the presence of our troops has a great influence in completing a satisfactory solution, and I would earnestly deprecate any rigid limitation of the actual number of days required to arrive at a settlement, which I am using every possible endeavour to effect.

No. 66.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 25th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. See telegram of 24th February from General Willcocks. So long as General Willcocks has good reason for believing presence of troops conducive to satisfactory result of negotiations, there is no case for rigid limitation.

No. 67.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Expedition against Zakka Khel. We have replied as follows to telegram of 24th February from General Willcocks, which was repeated to you:—"Actual number of days required to arrive at a settlement has not been rigidly limited. Our readiness to accept Sir H. Deane's view of terms, and Secretary of State's desire for early settlement have been communicated to you. Quick settlement, followed by withdrawal of troops, is the important thing to effect. Within these limits you have been given full discretion."

No. 68.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 25th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar. 24th February. The Maliks and elders of the Afridi jirga spent last night in discussing the best means of effecting settlement with the Zakka Khel. Roos-Keppel had a long interview with the jirga this morning, and we are satisfied that they are really anxious to come to a lasting arrangement with the Zakka Khel, as they all feel that the continued misconduct of this clan must eventually bring the whole tribe into conflict with Government, and endanger their independence. While all agreeing as to the end, they show much diversity of opinion regarding the means, as the maliks are all jealous of one another, and the clans are strongly influenced by their own politics, the Gar clans, viz., the Kambar and Kuki Khel, desiring to break the power of the Zakkas, to whom they are hostile, while the remaining clans, the Malikdin, Kamri, and Sipah, do not wish to see their own partisans permanently weakened. The jirga are leaving to-morrow morning for Halwai, and have sent messengers there to collect the Zakka Khel. They have asked for four or five days for discussing, and have been told that two days must suffice. It will certainly be necessary to extend this period, but had the first request for four or five days been granted that also would have been extended. They hope to arrange for each of the great Afridi clans to become responsible for the future good behaviour of one Zakka Khel section, the guaranteeing clan taking action against the section in the event of the misconduct of any of its members. If they can arrange this it will give us a very satisfactory guarantee for the future. I am satisfied that the punishment of the Zakkas has been very complete. The Afridi elders are unanimous that no frontier tribe has ever been so sharply, quickly, and effectively punished, and state that the losses of the Zakka Khel in proportion to their fighting strength have been crushing, and that there is not a family in the Bazar Valley which has not lost at least one of its members. The more far-sighted of the Maliks and elders argue that the Zakka Khel have been and are a standing danger to all the Afridis, and that they must in their own interest take this opportunity of placing matters on a satisfactory footing. I have as yet had no direct communication with the Bazar Zakka Khel, but they have been sending messages to the Afridi jirga asking for their intervention. I have to-day received information of a large influx of Afghans, mostly Sangu Khel Shinwaris, into Bazar, and my messengers report that the arrival of these reinforcements has again put heart into the Zakka Khel. It is stated that there are to-day 1,500 outside volunteers in Halwai and Thabai. This is probably exaggerated, but the number is undoubtedly high. The Afridi jirga will have a very difficult and delicate task, and, although they are hopeful, their success is by no means certain. I am satisfied, however, that they will do their best. One point on which all were agreed was the necessity of inflicting tribal punishment upon individual raiders who have amassed wealth by raids into British territory, as they say that to leave these men in undisturbed possession of their booty, while the punishment for their misdeeds had fallen upon the whole community, would

present too great a temptation to individuals to follow their example in the future and thus bring constant trouble upon the guarantors of their sections. Such action is highly desirable, but it is not necessary to delay a settlement for it, as it would require a long time to organise and could be carried out later in communication with the Political Agent, Khyber. I received the Maliks this afternoon and their interview has done much to re-assure those of them who were nervous regarding our intentions towards them.

No. 69.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 26th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar. 25th February. All quiet; no movement made to-day. The Afridi jirga left camp this morning for Halwai, where they were received by the Zakka Khel numbering some 600 men, including the representative elders of the clan. From accounts received up to the present, the prospect of satisfactory settlement appears promising, in spite of efforts of large number of Sangu Khel and other trans-border men, who incite the Zakkas to further resistance.

No. 70.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 26th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp east of China in Bazar. 25th February. The Afridi jirga left this morning for Halwai. Roos-Keppel accompanied them beyond the picket line. On parting they put up prayers for the success of their mission. They rested at a shrine between China and Halwai, and were met there by a deputation of Zakka Khel, who conducted them to Halwai. At Halwai they found about 600 Zakka Khel, including most of the representative elders of the clan, who received the jirga well, and took an oath on the Koran that they would abide by the decision of the jirga, and would join the Afridis in punishing the raiders. Maliks Yar Muhammad Khan and Zamar Khan Jabbar Khan have written to the above effect. Their messengers say that the proceedings of the jirga were much disturbed by hundreds of Sangu Khel Shinwaris, who stood round and shouted abuse at the jirga, urging the Zakka Khel to continue the fight. It is fully convinced that well over 1,500 Afghans, mostly Sangu Khel, but including Kuda Khel Mohmands and men from every part of Ningrahar, have arrived in Bazar, and that they are doing everything in their power to induce Zakka Khel to hold out. Shakar, the notorious raider of Hazara has brought a band of 60 well-armed men. The messengers say that the Zakka Khel are themselves becoming afraid of these outsiders, who considerably outnumber them. Kumrgul Amai, a well-known raider and first cousin of Dadai, was present, and took the oath with the rest. He had to leave the jirga suddenly as a messenger came to say that Dadai was dying and wished to see him. Yar Shah, the great raider and Dadai's rival in the tribe, also took the oath. Multan is in hiding, as he distrusts the jirga, and Kaman, who has been slightly wounded, has gone to visit the Afghan commandant at Kahi. Messengers have been sent by the Zakka Khel elders to all men of note who were not present to-day summoning them to the jirga at Halwai to-morrow. I consider that the commencement of these negotiations is promising. I have received a message from the celebrated Mulla Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, asking me not to believe stories against him and stating that he has no intention of exciting the tribes.

No. 71.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Peshawar City station was attacked 9 p.m., 25th February, by gang said to number 40. Rs. 50 taken, station-master and chaukidar wounded. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, reports:—

"Everything points to raid on city station being work of Zakka Khel gang. Chaukidar says they were Afridis armed with rifles. A fired Lee-Enfield cartridge was found on the spot, and the gang retired by precisely the same route as that taken by recent city raiders. On receipt of information this very line held by troops, but raiders had passed, as information was not given by station officials until raiders had left; and then only by foot messenger to city police station instead of by telegraph to cantonment station. We had no information of movement of gang from Bazar, but it seems not unlikely that advantage has been taken of lull in operations during negotiations."

Have called for further report with special reference to apparent absence of police at railway station and arrangements made, or about to be made, for the protection of life and property in Peshawar.

No. 72.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 27th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 26th February. The Afridi jirga is expected to return to this camp to-morrow. Their return has been delayed by the hostile action of the lashkar of men from Afghan territory, who are reported now to number about 2,000, under the leadership of the well-known Mulla, the Sufi Sahib of Battikot.

No. 73.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 27th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 26th February. The Afridi jirga spent the night with the Zakka Khel at Halwai, and it is reported that they came to terms with them. At 10 o'clock this morning they started to come here, but they perceived a lashkar of all the Afghans in Bazar coming from the Thabai Pass. The lashkar, which is said to be about 2,000 strong, consists of about 100 Mohmands, 900 Sangu Khel Shinwaris, and 1,000 miscellaneous Ningraharis, all Afghan subjects. The jirga accused the Zakkas of treachery in bringing the lashkar, but they swore that they knew nothing of it, and offered to go and turn it back. The other Afridis sent four elders from each tribe to see that there was no treachery, and the Zakka Khel begged the Afghan lashkar not to come further, saying that they had come too late to be of use, and would only now spoil a settlement, which all the Afridis wished to make. The lashkar agreed after some demur to wait at the western end of the Bazar valley until the result of the negotiations of the jirga are known. All this delayed the jirga, and instead of getting to China by mid-day, as they had arranged, they only got there in the late afternoon, too late to come into camp to-day. I expect them here to-morrow.

No. 74.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 28th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 27th February. The Afridi jirga, numbering about 1,100 men, including about 300 Zakka Khel, including all the leading elders, came in to-day. Colonel Roos-Keppel proceeded by himself half-way to China to meet them and brought them in. They deposited their rifles for safe custody without demur. A formal jirga will be held to-morrow. The Sangu Khel lashkar is at Thabai, awaiting the result of the jirga.

No. 75.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 28th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp East of China in Bazar, 27th February. All quiet except for continued sniping into camp at night. Afridi jirga with many Zakka Khel came into camp to-day. Sangu Khel and other tribesmen from across Afghan border stood collected near Halwai and Thabai, awaiting result of jirga.

No. 76.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 29th February, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Chora, 29th February. Bazar Valley to-day evacuated by troops. Whole force is now here except 2nd Brigade, which is at Ali Masjid. Owing to snow and hailstorm preventing communication, the following message, which was written yesterday from Camp East of China, could not be sent:—

28th February. Jirga of all the Afridis, including Zakka Khel, spent the night discussing the details of settlement. I received them this afternoon, and a petition to the following effect, to which were appended the seals and signatures of 322 maliks and elders representing every tribe of the Afridis, was laid before me:—"We, the elders and maliks of the whole Afridi tribe assembled in jirga, make humble representation to the British Government that, as we are anxious to end the quarrel between the Zakka Khel Afridis and the British Government, which the former's misconduct has caused, we have agreed and do promise that we Afridis will hold ourselves responsible, jointly and severally, in the following manner for the future good behaviour of every section of the Zakka Khel tribe:—Khyber Pakhai Zakka Khel will undertake responsibility for Bara Pakhai Zakka Khel; Kambar Khel for Shan Khel of Bara and Tirah; Kamarai Khel for Khusrogis Zakka Khel, except Jawal Khel, Kuki Khel and Nikki Khel Pakhai of Khyber for Mohib Khel half of Anai Zakka Khel; Sipah Khel for Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel; Malikdin, for Paindai, the Jawal Khel Khusrogis and the Sahib Khel half of Anai Zakka Khel. We promise also that we will help one another in punishing these bad characters, when called upon to do so, and the British Government may punish us for the misconduct of the Zakka Khel sections for whom we stand security, by fine, by exclusion from British territory, or in any other way. With regard to the past we pray that the British Government will not complete the ruin of the tribe for the misdeeds of a badly-behaved minority, but will, in its might, take into consideration the losses which the Zakka Khel have sustained by war and by exclusion from British territory. We beg that we, with the help of the Zakka Khel elders, may undertake the punishment of the actual thieves, who have

led the raids into British territory, wherever they may be; and as an earnest that we will punish them in a manner satisfactory to the British Government, we deposit here, as security, 53 rifles, which are worth over Rs. 20,000, according to the prices current in our country. These rifles shall not be returned to us until the Political Agent, Khyber, is satisfied that sufficient punishment has been inflicted upon the thieves. We, the Zakka Khel, concur in this petition, and promise in every way to assist the Afridi jirga." The petition ends with an expression of hope that the British Government will show mercy and favour. On behalf of Government, I formally accepted the terms submitted in petition, which, in my opinion, more than meet Government's wishes; and in public jirga, at which all the senior officers of the field force were present, I signed and concluded settlement. Government will, I trust, approve the settlement. Of the tact and ability displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel in effecting this settlement I cannot speak too highly. I would also bring to notice the invaluable services of his assistant, Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum. To-morrow all the troops will evacuate the Bazar Valley.

No. 77.

From Officer Commanding Bazar Valley Expedition to Secretary of State, dated 1st March, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp at Chora, 29th February. All the Afridi tribes were fully represented at yesterday's jirga. All the maliks, and a large majority of elders of each tribe were present. The following well-known raiders, besides nearly all elders, were included in jirga of Zakka Khel, who were most strongly represented:—Yar Shah; Miras Khan; Mehr Din, uncle of Multan; Amir Shah; Dadai, and Saidani, Anai; Godai, cousin of Usman, Zafar, Chaman, and Shinkai, Khusrogis. Usman and Multan, fearing that they would be surrendered by jirga, remained at Thabai with Afghan lashkar. Messengers to announce the conclusion of peace were sent by Zakka Khel elders, after settlement had been arrived at, to all sections of the tribe, latter being informed that elders themselves would fire upon them if they attacked the camp or the troops on leaving. Afridi jirga hope that within a month their bad characters will be punished, and securities for their behaviour taken. At local prices, rifles which Afridis have deposited are worth value put upon them; they are all of English manufacture. Most of the sniping into Chora camp is said to be due to Mirza Ali, who is reported to be at Lawata, about four miles south of Chora, with a band of nine Sturi Khel Orakzais.

No. 78.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of Secretary for India, dated 2nd April, 1908. Received 18th April, 1908.

In our Foreign despatch dated the 9th January, 1908, we stated that the behaviour of the Zakka Khel Afridis had been such as to compel us to take severe measures against the tribe.

2. Shortly after the issue of the despatch the Zakka Khel Afridis committed a fresh series of outrages of a peculiarly daring and defiant character, ending with a raid on Peshawar City on the 28th January. On the 31st January, 1908, we asked your permission by telegram to send a punitive expedition into the Bazar Valley. On the 2nd February you agreed to our proposals, but on certain conditions.

3. Of the events in the Bazar Valley you have been fully informed. We now have the honour to enclose, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of the reports on the political aspect of the operations, together with our orders on them.

1. Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 16th March, 1908, with enclosures.

2. Letter to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated the 24th March, 1908.

4. The punishment inflicted on the Zakka Khel Afridis has been sharp and

severe, and we have every reason to hope that a settlement has been satisfactorily concluded.

5. We have already brought to your notice* the eminently successful manner in which Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., executed the task entrusted to him. We now desire to invite your attention to the remarks recorded by Sir James Willcocks as to the valuable services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force and Political Agent, Khyber. We desire to express our entire concurrence with these remarks.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) MINTO.
„ E. N. BAKER.
„ H. ADAMSON.
„ J. O. MILLER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 78.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 16th March, 1908.

I have the honour to forward in original a letter dated 4th March, 1908, and its enclosure, from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., which contains the political report on the Bazar Valley expedition by Lieutenant-Colonel G. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force.

2. I cordially endorse all that the General, Sir James Willcocks, says and I consider that Government is to be congratulated on the settlement with the Zakka Khel, effected, as it was, in the face of strong fanatical encouragement from Afghan tribes which threatened to bring about awkward and troublesome complications.

3. In February I was authorised to exceed my grant for presents to Chiefs on the eve of the expedition in order to reward the jirgas of the other Afridi clans. I thought it better, however, to defer such rewards until these jirgas should have demonstrated their sincerity of purpose. Now that they have been working hard in the interests of Government in Bazar, in Peshawar, and now in Tirah and Bara for over a month, doubtless much to their private inconvenience, I propose to reward them suitably and, on the authority of your telegram, I have asked the Accountant-General to place funds at my credit. I trust this action is approved.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Bazar Valley Field Force, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 4th March, 1908.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of Government, the Political report of the expedition into the Bazar Valley, compiled by Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force under my command. The report so fully explains everything connected with the situation that I do not propose enlarging on it. As regards his remarks on the military operations, I leave them as they stand, for they explain the friendly views of a comrade and Political Officer combined, as they appear to him immediately after the events they describe. If our troops have gained an extra respect from an admittedly gallant foe, I hope it may be of benefit hereafter to both parties. I can endorse every word regarding the Khyber Rifles. I have already reported to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on the good conduct and discipline of the corps throughout the operations. It has indeed been an object lesson and proves what good leading and example can do in a battalion enlisted from amongst the very people they are sent to fight against. The services rendered by Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, Assistant to the Chief Political Officer, are deserving of the highest praise. He accompanied me in my first advance from Ali Masjid to China, whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel was commanding the Landi Kotal column and his advice at Chora was most useful. As for his services in relation to the Zakka Khel settlement, I entirely agree with the Chief Political Officer in his commendation. I sincerely trust the Sahibzada will receive some substantial acknowledgment of his good work from Government. He is a very hard-working, loyal, and zealous servant of the State. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel's services are well known to Government, but it is a great pleasure to me to be able to state here how impossible it would have been to make any settlement

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* *See* No. 79.

of value with the tribes, regarding the Zakka Khel, without his tact, knowledge, and coolness. When the Afridi jirgas reached China from Halwai on 27th February, they sent word to Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, who went out alone half way to China to conduct them in. Considering it was unsafe for any man to go beyond the picquet line, I consider his conduct deserving of high praise, for, to say the least of it, it was a very risky proceeding. It was further his determined manner which finally persuaded the jirgas that Government meant to have a good sound settlement or none at all, and I cannot speak too highly of his work, and unhesitatingly place on record that the chief credit for the political success of the expedition is due to him.

Annexure 2.

Political Report of the Bazar Valley Expedition, dated 3rd March, 1908.

(Extract.)

It is not necessary, for the purposes of this report, to recount in detail the events which led to the expedition. Suffice it to say that bands of Zakka Khel had for the past three or four years so harried the borders of the Kohat and Peshawar districts that all security of life and property was lost. The other Afridis had behaved well in so far that they had restrained members of their own clans from joining in these raids, but they had made only half-hearted efforts to check the Zakka Khel from raiding and appeared to consider the matter no concern of theirs. It became at last absolutely necessary to punish the Zakkas, but the Government of India were naturally anxious that the punishment should be confined to them, and that, as far as possible, measures should be taken to isolate them and to avoid a general rising, which is always possible when troops move into any tribal territory. With this object the jirgas of all the Afridi tribes, excepting the Zakka Khel of Bazar, were summoned to Peshawar, and it was explained to them that, as Government had no quarrel with them and had no desire to extend its territories at their expense, it behoved them in their own interests to refrain from joining the Zakka Khel, who were about to be punished, to do their best to bring the latter to reason and to obtain from them such guarantees as would ensure their future good behaviour. Simultaneously with the dismissal of the jirgas the Bazar Field Force left Peshawar. The Zakka Khel expected that an expedition would be sent against them, but they counted on some delay and on slow movement on our part. In consequence they deferred the removal to a safe place of their families, flocks, and portable property, until they got news of the actual start of the force which, once started, moved with such rapidity as to reach Walai, a point which commands the entire valley of Bazar, on the third day after the jirga at Peshawar, while the majority of the Zakka Khel were still arranging for accommodation for their families in Afghanistan. The duration of the expedition was rigidly limited by the orders of Government and the problem how, in a very short time, so to punish the Zakka Khel as to induce them to make any submission or to give any guarantees for the future, appeared almost insoluble. Fortunately, we had to deal with a very gallant enemy, who assisted the solution by fighting in so determined a manner on the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st February as to suffer very heavy loss. In spite however of the resistance of the Zakka Khel, their "castellos," or small forts, were steadily demolished and large supplies of wood and fodder were obtained from them. The enemy's casualties in the fighting between the 15th and 21st February exceeded those of all the Afridis in the Tirah Campaign of 1897-98. These casualties, their material losses, the hardships suffered by their families, who were enjoying the grudging hospitality of their Afghan neighbours, and their total inability to inflict serious loss upon our force, had their effect upon the Zakka Khel who, though they were too proud to sue for peace, became disposed to welcome the intervention of the other Afridis, which they would have scouted earlier. While the fighting had been going on in Bazar, the Chiefs and elders of the other Afridi clans had been exerting themselves to the utmost to restrain the turbulent element in Tirah from joining the Zakka Khel, and they were so successful that of the whole tribe probably not more than fifty volunteers from the Afridis took part against us. When they were satisfied that they could control their own tribesmen, the Chiefs and elders entered into negotiations with the Zakka Khel and their preliminary overtures were received at least with courtesy. Unfortunately, there exist both in India and in Afghanistan mischief-makers who are never so happy as when setting others by the ears, and the Zakka Khel were in constant receipt of messages from Peshawar encouraging them to hold out as Government had ordered the withdrawal of the force, and from Afghanistan promising them material assistance. These messages, taken with the fact that numbers of Afghan volunteers and large supplies of ammunition and flour were arriving daily at the Thabai Pass from Afghanistan, undoubtedly stiffened the backs of the Zakka Khel, and up to the 25th February the issue of negotiations appeared very doubtful. On that date the Afridi representatives who had assembled in Sir James Willcocks' camp left for Halwai. There they held a consultation with the Zakka Khel which lasted that day and night. Their discussions were continually interrupted by the howls of hundreds of Afghan fanatics, mullas and others, who clustered on the hills around, abusing the jirga and calling upon the Zakka Khel not to listen to "the *feringhi's* dogs." In spite of this a working arrangement was come to by which the Zakka Khel elders placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of the Afridi representatives, details being left for settlement later, and it was decided that the combined jirgas should proceed to China next day, invite the Political Officer to meet them there, and settle the matter. On the morning of the 26th, when the jirgas were about to start, it was seen that a large force was advancing east from the Thabai Pass. It consisted of Afghans (mostly Shinwaris) with standards, who were headed by bands of mullas including some of the most influential in the Ningrahar Province. The Afridi Chiefs and elders believed that they had been deceived and accused the Zakka Khel of treachery, but the latter swore that they had no

knowledge of this reinforcement and that they would do their best to induce it to return to Afghanistan. The Zakka Khel elders went off to meet the Afghan force and as the other Afridis did not place much confidence in them, four elders from each of the other clans accompanied them to guard against any double dealing. The Zakka Khel informed the Afghans that they would have been delighted to see them ten days earlier, but that now that they had decided to make peace their presence was inconvenient. The Afghans were very loth to return, but the Afridis swore that if they did not do so they themselves would attack them in flank. At last it was arranged that the Afghans should return to their own border and there await the result of the negotiations. If these proved unsuccessful their assistance would be welcomed. All this took time, and the jirga arrived at China in the evening instead of the morning of the 26th February. They spent the night there, and next day the whole assembly, numbering about eleven hundred men and including about three hundred Zakka Khel, marched into camp. Most of them were armed, and it was necessary for the safety of the camp to disarm them. This was a very delicate task, but it was eventually accomplished. The jirga discussed with the Political Officer and the Assistant Political Officer the whole question of a settlement throughout that afternoon and evening and the following morning (28th (February), and at last a draft agreement was arrived at which ran as follows:—

"We, the Maliks and elders of the Afridi tribe in jirga assembled, humbly represent to the British Government that, being anxious to end the quarrel between the Zakka Khel Afridis and the British Government, which has been caused by the misconduct of the former, we have agreed and do promise:—

"That we, the Afridis, will hold ourselves responsible jointly and severally for the future good behaviour of every section of the Zakka Khel tribe; thus—

"The Malikdin Khel Afridis will be responsible for the Sahib Khel half of the Anai, Paindai, and Jamal Khel Khusrogi Zakka Khel.

"The Kambar Khel Afridis will be responsible for the Shan Khel Zakka Khel of Bara and Tirah.

"The Kuki Khel and Nikki Khel Pakhai Afridis will be responsible for the Mohib Khel half of the Anai Zakka Khel.

"The Sipah Afridis will be responsible for the Zia-du-din Zakka Khel.

"The Kamarai Afridis will be responsible for the Khusrogi Zakka Khel, excepting the Jamal Khel.

"The Khyber Pakhai Zakka Khel will be responsible for the Bara Pakhai Zakka Khel.

"Also we promise that when we are called upon we will assist each other in punishing these bad characters, and Government may punish us by fine, by exclusion from British territory, or in any other way for the misdeeds of the Zakka Khel sections for whom we stand surety.

"As regards the past we beg that Government in its strength will take into consideration the losses suffered by the Zakka Khel, by exclusion from British territory and by war, and will not complete the ruin of a tribe for the sins of the badly-behaved minority.

"As regards the actual thieves who have been leaders in the raids into British territory we also beg that we, with the assistance of the Zakka Khel elders, may undertake their punishment wherever they may be, and we will punish them to the satisfaction of Government, and in earnest of this we here deposit fifty-three rifles, which are worth, according to the prices current in our country, more than twenty thousand rupees, as security, and these rifles will only be returned to us when the Political Agent, Khyber, is satisfied that the thieves have been sufficiently punished, and we, the Zakka Khel, agree to this petition and promise to assist the jirga in every way.

"Further we hope for the mercy and favour of Government."

This draft was approved by Sir James Willcocks, and arrangements were made for him to receive the jirga at 3.30 p.m., on the 28th February. The rifles mentioned in the petition, which were to be deposited by the jirga, had to be obtained from them and this was a tedious business, as each person was most anxious that his neighbour's, not his own, rifle should be given up. Also efforts were made to induce us to accept arms of local maunfacture which have a very small market value. These difficulties were at last got over, and Sir James Willcocks received the representatives of the whole tribe, including the Zakka Khel. The petition of the jirga was read to them in Persian and explained in Pashtu, and at the termination of the reading each Chief rose and formally asked the elders of his clan whether they authorised him to guarantee these terms on their behalf and on behalf of their constituents. The reply being unanimous, Sir James Willcocks accepted and signed the settlement on behalf of Government. When the settlement had been signed, the elders sent messengers to every part of Bazar to inform the Zakka Khel that peace had been made and that they could now bring back their families to their houses. They also warned them that if they discredited the settlement by firing at the troops the Afridi Jirga would attack them. As the weather was very bad some of the Zakka Khel members of the jirga, whose homes were near, asked to be allowed to depart and were permitted to do so. They sent some of their men to Thabai to dismiss the Afghan gathering. Next morning, the 29th February, the whole force marched to Chora. All the jirga accompanied the troops except the Zakka Khel elders, who waited until the rearguard had left camp and then took leave of us in the most friendly manner. Not a single shot was fired at the troops during the march of 29th February to Chora, during the night there, or during the march of the following day to Ali Masjid, a record in the history of frontier expeditions. The campaign has been a most valuable and interesting test of the extent of our control over our border tribes. That the Chiefs and elders of the other Afridi clans should have succeeded in restraining their clansmen from joining the Zakka Khel, with whom they are so intimately connected, is little short of marvellous, and that they should have bound the

Zakka Khel in an agreement by which they themselves accept a very onerous responsibility is hardly less so. The Afridi Chiefs and elders have worked hard and well, they have shown determination and unselfishness and have deserved well of Government. Among so many it is difficult to choose, but I cannot refrain from mentioning the names of Malik Zaman Khan, Chief of the Kuki Khel, Malik Yar Muhammad Khan (Malikdin Khel), Malik Shahmard Khan (Sipah), and Malik Amaldin (Kambar Khel). Another point of great political interest was the behaviour of the Khyber Rifles. This corps, which is mainly composed of Afridis, including some 350 Zakka Khel, had to take part in an expedition against a people to whom the men were bound not only by race and religion but by the closest ties of blood. Indeed in many cases during the expedition brother was fighting against brother and son against father. The experiment was viewed with mistrust by many and with misgiving by all, but it has been more than justified, as throughout the expedition the Khyber Rifles gained universal praise for their keenness and willingness, not a man deserted, and not a rifle was lost. I mention this particularly in this report, as I consider it of great political importance. The Khyber Rifles were in 1899 merely an armed rabble without cohesion or discipline, and the tribesmen themselves have fully shared the doubts of the authorities as to whether the men could really be employed against their own relatives and countrymen. The political effect of the satisfactory behaviour of the Corps cannot but be considerable, not only among the Afridis but throughout the border tribes. I have made every effort to obtain an accurate estimate of the losses of the enemy, but it is most difficult to get anything like complete figures. I shall know later, but at present I can only say that I know the names of 38 men buried in Bazar between the 15th and 21st February. A good many corpses were taken to Afghanistan for burial and some to Tirah. Also we have to add the enemy's losses on the 21st February, when they are believed to have been heavy, and on the 23rd February, when they are believed to have been slight. Altogether I think that it is safe to say that the enemy have lost not less than 70 killed. As regards the wounded, Afridis are very disinclined to give details of their losses. This is partly owing to pride and partly owing to fear of the evil eye, to which wounded men are particularly susceptible. We shall probably never know accurate details of the enemy's wounded and can only estimate their losses by the usual proportion of wounded to killed which would bring their total casualties to a very high figure. But for these losses it would have been impossible to bring the tribe to reason without a protracted occupation of the country, and it is only the remarkable military success of the expedition which made a settlement feasible. The Afridis, who are no mean judges of hill fighting, express themselves amazed at the handling and conduct of the troops as unlike anything they have seen or heard of, and the fact that they have obtained no loot in mules, rifles, stores, or ammunition, on which they confidently counted to compensate them for their own losses, has given them a strong distaste for expeditions conducted on these novel lines. As regards the punishment inflicted upon the enemy by material loss, every fort and watch tower in the valley has been razed to the ground, large supplies of wood and fodder have been obtained, and the losses due to exposure among the sheep, goats, and cattle (which are always, in Bazar, kept in caves in the winter) have been very great. The Zakka Khel have entirely exhausted their supplies of ammunition and cash and every individual in the tribe has felt the sharp punishment inflicted and will continue to do so for some time. I think that there is no doubt that the Zakka Khel really repent their misconduct, and that they will do their best to prevent further trouble. Thanks to a combination of military skill, political good fortune, and the loyal efforts of the Afridi Chiefs, a settlement of the Zakka Khel question has been arrived at which is more satisfactory than I should have dared to hope for even had our movements been unhampered and the duration of our stay unlimited, and I believe that the settlement will prove a durable one, and that it will improve our relations not only with the Zakka Khel but with all the Afridis. Should Government be satisfied with the political results attained, and should my hopes for the future be justified by the event, I would like to state that such political credit as may have been gained is due mainly to the efforts of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, whose services have been invaluable. The Sahibzada served through the Tirah Expedition and has been since 1898 Assistant Political Officer, Khyber. His knowledge of the Afridis and the real affection and respect which they have for him have given him a power over them which has ever been used for their good. The recent negotiations were complicated and difficult, and we had many a *mauvais quart d'heure* when it looked as if all would be broken off. We were hampered by the necessity for haste, and intriguers from both the British and Afghan borders worked against us, but throughout the negotiations Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum never despaired; nothing could ruffle his imperturbable patience or bend his determination, and that we have made a real settlement is due principally to his influence and skill. I would take this opportunity of bringing his services strongly to notice. In conclusion, I venture to express to Sir James Willcocks my very real gratitude for his kindness, advice, and support, without which his political staff could have done little to serve him.

Enclosure 2 in No. 78.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 24th March, 1908.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 16th March, 1908, with which you forward the political report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., on the Bazar Valley expedition, with the remarks thereon of Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.

2. The object of the expedition was to punish the Zakka Khel tribe for a series of crimes committed by members of it in British territory, and to obtain satisfactory assurances of their good conduct for the future. This object has been completely fulfilled, thanks to the bravery and high efficiency of the troops and the conspicuous ability with which the military operations and the political negotiations were conducted. The Zakka Khels have submitted and the other Afridi clans have assumed joint responsibility with them for their good conduct, and undertaken to bring individual offenders to just punishment for their offences. Never before in the history of the frontier has punishment so sharp been inflicted so swiftly, with results so satisfactory, and with so little loss to His Majesty's gallant troops.

3. Not the least interesting and re-assuring feature of the recent operations has been the attitude of the Chiefs and elders of the Afridi clans. This attitude was no doubt influenced by the confidence which you inspired at the outset of the operations, when you explained to them in assembly the object of the expedition and the intentions of the Government. The Governor-General in Council desires to acknowledge the services which you rendered at this important juncture. The assistance rendered by Malik Zaman Khan will be specially recognized. To Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, to Malik Shahmard Khan, to Malik Amaldin and to others you will now bestow suitable rewards.

4. The services of Major-General Sir James Willcocks as the General Officer Commanding the expedition have been separately acknowledged. The services which he rendered as officer in supreme political control remain to be acknowledged. The Governor-General in Council desires to place on record his high appreciation of those services.

5. General Willcocks pays a fine tribute to the tact, knowledge, coolness, determination and fearlessness which Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel displayed, and he adds that the chief credit for the political success of the expedition is due to him. In selecting Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel as Chief Political Officer, the Governor-General in Council was confident that all that could be done to effect a speedy and satisfactory political settlement would be done, and he desires to recognise the services rendered by this distinguished officer.

6. The Governor-General in Council also desires to associate himself in the high praise bestowed by General Willcocks and Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel on Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum for his invaluable assistance in dealing with the tribes.

7. It only remains to join in the tribute which all concerned have paid and justly paid to the Khyber Rifles, who have once more shown to their own people their loyalty to the British Government, which is not less proud of them than they are of their service. It cannot fail to be gratifying to them to read of the estimation in which they are held by the General under whom they have served, and by the Commanding Officer whom they know so well.

8. The Governor-General in Council trusts that the settlement recently concluded will have important results in securing the peace of this portion of the frontier.

No. 79.

Letter from the Government of India, Army Department, to the Right Honourable John Morley, O.M., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 9th April, 1908. *Received 25th April,* 1908.

(Extract.)

Annexed is a copy of Army Department Notification dated 20th March, 1908, publishing a despatch from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., describing the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force from the 13th February, 1908, to the 2nd March, 1908.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Army Department Notification, dated 20th March, 1908

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the Staff in India, dated the 16th March, 1908, forwarding a despatch from Major-General

Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., describing the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force from the 13th February 1908, to the 2nd March, 1908.

The Governor-General in Council concurs with the Commander-in-Chief in his opinion that the able manner in which the operations were conducted reflects great credit on Major-General Sir James Willcocks and the Brigade commanders and Staff working under his orders.

His Excellency in Council also shares with the Commander-in-Chief his appreciation of the soldierly conduct displayed by all ranks throughout the operations.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Letter from the Chief of the Staff, Army Head-Quarters, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, dated 16th March, 1908.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatch from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., describing the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force.

2. The speed with which the Force was mobilised, and the rapidity of its movement into the Bazar Valley and subsequent operations, contributed very largely to the quick and successful termination of the expedition.

3. To secure speed in movement, the troops operated on a much lighter scale of equipment and transport than has been adopted on previous occasions on the frontier; but although the climatic conditions were severe, the health of the Force and the admirable spirit displayed by all ranks left nothing to be desired.

4. The losses inflicted on the Zakka Khel were unusually heavy, and were due to the excellent handling of the troops and to their training and efficiency in the field.

5. Lord Kitchener is confident that the Government of India will agree with him in considering that the work done reflects the greatest credit on all concerned.

His Excellency desires especially to commend to the notice of Government the excellent services of Major-General Sir James Willcocks, who so ably conducted the operations and brought them so rapidly to a successful conclusion.

He trusts also that those who have been brought to notice in this despatch may be considered deserving of commendation.

Annexure 1.

Letter from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Bazar Valley Field Force, to the Chief of the Staff, Army Head-Quarters, Calcutta, dated 5th March, 1908.

(Extract.)*

I have the honour to submit the following report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the operations of the Field Force under my command in the Bazar Valley.

1. On the 3rd February I received telegraphic orders from His Excellency which informed me that a punitive expedition against the Zakka Khel Afridis had been approved by the Secretary of State for India. It was enjoined on me to keep the matter secret and to so arrange that within a few days the troops which were to form the expeditionary force should be ready to move at once on the orders for an advance being issued. I also received written instructions which gave a general idea of what was to be done; with detailed orders for the composition of the Force and a scheme of operations as a guide up to the time the troops entered the country of the Zakka Khel.

The following were the strengths:—

First Brigade.

1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

53rd Sikhs (Frontier Force), 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force), 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkhas (Frontier Force).

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* This despatch was published in full in the "London Gazette" of the 22nd May, 1908. It is reprinted here with the omission of the lists of names of those whose services were specially commended, and of the detailed list of casualties.

Second Brigade.

1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.
28th Punjabis.
45th Sikhs.
54th Sikhs (Frontier Force).

Third Brigade (in reserve).

1st Battalion, Royal Munster Fusiliers.
23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery (Frontier Force).
1st Battalion, 6th Gurkha Rifles.
55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).

Divisional Troops.

2 Squadrons, 19th Lancers.
2 Squadrons, 37th Lancers.
23rd Sikh Pioneers.
25th Punjabis.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
4 guns, 22nd (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
No. 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.
No. 9 Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners.

Attached.—800 Khyber Rifles.

2. Later on I received instructions to be ready to move forward from Peshawar as soon as the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, had interviewed the Afridi Jirgas, which had meantime been ordered to assemble there.

3. During the few days remaining all the railway, transport, supply, medical and other arrangements were completed, mostly by verbal orders. In accordance with instructions from Army Headquarters and in communication with the General Officer Commanding, Rawal Pindi Division, the troops and followers from that division which were to form part of the Field Force were held in readiness. Up to the last moment secrecy was maintained and not until within a few hours of starting were all ranks of the advanced troops equipped with field service clothing, &c.

4. On the 12th February the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, interviewed the Afridi Jirgas. This same afternoon troops began to move forward, and next day the picquets in the Khyber Pass were taken over by detachments of the Field Force; and line of communication posts were established at Jamrud and Ali Masjid. Half a battalion, 5th Gurkhas, marched to Landi Kotal.

5. During the 12th February the 2nd Brigade from Nowshera and other troops from outside the 1st Division area arrived by road or rail at Peshawar, and the Force which was to make the first advance was completed. The troops moving from the above two stations were at once replaced by the Reserve Brigade which arrived by train.

6. On 13th February the 1st and 2nd Brigades and Divisional troops left Peshawar and bivouacked at Jamrud. No tents were carried and all officers were on half field service scale of baggage.

7. On 14th February the Force moved to Lala China near Ali Masjid.

8. I felt convinced, considering the quiet way in which the Force had been mobilised, and how little was even known of its departure from Peshawar, that by a rapid march into the centre of Bazar we should not only morally surprise the enemy but forestall them in any of the positions they might have selected to defend. Accordingly at dawn on 15th February the following troops, under command of Major-General Barrett, C.B., left Lala China:—

With the Divisional Staff I accompanied this column.

Strength.

3rd Mountain Battery.	45th Sikhs.
Seaforth Highlanders.	54th ,,
28th Punjabis.	Wing 2-5th Gurkhas.

6th Company, Sappers and Miners.

Excepting a very small proportion of water, ambulance and other necessary mules, no transport accompanied this advance and officers and men carried three days' rations on the person. The route taken was by Chora in Malikdin country. The strong fort belonging to Yar Muhammad Khan at this place was occupied by troops from General Anderson's Brigade which moved up from Ali Masjid this same day.

No opposition was met with until after passing Chora when the Zakkas began firing on the advanced guard near Tanda, Tangi and from the high hill Tsapara on to which the 5th Gurkhas were advancing. The column moved on, being fired at regularly from our left flank till we reached Walai, east of China. Only one casualty occurred, a gunner of the 3rd Mountain Battery being wounded.

It was getting late now and a position for the night was selected. The Seaforth Highlanders swarmed up Khar Ghundai, a steep hill 1,000 feet above the bivouac, and established themselves in sangars on the summit. Picquets were also placed round the Walai nala. Heavy firing was kept up throughout the night, but only caused us the loss of one Highlander and one sepoy, 28th Punjabis, killed, both in the picquets. The Highlanders also had an officer and four men struck by rocks hurled from close quarters into the sangars. The Zakkas lost three killed and seven wounded on Seaforth's hill, amongst the latter being the well-known raid leader Dadai, badly hit.

9. The 5th Gurkhas on Tsapara hill were also sniped all night, but had no casualties.

10. Whilst we were marching to Walai, a small column from Landi Kotal, consisting of a wing 5th Gurkhas and 700 Khyber Rifles, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, Chief Political Officer with the Force, moved on the same date, and rapidly crossing the Bazar pass entered the valley without opposition and occupied China itself. The picquets were fired on all night, but no casualty occurred. This column moved without any transport whatever and carried its ammunition and 3 days' rations on the person.

11. Thus within 12 hours of leaving the Khyber the two columns had established themselves in the heart of the Zakka country. From information since received it is clear that the Zakkas had no idea of our date of leaving Ali Masjid and had made up their minds we should in any case halt at Chora for a day, and in consequence had not time to occupy Khar Gundai, the strongest position in the valley.

12. On the same day as I moved to Walai the major portion of the first Brigade occupied Chora, thus connecting up the line of communications.

13. On 16th February the advanced camp was moved up the Walai stream to a well-protected site where there was a plentiful supply of running water. Here the telephone apparatus of the Peshawar Division was set up and proved most useful, Headquarters being connected with the two Brigades and all important picquets, rendering immediate communication safe and easy.

During this afternoon the Landi Kotal column marched into Walai from China. A large convoy of supplies from Chora also arrived in camp. Whilst this convoy was moving in, the 45th Sikhs who were picquetting the lower spurs of Sara Paial Hill were being annoyed by fire from the crest, which in consequence it was decided to occupy. The leading companies advanced but were brought to a standstill by a heavy fire from what appeared to be a considerable number of Zakkas. The Zakkas endeavoured to push forward, but other companies were sent in support of the Sikhs and by my orders a steady fire of shrapnel was kept up on the enemy who were plainly visible from the guns. Meantime half a battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders arrived from camp and the combined troops soon cleared the hill. The Sikhs had a native officer and a sepoy wounded. The Zakkas lost 5 killed and 10 wounded this day.

14. On 17th February most of the 1st Brigade had reached Walai, and I had sufficient troops to form two columns for daily operations. This became the headquarters from which punitive measures were hereafter carried out in every direction, according to the movements of the Zakkas.

15. Before daybreak on 18th February a column under Major-General Barrett moved out to destroy the towers and enclosures at China. With the Divisional Staff, I accompanied this column.

Strength.

Seaforth Highlanders.	5th Gurkhas.
3rd Mountain Battery.	23rd Pioneers.
54th Sikhs.	6th Company Sappers.

The Seaforths and Gurkhas moving by Surmundo and Khwar and covered by the mountain guns occupied the hills north of China. Lieutenant Macfadyen of the Seaforths was mortally wounded in this advance.

After destroying the main towers and securing a quantity of wood and fodder the column began its return march to camp and the Zakkas at once closed in on the rear-guard and flanks. The troops retired very steadily, the battery and its escort of Seaforths which were in the comparatively open country south of China being specially selected for attack. The 54th Sikhs also on this flank were hotly engaged, some of the tribesmen closing to revolver range. Many Zakkas were here placed *hors-de-combat*.

By 4.20 p.m. the Gurkhas who held the hills above China had moved off them and the Seaforths had also come down from the eastern spurs which they had been occupying.

The column now retired quietly, the Zakkas making brave but fruitless attempts to follow. Their losses this day were heavy and they avoided the open country as far as possible for the future. Our casualties were one British officer wounded (since dead), two British officers, two British rank and file, and four native rank and file wounded.

16. On 19th February a column under Brigadier-General Anderson proceeded to China to complete the destruction of the towers and bring in fodder. No opposition was offered to the advance, but as usual the Zakkas followed up the retirement and were again severely punished. The troops returned to camp by the Jabagai gorge.

17. On 20th February Brigadier-General Anderson again moved out with a column to reconnoitre the Sassobi Pass and the Algad Valley. I accompanied this reconnaissance. The advanced guard was fired on from both sides of the Pass, but a good survey was obtained by Captain Rich, R.E.

Whilst the towers at Surmundo and Khwar were being destroyed, a portion of the column moved up the Algad Valley and from Sarwekai Pass saw a body of Zakkas advancing from the direction of Halwai. A few shells soon scattered them. The retirement to camp was followed with less vigour than on the 18th instant, but the enemy again suffered loss.

18. News had been received for some days that the tribesmen had collected in large numbers at Halwai where they had been joined by many Sangu Khels and other Shinwaris from across the Afghan border. On 21st February I moved with two columns under command of Generals Barrett and Anderson, keeping a squadron of the 37th Lancers with me in case an opportunity for the employment of cavalry presented itself.

Strength.

General Barrett's Column.

3rd Mountain Battery.	28th Punjabis.
500 Seaforths.	4 Companies, 54th Sikhs.

500 Khyber Rifles.

General Anderson's Column.

22nd Mountain Battery.	400 of 5th Gurkhas.
Section No. 9 Company Sappers.	53rd Sikhs.
400 Warwicks.	59th Rifles.

The 28th Punjabis of Barrett's Brigade occupied the China heights soon after daylight and held them during the day to cover the retirement; the remainder of this Brigade took the route south of China. The Khyber Rifles and 6th Company Sappers moved by the Bazar nala and destroyed the towers at Kago Kamar. Fire was opened on them by the Zakkas and kept up during most of the day. The Seaforths on our extreme left occupied the Saran hills and kept the enemy to the south and west of Halwai.

Meantime General Anderson's Brigade, moving north of China by Khwar and the Sarwekai Pass, debouched on to the plain north of Halwai. During this movement the Zakkas kept up a dropping fire from the direction of Pastakai. The two columns now advanced simultaneously. The steep hills overlooking Halwai were occupied without a check, the mountain guns making the enemy's sangars quite untenable. Anderson's right was very well protected from any attack from the Thabai or Mangal Bagh passes by the 59th Rifles.

19. The towers and stacks of timber in Halwai were destroyed and the Force commenced its return march to camp. This was, as usual, the signal for numerous parties to come down from the Thabai direction. These opened fire at long ranges, but the Derajat Battery, very well handled, kept them on the move. Both brigades were now moving by the south of China Hills which were held by the 28th Punjabis. By the time the rearmost battalion had arrived abreast of China the Zakka fire had almost died away, but as the 28th Punjabis began to leave the hills, covered by the fire of six guns, the tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers and closely pressed the battalion. The Punjabis withdrew steadily, but lost one man killed and eight wounded during the operation. Several acts of individual gallantry are reported and I am recommending three men for the Indian Order of Merit.

On our left (facing enemy) the Seaforths and Khyber Rifles were also attacked, the Zakkas advancing to close range, several of them being shot by both corps. It was whilst gallantly directing his rearmost companies at this stage of the fight that Major the Honourable D. Forbes-Sempill, Seaforth Highlanders, was killed.

The 53rd Sikhs who formed the rear centre covered the retirement and were very well handled.

By the time the rear guard had got east of China Hills, the Zakkas drew off and only fired at long ranges. Our casualties were one British officer and one Sepoy killed and ten native rank and file wounded. Not a shot was fired into camp this night.

20. On night of 22nd February the tribesmen tried the effects of sniping from several directions simultaneously, but although they wounded a sergeant in the Warwicks their own casualties are reported to have been a good deal heavier.

21. Next morning General Anderson again visited China with a column and brought away most of the remaining wood and fodder. The Zakkas kept at a very respectful distance, but the mountain guns again did some good work. Whilst demolishing the last tower two sappers and a follower were injured.

During the afternoon the first of the Afridi jirgas arrived in camp and asked for terms and mercy for the Zakka Khel and expressed their eagerness and ability to deal with them in the future. I gave them 48 hours to complete these arrangements and they all left for Halwai. In order that they might meet the Zakka elders I suspended active operations in the Halwai direction for that period.

22. On 24th February Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan, 54th Sikhs, with a small column visited Jabagai and destroyed the towers. The Zakkas offered but a feeble resistance.

23. On 26th February a water escort of 45th Sikhs on Tsapara Hill was attacked in thick scrub jungle and had one Sepoy killed and two wounded.

24. On 27th February the combined Afridi jirgas, about 1,100 men (including 300 Zakka Khels), arrived at China from Halwai with white flags. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, Chief Political Officer, went out alone half-way to China to meet them and conducted them into camp.

Next day I held a public jirga at which they presented a petition, the details of which are known to Government. They deposited 53 rifles of English manufacture as a guarantee of keeping their promise to punish the individual raiders and begged we would now spare the Zakka Khel, undertaking to hold themselves responsible for the conduct of the tribe in future. As in my opinion the terms more than satisfied the demands of Government I accepted them and a formal agreement was drawn up and signed by 322 chiefs and elders, representing all the Afridi tribes, including the Zakka Khel.

25. Before the terms of above agreement were known at Chora on the night of 28th February, the camp at that post was heavily fired into and one Sepoy, 23rd Pioneers, and four Sepoys, 45th Sikhs, were wounded.

26. Immediately the terms of settlement with the jirgas had been signed on 28th February, secret orders were issued for the entire force to leave the Bazar Valley at dawn next morning. The Zakka Khels and such others of the jirgas as desired were allowed to proceed to China at once, and this proceeding convinced them that we had no intention of leaving for a few days at least.

27. At daylight on the 29th February Major-General Barrett's Brigade began to leave camp for Ali Musjid *viâ* Chora, a distance of 15 miles. The transport and baggage of both Brigades had gone by 9 a.m., and by 10 o'clock the rearmost picquets began to withdraw. General Anderson's Brigade covered the withdrawal and his arrangements were very well carried out. I remained with this Brigade at Chora the night and next day marched through to Jamrud, where the entire force was concentrated prior to demobilisation. A battalion and two squadrons were left at Ali Masjid as a temporary guard to surplus stores.

28. From the time we left China till arrival in British India not a shot was fired by the Zakkas. I am glad to be able to add that during the entire operations not a single follower, public or private, was killed or wounded by the enemy, and only one rifle was lost in the Bazar Valley, and that was on a man killed while skirmishing in thick bush.

29. I beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the soldierly conduct of all ranks of the Force. Their good discipline and cheerfulness have been very marked, and it has indeed been an honour to command such a fine division in the field. The fact that Brigades were employed intact under their own generals and staff, as they had been trained in peace time, made the carrying out of all operations a simple matter, and my own share in the work was appreciably lightened by having been allowed to select my staff officers from the permanent divisional establishment.

That the enemy lost heavily whilst own own casualties were small is due to the improvement in musketry training and the manner in which the troops work and run up shelter at the shortest possible notice. Sangars and pits quickly covered the bivouacs, and the picquets were secured against a rush at night by wire entanglements, &c. Constant night work now forms a regular part of infantry training, and the results were very plainly visible. As far as hill fighting is concerned our troops had little to learn from the Afridis.

The various departments of the Force were all satisfactory, and especially the transport service, where the discipline and order that prevailed were very noticeable.

The good conduct of the Khyber Rifles, many of whom were actually serving against their own kith and kin, is a remarkable testimony to their efficiency and loyalty. Not a rifle was lost by the corps, nor was there a single desertion.

30. The enemy's losses, as far as can be ascertained at present, have been at least 70 killed, and the wounded may reasonably be put at a much higher figure.

Annexure 2.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES.

Officers.

1 killed (Major the Honourable D. Forbes-Sempill, 1st Seaforth Highlanders).
4 wounded (2nd Lieutenant I. C. MacFadyen, 1st Seaforth Highlanders, died subsequently).

Non-commissioned Officers and Men.

British Troops.

1 killed (Private R. Fordyce, 1st Seaforth Highlanders).
6 wounded.

Native Troops.

1 killed.
27 wounded (two died subsequently).

No. 80.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated 22nd May, 1908.

I have considered the letter of Your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, dated the 2nd April, 1908, forwarding the reports you have received, through the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, on the political aspect of the recent expedition against the Zakka Khel Afridis, together with the orders you have issued thereon.

2. I desire to associate myself with the appreciation expressed in these orders of the services rendered by Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., as officer in supreme political control of the expedition, by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., Chief Political Officer with the Field Force, and by Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, and of the gallant and loyal conduct of the Khyber Rifles.

3. Your letter brings specially to my notice the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, to whose tact, energy, and ability the conclusion of so prompt and satisfactory a settlement with the tribesmen was largely due. I request that Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel may be informed that His Majesty's Government highly appreciate the manner in which he carried out his difficult task.

4. Your letter on the subject of the conduct of the military operations by Major-General Sir James Willcocks, and the troops under his command, is being dealt with in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

No. 81.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, dated 29th May, 1908.

I have considered in Council the letter of your Government in the Army Department, dated 9th April last, and its enclosures, regarding the operations of the Bazar Valley Field Force against the Zakka Khel.

2. His Majesty's Government desire to place on record their high appreciation of the Military dispositions made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to give effect to their policy; and to express their entire concurrence in the terms in which, in your Army Department Notification of 20th March, Your Excellency has spoken of the services of Major-General Sir James Willcocks and of the officers and troops under his command.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.

No. 82.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Viscount Morley of Blackburn, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 4th June, 1908. *Received 22nd June*, 1908.

In continuation of our despatch dated the 2nd April, 1908, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter dated the 5th May, 1908, from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, enclosing the final political report regarding the carrying out of the settlement made with the Afridis on the conclusion of the Zakka Khel punitive expedition in February last.

2. The prompt and successful manner in which the settlement has been carried into effect reflects much credit on Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel. A copy of our letter acknowledging the report is enclosed.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) MINTO.
„ KITCHENER.
„ H. ERLE RICHARDS.
„ E. N. BAKER.
„ C. H. SCOTT.
„ H. ADAMSON.
„ J. O. MILLER.
„ W. L. HARVEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Letter from the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 5th May, 1908.

I have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a letter, dated the 30th April, 1908, with its enclosures, from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., forwarding a further report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., late Chief Political Officer, Bazar Valley Field Force, regarding the completion of the settlement effected with the Afridis at Walai on the 28th February, 1908.

2. I concur with Sir James Willcocks that the Afridi Jirgas have, in the thorough manner in which they have insisted on the restoration of the stolen property, indicated a genuine desire to effect a lasting settlement with Government. Though subjected to a severe strain since the Bazar Valley Expedition owing to pressure both from Afghanistan and the Mohmands, they have hitherto stood firm, and if they continue to do so through the present disturbances, Government will have a good guarantee of the sincerity of their desire for peace. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel is to be congratulated on bringing the negotiations to so successful a conclusion.

Annexure 1.

From Major-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 30th April, 1908.

(Extract.)

I have the honour to forward herewith the final Political Report of the Bazar Valley Expedition received from Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., late Chief Political Officer with the Field Force. In my opinion the efforts of the Afridi Jirgas have (as Colonel Roos-Keppel remarks) been remarkably successful, and I entirely agree with him that the enhanced rewards to them are well deserved. The return to them of the surrendered rifles is the natural consequence of their loyal conduct in bringing the raiders and thieves to tribal justice, and, taken as a whole, the settlement appears to have been very satisfactory, as I anticipated it would be.

Annexure 2.

Report, dated 22nd April, 1908, on the completion of the Zakka Khel settlement made at Walai on the 28th February, 1908.

(Extract.)

The Afridi Jirga had undertaken at Walai to be responsible for the future good behaviour of the Zakka Khel and to themselves punish actual offenders in recent raids into British territory. This latter clause was suggested by the Afridis themselves as they argued that were individual thieves and raiders allowed to retain and "digest" the booty which they had accumulated, the temptation to others to follow their example and to defy the loose organisation of the tribe would be irresistible. No fine had been imposed by Government and the nature of the punishment to be inflicted was left to the Afridis themselves. After the troops had returned from the Expedition the whole Jirga of the Afridis came to Peshawar to discuss with the Political Agent the nature of the punishment to be inflicted upon the raiders. An unfortunate incident occurred during the visit of the Jirga which nearly broke up the assembly. Some youngsters, Peshawaris, Afridis and others, created a disturbance in the streets in the money-changers' quarter and some exposed money was stolen from the stalls. This was magnified into an "Afridi raid" and a cry was raised that all Afridis were being arrested. Fortunately it proved possible to reassure the elders and to satisfy them that no harm to them was intended. They eventually decided to organise a Jirga of about 600 men, including the Maliks and most influential elders of each clan of the Afridis, and to visit the Zakka Khel settlements in turn. On the 8th March the combined Jirga left for the Zia-ud-din Zakka Khel country at Shinkamar, and spent about 5 days there; they then moved slowly up the Bara visiting the Shan Khel and Pakhai settlements, thence to Maidan where they spent 20 days, thence to the Bazar Valley, and thence to Jamrud where they arrived on the 3rd April, 1908. At each place they were fed throughout their stay by the Zakka Khel in accordance with tribal custom and this in itself was a heavy punishment to the latter who sent in many messages to the Political Agent begging to be relieved of the burden of these unwelcome guests and to be allowed to settle matters direct. In each place they succeeded in getting hold of the raiders and by beating them and threatening to burn their villages induced them to hand over to the Jirga rifles as an earnest of their promise to disgorge their booty. The Jirga worked with an energy and unity of purpose never before displayed and were extraordinarily successful. They brought to Jamrud every notorious raider in the tribe (with the sole exception of Multan who had taken refuge at Jalalabad) and the amount of loot which they had compelled them to disgorge. This included:—

	Rs.	A.	P.
(1) 4 Martini-Henry rifles taken from the Kohat Border Police at Lachi on the 13th November, 1907, valued at Rs. 500 each	2,000	0	0
(2) 2 smooth-bore Martinis taken from the Pabbi Police on 16th December, 1907, valued at Rs. 100 each	200	0	0
(3) 97 pieces of gold jewellery set with precious stones (mostly rubies and pearls), weight 171 $\frac{3}{32}$, and 221 pieces of plain gold jewellery, weight 345 $\frac{9}{16}$ tolas. The articles cannot be identified from the Police lists, and there is no means of valuing the jewels (a proportion of which may be false). The total weight of the gold settings is 516 $\frac{31}{32}$ tolas, which at the low rate of Rs. 25 per tola comes to	12,924	3	6
(4) Loose stones, rubies, pearls, and other miscellaneous stones, weight 34$\frac{1}{2}$ tolas, value not ascertainable.			
(5) 165 pieces of silver, jewellery, weight 826 tolas, bullion value	826	0	0
(6) Cash fines recovered in British coin from raiders	5,987	9	3
(7) Cash fines recovered in Kabul coin from raiders, Rs. 3,103 ...	1,551	8	0
(8) 49$\frac{5}{8}$ tolas of brass ornaments and fragments, some set with imitation pearls including some pieces of doubtful and inferior gold. Not valued.			
(9) Some donkeys, clothing, &c., and some sheep returned direct to claimants. Not valued.			
Total	23,489	4	9

To this must be added the value of the jewels in items 3 and 4 which must be at least Rs. 10,000, and the allowances of the Zakka Khel, which are in deposit, making a grand total of Rs. 53,039-4-9, as under—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Loot recovered, as per above list	33,489	4	9
Allowances of Zakka Khels from 1st April, 1906, to 28th February, 1908	19,550	0	0
Total	53,039	4	9

When it is remembered that the fine imposed on the Zakka Khel Afridis for their share of the 1897 disturbances was Rs. 9,000, and this was eventually paid for them by the other Afridis, who have never succeeded in recovering any part of it, I think it will be acknowledged that the Jirga has been remarkably successful. As no fine had been imposed at the end of the Zakka Khel Expedition, I should have been satisfied with the mere punishment of the offenders and should have raised no objection to the retention by the Jirgas, as a recompense for their trouble, of the amount which they recovered. As, however, all the loot has been handed over to me, I have accepted it, and have sent it to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, for return to the losers, and I have somewhat increased the rewards which I had decided to give to the Afridi Maliks and elders instrumental in the settlement and in this subsequent punishment of raiders. As regards Multan, who had taken refuge with the Afghans at Jalalabad, the Afridi Jirga demanded that he should come in, make unconditional submission, pay a fine of five thousand rupees and give guarantees for the future. He was at first inclined to agree to these terms, but was persuaded by the Afghans not to submit. The Afridi Jirga have deposited with me one Lee-Metford, eight Martini-Henry, and four snider rifles, roughly valued at five to six thousand rupees, as a guarantee that they will not allow Multan to return to, or to settle in, Tirah until he has been properly punished. The settlement of all these cases was long and tedious, and at one time it looked as if the Zakka Khel were going to break away from the Jirga and defy them and Government, as they put forward a very determined claim to payment of their back allowances, arguing that if they paid up what they owed Government it was only just that Government should pay what was due to them. They were told that their allowances were forfeited as a punishment for their numerous violations of British territory, and they at last gave way with a bad grace. Throughout the stay of the Jirgas at Jamrud they have been pestered by numerous messengers from the Mohmands and from Afghanistan, who have urged them to help the Mohmands by rising and threatening Peshawar. This had, of course, an unsettling influence, and increased our difficulties with the Zakka Khel, but I do not at present apprehend any trouble. Whatever the future may bring forth, the Maliks and elders of the Afridis have fully redeemed their promise of punishing raiders, and they have done far more than I considered was possible. I have therefore returned to them the rifles which they handed over at Walai as a pledge for the carrying out of their promise. Unless the Afridis generally, and the Zakka Khel in particular, become affected by the present agitation among the Mohmands, I have hope that this settlement with the Zakka Khel will prove satisfactory and that we shall have no more outbreaks or organised raiding.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, dated 22nd May, 1908.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 5th May, 1908, forwarding a copy of a letter from Major-General Sir James Willcocks, giving cover to a report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. O. Roos-Keppel, C.I.E., regarding the completion of the settlement effected with the Afridis at Walai on the 28th February, 1908.

2. The Government of India concur with you that Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel is to be congratulated on bringing the negotiations so promptly to a successful conclusion. The Governor-General in Council desires to acknowledge the able manner in which Colonel Roos-Keppel managed these difficult negotiations.

PART III.

MOHMANDS: OPERATIONS.

No. 1.

Letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Right Honourable Lord George F. Hamilton, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 13th January, 1897. Received 1st February, 1897.

(EXTRACT.)

We have arrived at arrangements which promise to be satisfactory with those Mohmand clans, over which the Government of India have assumed political control. Representative jirgas of them met Mr. Merk, Commissioner of the Peshawar Division, by invitation, early in November. Their attitude was good and they accepted the position as explained to them; they have been allowed to continue to receive river tolls as heretofore, and allowances* aggregating Rs. 16,800 a year have been fixed for them in lieu of those heretofore actually or nominally paid by the Amir. The allowances and presents made to the tribes through the Khan of Lalpura, amounting to about Rs. 7,000 a year will, at their request, be paid to them direct in future. A slight addition of Rs. 325 a year to the old *inam* of Rs. 1,000 a year drawn by the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel Pindiali Mohmands has also been sanctioned. We have told His Highness the Amir that arrangements have now been completed with the Halimzais and Tarakzais and certain other sections of the Mohmands in a manner satisfactory both to the Government of India and to the jirgas of the tribesmen; that the allowances which the tribes have received either directly from Kabul or through the Khan of Lalpura will now be paid to them by the Government of India, and that His Highness will be relieved of any concern in regard to them.

	Rs.
* Halimzai	8,480
Kamali	2,800
Dawezai	1,200
Utmanzai	720
Tarakzai	3,600

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 5th December, 1896.

(Extract.)

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor held a Darbar near Shabkadr to receive the representatives of the "assured" Mohmand clans and thereby openly mark the change in our relations with them which has been effected by the Durand Agreement and the recent negotiations with Mr. Merk. Over 1,000 members of the above clans were so received by His Honour, who conveyed to them on behalf of the British Government the assurance that they had passed under sole British control, and that such grants as they had before received from the Kabul Government would be regranted to them and maintained by the British Government. The clans were clearly and emphatically informed that in return for these allowances they would be expected to render such service as Government might require from them, and to be faithful and well conducted in their dealings with the British Government. They fully recognised and more than once recurred to the main fact of their having come under our sole control. A copy of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's speech, which was delivered by His Honour in English and afterwards translated to the members of the jirga in Pashtu, is enclosed for the information of the Government of India: and I am to explain, in order to account for some phrases in it which may sound strangely to English ears, that it was prepared with a view to being translated into Pashtu.

Annexure.

Note of proceedings of the Darbar held by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor near Shabkadr on 26th November, 1896.

(Extract.)

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and its Dependencies received representative jirgas consisting of 1,109 men of the Halimzai, Tarakzai, Utmanzai, Dawezai, Isa Khel, and Burhan Khel Mohmand clans in a private Darbár held near Shabkadr on 26th November, 1896. His Honour addressed the assembled clansmen as follows:—

"I have called you here to-day in order that I might explain to you myself that the British Government has agreed to accept and has now assumed sole political control over you. As you know, three years ago a commission of British officers visited Kabul, and by a convention with His Highness the Amír a demarcation of the boundaries of political influence of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir was settled, and in consequence of that agreement you have come on that side of the boundary which is under sole British influence and control. In future therefore your relations will be with the British Government alone, and with no other Government, and I am sure that, as hitherto our relations have been good, so also hereafter the new relations, which I am glad to see have been commenced, will prove entirely satisfactory and will result in the advancement of the prosperity and welfare of yourselves. The British Government is just, and in order that you may not lose by coming under the sole control of that Government it has been decided and I inform you that the allowances which you have hitherto received from His Highness the Amír through the Governor of Jalalabad or the Khan of Lalpura will be continued to you, and the first half year's instalment will be paid to you by the Commissioner immediately. Some of your clans, such as the Utmanzai, the Dawezai and the people of Pindiali, have not received such allowances, but the British Government in its kindness has agreed to give them allowances also. In return for these allowances you will, whenever the Government thinks it necessary, be called upon to do service in such manner as Government considers advisable, and upon the service you render, upon your good conduct, and upon your fidelity to the Government will depend your allowances and the favour which the great British Government will show to you. Also as you were in the habit of receiving presents from the Khan of Lalpura, the Government in its justice will see that you do not lose in this matter. The distribution of these allowances and presents will be settled by my officers, to whom I have given authority for this purpose. Most of you have long known our Government and have dealt with its officers for over 50 years and have received *jagirs* and *inams* from that Government, and you all know that the British Government treats its dependents with kindness and consideration; it is always just; it is strong to reward and to punish; and in return for its kindness and consideration it expects and requires that its dependents show fidelity and service, and I sincerely trust that your new relations with the British Government will lead always to your prosperity and welfare, and that your name will be always well spoken of in the house of the Suzerain."

No. 2.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

On the night of 24th March village Marozai, six miles to the north-east of Shankargarh police station, was raided; two Hindus killed, one wounded. Troops at Abazai and Shankargarh turned out, but raiders escaped. On the night of 24th, Mirzadhar village, two miles from Marozai, was raided, several Hindus' houses looted and burnt, and one Hindu carried off. Burtan Khels Mohmands brought back Hindu, and handed over a Koda Khel Mohmand raider whom they captured. On the night of 30th March a raid was committed at Chikkor, nine miles south-east of Shankargarh, and Hindus' houses looted. All three raids are believed to be the work of remnant of Mohmand lashkar, which collected at the end of Zakka Khel expedition. Military detachments at Abazai and Shabkadr are being strengthened, and military will temporarily take over Moghal Khel Border Military Police post, in order to set free Border Military Police for patrol, as further activity is apprehended from this gang.

No. 3.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

North-West Frontier. My telegram dated 3rd instant. Telegram dated 14th instant from Political Agent, Khyber, states that Mullas, headed by Hazrat Sahib of Charbagh, have been preaching in Ningrahar, and crossed the river on 10th

instant at Lalpura, their intentions being uncertain; also that Koda Khel at encampments have left their country and have taken refuge with the neighbouring clans. Telegram dated 15th April from Officer Commanding at Landi Kotal, states that on 14th instant Sufi Sahib of Kot, with 1,500 men, left Lalpura for Koda Khel to join force of Hazrat Sahib, total being thus brought up to over 3,000; that villagers are joining in masses, Ghaza being general, with the reported object of delivering an attack on night of 17th April upon Dheri Shabkadr, Malik Gholam Khan, Pindiali, being attacked *en route* because he released Hindu who was captured in Mirzadhar raid and arrested two Koda Khel. Movement to Kamali towards British territory has, according to later information received to-day from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, been made by Mohmand gathering, which now, including some 2,000 Afghan subjects, numbers about 5,000, with Sufi Sahib's son and Hazrat Mulla at their head. Kamali are reported unreliable by Mohmand chief. Attempt made by Halimzai jirga to bring in Koda Khel jirga to discuss matters was unsuccessful. There is, in Chief Commissioner's opinion, a distinct danger of a fanatical outbreak with these influential Mullas present. General Officer Commanding has been asked by him to reinforce Shabkadr Abazai line by sending out more troops there. Everything possible is being done, through Mohmand chiefs, to reassure the clans, the gathering having apparently been caused by a rumour that we intend to invade Mohmand country.

No. 4.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram dated 17th instant. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, telegraphed as follows on 19th and 20th instant respectively:—

(1.) "Arrival of Mohmand lashkar at Kamali, with intention of attacking Gholam Khan, is reported from Shabkadr. It is said, however, that Gholam Khan, who has moved to British territory, is with his family at Matta Moghal Khel. About 10,000 is said to be number of Mohmand lashkar. A band of 150 men to watch Kotah, about half a mile outside our border, was sent last night."

(2.) "Mohmand gathering. See my telegram of yesterday. Patrol west of Matta Moghal Khel, inside our border, was fired upon yesterday by band of Mohmands. Patrol did not return fire. Post at Matta was fired into last evening, and firing from both sides of road was directed against a party of troops moving from Garhi Sudda to Matta. One sepoy, 28th Punjabis, and one syce, 19th Lancers, severely wounded, and one man of the Warwicks killed. After consulting me, General Officer Commanding is moving out, under General Anderson, a column of two guns and 1,000 infantry from Peshawar. I have, this morning, advised General Officer Commanding to move to Peshawar a second column which is being held ready at Nowshera in case of need. Every endeavour to prevent further collision will be used by General Willcocks, who has to-day gone to Shabkadr."

No. 5.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of to-day. Mohmands. Following telegram dated 20th instant received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"The longer this gathering under fanatical Mullas remains in its present position, the greater is the probability of a big fanatical outbreak; I am therefore definitely of opinion that a sufficiently strong force should be organised at Shabkadr to assume offensive. In view of trouble spreading to other portions of Peshawar border, I would also urge maintenance at Peshawar of a strong column." Telegraphing on the 20th April from Shabkadr, General Willcocks states that he has ordered two squadrons of cavalry from Nowshera Cavalry Brigade to Shabkadr, and also two guns, Mountain Battery, and one Field Battery, and 800

infantry from Nowshera to Peshawar. He further states that presence of a lashkar about 7,000 strong at Pandiali, of another about 2,000 strong at Kamali, and of a third about 1,000 strong at Alakandi, six miles from Matta Moghal Khel, is asserted by all reports alike; and that large numbers have evidently gathered, though numbers are probably exaggerated. It is reported that at Pandiali a jirga of all big Mullas is to-day assembling. All precautions against attack are being taken by General Willcocks.

No. 6.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmand disturbances. General Willcocks wires 20th:—"Mohmands fired patrol yesterday, west of Matta Moghal Khel inside our boundary. Fire was not returned. Yesterday evening a party moving from Garhi Sadda to Matta Moghal Khel was fired at from both sides of road. Post at Matta was also fired into. Private R. G. Adams, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Battalion, killed; Private Picard, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Battalion, slight gunshot wound, arm; one Sepoy, 28th Punjabis, and one Syce, 19th Lancers (Fane's Horse) wounded severely. Fire was returned on both occasions. In consultation with Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, am moving out this morning a column from Peshawar of two guns and 1,300 infantry under General Anderson. Another column is being held in readiness at Nowshera in case of need Am just going out myself and will use every endeavour to prevent further collision." Willcocks wires later from Shabkadr:—"Chief Commissioner strongly recommends in writing that troops from Nowshera be moved to Peshawar at once with a view to further developments and for security communications with Shabkadr. I have ordered two guns, mountain battery, and one field battery, and 800 infantry by road and rail from Nowshera to Peshawar at once. I will be at Matta to-night. Have also ordered two squadrons cavalry from Nowshera Cavalry Brigade to Shabkadr." Troops mentioned by Willcocks left Nowshera for Peshawar last night by road.

No. 7.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 21st April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

In continuation of my telegram of to-day. Willcocks wires from camp Matta Moghal Khel at 11 a.m. on 21st April:—"No firing last night. Mohmand watch posts, along hills just outside border, visible. I will give no possible cause for Mohmands to attack us. If they do, we are in a position to repulse and punish them. Troops from Nowshera all reach Peshawar by road to-day. Cavalry from Nowshera arrived by night march at Shabkadr this morning. At 8 o'clock this morning a party of Mohmands crossed our border, in open, and fired on our standing patrol, west of camp. Patrol was withdrawn, as I am endeavouring to show that we are here in purely protective advanced position, but, as Mohmands kept in open ground, I fired three shells and dispersed them. Whoever their parties are, they are evidently doing their best to draw us across the border, but they will not do so unless they attack us in force. They have now planted a standard 4,000 yards from camp. Health of troops good, but weather is very hot."

No. 8.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated, Shankargarh, 22nd April, received from General Anderson:—"During the night there was a little sniping into camp, Matta; no casualties resulted. In consequence of occupation of foot hills west of Sadr Garhi,

and about 3,000 yards from Matta camp, by at least 1,000 of the enemy, a strong post was established and occupied at Sadr Garhi by 300 of our men. Flank guard moving to Sadr Garhi was fired on in desultory fashion all morning. Only casualties were two horses wounded. On night of 21st April, telephone wire was cut and carried away. Shankargarh fort, city, and camp on west side subjected to a certain amount of sniping."

No. 9.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 22nd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of yesterday. Mohmands. Following telegram, dated 21st April, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:—"Spread of fanatical feeling to Shamozai, Utman Khel, and Bajaur is shown by reports received at Malakand from Nawab of Nawagai; Jehad has been avowed and is being preached by deputies from the Mullas."

No. 10.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 22nd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. Your telegram of to-day, repeating Chief Commissioner's telegram of the 21st instant. You will, of course, take such military action as you may consider necessary, bearing in mind the policy of His Majesty's Government on the frontiers. I shall be glad to be kept informed promptly and fully.

No. 11.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following reports from Panjkora bridge, telegraphed by Political Agent, Malakand, 22nd instant:—Mulla Barbara, Inzarai, Doda Jan, Sufi Sahib, Badshah of Islampur, and disciples, and Sheikhs of Hadda Mulla have started for Shabkadr at head of Mamund Salarzais, Mandals Khels, Charmangis, and other Bajis. Men of Asmar, Shigal, Kohistan, Shortan, Kama, and Kunar are coming to join fanatics.

No. 12.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated 22nd April, received from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, regarding Mohmands:—"Desultory long-range fire has been kept up by enemy, who, reports show, are holding low hills from Swat River to Subhan Khwar. One havildar 53rd Sikhs wounded. It is said that Hazrat Sahib and son of Sufi Mulla, with some 3,000 men, have reached mouth of Gundab. Grain, ammunition, and cash are being steadily sent down to Mohmands. from Ningrahar, and attitude of gathering is even more aggressive to-day."

No. 13.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from General Anderson, 22nd April, regarding Mohmand disturbances:—"Considerable bodies of enemy now occupy the whole line of foot hills between Swat river and Subhan Khwar. Enemy has kept up desultory firing all day. One havildar, 53rd Sikhs, wounded slightly, and two cavalry horses wounded close to Matta Camp while on patrol; long range fire in all cases. There is no general advance into plain though a few of enemy frequently come down and fire here and there."

Following from General Willcocks, at Shabkadr, dated 22nd April:—"Large following of Mohmands with standards dispersed this afternoon by shell fire. They were advancing from west towards Garhi Sadr, which is opposite to Abazai. Considering that the enemy now evidently mean business, I have ordered following troops from Peshawar to Shabkadr:—18th Field Battery, 2 guns Derajat Mountain Battery, Seaforth Highlanders, and 200 men of 28th Punjabis. When these troops have arrived I shall have following force on line Abazai, Shabkadr, Michni:—2,700 infantry, 520 cavalry, and 12 guns."

No. 14.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram received from Intelligence Officer, Peshawar, 23rd April, regarding Mohmand disturbances:—"Last night little firing took place at Shabkadr and Abazai, shown on map as Hajizai, where bridge-head is held by small guard. No news from Matta, to which place telephone is cut, as also telegraph to Peshawar. Last night village of Katozai was raided. On morning of 23rd April, Intelligence Staff Officer rode to Peshawar from Shabkadr."

No. 15.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphed 23rd April from Shankgarh that an attack by the enemy on bridge-head Abazai on Shabkadr-Peshawar road last night was repulsed, one sowar wounded slightly. Throughout the night enemy fired upon Shabkadr fort and hornwork. Matta was sharply attacked by them; 21st Cavalry had one sowar wounded in head. Excited by the heavy firing, 80 horses of the 19th Lancers and 21st Cavalry stampeded, broke away, jumped intrenchments; many are being recovered to-day, though some are still missing, and others killed in barbed-wire fencing. Village, five miles within our border was attacked and looted by enemy, who, during darkness, crossed our main road from Abazai to Matta. At same time, Garisad post, opposite Abazai on Swat River, where fortified camp has just been established by me, was attacked by the enemy. Attack repulsed with loss to enemy of several wounded and four men killed.

No. 16.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 23rd April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram repeating telegram of 20th April from Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. In view of large gatherings reported in later telegrams, are you satisfied that maintenance of defensive will not promote big fanatical outbreak? Might not safe policy be to disperse gathering before it becomes larger? It is for you, of course, to judge.

No. 17.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegrams 22nd and 23rd April. I have given authority, on representations from Chief Commissioner and General Willcocks, to cross border and assume offensive when necessary, impressing at the same time on General Willcocks observance of policy of Government regarding permanent occupation. Immediate mobilisation of two brigades with reserve brigade and divisional troops has been sanctioned.

No. 18.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

The following units have been moved to Mohmand border up to the evening of 22nd April, making a total of 2,700 infantry, 520 cavalry, 12 guns, on the line Michni, Shabkadr, Abazai:—Royal Field Artillery, 18th Battery, and 4 guns 80th Battery; 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery, 2 guns; 1st Section 6th Company Sappers and Miners; detachments of 19th Lancers, 21st Cavalry, Guides' Cavalry, 1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 28th Punjabis, 53rd and 54th Sikhs, 59th Sind Rifles. The 1st Battalion Munster Fusiliers and 30th Punjabis have been moved to Nowshera, and the 45th and 54th Sikhs and 55th Rifles to Peshawar.

No. 19.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

The telegraph wire between Peshawar and Shabkadr was cut again about 9.30 last night, and has not yet been restored.

No. 20.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmand Force. Following are the names of Commanders:—Major-General Sir J. Willcocks to command the Force, Brigadier-General C. Anderson to command First Brigade, Major-General A. A. Barrett to command Second Brigade, Major-General J. G. Ramsay to command Reserve Brigade.

Following is composition of force:—First Brigade:—1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 53rd Sikhs, 57th Wilde's Rifles, 59th Scinde Rifles, Sections A and B No. 1 British Field Hospital, No. 101 Native Field Hospital, Brigade Supply Column. Second Brigade:—1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, Infantry of the Corps of Guides, 28th Punjabis, 55th Coke's Rifles, Sections C and D No. 1 British Field Hospital, No. 102 Native Field Hospital, Brigade Supply Column. Reserve Brigade:—1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, 21st Punjabis, 22nd Punjabis, 40th Pathans, Sections A and B No. 7 British Field Hospital, No. 112 Native Field Hospital, Sections A and B No. 113 Native Field Hospital, Brigade Supply Column. Divisional Troops:—21st Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry, Mountain Division No. 8 Battery Royal Garrison Artillery, 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery, 28th Mountain Battery, No. 6 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, No. 1 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, 34th Sikh Pioneers, No. 103 Native Field Hospital. Reserve Brigade to proceed to Peshawar. Orders have been issued for all movements, including

following reliefs:—No. 2 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, Roorkee to Peshawar; 33rd Punjabis, Jubbulpore to Nowshera; No. 5 Company 1st Prince of Wales' Own Sappers and Miners, Roorkee to Rawalpindi.

No. 21.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 24th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram, dated 24th April, has been received from General Willcocks, at Shankargarh, reporting that to-day two columns comprising all available troops simultaneously attacked enemy's position to west of Matta and Shabkadr. Enemy driven from their sangars. Two casualties in Shabkadr column and about sixty casualties in Matta column.

No. 22.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. Following telegram from General Willcocks, 24th April, from Shankargarh:—"Two columns, consisting of all available troops on this border, to-day reconnoitred and searched out enemy's lashkars on foothills two miles west of Shabkadr. Column under Colonel Unwin, 21st Cavalry, one squadron 21st Cavalry, 18th Battery Royal Field Artillery, two guns 22nd Derajat Mountain Battery, 100 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks, 400 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, and 150 28th Punjabis, moved up Gundab Valley as far as village of Shabaz Kor. Enemy's strength was ascertained and position of his sangars. Enemy mostly armed with Lee-Metfords and Martinis. Matta column under Brigadier-General Anderson. Column consisting of 300 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, and 200 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks, and 250 53rd Sikhs, and 220 57th Rifles, and 150 59th Rifles, and one squadron 19th Lancers, and one squadron 21st Cavalry, and four guns 80th Battery Royal Field Artillery, moved against enemy's sangared position to the north-west of Matta. Enemy offered determined resistance, but all his positions were gallantly carried by the troops. One sangar was taken by 57th Rifles with bayonet. 1st Battalion Royal Warwicks found enemy escaping through a gorge, and inflicted heavy loss on them with rifle fire. Enemy estimated at minimum of 4,000 men. General Anderson commanded with much dash, and has inflicted heavy blow on Mohmands. Following casualties in both columns, and in sniping into camp. Killed:—British rank and file, 2; native, 5. Wounded severely:—British officers, 4. British rank and file, 10; native, 18. Wounded slightly:—British rank and file, 7; native, 12. Authentic reports received show that enemy lost over 100 killed.

No. 23.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

A telegram, dated 25th April at Shankargarh, has been received from General Willcocks, reporting that no sign was found of enemy during reconnaissance made this morning beyond Hafizkor village up Gundab valley. Their positions to west of Matta have also been abandoned.

No. 24.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 26th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram received to-day from Willcocks at Shankargarh regarding Mohmands reports that since yesterday everything has been quiet. The condition of all the wounded is satisfactory. There has been no further cutting of wires or raiding.

No. 25.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram dated the 23rd April. Mohmands. It appears that, in order to prevent Mohmands and Afghans being taken in rear, *viâ* Nawagai, Shamozais, Salarzais, and Mamunds, had collected lashkar to attack and destroy Panjkora bridge. Lashkar has dispersed, Dir riverain Khans and their men having joined levy of reinforcements which had been despatched. Mullas have retired having failed as they hoped to cause rising of Dir and Swat.

No. 26.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram, dated 25th instant, from Political Agent, Khyber, reports continuance of crossing at Lalpura for Mohmand country of parties of 10 to 50 men with flags. General opinion is that lashkars cannot hold out long, and messages asking for more food are constantly received from Mohmand country. No success has so far attended efforts that are being made to get Afridis to rise. Khyber Zakka Khel are full of protestations of loyalty, and Loargai Shinwaris are staunch and reliable.

No. 27.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 26th instant, regarding Mohmands, as follows:—"Large number of men are arriving from Mohmand country with killed and wounded according to report of messenger who arrived from Hazarnao this morning. In fighting west of Matta, on Friday last, they own to having 240 casualties. Corpses of Maliks Lataman and Deh Bashi, of Khassadars at Dakka, have been brought to Hazarnao by Shakar of Hazarnao, Naib Kotwal of Jalalabad, who has arrived there wounded in the head, and also bringing corpse of his still more notorious brother, Ilm Sadbarhi of the Hazarnao Khassadars. Large number of friends, who have taken this excuse to leave lashkar, accompany each dead and wounded man brought to Ningrahar. Small belated parties are still going on towards Mohmand country, but the people of Ningrahar are much disheartened at these losses. An attempt to induce Zakka Khel to rise is being made by a mulla from Ningrahar who went, *viâ* Sassobi Pass, to Bazar Valley on the 24th April. Mulla Saiyid Akbar is reported to have sent messages to Sufi Sahib that he cannot persuade Afridis to rise, but that latter will not oppose lashkar, and many will probably join it, if, instead of attacking Landi Kotal, Sufi will bring his Sangu Khel lashkar to the lower Bara *viâ* the Bazar Valley.

No. 28.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram dated 27th instant received from General Willcocks regarding Mohmands:—"According to most recent information, Mir Sahib Jan Badshah of Islampur Kumar, the leading spirit in Matta fight, has crossed the Indarai pass into Kamali Halimzai limits, and Hazrat Sahib of Bhat Khak, with his lashkar, is still in Khwaizai limits. In addition to their Afghan adherents, each has still a considerable contingent of Mohmands. With exception of the

Tarakzai, a small following of Gholam Khan Isa Khel, and the elders of the Gundab Halimzai, there appears to be little doubt that Mohmands, as a whole, were implicated in recent engagements with our columns from Matta and Shabkadr. The Ambahar Utman Khel, under leadership of Mir Baz, and the Khoda Khel Baizai, under leadership of Mahasal, were the most prominent; Kunaris, a large contingent of Ningraharis, Khwaizai, men of Lalpura, and Khassadars, were included among their Afghan allies."

No. 29.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 27th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

We have instructed General Willcocks, after considering Mohmand situation in Council this morning, that an advance should be made with two brigades from Mohmand border, one on Pandiali and the other up the Gundab, to operate in Kamali Ambahar, if jirga does not arrive at once and submit. Offensive measures are considered necessary both by General Willcocks and by Chief Commissioner. Enemy are not yet dispersed though apparently disheartened.

No. 30.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 28th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 27th April. You have, I presume, considered carefully how far it is advisable to order what practically is a new expedition into hill country, distant from our border. Might not case possibly be met by blockade and, if necessary, stopping allowances?

No. 31.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 28th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

According to news from Bajaur, other Mullas are greatly depressed by action of Sarkanri Mian Mulla, Kunar, who has returned to Afghan territory, in consequence of receiving letter from Amir that this is not holy war now.

No. 32.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 28th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following report, dated 27th instant, received from Political Agent, Khyber, regarding Mohmands:—"Confirmation received of report that enemy's losses in fighting of 24th April were very heavy. No more volunteers are expected to be going in direction of Mohmand country, whence a steady stream of men has been returning for the last two days. Good work is being done, so far with success, by Afridi maliks and elders to counteract efforts of Afghan sheikhs and mullas in Tirah. It is reported that at Girdi, four miles from Dakka, there was a large gathering of between 2,000 and 3,000 last night, but as regards its composition or intentions there is no accurate information. Bhar lashkar of Loargai Shinwaris, some 1,000 strong, of whom about 600 possess rifles, has offered its services."

No. 33.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of 28th April. Blockade is impracticable owing to interposition of friendly tribes between our border and those implicated. I am most anxious to avoid expedition, but it is necessary to enforce some punishment. I will instruct General Willcocks to do all he can to arrive at reasonable terms when jirga assembles, which will not be for some days. We may be obliged to advance if negotiations fail, but it will only be with intention of returning at once after inflicting punishment.

No. 34.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram dated 28th instant received from Political Agent, Khyber:—"Excitement in Ningrahar is dying and situation is improving. No fresh parties reported going to Mohmands, and all day yesterday boat-loads of men crossed from Lalpura on their return from Mohmand country. Gathering at Girdi has now dispersed; it consisted mainly of men returned from war. Sangu Khels are reported to be dispersing to their homes, and Sufi Sahib to be sick at Drabgai. It is stated that Hazrat Sahib, with about 400 men, has withdrawn to Ucha and Jawan in the Bohai Dag. In order that he may be able to make a demonstration on Friday next on the Shabkadr line, he is sending to Ningrahar for reinforcements, and mullas are proceeding from one village to another calling upon people to join Hazrat Sahib; people, however, return to their homes after going a few miles. It is not believed that those who have returned from Mohmand country will go back to Hazrat, though they have promised him to do so. From Bara, Bazar, and Tirah all reported quiet."

No. 35.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 29th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram received from General Willcocks at Shankargarh, dated 28th April, reports all wounded are doing well. Everything is quiet on the border. None of our camps have been fired at.

No. 36.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Malakand, telegraphed 28th instant, as follows:—"Malik of Kotkai reports that attack upon either Panjkora or Dargai is intended by Ambahar and Laman Utman Khels. As same report has reached Panjkora, I have informed Officer Commanding Malakand Force, but I am doubtful of truth of the report."

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 29th instant, as follows:—"My previous telegram, as to discouragement of people and disinclination for further fighting, is confirmed by numerous reports from Ningrahar. Boat bridge at Lalpura has been dismantled, Kabul River being in flood. The Mian Sahib of Tsappar, near Gandamak, has arrived and is halted at Peshbolak, at the head of a large lashkar of Khugianis. This lashkar is the only one now assembled in

Ningrahar; it is 4,000 strong according to report, but this is probably an exaggeration. Its leaders are at Drabgai with Sufi Sahib. All is reported quiet by Afridi elders and maliks in Tirah, who continue to oppose efforts of Afghan Mullas successfully. Adverting to my telegram, dated 26th April, Afridis have given most discouraging replies to Mulla, who is sounding them on the subject. Several Zakka Khel elders, from Bazar, have been here to say that Zakka Khels have replied to Mullas that they object to and will oppose passage of any lashkar through their country; and Malik Yar Muhammad Khan has sent his son to say that he will oppose any Afghan lashkar approaching Chura.

No. 37.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 30th April, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

I repeat, for information, the following telegrams regarding Mohmands.

(1.) General Willcocks telegraphed last night, 29th April, as follows:—"Mullas' activity in Mohmand country still continues. On night of 28th instant, Hazrat Sahib was at Koda Khel, whither he has now moved, up Bohai Dag. Hazrat is announcing that he will attack us at Kharappa, and that Sufi Sahib, with a Shinwari lashkar, is on his way to join him, and has reached Lalpura. Hazrat's movements, however, it may be noticed, are bringing him by degrees nearer home. Have received information of collection in Alikandi Pass of miscellaneous lashkar, consisting of about 300 Mohmands."

(2.) Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed, also on night of 29th instant, as follows:—"Khugiani lashkar is reported to be 6,000 strong, by a messenger who has just returned from Peshbolak. In addition to above, lashkar was joined at night by following parties of Shinwaris of Safed Koh:—500 Adal and Marjan Khel, 500 Pekhawal, and 700 Sangu Khel."

No. 38.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphed, 30th April, from Shankargarh, as follows:—"While nothing definite is known, so far, regarding attitude of other tribes, it seems probable that subsidised tribes will attend jirga on 4th May. Ambahar Utman Khels and Burhan Khels have sent in replies; the latter say that summons to Shabkadr will be obeyed by them. Ambahar do not definitely state that they will come; they say that any settlement Mohmands may make with General Commanding will be followed by them, and that, for the rest, they are Mussulmans. After visit to Khuda Khels, Hazrat Sahib has returned to Khwaizai. Much anxiety to keep this mischief-maker with them is still evinced generally by Baizai and Khwaizai, who say that they will raise another lashkar if Sufi Sahib comes. Reports of gatherings in Alikandi Pass and Gundab are negatived by latest information. Firing was again opened last night on Border Military Police, at Abazai boat bridge, over Kabul River."

No. 39.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

In spite of efforts of local mullas, acting under advice of Hazrat and Sufi Sahibs, all leading Bajaur Khans remain loyal, according to telegram from Political Agent, Malakand, dated afternoon of 30th ultimo. Loyal attitude also maintained by Dir and Swat.

No. 40.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 1st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 1st May as follows:—"At Mian Killi, one of the Peshbolak villages, public prayers were yesterday held by Sufi Sahib. After prayers he was mobbed by members of his lashkar, who are growing discontented; they demanded that either they should be dismissed to their homes or else led against enemy. Villagers give as little food as possible to lashkar, which is billetted on villages round Peshbolak. A consultation was held with leaders, at which Sufi explained difficulties of the situation to the latter, saying that he could not go to Bara, as Afridis, on whose co-operation he had confidently counted, had refused to join him, and that an attack by him on their brethren in the Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal might be resented by Afridis. He further said that, with Landi Kotal strongly garrisoned on one flank and Afridis unfriendly on the other, it would be dangerous to advance towards Peshawar through Bazar Valley. Messenger says that, although supplies are steadily coming in, numbers rise in proportion, so that lashkar will be forced to advance or disperse at once; no decision had, however, been arrived at when messenger left. Ningraharis have been telling lashkar that Landi Kotal is impregnable and very strongly held, whereas members of lashkar, who are mostly from distance, at first believed what mullas had been telling them, viz., that Landi Kotal was very weakly held. All is reported quiet at Tirah by a Zakka Khel Malik of Upper Bara, who has just arrived. Latter states that Mulla Saiyid Akbar has not succeeded in getting even a dozen men, though he has made great efforts to raise a lashkar."

No. 41.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Situation in the Khyber has now become most serious and disquieting. Movement has been made, in two bodies, by the Afghan lashkar, which is variously estimated at from 13,000 to 20,000; it is expected that Landi Kotal will be attacked this evening by the former and better-armed body, or its advance guard, which has passed Landi Khana. It it expected that Chura fort, belonging to Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, who helped us in Zakka expedition, and also Ali Masjid, will be attacked to-night by latter body, which is moving through Bazar Valley. With a view to rendering assistance, troops have been despatched to Jamrud. Position that has now developed, with this invasion of British territory and threatened attack upon a British fort by Afghans, has been considered by us in Council. While we cannot conceal from His Majesty's Government extreme gravity of the situation, we have decided for the present to await events and remain strictly on the defensive. As the replies about the jirga are not satisfactory and Mullas are still active, an immediate advance on the Mohmand side is strongly urged by both General Willcocks and the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. We have decided, however, though not insensible to these considerations, that, at any rate, until the situation is clearer, no advance shall be made on Mohmand side. More reassuring news is sent by Political Agent, Malakand, who says that bravery of Government troops is admitted by Mohmands and other tribes, and that excellent military arrangements have astonished and discouraged them. We are telegraphing to General Officer Commanding as follows:—"Government of India have decided on broad grounds of policy, while fully recognising weight due to arguments of yourself and Chief Commissioner, that no advance should at present be made. As regards terms, Government of India are unable, for the same reason, to come to a decision at present. Authority is therefore given to you to open proceedings by calling for an explanation of their conduct from those who attend, saying that what they may have to say in their defence will be considered by you; but you are not to announce any terms to jirga. Until authorised by the Government of India to do so, you will make no definite communication to them. You should lose no opportunity of bringing influence to bear on others to attend the jirga."

No. 42.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Composition of force against Mohmands, as follows:—Commanding, Major-General Willcocks, with full political control, and Major Blakeway as Political Officer.

General Commanding First Brigade, Brigadier-General Anderson, with following troops:—1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 53rd Sikhs, 57th Rifles, 59th Rifles.

General Commanding Second Brigade, Major-General Barrett, with following troops:—1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, Corps of Guides Infantry, 28th Punjabis, 55th Rifles.

Divisional troops, 21st Cavalry, No. 8. Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery, 28th Mountain Battery, No. 1 and No. 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners, 34th Pioneers.

Third brigade in reserve.

Commanding, Major-General Ramsay, with following troops:—1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, 21st Punjabis, 22nd Punjabis, 40th Pathans.

We have arranged, also, to keep Khyber and Malakand movable column complete. We have also moved the following troops in the hills to stations on the line of rail:—Firstly, a brigade, consisting of 1st Battalion 1st Gurkhas, 2nd Battalion 1st Gurkhas, and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkhas, 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas, to Jullundur, Nowshera, and Ferozepore. Secondly, 21st Kohat Mountain Battery, 1st Battalion 5th Gurkhas, 2nd Battalion 5th Gurkhas, and 1st Battalion 6th Gurkhas, to Hasan Abdul; also the 1st Battalion Connaught Rangers, from Dagshai to Rawalpindi.

No. 43.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphs 2nd May, as follows:—

(1.) "Villages of Khargali and Bagh have been occupied by lashkar which appears to be some 6,000 strong, and can be plainly seen due west of this fort about 4,000 yards off. No serious attempt to attack has been made by lashkar, though it has exchanged shots with our post at Michni Kandao. Enemy are being forced to take southern route, which will bring them against our strongest side, by Loargai Shinwaris, who are holding hills to the north of Landi Khana, and are behaving very well. Mulla had promised men of lashkar that, as soon as they appeared at Landi Kotal, all Khyber rifles would desert, and all the Afridis would join lashkar; men are, however, disheartened, and appear anything but enterprising now that they see no signs of fulfilment of these promises. Messages have been sent by Sufi Sahib, who is in Bazar Valley, and who has promised to send an Afridi lashkar to help lashkar here, summoning whole Afridi jirga to meet him in Bazar Valley. I have received a message from the leaders of Afghan jirga that, if we will give up fort and pay a nagha of Rs. 60,000, they will let us go in safety, as they do not want any unpleasantness. Lashkars are entirely composed of pure Afghans, and contain no tribesmen. I have written to Sarhang of Dakka not to send any more caravans at present, as caravan might be used as stalking horse by enemy. I request that orders to stop caravans may be given in Jamrud and Peshawar."

(2.) Same date. Later:—"Report from Tirah, by Malik Shah Mard Khan, states that Mulla was unsuccessful in attempt, made on receipt of Sufi's letters, to collect Afridi jirga. No Zakka Khels have joined Sufi, whose lashkar, about 6,000 strong, was seen at Khwar, in Bazar Valley, at noon to-day, by Malik's messenger."

(3.) On morning of 3rd May:—"There was strong attack all night on Michni Kandao. No serious attack here, though heavy firing took place at intervals throughout night. All well."

No further news of Mohmands. On Malakand side things are quiet.

No. 44.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 3rd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires from Landi Kotal, 2.40 p.m. to-day:—"Arrived here 2 p.m. with one squadron of cavalry. Ramsay's Indian Brigade with four field guns will be here in one hour. Ali Masjid is held by one battalion and two mountain guns. General Barrett, with 2½ battalions of infantry, two guns 18th Battery Royal Field Artillery, and 23rd Mountain Battery, should reach Ali Masjid to-day. Enemy are firing few shots from hills west of Landi Kotal."

No. 45.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram to following effect, dated Shankargarh, afternoon 3rd instant, received from Chief Political Officer, Mohmand Field Force:—"Gundab Halimzai are present as usual. No jirgas are reported on their way other than those of Pandiali Mohmands, viz., Burhan Khel and Isa Khel, which have arrived to-day. Date originally fixed for jirga was to-morrow. Instructions in your telegram* will now be carried in effect, and, by using members of jirgas now present as intermediaries, it is hoped that attendance of others may eventually be secured in spite of hostile influence of Mullas."

No. 46.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, telegraphed 3rd May as follows:—"Most of Zakka Khel having gone to Maidan to sow maize, there are now very few of them in Bazar Valley. A jirga with Sufi was held yesterday evening by those in Bazar Valley; they told him that unless all Afridis agreed to join him they could not do so and would oppose his advance, as they had just made peace with Government for five years and other Afridis had stood surety for them. Messengers begging them to come to him in Bazar Valley have been sent by Sufi to Mullas and elders of Afridis; he apparently fears to advance."

No. 47.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following telegram, dated 3rd instant, from Political Agent, Khyber:—"Repeated and determined efforts were made last night by enemy to take Michni Kandao blockhouse, upon which their main attack was concentrated. From 3 p.m. yesterday to 8 a.m. to-day heavy firing continued Every attack was driven off and loss inflicted on enemy by Subadar Tor Khan, Khyber Rifles Landi Kotal was fired upon at 10 p.m. from north and south, and firing was repeated at short intervals until daylight this morning from all points of the compass. Repeated efforts to take and burn caravanserai were made by enemy, but heavy fire from the block-house drove them off on each occasion. Shinwaris of Khargali report that they know 17 wounded and three killed among enemy, who have now withdrawn to Khargali and to hills on Afghan border to west. Men who took letter to Sarhang

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* *See* telegram from Viceroy, dated 2nd May, 1908 (No. 41).

yesterday met some being carried to Dakka last night, so that their casualties probably exceed above figures. One casualty on our side. Except that a chaukidar's hut at the head of waterworks near Khargali is reported to have been burnt by them, enemy have done us no harm. Parties of them can now be seen retiring to Darband over ranges. Orders are reported to have been sent to lashkar here by Sufi Sahib that, as he wished to attack from south and thus make it appear not a deliberate attack from Afghanistan but an Afridi rising, lashkar should on no account attack the Afghan side; but that orders were disobeyed, lashkar having got out of hand. All attempts of enemy to occupy hills commanding Landi Kotal from the north-west were repelled by the Loargai Shinwaris lashkar, which was engaged at intervals during the night. No Afridis have joined Sufi according to report of Zakka Khel elders who have come to offer their services."

No. 48.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

The present situation in the Khyber is as follows:—At Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid, in support of the Khyber Rifles, are all the 3rd Brigade and half the 2nd Brigade Mohmand Field Force, together with 54th Sikhs, 31st Punjabis, two mountain batteries, six guns, and one squadron of cavalry. An attack was made this morning on lashkar which had entered British territory under Sufi Sahib, and which was not more than 4,000 yards from fort at Landi Kotal, and had been firing three days into fort. Our force consisted of three battalions with two batteries. Enemy fled over border into Afghan territory, where they could not be followed.

No. 49.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 4th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires from Landi Kotal, 4th May, attacked to-day Sufi Sahib's lashkar, and drove it across Afghan boundary, being careful to keep himself well within our own boundary. Enemy's force, estimated not more than 1,000, had occupied villages of Bagh and Khargali about 4,000 yards directly west of Landi Kotal. Enemy, who did not appear to be well armed, were easily driven from their sangars and friendly Shinwari villages, which they have forcibly acquired possession of. They exposed themselves frequently in the open and must have suffered from our shrapnel and rifle fire. Mulla leading them escaped on horseback early in day. Owing to continuous thunderstorms and heavy rain our troops had hard day. We attacked in two columns, viz., Ramsay's, with 28th Mountain Battery, 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, 40th Pathans, two companies 21st Punjabis on left, 80th Battery Royal Field Artillery, in a position on Landi Kotal, Dakka road. Roos-Keppel, with 50 dismounted 19th Lancers, two companies 21st Punjabis, 500 Khyber Rifles on right. Following casualties occurred:—Lieutenant G. D. Campbell, 40th Pathans, gunshot wound in thigh, slight; 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, No. 6938, Private Edward Lynch, gunshot wound in shoulder, severe. Khyber Rifles, one sepoy wounded slightly. 3rd May, one bugler, 21st Punjabis accidentally killed.

No. 50.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Gundab Halimzai and Pandiali jirgas were interviewed on 3rd May by Political Officer, Mohmand border, who told them that no communication could be made to them, as they were not a representative jirga of Mohmand and other tribes,

and as General Willcocks was absent. Political Officer agreed to proposal made by them that they should go to other sections in jirga and persuade them to obey the summons; he told them at the same time that information of the result of their mission must be sent in by night of 8th instant. They have been given clearly to understand that, if information as to the jirga's intentions is not sent by the 8th May, or if the jirga fails to arrive by the 10th instant, Government reserves the right to act as may seem fit.

No. 51.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

News received from the Political Agent, Malakand, yesterday, is summarised as follows:—An endeavour to raise a hostile lashkar in Upper Swat is being made by Sartor fakir; it is, however, opposed by Maliks. Loyal messages have been sent by Nekpi Khels, and Khan Khels of Thana refuse to listen to Mulla. It is at present their desire, as well as that of Khan of Dir and Dir chiefs, to employ their own tribal lashkar to deal with any trouble. A message sent to them by Viceroy expressing high satisfaction at their loyal conduct has greatly encouraged all of them. Refusal to join Afghan Mullas, on the ground that it is against the will of the people, has been repeated by Palam Ba of Dir.

No. 52.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 5th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires 5th May from Landi Kotal, 1.30 p.m. "All quiet here, Lashkar has disappeared over Afghan boundary. Authentic reports state they had about 60 casualties yesterday, including three mullas killed by a shell."

No. 53.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 6th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram dated 5th instant from Chief Political Officer, Mohmand border, reports departure, post haste, on afternoon of 4th instant, of Pandiali and Halimzai jirgas for the purpose of visiting other sections; he feels confident that utmost endeavour to bring in absentees will be made by them. Except for a few Sheikhs, Mir Sahib and Hazrat Sahib are now without a following. Mir Sahib has returned from Chamarkand near Nawagai to Sufi limits, and Hazrat Sahib has left Khwaizai limits with the intention of going to Ningrahar. Telegram dated the same evening, from Political Agent, reported that at Panjkora bridge all was quiet, and that a relative had been sent by Sartor Fakir to state that he does not intend to rise against Government, though he had received many letters from Afghan Mullas urging him to do so, unless tribes of Swat and Upper Swat are ready to join him.

No. 54.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 6th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Political Agent, Khyber, has reported following news:—On the 4th instant Sufi Sahib was still at China, his lashkar in Bazar being scattered about in adjacent villages and reduced to some 1,000 men. Great efforts were made by him to induce the Zakka Khel and other Afridis to join him. All respect for Sufi Sahib vanished upon arrival of a messenger with report of the annihilation of his Landi Kotal lashkar while Sufi was holding a jirga; he accordingly returned to Afghanistan with his following at nightfall. No members of either lashkar remained in Khyber Agency on the 5th May. Return of Sufi Sahib and his lashkar either to Bazar or to Landi Kotal is considered improbable by Political Agent.

No. 55.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Major H. Coape-Smith, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers, Commandant, 50th Camel Corps, killed at Ali Masjid on 6th May in attempt to recover transport animals carried off by raiders.

No. 56.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. General Willcocks telegraphs from Landi Kotal, 6th May, orders have been issued for the return to Peshawar to-morrow of troops in Khyber with the exception of two guns, 28th Mountain Battery, which will be left at Landi Kotal, and 54th Sikhs at Jamrud.

No. 57.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram dated 6th May from the Chief Political Officer, Mohmand Border, reported that a general jirga to discuss question of attendance at Shankargarh was to be collected in Halimzai limits on May 6th or 7th, at which all Mohmand Sufis and Utman Khel were to attend. Hazrat Sahib has gone to Chaknawar on Kabul River, having abandoned all hope of again rousing fanatic Mohmands. According to a credible report the Amir has recalled Mir Sahib Jan Badshah, who has also returned to Kunar. Corroboration of this news is provided by information sent by Bajaur Khans to Political Agent, Malakand, to the effect that principal Afghan Mullahs have received urgent orders to return immediately to Afghanistan. Telegram dated the evening of 6th May, from Political Agent, Khyber, reports that it is generally believed that, even if he wished to do so, Sufi could not reassemble his lashkar, which has dispersed in all directions. Political Agent adds that excitement appears, generally speaking, to be subsiding in Ningrahar.

No. 58.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 7th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Anderson wires 7th May from Shankargarh all reported quiet this morning on border from Abazai to Michni.

No. 59.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 8th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires on 8th May from Peshawar:—"Arrived yesterday. Ramsay's Brigade reached Ali Masjid yesterday and arrives Peshawar to-morrow, 9th May. General Barrett with Seaforths, Guides, and 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery, arrived Peshawar this morning. 54th Sikhs remain in garrison at Jamrud, and two guns 28th Mountain Battery are at Landi Kotal."

No. 60.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Telegram dated the night of 7th May from the Political Agent, Khyber, states that things continue to quiet down in Ningrahar. Arrival of Hazrat Sahib at Kama is reported. It is generally believed that Mullas are being recalled, though purport of communications is not known for certain. On the Shabkadr and Mohmand side there are no further developments.

No. 61.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 9th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Report from Political Agent, Malakand, dated last night, states that tribesmen begged Hazrat Mulla, who was returning, under the Amir's orders, to Afghanistan, to remain until settlement is arrived at, and at their request he has remained at Khwaizai, Mohmand country. News that all Afghan subjects who had crossed frontier had been recalled by the Amir is confirmed by reports from Asmar.

Telegram dated evening of 8th May, from Chief Political Officer, Mohmand Border, reports refusal to obey our summons to jirga on the part of Khwaizai and Baizai, who have sent a letter saying that "bygones are bygones" must be the basis of any peace we may wish to make with them. Attendance has also been declined by Utmanzai Dawizai Sufi and Ambahar Utman Khel. Pandiali Mohmands say they will come in whenever required, but only Kamali and Gandab Halimzai are present at Shankargarh.

No. 62.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 10th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Mohmands. You are aware that two periods were given to them, in which to assemble in jirga summoned to meet Sir J. Willcocks on our frontier, in hope that a punitive expedition into the Mohmand country might thus be avoided. Yesterday

was the date on which the time allowed expired, and I am very sorry to say that news reached us this morning of refusal of Mohmand Maliks to come in, and of the receipt of insulting replies from some of them. The prompt restoration of order on this part of the frontier being imperatively necessary, I have, pending your approval, to-day authorised the Commander-in-Chief to send troops into Mohmand limits. Major Godfrey has consulted friendly tribes, who agree that the expedition is necessary. Spirit of your instructions in regard to Zakka Khel will be strictly followed. The force would consist of two brigades and one in reserve, and should advance immediately. Your early sanction is very anxiously awaited.

No. 63.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 10th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Your telegram of to-day's date. Your directions to Commander-in-Chief as to Mohmand expedition, to be carried through on the lines of the Zakka policy, have my entire approval.

No. 64.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 10th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

There is no change in the position. Swat is steady and Ningrahar quiet. The Upper Mohmands say they will fight. Sartor Fakir, according to report, has reached territory of Azzi Khel, but his arrival there is not acceptable to Dabuzis.

No. 65.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 11th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following further telegram, dated 4th May, from the Political Agent, Malakand, is repeated for information in continuation of my telegram dated 5th instant:—"The Khan of Dir and the chief of the tribes are all at the Panjkora bridge; the message of the Viceroy has been communicated to them. They all assembled immediately with the native officers of Dir levies, and made unanimous request that an assurance of their loyalty to the British Government should be conveyed to Lord Minto, to which they added statement that threefold strength and determination to keep any disloyalty to the Government of India in check has been given to them by the Viceroy's kind notice. Khans of Swat were much gratified by the Viceroy's message, of which I went to Chakdara to tell them."

No. 66.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 12th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

According to telegram dated the night of 11th May, from Political Agent, Khyber, all was quiet in Ningrahar, and no sign of anyone going to join Mohmands. After visiting Governor of Jalalabad, Hazrat and Sufi Sahib have returned to Charbagh and Drabgai. According to telegram from Political Agent, Malakand, an attempt to incite tribesmen to ghaza is being made by Sartor Fakir, who is at Manglaor. Ranizais, in Major Godfrey's opinion, can and will hold their own

against him, and so far he has not met with much success. A warning to be in readiness to attack Drosh is reported by the Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, to have been sent to Padshah of Kunar, a disciple of the late Hadda Mulla, who had incited the people of Asmar and Kafiristan to join the Mohmand lashkar. In view of Mulla's want of success in Kafiristan and elsewhere, Assistant Political Agent thinks that the chance of aggression by Padshah is remote. The necessary precautions have, however, been taken.

No. 67.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 12th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

The advance into the Mohmand country will begin to-morrow. All posts on the Mohmand border are now held by the 3rd Brigade, whilst the 1st and 2nd Brigades are concentrated at the mouth of Gundab Nullah.

No. 68.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks has been instructed as follows:—"Instructions as to objective of expedition against the Mohmand tribes have already been received by you. The policy of Government is the same as that announced in the case of the expedition against the Zakka. Punishment and the reduction of the Mohmands to submission as soon as possible are the objects of the expedition. The absence of all desire or intention on the part of the Government to annex Mohmand territory or to interfere with the *status quo* in respect of the general relations between Government and the Mohmands should be made widely known by you. In bringing offending sections to submission you will lose no opportunity of securing assistance of other sections. You should treat with indulgence sections who have shown a disposition to submit. No terms should be announced by you to any section without previous reference to Government of India. Complications with tribes or sections of tribes who may be settled on Afghan side of the Durand line must be avoided."

No. 69.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 13th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 2nd May. Composition of force. Owing to sporadic cholera following changes have been made: First Brigade, 22nd Punjabis replace 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; Second Brigade, 54th Sikhs replace Queen's Own Corps of Guides; Third Reserve Brigade, 1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles replace 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers and 22nd Punjabis.. Queen's Own Corps of Guides have been added to divisional troops. First and Second Brigades as now constituted will advance into Mohmand country. Queen's Own Corps of Guides and one battalion from Third Reserve Brigade will hold lines of communication in advance of Shabkadr. Remaining three battalions of that Brigade will hold posts on Mohmand border and lines of communication back to Peshawar. 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles are being brought up from Hasan Abdal to complete the Malakand Moveable Column in place of 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles. When reported free from infection, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers return to Peshawar, and 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers go to Nowshera as a temporary measure.

No. 70.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 14th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 13th May. Following further changes have been made in composition of force:—Third brigade:—19th Punjabis replace 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, moved into camp on account of cholera. 21st Punjabis is regiment from third brigade holding lines of communication in advance of Shabkadr. The 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, who replaced 54th Sikhs at Jamrud (see my telegram of the 8th May), are being withdrawn to Peshawar. The composition of fourth brigade:—1st Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment and 1st Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles replace 1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment and 19th Punjabis.

No. 71.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 14th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs 13th May from Shankargarh:—"All quiet on Mohmand border. 26 fresh cases of cholera in 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers, and one in 40th Pathans. Nine deaths and 29 cases in 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers to date."

From Camp Dand, Gundab Valley, 13th May:—"First brigade and divisional troops arrived here to-day. Road has been improved for camel transport. Second brigade at Hafizkor. Flying column advances to-morrow without transport; remaining troops follow as far as Ghalanai. Second brigade will come to Dand. Heliographic communication may be difficult, but Officer Commanding Ghalanai will report.

No. 72.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 15th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Arrived Nahaki yesterday with two battalions, four guns, two squadrons. Kharappa and Nahaki Passes not held by enemy. Reconnaissance up the Khapak Pass fired on. Remainder of First Brigade and Second Brigade arrive here to-day from Ghalanai.

No. 73.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 15th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks telegraphs from Nahaki, 15th May, 7 a.m.:—"Arrived here yesterday with part of Anderson's Brigade. No opposition experienced by main portion of column, but reconnaissance to Khapak Pass and patrol in this valley fired on; also some sniping here last night. No casualties. Health troops here excellent. Heat very great during day, but nights cool."

No. 74.

From Chief Staff Officer, Mohmand Field Force, to Secretary of State, dated 15th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Further reconnaissance of Khapak Pass carried out to-day, and found to be held in strength. Reconnaissance also carried up valley to N.E. Nahaki, where enemy was found in small numbers. 1st and 2nd brigades will be concentrated at Nahaki to-morrow. Casualties during day, three sowars, 21st Cavalry, slightly wounded.

No. 75.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 16th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General, lines of communication, telegraphs 16th May, 1908, from Shankargarh:—All reported quiet this morning from Michni to Abazai.

No. 76.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 17th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General, lines of communication, wires to-day:—"All reported quiet on Mohmand border from Michni to Abazai."

General Willcocks wires from Nahaki:—"Anderson reports determined attacks were made last night on his camp picquets at Darwazagai, during severe thunderstorm. Picquet of 22nd Punjabis had to be reinforced between 10 and 11 p.m. Enemy was beaten off about 2 a.m., leaving many dead bodies on hills round the picquets. Our casualties were:—22nd Punjabis, one native officer, seven rank and file killed, four men dangerously wounded, five men wounded severely, five men wounded slightly; 57th Rifles, one man wounded slightly; 59th Rifles, one native officer killed, one native officer wounded slightly; total, two native officers and seven native ranks killed, one native officer and 23 native ranks wounded."

No. 77.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 17th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Determined attacks were made last night on picquets of Darwazagai camp during a severe thunderstorm, picquet 22nd Punjabis being so hard pressed that it was necessary to reinforce it. Enemy beaten off at 2 a.m., leaving many dead bodies on hills round picquet. Our casualties during 17th, and night 16th-17th, including those reported in my telegram of yesterday, were:—22nd Punjabis, one native officer and seven sepoys killed, four sepoys dangerously, five sepoys severely, and five slightly, wounded; 59th Rifles, one sepoy slightly wounded; 57th Rifles, one native officer killed, one native officer wounded, one sepoy dangerously, five sepoys severely, two sepoys slightly, wounded. Both Brigades were occupied to-day in destroying towers of villages of Kandahari Sufis and recalcitrant Halimzais. First Brigade destroyed 14 towers to north and north-west of Darwazagai, while Second Brigade destroyed those of Gum Batai, Lachi, and Khawaja Kin. Quantities stacked grain also destroyed. Brigade camps as yesterday.

No. 78.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 18th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Intelligence received from Political Agent, Khyber, 16th May. Following is summary:—Mohmands from Afghan territory, to number of 400, have gone to join those within our limits. They have not been joined by any Afridis. A farman from Kabul has been received by the Sarhang of Dakka. He has publicly announced that the Amir disapproves of his subjects joining the Mohmands. The Hakim of Lalpura has made similar announcement. Sarhang has had orders that various Afghan officials who took part in the first Mohmand outbreak and joined in the invasion of Khyber are to be sent by him to Kabul.

No. 79.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 18th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Officer Commanding lines of communication telegraphs from Shankargarh, 18th May:—"All reported quiet this morning on Mohmand border from Michni to Abazai."

No. 80.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 18th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

First Brigade after punishing most southernly of the Kandahari Sufis has returned to Nahaki. Second Brigade has proceeded up the Bohai Dag to destroy Khan Beg Kor, which was latterly the headquarters of Hazrat Mulla. Casualty, one sepoy, 59th Rifles, slightly wounded.

No. 81.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires from Nahaki last night that First Brigade has returned to Nahaki from operations against Kandahari Sufis. Second Brigade has proceeded up the Bohai Dag Kor. Casualty, one sepoy, 59th Rifles, wounded slightly.

No. 82.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp of First Brigade was attacked last night at Nahaki by about 500 men, said to be Utmanzai and Darwazai lashkar. Enemy came on from three sides, advancing encouraged by shouts of Mulla and tom-toms playing. Attack was not pushed home, being checked by fire of picquets, though sniping continued during the night. Our troops were thoroughly well entrenched and covered in village, and casualties were very slight. One sepoy, 22nd, and one transport driver slightly wounded, and some horses and mules hit. Report just received from General Barrett that Second Brigade, *en route* to Khan Beg Khor, met with strong

opposition yesterday from Khwaizais, Baizais, and others, near Zarawar China, the hills on both sides of the valley being held. From these they were dislodged with heavy loss, the 58th taking the spurs on the north, and the 28th those on the south, with great dash. While 34th Pioneers were destroying towers of Zarawar China, one party was charged by 12 ghazis, who were all bayonetted after killing three and wounding two Pioneers. The village of Khan Beg Khor was reached and destroyed, the troops camping for night at a tank two miles east. Enemy's loss heavy, estimated at 60 killed. Five prisoners, with rifles, taken. Enemy were estimated at 2,000, and fought well. Our casualties were :—Lieutenant Ivens, 26th Punjabis, attached 54th Sikhs, dangerously wounded; Captain Finlay, 58th Rifles, attached 57th Rifles, and Lieutenant Sparling, 57th Rifles, both slightly wounded. 28th Punjabis :—1 sepoy killed; 1 sepoy dangerously, 1 sepoy severely, 2 slightly, wounded. 54th Sikhs :—1 sepoy severely, 1 slightly wounded. 57th Rifles :—1 sepoy killed; 2 severely, 1 slightly, wounded. 34th Pioneers :—3 sepoys killed; 2 severely wounded. 55th Rifles :—1 sepoy killed; 3 severely, 1 slightly, wounded. 23rd Mountain Battery :—1 sepoy slightly wounded. 21st Cavalry :—1 sowar slightly wounded. 28th Mule Corps :—1 mule driver slightly wounded. Total, 3 British officers wounded. Rank and file, 6 killed, 18 wounded. Second Brigade retiring to Nahaki to-morrow, and First Brigade moves north towards Lakari. Field Force Headquarters will accompany this Brigade.

No. 83.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 19*th May*, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

My telegram of the 14th May. 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, being free from cholera, have replaced 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment in Fourth Brigade.

No. 84.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 20*th May*, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Nahaki camp of First Brigade here was again attacked in force last night from 9 to 12. The enemy showed much daring and crept up to close quarters through the many ravines in vicinity of camp. Some were bayonetted on the breastworks. Though the firing was heavy and continuous, I am glad to be able to report that casualties were small. One sepoy, 22nd Punjabis, killed; one sowar, 21st Cavalry, wounded. Several transport animals were also killed and wounded. Second Brigade, yesterday, destroyed the towers of the village of Kung, and has, to-day, returned to Nahaki. First Brigade moved, to-day, to Umra Killi. May be out of touch for next four days, during which time General Barrett will communicate with you. Following casualties, Second Brigade, since night, 18th :—One man, 21st Cavalry, severely wounded; Seaforth Highlanders, No. 9546 Private John White, accidentally killed; 54th Sikhs, one man killed, two men dangerously wounded, and three men severely wounded; 54th Rifles, one man severely wounded.

No. 85.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 21*st May*, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

We yesterday found enemy holding village of Umra Killi, a deep and very intricate nullah behind, and hills beyond, in considerable strength. From these they were dislodged by First Brigade after stubborn resistance, during which their

leaders frequently led charges with swords. Enemy consequently lost very heavily, probably over 200, very many dead bodies being counted by our officers; but even then they closed in on the entrenchments as night fell and made several half-hearted attacks during night. Towards evening numbers could be seen leaving their main body, carrying dead and wounded. The lashkar was composed of Dawazai, Utman Khel, and Sufis. To-day I will destroy Utmanzai and Sufi villages and quantities of corn, which is stored all over valley.

Casualties:—

Killed.—Lieutenant Soole, 21st Cavalry, and Lieutenant Archibald, 82nd Punjabis, attached 57th Rifles. Slightly wounded.—Lieutenant Bruce, 53rd Sikhs.

Killed.—One native officer, 57th; one sepoy, 57th; one sepoy, 53rd. Wounded.—One gunner, No. 8 Mountain Battery, and one gunner 81st Heavy Battery, employed as signaller; one subadar, three sepoys, 53rd; six sepoys, 57th; two sepoys, 59th; two sowars, 21st Cavalry; three followers.

Total.—Two British officers killed, one wounded; native officers, one killed, one wounded; rank and file, two killed, 15 wounded. Several horses and mules killed and wounded.

55th Rifles and two guns, 28th Mountain Battery, join this column for present operations.

No. 86.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 22nd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Yesterday and to-day have destroyed towers and grain of Kandahari Sufi village between Nahaki and Lakarai, that section having refused the very moderate terms offered them. In consequence of punishment meted out to Kandahari sections the Zulbuz and Masand section of Sufi tribes have now come in and accepted terms. Enemy held very strong position on Lakarai Kotal in great strength, but, when we occupied pass, they put up a white flag and sent in jirga. Casualties: Captain O'Grady, 59th Rifles, gunshot through thigh, severe. All quiet at Nahaki.

No. 87.

From General Barrett, Commanding Second Brigade, Mohmand Field Force, to Secretary of State, dated 23rd May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

I reconnoitred to-day towards Shabai Pass, remaining out till 3 p.m. No guns heard from Willcocks' direction. But few enemy seen. My casualties nil. Health troops here remains good.

No. 88.

From General Barrett, Commanding Second Brigade, Mohmand Field Force, to Secretary of State, dated 24th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks heliographs to-day:—"We are now close to Kargha, in front of which about 2,000 Utman Khels had taken up a regular sangared position, but after shelling them they have cleared and now do not mean fighting. We reach Mulla Killai to-morrow." I reconnoitred to-day to within three miles of Mulla Killai. No opposition. Regret to report death of Major M. C. Maclachlan, Seaforth Highlanders, accidentally shot in camp to-day.

No. 89.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 25th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Report from General Willcocks states that terms were not accepted by Sufi jirga which came in on the 21st or 22nd instant. Upon resumption of punitive operations against them, payment of the whole Sufi fine was undertaken by Gurbaz Masaud Sufi. Sufi and Musa Khel Mitai jirgas made submission on the 23rd instant, the terms being the demolition of Bagh and of one village in Lakarai, and a fine of Rs. 4,500. As regards the settlement arrived at, Sir J. Willcocks, who says that negotiations were full of difficulties, commends the skill and great patience of the Political Officer, Major Blakeway.

No. 90.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 25th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Kargha, 24th May. First Brigade moved yesterday from Lakarai to Shato Khel with only slight opposition. Casualties: one sepoy 55th, and one 57th, wounded. To-day advanced to this place. Enemy held strongly entrenched position at entrance to Ambahar, about 2,000 strong from all Utman Khel sections, with men from Bagura and Nawagai. Their left flank was turned, and they were heavily punished, the cavalry pursuing and completing the rout. Enemy left over 100 killed on the field. Our casualties were slight; two native ranks killed, and nine wounded. Moving to-morrow to Mulla Killai, where troops will have a well-earned rest of two days, while I hope to clear up political situation. Heat intense, but health of troops good.

No. 91.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 27th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Mulla Killai, 26th May. Enemy's casualties on the Ambahar have now been ascertained as 140 killed, and large numbers wounded. Reached this place yesterday, with opposition, with First Brigade, and joined here this morning by portion of Second Brigade with convoy of supplies. First Brigade leaves for India, *viâ* Pandiali, on the 28th. I proceed, with Second Brigade, to settle certain questions with Baizai and Khwaizai, and hope to recross one border, *viâ* Gandao Valley, on 1st June. Heat very trying; wounded doing well, and health of troops good.

No. 92.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 27th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Camp Nahaki, 27th May. Marched to-day from Mulla Killai with portion Barrett's Brigade to bring further pressure on recalcitrant Utmanzai and Dawazai sections. Presence of our troops at Yakdand proved sufficient to bring both to terms, and since my arrival here the Khwaizai have also sent in jirga and submitted. There only remains now the Baizai section recalcitrant, and I am dealing with them to-morrow and following day. Hope all troops will have crossed border by 31st. Sick and wounded doing well, and general health good in spite of great heat and arduous marching.

No. 93.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 29th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Proceeded yesterday with Second Brigade from Nahaki to Khan Beg Kor. As only the Bazar section of Mohmands has refused to submit after being given every opportunity of doing so, and as they have taken part in many fights against us, I considered it necessary to punish them before leaving Mohmand country, and consequently visited their headquarters at Khuda Khel to-day, where I have destroyed all their towers and large quantity of grain and fodder. Second Brigade returns to Khan Beg Kor to-day, and to Galanai to-morrow, 30th. First Brigade proceeds to-day from Dag to Lagham. All troops will leave Mohmand country by 31st.

No. 94.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 30th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Following casualties occurred in fighting with Khuda Khel yesterday:—Lieutenant W. Young, 67th Punjabis, attached 54th Sikhs, gunshot wound, abdomen, dangerous. Havildar, 5 sepoys, 54th Sikhs, and 4 sepoys, Guides' Infantry, wounded. 2nd Brigade withdrawn over Khapak and Nahaki Passes respectively to Galanai in Gundab Valley without a shot being fired. 2nd Brigade moves to-morrow to Hafiz Kor. 1st Brigade to-day moves to Nafgal Khel and proceeds to Peshawar 31st instant.

No. 95.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 30th May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Regret to report death to-day from wound received in action of Lieutenant W. Young, 67th Punjabis, attached 54th Sikhs.

No. 96.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 31st May, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks wires from Hafiz Kor, 31 May, following casualties are reported during night 29th-30th and withdrawal picquets evening 30th May:—One private, 1st Seaforth Highlanders, 4 sepoys, wounded.

No. 97.

From Officer Commanding Mohmand Field Force to Secretary of State, dated 2nd June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Last troops Mohmand Field Force crossed border at 2 p.m. yesterday. No shots fired since leaving Khwaizai country.

No. 98.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Punitive measures having concluded, General Willcocks and staff returned to Peshawar 31st May. First Brigade re-crossed administrative border on 30th May, and Second Brigade on 31st May; lines of communication troops on 1st June. Demobilisation is now proceeding as rapidly as possible.

No. 99.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 2nd June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

General Willcocks has informed you from time to time of progress of military operations against Mohmands. In now reporting conclusion of operations I send following summary of results achieved. Punitive force reached hostile territory on 15th May last, and the punishment of sections commenced after Willcocks had announced there was no intention of annexation or interfering with maintenance of *status quo*. Mitai Musa Khel section of Baizai were first to submit, and were on 19th May ordered to pay fine of Rs. 2,000 and surrender 6 rifles. Sufis, whose towers had been destroyed on 17th May came in on 20th May, but refused to accede to demands. After further punishment they agreed to fine of Rs. 4,500. Pandialis on 22nd May accepted fine of Rs. 2,000 and 6 rifles. Kamali Halimzai submitted on 25th, but were to be exempted from fine as they had been severely punished by destruction of towers. Utmanzai and Dawazai agreed on 27th May to fine of Rs. 1,000 each, while Khwaizai submitted same day, but were not fined as they had suffered severely. Utman Khel received heavy punishment, losing 140 killed at Ambahar on 24th May, but were not further proceeded against. By 28th May all sections had submitted except Baizai of Bohai Dag and had either paid fines or furnished hostages for prompt payment. Announcement was made on 28th May that account with them was settled, that allowances outstanding would be forfeited but that payment would be resumed forthwith. This announcement has been received with satisfaction. Baizais whose attitude had been contemptuous throughout were duly chastised, and by 30th May entire force was well on way back. Combined jirga of assured tribes and Khwaizai met Willcocks at Galanai on same day and delivered request signed by Maliks that Government might be informed of their intention to refuse passage to Baizai raiders. Willcocks reports they harbour no ill will towards us and ascribe their misfortunes to Baizai. All fines were paid in by 31st May and hostages released. Entire force is now back in Peshawar district. We consider the result of expedition highly satisfactory, and that it reflects much credit on General Willcocks and his Chief Political Officer, Major Blakeway, who were working under great difficulties. We also consider that great credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Godfrey, Political Agent, Dir, Swat, &c., whose management of Bajaur, Dir, and Swat tribes during recent expedition contributed largely to localisation of the disturbances. We have already intimated our high opinion of the value of Colonel Roos-Keppel's services in keeping the Afridis quiet.

No. 100.

From Secretary of State to Viceroy dated 4th June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

His Majesty's Government share the satisfaction you express in your telegram of the 2nd instant at the result of the expedition against the Mohmands, and offer their congratulations to yourself and to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I request that General Willcocks and the other officers named may be informed of my entire concurrence in the tribute which you pay to their services.

No. 101.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated 16th June, 1908.

(Telegraphic.)

Frontier operations. Cost of Zakka Khel expedition. It is not yet possible to obtain final figures, as it will take time to determine the exact extent of replacements. But at present £57,000 is estimated cost. Mohmand and connected operations. Estimate is £150,000, but this is wholly provisional. Excess of cost over that for expedition against Zakka Khel is due to the precautionary movements made in view of prevention of possible developments, to the outbreak of cholera among the troops, and to the longer duration of operations. Provision for batta is also included in the estimate. The Gazette casualties are as follows:—(1.) Expedition against Zakka Khel. Native troops: one killed, two died of wounds, two died of disease, 25 wounded, none taken prisoner. British troops: two killed, one died from wounds, nine wounded, none taken prisoner. The enemy lost 70 killed and 130 wounded; no prisoners were taken. (2.) Kargha. No casualties among British troops. Native troops: two killed and nine wounded, none taken prisoner. The enemy lost 120 killed and 200 wounded. Five prisoners were taken and released, with the exception of two mullas and one man long wanted for crimes in the Peshawar district. The mullas will also shortly be released. (3.) Mohmand. British troops: eight killed, two died of wounds, 39 died of disease, 33 wounded, none taken prisoner. Native troops: 22 killed, four died of wounds, 12 died of disease, 142 wounded, none taken prisoner. The enemy lost a large number wounded, and between 300 and 400 killed; five prisoners were taken who have since been set at liberty.

PART IV.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

List of Raids and Outrages committed on the North-West Frontier from July, 1899, to July, 1906.

(Prepared in the Intelligence Branch Division of the Chief of the Staff Army Head-Quarters in India.)

(1.)—KHYBER AND PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDER.

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1899.			
28th September...	Gurkha picquet at Michni Kandao fired on. One man wounded.	Shinwaris (led by Shakar).	
September 1899 to February 1900.	Constant raids and counter-raids across the Afghan border.	Khusrogis of Bazar and Shinwaris of Ningrahar.	
1899.			
28th October ...	Murder of a man in Shinpokh	Shilmanis	Fine imposed.
2nd November ...	Two horses stolen from Peshawar, cavalry lines.	Shinwaris.	
15th November...	Eighty Commissariat goats raided at Landi Kotal.	Khusrogis	Goats recovered by Khyber Rifles.
17th November...	Attack on Khyber Rifle picquet at Michni Kandao.	„	Four Khusrogis killed; one wounded.
30th November...	Three Government bullocks stolen from Peshawar.	Shinwaris of Ningrahar.	
1st December ...	Two Hindus kidnapped in Peshawar District.	Khusrogis.	
2nd December ...	Convoy fired on in the Khyber	Khusrogis	Houses of leaders burnt.
1900.			
7th January ...	Cattle of the village of Achini, Peshawar District, raided.	Khusrogis and Shinwaris...	Booty recovered by pursuing party.
9th January ...	Sepoy of Khyber Rifles wounded at Jamrud.	Kuki Khel sepoy of Khyber Rifles.	
25th March ...	Murder of Mr. Gunter at Shabkadr ... Murder of Lieutenant Green, R.E. ...	Kuki Khel Afridi... ...	Executed.
15th April ...	Village of Phandu, Peshawar District, attacked.	Aka Khel.	
19th April ...	Sentry of Khyber Rifles murdered ...	Kuki Khel *hamsaya* ...	Fine of Rs. 1,500 and a rifle imposed.
Ditto ...	Telegraph wire cut between Peshawar and Hari Singh.	Khusrogis.	
1st May	Two Kuki Khels shot at Taikhal Bala ...	Villagers	Compensation paid.
7th August ...	Sepoy of Khyber Rifles murdered on Khyber road.	Unknown	Rs. 1,200 fine imposed on neighbouring villages.
3rd September ...	Attempted cattle theft in Kohat District	Zia-ud-dins	One man captured and tried. Sentence not stated.
20th October ...	Donkeys raided near Ilm Gudr	Kuki Khel.	
27th October ...	Donkeys raided near Chora	„	Leader imprisoned and released on giving security.
—	Several raids in Kohat District	Zia-ud-dins	Four months' allowances cut.
9th December ...	Naik of Khyber Rifles wounded near Jamrud.	Aka Khel.	
1901.			
6th January ...	Three Khyber Rifles' rifles stolen... ...	Unknown.	
January	Two mules stolen from Peshawar ...	Mullagoris	Rs. 200 fine. Mules recovered.
„	Ten camels stolen from Peshawar ...	„	Camels recovered.
February ...	Sheep raided in Kohat District	Zia-ud-dins	Fine of Rs. 50. Sheep recovered.
2nd March ...	Shinwari sheep raided	Hazarnao gang.	
16th „ ...	Bullock stolen from Peshawar	Khusrogis	Recovered.
4th April ...	Aka Khel cattle raided on Kajuri plain...	Kuki Khel.	
3rd May	Convoy fired at in the Khyber	Khusrogis	Offenders imprisoned.
28th „	4 rifles stolen from Khyber Rifles ...	Shinwaris, including 2 sepoys.	Sepoys sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
8th June ...	Six hundred sheep raided from Ningrahar	Sangu Khel refugees ...	Sheep restored.
June	Two horses stolen on Kohat road... ...	Paindai Zakka Khel ...	Horses restored. Fine of Rs. 250 paid.
2nd July... ...	Four men murdered close to Landi Kotal	Shinwaris	Rs. 1,000 fine imposed.
8th August ...	Sowar of Khyber Rifles murdered on Peshawar road.	Unknown.	
9th August ...	Hindu kidnapped on Kohat road ...	Aka and Zakka Khel.	
17th October ...	Mare stolen from Nowshera	Shinwaris	Mare recovered.
1st December ...	Trading party attacked near Hazarnao ...	Khusrogis.	
1st „ ...	Sheep raided in Shilman	Zakka Khel	Recovered.
3th „ ...	Two ponies stolen from Peshawar transport lines.	Ningraharis	Recovered by Khyber Rifles.
16th „ ...	Two Sepoys of Khyber Rifles fired at near Ali Musjid.	Kuki Khel	Fine of Rs. 75 imposed.
23rd „ ...	Sheep of village of Sangu raided... ...	Khusrogis	Houses of leaders burnt; fine imposed.

KHYBER AND PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDER—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1902.			
6th January ...	Two dakaities in Peshawar District ...	Aka Khel and others ...	Fine of Rs. 8,000 (Kabul) imposed.
January	Some shots fired near Khyber road ...	Pakhai Zakka Khel ...	Fine recovered by tribe.
February - March	Several raids and counter-raids	Shinwaris of Loargai and men of Dakka.	
17th March ...	Border Military Police sepoy shot near Ilm Gudr.	Unknown	Sepalis of Ibn Gudr fined Rs. 2,000.
4th May	Bania of Landi Kotal robbed	Afghan Khassadars.	
5th July... ...	Sangu Khel murdered in the Khyber ...	Zakka Khel sepoy of 20th Punjab Infantry.	Fine of Rs. 500.
14th „	Ningrahari traders robbed near Torkham	Zakka Khel...	Property recovered and thieves captured by Khyber Rifles.
August	Several raids on the Kajurai plain ...	Aka Khel.	
1903.			
20th February ...	Khyber Rifle picquet fired on	Khusrogis	House of leader burnt.
2nd May and following days.	Khyber Rifles at Smatzai fired on ...	Koda Khel Mohmands.	
26th May ...	Afghan post at Durbaba fired at	Anai Zakka Khel.	
July-August ...	Continuous unsuccessful attacks on the Shia Orakzai.	All Afridi and Sunni Orakzai sections.	
22nd August ...	Women of Landi Kotal carried off through Afghan territory.	Zakka Khel.	
14th November...	Malikdin Khel women seized close to Jamrud.	Kuki Khel	Women released by Political Agent.
1904.			
29th January ...	Telegraph wire in the Khyber cut ...	Unknown.	
4th March ...	Ditto ditto ...	„	
21st „ ...	Attempt to murder Colonel Finnis, R.E., at Peshawar Railway Station.	Aka Khel Afridi	Executed.
9th June ...	Policeman murdered and attempt to attack British soldiers.	Mulla of Kunar	„
15th „ ...	Cattle stolen from village of Mashu Khel, Peshawar District.	Shinwaris and Zakka Khel	Cattle re-captured by Malik Yar Muhamad.
3rd September ...	Raid on the village of Darshi Khel, Kohat District.	Zakka and Kambar Khel ...	Tribe forced to take action. Several ringleaders killed; others expelled.
7th October ...	Rafts on the river near Loi Shilman fired on.	Mohmands.	
2nd December ...	Attempt to murder the Sub-divisional Officer in charge of the Mullagori road.	Unknown.	
4th December ...	Raid on the village of Pabbi. One man killed and two wounded. Property valued Rs. 4,000 stolen.	Residents of District ...	Some local residents arrested and Rs. 350 worth of property recovered.
9th December ...	Peshawar Railway station entered and cash stolen from booking office.	Local bad characters.	
1905.			
10th January ...	Afridi outlaws fire on Khyber Rifles at Samghakal Pass and Karawal hill. One sepoy killed and one wounded.	Sipah Afridis	Two killed and two wounded.
1st February ...	Raid on Akhora Bazar. Two constables and two villagers wounded and one chaukidar killed.	Hazarnao gang	One raider killed, others believed to have been wounded.
February ...	Border Military Police post surprised at Banda Daud Shah, Teri, Kohat. Six rifles stolen.	Zakka Khel Afridis.	
28th February ...	Attack on the Matanni police post ...	Peshawaris, Afridis and the Hazarnao gang.	
8th March ...	Raid on the village of Sherdad Garhi ...	Kuki Khel and others ...	Sahibgul, Kuki Khel, arrested.
10th March ...	Raid on *dharmsala* in Peshawar City. Cash box said to contain Rs. 25,000 and large amount of property stolen.	Jafar, Torai and other Hazarnao outlaws with 12 Afridis.	Afridi *jirga* paid fine of Rs. 1,000, the Bawa and chaukidar imprisoned.
13th „ ...	Attempt to steal rifles from station cells at Kohat, two sepoys wounded.	Basti Khel Afridis... ...	Three captured and imprisoned. Basti Khels fined.
22nd April ...	Twelve women carried off from Landi Kotal. One wounded.	Khusrogis	Women returned on payment of ransom of Rs. 105 each.
24th April ...	Raid on Jamrud. No details	Hazarnao gang	Special references made to the Amir regarding the Hazarnao gang.
25th April ...	Attack on the tonga *chauki* at Matanni. Five ponies stolen.	„ „	„ „ „
26th April ...	Tonga pony station at Matanni raided ...	The Hazarnao gang, etc.	
9th May	Khassadar post at Smatzai attacked ...	Afghan Khassadars.	
9th June ...	Border Military Police, Kohat, fire on gang of outlaws; 1 captured.		
9th September ...	Murder on the Mullagori road	Mullagoris.	
September ...	Attack on grass-cutters at Matanni, one man killed, one rifle taken.	Zakka Khel Afridis.	

KHYBER AND PESHAWAR AND KOHAT BORDER—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1905—*cont.*			
20th September...	Villagers of Matanni robbed	Aka Khel and Sturi Khel.	
16th December ...	Lieutenant Mackie fired on near Jamrud	Mullagoris.	
22nd „ ...	Raid on village of Banamari	Zakka Khel and outlaws ...	One outlaw shot.
31st „ ...	Mullagori sepoy of Kohat Railway murdered near Jamrud.	Two Mullagori sepoys ...	Seven years' imprisonment inflicted.
January	Attack on the shop of a Hindu in Kohat District. Ram Singh, the owner, wounded.	Nine men led by a Zakka Khel.	
1906.			
3rd March ...	Kuchi sheep raided in Ningrahar ...	Sangu Khel refugees and Zakka Khel.	Settled through Malik Yar Muhammad.
21st March ...	Raid on village of Jogin. Theft of property valued at Rs. 15,700.	(1) Outlaws and others, resident in Afghanistan, and (2) Tarakzai Mohmands.	Amir informed regarding (1). Mohmands surrended 20 persons of whom 7 detained for trial.
9th April ...	Raid on village of Tangi	Zakka Khel, Mohmands, Utman Khel and others.	Utman Khel fined.
26th „ ...	Mullagori contractor murdered in Railway Camp.	Mullagori	Murderer sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000.
28th May ...	Attack on village of Shahab Khel ...	Zakka Khel.	

(2.)—KURRAM.

1899.			
29th November...	Raided a small flock of sheep belonging to Ghilzai *hamsayahs* living in Kurram.	Khoedad Khels, Khojal Khels.	
1900.			
3rd March ...	Cutting telegraph wire; two posts torn and 20 yards wire carried off.	Khani Khel Chamkannis.	
10th August ...	Shots fired at night into Sadda village ...	Massuzai.	
16th August ...	Sepoy of Kurram Militia shot	Kuki Khel, Afridis ...	Brother, and two other relatives, of murderer arrested, July 1901.
September ...	About 400 men raided village of Kharsin near Matun; two villagers killed and 300 cattle and 2,000 sheep and goats carried off.	Wazirs and Dauris.	
14th September	25 cattle carried off from Bonzala grazing-grounds.	Khoedad Khels.	
October	Small party carried off some cattle belonging to a Turi, near Darwazagai.	Jajis.	
October	Carried off seven flocks of sheep from some Ghilzai encampments near Matun.	Mohmit Khel, Wazirs.	
7th November ...	Large gang of raiders attacked some Ghilzais at Tor Obo in Khost; one killed on each side.	Wazirs.	
November ...	Raided Khadizai, in Khost; 60 cattle carried off.	Mohmit Khel, Wazirs.	
December ...	Stole three mules from main road in Kurrum.	Mastu Khel, Massuzai.	
8th December ...	Carried off flock of sheep from a Ghilzai encampment at Tor Obo, in Khost.	Hassan Khel, Wazirs.	
8th December ...	Carried off 80 sheep and eight donkeys from Sheikhan, in Khost.	Mohmit Khel, Wazirs.	
1901.			
February ...	Carried off 120 cattle and 100 sheep from Gurbaz, in Khost.	Mahsud Wazirs.	
22nd February ...	Party of 30 men cut telegraph wire near Sadda.	Mastu Khel, Massuzai.	
25th February ...	Carried off 600 head of cattle from some Ghilzais near Matun; one Ghilzai killed.	Wazirs.	

KURRAM—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1901—*cont.*			
3rd March ...	Ineffectual raid on Ghilzai flocks near Tor Obo, in Khost; two Ghilzais and three Wazirs killed.	Hassan Khel, Wazirs.	
7th March ...	Ineffectual raid on Hassan Khel, Wazir flocks; one Wazir killed.	Ghilzais.	
9th March ...	Party of Turis, carrying salt, attacked on road between Tutkai and Thal.	—	
March	Carried off 20 head of cattle from Khapianga, in Lower Kurram.	Hassan Khel, Wazirs.	
13th March ...	Ineffectual raid on Turi cattle near Darwazagai.	Jajis	Governor of Khost informed and requested to prevent recurrence.
25th March ...	Carried off Rs. 1,000 in cash from a Ghilzai *kafila* in Khost.	Hassan Khel, Wazirs.	
28th March ...	Strong gang completely looted Hindu caravan between Matun and Dawar; two Afghan sepoys, and one Hindu killed.	Wazirs.	
13th March ...	Carried off 100 sheep from Lakand, in Khost.	Madda Khel, Wazirs.	
28th March ...	Raided 20 head of Turi cattle from Darwazagai.	Jajis	Governor of Khost notified.
27th June ...	Raided 40 head of cattle from Paiwar villages.	Do.	
2nd July... ...	Raided nine bullocks and 14 sheep from Turi village of Kunj Alizai.	Muqbils.	
July	Attack on Ibrahimzai village; some villagers carried off.	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
16th August ...	Attacked party of Khostwal residents of Inzrai, in lower Kurrum; one Khostwal killed and remainder looted of all they had.	Mohmit Khel, Wazirs.	
7th October ...	Carried off 128 sheep from Baliamin ...	Jajis	Governor of Khost notified.
November ...	Raided 10 head of cattle and some sheep from Tanni villages in Khost.	Kabul Khel, Wazirs.	
1902.			
8th February ...	Cutting telegraph wire in Kurrum ...	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
13th March ...	Ditto ditto ...	Ditto.	
28th March ...	Raided 32 sheep from Turi village of Bugdi	Mangals	
19th April ...	Ineffectual raid on Turi cattle near Laka Tiga post.	Jajis.	
20th April ...	Large *lashkar* fired on labourers at work on Laka Tiga post.	Do.	Governor of Khost notified.
23rd April ...	Raided 23 head of cattle belonging to malik of Baliamin.	Do.	
3rd May	Ineffectual attempt to raid Turi cattle close to Kharlachi post.	Jajis.	
19th May ...	Gang of 80 men raided large number of cattle and sheep from Turi villages of Jalmai and Chasdiwan; most of animals recovered and 3 Jajis killed.	Jajis.	
July	Raided flock of sheep from Dargai, in Khost.	Mahmud Khel, Wazirs.	
8th August ...	Large gang attempted to raid cattle from Turi villages of Kharlachi and Shingak; 2 Turis, and 4 Muqbils, said to have been killed.	Muqbils	Governor of Khost notified.
August	Raided about 200 cattle from Khadizai, in Khost.	Wazirs.	
30th August ...	Raided into Kurram and carried off over Rs. 3,000 worth of property, killing one man.	Jajis, Muqbils.	
9th September ...	Raided 9 Turi bullocks	Jajis.	
September ...	Samana rifles patrol fire on raiders. One wounded and captured.	Khojal Khel Tori Khel.	
29th September...	Affair with Kurram Militia near Wali China.	Jajis.	
1903.			
January	Raided 20 camels from Ghilzais in Khost	Wazirs.	
3rd February ...	Large gang attempted to raid Ibrahimzai and Sadda villages; met Militia patrol from Sadda post on whom they fired; were finally driven off after engagement lasting 3 hours.	Mastu Khel, Massuzais.	
15th March ...	Attacked party of Ghilzais on road between Chapri and Thal and carried off 180 sheep.	Zaimukhts.	
March	Attacked a Ghilzai camp in Khost, killed the Ghilzais and carried off 4 rifles and 120 camels.	Mahmud Khel, Wazirs.	

KURRAM—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1903—*cont.*			
20th April ...	Carried off a Hindu woman from just outside Sadda village and kept her till Rs. 1,100 was paid as ransom.	Mastu Khel, Massuzais.	
4th August ...	Raided 80 sheep from Mulla Bagh in Kurram; 2 Turis seriously wounded.	Ningraharis	Naib-Hakim of Ningrahar informed.
September ...	Raided 300 cattle and sheep from Ningrahar.	Chamkannis.	
September ...	Raided a Shinwari village; killed and wounded several villagers and drove off some cattle.	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
25th September...	Raided 12 head of Turi cattle	Jajis.	
1904.			
11th February ...	Cut telegraph line between Ibrahimzai and Balish Khel.	Mastu Khel, Massuzais.	
8th March ...	Attempted to break into Sadda village; damaged parapet walls of new Sadda bridge.	Ditto.	
May	Carried off 4 Hindus, 1 Hindu woman, 1 mare, 9 donkeys laden with merchandise from main road near Chapri.	Mastu Khel, Masuzais ...	Four Hindus returned through efforts of *Jirga*.
7th September ...	Raided 15 donkeys from Turi woodcutters.	Muqbils.	
1st December ...	Raided 16 sheep from (Walai China) Turi village.	Jajis	Pursuit party caught 1 bullock belonging to Jajis.
8th December ...	Raid on cattle at Samir, one herdsman killed, one wounded.	Parachamkannis	*Vide* entry against 11th May 1905 below.
28th December ...	Deshera Dandar village raided. 40 donkeys looted.	Kurram outlaw and Jajis	Kurram outlaw reported to have been arrested by Governor of Khost, but not confirmed.
1905.			
January	Raided 40 Turi donkeys.	Jajis.	
18th January ...	Telegraph wire cut at Ibrahimzai. Attempted burglary of village-shots fired at Survey camp.	Parachamkannis	*Vide* entry against 11th May below.
16th March ...	Raid on Turi cattle at Shabak ...	Khattak outlaw and Khostwals.	Two raiders killed: subsequently 4 arrested by Governor of Khost.
22nd March ...	Mill burnt at Samir; five telegraph poles broken and telegraph wire carried off.	Chamkannis...	*Vide* entry to 11th May below.
20th March ...	Raided 7 Turi donkeys and two raids on Kandar Nasti Kot.	Muqbils	One raider killed.
21st March ...	Damaged bridge on main road, 2 miles from Parachinar, and cut telegraph line.	Chamkannis	*Vide* entry to 11th May below.
25th March ...	Raid on cattle at Chapri	Zaimukhts	Two raiders captured.
4th April ...	Travellers raided at Kaddam Sapper ...	Afghan sepoys.	
5th April ...	Damaged Sadda bridge	Perachamkannis	*Vide* entry to 11th May below.
6th April ...	Shakar Kot raided	Jajis.	
8th April ...	Maru Khel raided	Jajis.	
12th April ...	Raided 10 head of cattle from Ahmadi Shama, in Lower Kurram.	Saifali, Wazirs.	
16th April ...	Ibrahimzai village surprised. All firearms, 2 boys and 1 woman carried off.	Massozais	*Jirga* called on to restore and pay fine of Rs. 1,000 (fine subsequently deducted from tribal allowances).
25th April ...	Raided 12 Jaji cattle and wounded some Jajis.	Turis.	
11th May ...	Cut telegraph line, and destroyed large number of newly-planted young trees. Saiad Abbas Ziarat.	Chamkannis	Many Chamkannis captured by *baramta*, fines paid.
13th May ...	Two women carried off to Khost from Alizai.	Khostwals, who had been residing in British territory.	
5th June ...	Sultan village raided. 1 man killed, 1 mule stolen.	Jajis	Gang arrested by Governor of Khost and sent to Kabul in chains.
10th June ...	Attempt to raid Taida village. 1 villager wounded.	Muqbils	Raiders repulsed.
15th June ...	Attempt to drive off cattle from Zehran.	Kharotis of Ningrahar ...	" Ditto.
28th June ...	4 telegraph poles uprooted, telegraph wire broken, 400 young trees along road destroyed.	Parachamkannis and Gharbinas.	*Vide* entry to 11th May.
July	Raid on cattle at Gram and 2 men kidnapped at Alamsher. Between Sadda and Ibrahimzai.	Parachamkannis and Gharbinas.	*Vide* entry to 11th May.
1st July	Attempt to raid Hunza Khel encampment	Jajis	Raiders repelled, 1 killed.
21st July ...	1 boy carried off from Mata Sanga ...	Muqbils.	

KURRAM—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1905—*cont.*			
1st August ...	Large gang raided Turi hamlet of Mahmud Kala, killing several villagers and carrying off many women and children.	Muqbils.	
8th August ...	Raid on wood-cutters at Ahmadzai ...	Jajis	Orders issued to arrest any of the gang who enter Kurram.
13th August ...	Raided 47 Turi cattle	Jajis.	
18th August ...	Raid on crops at Sadda	Alisherzai	One raider wounded, maliks called on to give redress.
23rd August ...	Kurram Militia attacked by 70 armed Massuzai, after having arrested some armed thieves who fired on them. Between Ibrahimzai and Sadda.	Mastu Khel, Gar Massuzai	Massuzai ordered out of Kurram and prisoners dealt with according to law.
2nd September ...	Attempt to raid Kunj Alizai	Muqbils	Raiders repelled.
5th September ...	Raid on encampment at Alizai, 3 men killed and 2 mules carried off.	Khatak outlaw and Khostwals.	Governor of Khost addressed, no result.
15th September...	4 Bangashes fired on at Khattak Dand ...	Jajis.	
15th September...	Attempt to drive off cattle from Mahura	Jajis	Raiders repelled.
26th September...	House broken into at Bughdi	Jajis.	
27th September...	2 Turis killed by raiders at Wali China ...	Jajis.	
28th September...	2 men kidnapped at Shilozan	Samil Massuzai	*Jirga* called on to have the men released. Result apparently not reported.
1st October ...	Massuzai murdered at night outside Bisattu.	Jajis.	
3rd October ...	Attacked Survey party near Shabak ...	Wazirs.	
5th October ...	Attempt to raid Tangai	Khostwals	1 thief killed, 1 wounded.
19th October ...	Attacked Survey party near Shabak ...	Khostwals	Governor of Khost notified.
20th October ...	2 men kidnapped from Sadda	Zakka Khel, Afridis ...	Both escaped.
October ...	2 men kidnapped from Zeran	Parachamkannis	Many Chamkannis captured by *baramta*, fines paid.
31st October ...	Raid on woodcutters, 4 donkeys carried off, Tor Ghar Hill.	Jajis.	
16th November...	Raid on Bakhtawar, 40 goats and some property carried off.	Jajis	Pursuit party shot 1 raider and recovered goats.
November ...	Reported that despite letters to Governors of Aryob and Khost the Afghan subjects on the Kurram border persist in pulling down cairns and flag posts erected by British survey parties.		
15th December...	Attacked Survey party near Kotkai ...	Jajis.	
31st December ...	Raided 20 Turi donkeys	Muqbils.	
1906.			
6th February ...	Raided 600 sheep and goats from Mangal kirris in Lower Kurram.	Khani Khel, Chamkannis.	
20th February ...	Cut telegraph line and destroyed young trees near Ibrahimzai.	Ditto.	
17th April ...	Raided 150 Turi sheep and goats, and killed 1 man and 1 woman.	Jajis.	

(3).—DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL.

1899.			
1st July	Two Levy sepoys, escorting postal runners, attacked on the Laorai pass; wounded them and took their rifles.	Gujars of Nari.	
17th September...	A ferry-boat, carried down by flood, burnt at Matkanai.	People of Matkanai (Utman Khels).	Fined.
29th „ ...	Lee-Metford and sporting rifle stolen from the relief (Chitral) column at Chakdara.	Unknown (probably Adinzai).	
9th October ...	Three Levy sepoys, escorting post, attacked: 1 killed; 1 wounded.	Najim, a robber, and others (probably Adinzai).	
12th „ ...	5 cattle drivers attacked at Shakot; wounded 4 (1 died afterwards) and robbed them of their money but left cattle.	Six men of Mardan subdivision, dependents of Sarbuland Khan of Palai.	

DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1899—*cont.*			
1st November ...	The Chitral mail attacked near Minjawar; wounded 1 and killed another escort sepoy (one rifle taken).	Swat valley men (probably) (Nawab of Dir is supposed to be at the bottom of these raids on mails to throw suspicion on the Khan of Nawagai).	Neighbouring villages fined.
7th „ ...	Attacked the Chitral mail between Sado and Robat. Two Levy sepoys of escort killed.	Unknown. (Tor Lalai supposed to be implicated.)	
11th December ...	Two thousands maunds of grass of a Commissariat agent burnt at Batkhela.	Unknown.	
16th „ ...	Broke into a widow's house near Dargai; killed her and her 3 children and looted the house.	One Badrai of Shakot and four men.	Badrai and another man executed.
30th „ ...	Stock of 1,000 maunds of grass burnt at Khar camp.	Unknown.	
1900.			
29th January ...	Attacked Afghan traders; killed 1 and wounded another near Totekan.	Totekan robbers	Four captured; 1 executed.
31st „ ...	Madras sapper shot at Chakdara while on sentry at 2 a.m.: rifle and bayonet stolen.	Unknown.	...
About 15th February.	Robbed the house of a zemindar, in the Talash valley.	Fourteen men, some of them servants of the Nawab of Dir.	
23rd February ...	Shot at and wounded a Sikh sentry of 26th Punjab Infantry at Khar, and escaped.	Rifle thief; tribe unknown.	
31st March ...	Killed Gul Mohammad Khan, Akhundzada of Munda at Mian Killi. A servant of Sahibzada Badshan Jan pursued him and was shot.	Tor Lalai (the outlaw) and 12 men.	Nawab of Dir ordered Utman Khels to give up Tor Lalai, but they refused. Tor Lalai murdered 5th July, 1900.
11th July ...	Made an attack on Ganbat and was repulsed.	Malik Akhan.	
24th „ ...	Martini-Henry rifle stolen from the Nawab's workshops at Dir.	...	
27th August ...	Robbed Khataks of their salt, 10 miles west of Sado.	Shamozai Utman Khels ...	Salt subsequently returned.
25th September...	Shot Malik Painda Khan of Nasafa in the Talash valley.	Villagers of Badwan.	
1901.			
28th January ...	Robbed 2 Madras Sappers of their rifles on the road between Khar and Malakand.	Two Swat Kohistanis from Kalam.	Thieves caught.
2nd May... ...	Various quarrels between Palai and Than; crop-stealing and fighting.	Khan Khels	Parties fined Rs. 500 each. Leaders kept at Malakand.
2nd „	Crop-cutting, fighting and village burning	Nawab of Dir's *Jirgas* and the Shamozais.	Nawab contrite: says he will make proper settlement and punish his representative who broke an old compact with the Shamozais.
May	Stole 3 bayonets, 60 rounds small arms ammunition, and some uniform, from Kushalgarb.	Mamunds	One coat and 1 bayonet recovered.
4th July... ...	Stole a bag of flour and other articles from carriers of Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chitral contractor, near Pana Kot.	Men of Dir (probably).	
July	Fighting ending in submission to settlement. The *Jirgas* came in: the leader of one side was wounded while asleep and under British protection.	Aladand Khels	Sargand Khan, his brother, a nephew of Ghulam Haidar Khan of Dargai and several followers fined and imprisoned.
2nd September ...	Fought with men of Barun; killed Hamid Jan and 2 of grandsons of Fahm Jan of Barun, in Panjkora.	Shahzadai men (of Subah Khan).	Paid fine of Rs. 16,000 and allowed to return.
24th „ ...	Carriers of Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chitral contractor, robbed near the Laora pass.	Gujars	Nawab of Dir ordered property to be restored and offenders punished.
17th October ...	Captain James, 42nd Gurkhas, robbed of belt, sword, field glasses at Drosh.	Unknown.	
21st „ ...	Martini-Henry rifle stolen from sepoy of 26th Punjab Infantry while doing hospital guard at Chakdara.	„	
12th November...	A *bania's* shop robbed at Khar, and *bania* wounded (shot through lung) the chaukidar who fired to catch them. The chaukidar died.	Servants of Maliks of Khar and Batkhela; also Hakim Khan, a refugee, from Kharki in Mardan.	
14th „ ...	A bayonet stolen from 37th Dogras at Dargai.	Unknown.	
19th „ ...	Mail attacked above Sado, and again near Warsak, but robbers repulsed.	Robbers (tribe unknown).	

DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1901—*cont.*			
November ...	Continued fighting between Nawab of Amb and the Amozai.	Nawab of Amb and Amozai	Warned by Commissioner and terms of peace arranged.
30th November...	Fight close to British camp (and killed 1 and wounded 10 men) over a land question.	Men of Dargai (rival factions).	Parties kept at Malakand; village fined 50 guns.
About 16th December.	The Native Assistant for Sam Ranizai robbed.	Kadir (a robber) and a gang	Captured and shot by the Dheri Alladand Jirga. Sharif Khan, who harboured the gang, sent to Peshawar to be under surveillance.
1902.			
7th January ...	Chitral mail fired on. A Levy sepoy killed and the runner wounded.	Ausa Khel and Nasruddin Khel.	Driven off, Nawab told to put a stop to this.
13th March ...	A Sikh chaukidar murdered	Mohmands from Peshawar district employed as coolies in Supply and Transport.	
13th April ...	Khatak coolies, who were quarrying for the bridgework, attacked and cattle taken.	Chakdara villagers (likely Ali Khels).	Cattle returned and Nawab asked to punish them. He fined them.
5th June ...	Badshah Khan of Landai (near Sado) shot dead.	Some of his relations (probably).	Nawab of Dir fined them, confiscated their lands and told Badshah's son to take the customary revenge.
15th „ ...	A levy sepoy of Sado post, while he was on leave, shot dead in Arangi village.	Three Shamozai Utman Khel of Naranj.	(Trouble caused by holy men, who refuse to perform funeral rites—frequent occurrence.)
5th July ...	A Punjabi Musalman, who had been a coolie working at Chakdara, but was now going about begging, murdered on road near Malakand Levy Post.	Unknown.	
6th „ ...	The Hindu's *dharmsala* pulled down; their well filled up; their religious books destroyed. Rs. 900 worth of damage done.	Mullas of Sam Ranizai ...	Security taken against future disturbance. *Jirgas* summoned and warned.
4th August ...	The 37th Dogras' washing stolen ...	Ghilzais from the nomad camp near Thana.	Pursued, dropped their loot: 7 were subsequently captured.
30th „ ...	Came into 37th Dogra camp fired on, but escaped, 1 hit.	Robbers (tribe unknown).	
5th September ...	Three Adinzai travellers robbed, killed 1 and another wounded.	Probably men of Dir.	
11th & 12th September.	A crop watchman murdered and the father of one of our Levy Jemadars shot at next night; also Chitral contractor's carrier attacked and robbed.	Khan Khels.	
29th September	A 31st Punjab Infantry Rifle stolen ...	Mohmands (probably).	
4th December ...	Post runners fired on	Unknown.	
1903.			
13th February ...	Gul Mohammad Shah of Sado killed ...	Shamozais	Nawab asked to deal with it.
August	A trader attacked, robbed and wounded ...	Unknown	Nawab of Dir fined village.
„	Went out armed to enforce their water claims in spite of Levy Jemadar warning them.	Khar villagers	Weapons confiscated.
8th September ...	The house of a Dir Levy sepoy set fire to	A Mulla of Kana Ghurband	
21st „ ...	A trader's house broken into at Mian Killi	Dakaits from Jhar... ...	Explanations required from Nawab of Nawagai, etc.
9th November ...	The Chitral postal escort attacked. A Dir Levy sepoy shot.	Gang of armed men of Kilagai and Charmung.	
20th „ ...	Attacked the Chitral postal escort, but were overpowered and caught.	Four Utman Khels and a Mohmand of Usakai.	
15th „ ...	Rs. 3,000 abstracted from the guard treasure box at Malakand.	Usakai	Thieves caught.
December ...	Hindus of Khar and others robbed on the road between Mundah and Jhar.	Shamozais	
„ ...	Broke their promise and began faction fighting, killed and wounded several, including a small girl.	Ranizai villagers	Guns confiscated. *Jirga* decided that blood money could not be taken as fight was factional. Security taken.
1904.			
15th January ...	A house broken into and one man shot at Mian Killi.	Shamozais.	
16th March ...	Raid on Jalala; destroyed the head of the main water-channel in Thana.	Musa Khels and Shamozais	A revenue collector of Dir, who headed the raid, removed.
27th July ...	Raiding on the Chitral road near Sado and thereabouts.	Miangul Jan, son of the Nawab of Dir.	Nawab of Dir went out to punish him, but forgave him, under pressure from Agent; takes the Adinzai district from his son.

DIR, SWAT, BAJAUR AND CHITRAL—*continued.*

Date.	Nature of outrage.	Clan or section implicated.	Reparation exacted.
1904—*cont.*			
31st October ...	Three Hindu and 2 Musalman merchants robbed, killed and their bodies thrown into a well, at Shakrat.	Shamozai servants of Miangul Jan.	
23rd November ...	Nawab of Nawagai comes to help Miangul Jan, and breaks his agreement with British Government by attacking Dir territory, but is beaten.	Nawagai men.	
16th December ...	Storts raiding on the death of the Nawab of Dir, his brother-in law.	Saiyid Ahmad Khan.	
1905.			
8th January ...	Two murders in Khan Khel limits ...	Khan Khels	Found guilty and shot by the Jirga.
December 1904 / January 1905 / April ...	Raids and counter-raids, and general disturbance due to the death of the Nawab of Dir, 8th December, 1904.	Numerous tribes.	
April	Regimental property stolen from the parade ground at Chakdara by night.	6 Adinzais	Caught and tried by Khan Khel Jirga.
April	Fight over wood and grass near Thana; 8 casualties.	Musa Khels and Khan Khels.	
May	Houses of two *Maliks* burned for receiving allowances from Government.	Gud Mulla	
July	Robbery and violence on the Dir road ...	Dir Levy sepoys concerned	Case handed over to Khan Khel Jirga.
August	Robbery under arms, between Dargai and Malakand.	Three men (tribe unknown)	Culprits escaped.
24th August ...	One of a party of traders attacked, robbed and killed in Sam Ranizai country.	Unknown	
30th August ...	Raid on graziers at Rumbar, Chitral: 200 sheep and goats carried off.	Thieves from Afghan territory.	Amir's representative written to: result not reported.
8th September ...	Destroyed a telegraph pole and broke the line.	Unknown, probably Mians	Damage only charged against villages, because their first offence.
2nd October ...	Rifle bolt taken from the Chitral reliefs.	Unknown	
8th „ ...	Faction fighting at Batkhela; several *maliks* killed; *road traffic stopped* to Malakand.	...	
16th „ ...	Lee-Enfield rifle stolen from 1st Gurkha camp.	...	Steps taken to prevent its leaving the country.
16th „ ...	Cash box extracted from the post chest ...	...	Villagers fined and box found by them almost intact.
31st „ ...	Rifle stolen from 1st Gurkhas on the march.	Pathan rifle thief	Dargai fined.
3rd November ...	The mail attacked; 3 Dir Levy (escort) men killed.	Gujars from Asmar ...	1 killed, rest escaped.
th December ...	Quarrelled and killed 4 and wounded 9 ...	Shamozais and Swatis ...	Fined.
1906.			
31st January ...	Theft of timber from a bridge	...	Fined.
29th „ ...	Bags of grain stolen from railway enclosure.		
29th „ ...	2 buffaloes stolen from the Military Bazaar.	...	Thief tried by jirga and shot.
31st „ ...	Caused a fire in a Hindu's house and great loss.	Robbers.	
8th March ...	Fired on an unarmed deputation of Sultan Khels.	People of Agra, Utman Khels.	
March ... / April ...	Faction fighting continued between Badshah Khan (Khan of Dir) and his uncle, brother, and others (January 1905).	Numerous tribes.	

APPENDIX II.

LIST OF RAIDS COMMITTED BY ZAKKA KHELS DURING THE SIX MONTHS FROM AUGUST, 1907, TO FEBRUARY, 1908.

(1.) *In the Peshawar District (prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar).*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Serial No.	Raids, attacks, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid, by whom and to whom communicated.	Action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	Distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure.	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
1	Raid at Patwar Bala.	24th October, 1907.	No information received	Nil.	Mathra Police Station, 1½ miles ... ... District police proceeded to the spot immediately upon receipt of report to investigate. Border Military Police at Shahgai distance about 3 miles, were not informed of the raid until 8 hours after the raid. Interception impracticable.	Nil.	No co-ordination possible in this case. Political Agent, Khyber, informed as to loss, Rs. 52 worth.
2	Raid at Pabbi	27th October, 1907.	Ditto. ...	Nil.	Taru Police Station, 3 miles ... ... Information reached Peshawar at 6 p.m. 40 Police Constables were at once despatched in tumtums to Badbher to intercept raiders. Border Military Police posts were warned by telephone and the outer line Fort Mackeson to Bara was patrolled. The Police party, which also started from the city towards Badbher, encountered the raiders about 1½ miles beyond the city on the Badbher road at about 1 a.m Two Constables were wounded and one was killed. One raider was mortally wounded. All stolen property (save some cash), *viz.*, two horses and clothing, value Rs.7-10-0, was recovered. Upon receipt of first report Military authorities were informed, and as a result reinforcement of the Military detachment at Pabbi was despatched by the 7 o'clock evening train.	Sergeant Craufurd, 1st Mule Corps, encamped at Pabbi, took 10 sepoys of the 45th Sikhs, with three Police Constables, and pursued the raiders, but without success. On receipt of further information at 9 p.m. that the raiders intended to attack another village, military assistance was invoked. 30 sepoys were sent in tumtums to Phandu, 15 to Pakha, and 15 down the Grand Trunk Road. These started about 11 p.m. Detachment of Gordon Highlanders at Jalozai arranged escort for mail tonga between Jalozai and Pabbi.	See columns 6 and 7.
3	Affair at Bara Fort.	20th November, 1907.	On 20th November, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, telegraphed to Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Political Agent, Khyber, informed Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, by letter that the Zakka Khel gang was meditating a raid in the Peshawar District. No precise information was received as to the direction in which the raid might be expected to take place.	All Border Military Police posts were warned to be on the alert. The District Police were similarly informed.	Bara Fort Border Military Police, 200 yards from scene of affair. Firing was heard at Sarband village, about one mile distant from Fort. Border Military Police party turned out of post at once, and was waylaid at a bridge 200 yards from the Fort. In the fight which ensued one Lance-Naik and one sowar were killed and two sepoys were wounded out of 16 men. One raider was wounded and subsequently succumbed. Raiders retired towards Ilm Gudr pursued by Border Military Police party and village *chigha*. On receipt of news of affair in Peshawar by telephone three Native Officers and 30 sepoys of the Border Military Police were despatched at 8 p.m. by tumtums to Bara to reinforce post and to assist in pursuit. Raiders made good their escape in the darkness.	None invoked, as not practicable.	No property was carried off.

4	Raid near Matanni.	25th November, 1907.	No information received. But for some days previously vague rumours had been received that an attempt upon the Burj Ladaur Border Military Police post was possible.	The strength of the Burj Ladaur Post was increased from 7 to 12 men on 21st November, 1907, and the neighbouring Border Military Police posts and Matanni Police Station were warned to be on the alert.	Matanni Police Station, 2 miles ... ... The raiders appear to have formed two parties. One party carried off a large number of goats from the Maira in the afternoon. This was not reported till later. The other party attacked the Burj Ladaur Post about 7 p.m. The post replied and succeeded in keeping the raiders at bay, no loss occurring on either side, until the arrival of a Border Military Police party from Fort Mackeson, the village *chighas* of Matanni and Adezai, and some Police from the Matanni Police Station. Whole party, including another Border Military Police party from Garhi Jani, pursued the raiders, but the raiders made good their escape in the darkness.	None invoked, as no news of the attack was received till the following morning.	73 goats were recovered by their owners on ransom from Zakka Khels in Bazar Valley. Political Agent, Khyber, informed as to loss of goats.
5	Raid on sheep of Achini Payan.	3rd December, 1907.	Nil.	Nil.	Burj Hari Singh Police Station and Kacha Garhi Border Military Police, each about 4 miles. No report of the raid was received till the next day, so no action was possible. The village *chigha* had gone in pursuit, but never came up with the raiding party.	Nil.	Political Agent, Khyber, informed of the loss of 70 sheep.
6	Raid at Masho Khel.	5th December, 1907.	Nil. It was generally rumoured that Multan and his gang were bent on raiding as usual.	As a result of the Bara affair of 20th November, 1907, one company of the 57th Rifles under two British Officers had been located in the Bara fort since 25th November, 1907. One company of a Native regiment was also at Badbher for training. Two other companies of Native troops were ready in Peshawar in case of need. Signalling communication between Bara and Badbher and Peshawar was arranged.	Bara Fort, 3 miles ... ... The raiders attacked a Hindu's house at about midnight. The Hindu was shot dead. The village *chigha* with 15 Government rifles pursued the raiders. A party of the 57th Rifles and some Border Military Police on hearing the firing turned out of the Bara Fort and proceeded towards Masho Khel, leaving two picquets at certain places. This party met the village *chigha*, and by an unfortunate mistake in the matter of recognition the *chigha* fired two shots at the party, wounding one Lance-Naik. The party then went on in pursuit of the raiders towards Ilim Gudr, but the raiders had escaped in the darkness.	See column 6	See columns 6 and 7. Political Agent, Khyber, informed as to loss, which was insignificant.
7	Raid on Transport post at Jalozai.	3rd January, 1908.	Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Superintendent of Police, Peshawar, received information from Political Agent, Khyber, and Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, respectively on 2nd January, 1908, that a strong party of raiders was likely to enter the Peshawar District. This information was confirmed by informers in Peshawar, and it was said that Kaggawalla, a village near Badbher, was likely to be attacked.	All Border Military Police posts and Police Stations were warned. 30 Police Constables were despatched to Kaggawala. The Khyber Rifles sent a strong detachment to the Kajurai plain. The arrangement referred to in this column under No. 6 had been abandoned by General Officer Commanding's orders.	This raiding party came unexpectedly across 41 Government mules at Jalozai and attacked the post, wounded one Duffadar and one Drabi, and carried off all the mules at about 8 p.m. They made off in a south-easterly direction. Shamshattu Border Military Police Station, distant 7 miles. See column 7.	Invoked at 11 p.m. upon receipt of information. Available at about 1.30 a.m. A squadron of Cavalry proceeded to Matanni and two companies, Native Infantry, picketted the Kohat and the Bara roads. Failure to intercept raiders due in the main to lateness in receiving information, the first information being a deferred telegram despatched from Pabbi at 9.17 p.m. by the Zaildar.	39 of the 41 mules were recovered through the Aka Khels and the Border Military Police.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Serial No.	Raids, Attacks, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid, by whom and to whom communicated.	Action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	Distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure.	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
8	Attempt at Kacha Garhi.	24th January, 1908.	Nil.	Nil.	Kacha Garhi Border Military Police Post, 600 yards from Kacha Garhi Railway Station. The raiders attacked the Kacha Garhi Railway Station intending to ambuscade the Border Military Police party, which it was anticipated would turn out of the post on hearing the shots. The Border Military Police post contained 11 men only, and consequently, and in accordance with orders, did not turn out. The raiders then made off across the border. Owing to the telephone between Kacha Garhi and Peshawar being out of order, information of the raid was not received until a Railway telegram from the Station Master reached the Deputy Commissioner at 12.10 a.m. The Station Master was also unable to get a telegram through to Jamrud until still later. The Khyber Rifles turned out by 1.45 a.m., but it was then too late to intercept the raiders. Failure was due to the temporary non-working of the telephone and the difficulty the Station Master experienced in getting his Railway telegrams through to Peshawar and Jamrud.	Nil.	Nil.
9	Raid on Peshawar City.	28th January, 1908.	On 28th January, 1908, Political Agent, Khyber, reported verbally that he had definite information that the Zakka Khel gang had spent the previous night at a ziarat near Dag Ismail Khel, and that the gang intended to raid the house of Khan Bahadur Abdul Hamid Khan at Badrashi, a village close to the Nowshera Cantonment.	Political Agent, Khyber, himself went down to Nowshera and made arrangements with the General Officer Commanding there for the troops to turn out immediately any firing was heard. In Peshawar the whole of the road from Peshawar City to Kohat Pass was picketted by the Military. Ditto the Peshawar-Bara road. Border Military Police held the Railway line and the Grand Trunk Road about 3 miles below the City Station. Police held the country between the City Station and Nisatta road.	The City Police Station, distant 220 yards from the scene of the raid. So far from a raid occurring at Badrashi, the gang attacked the Andarshahr quarter of the Peshawar City shortly before midnight. The City Police were under strength owing to other arrangements made in view of the report that Badrashi would be attacked. Some 50 Police from the stations, patrols and fixed points came to the scene. Firing was heavy upon both sides. Three Constables were shot, of whom two subsequently died. The nearest City gates were held in force, but the raiders escaped through the famous Mohabbat Khan Mosque, and by the aid of ladders escaped over the city wall. A party of Border Military Police of 1 Subadar and 18 men came to the scene from the Border Military Police lines, but arrived too late to be of any assistance. With the exception of the Military Cavalry patrol down the Peshawar-Jamrud road (see column 7), it was impossible to attempt to intercept the raiders, as the Military garrison, the Police and Border Military Police were all reduced to very low numbers by the arrangements described in column 5.	See column 5. The arrangements detailed there were made and carried out by sunset. In addition 100 sowars of the Native Cavalry were held in readiness to proceed before sunrise to Matanni. In addition, upon information of the raid being received, the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police obtained the assistance of 160 sowars of the Native Cavalry, who turned out by 2 a.m. and picketted the Peshawar-Jamrud road, endeavouring to intercept the raiders. The Khyber Rifles at Jamrud were informed by urgent telegram by the Superintendent of Police by 2 a.m. The Khyber Rifles sowars turned out and attempted to intercept the raiders, but did not come upon them.	See columns 5, 6, and 7.

10	Raid at Tirahi Bala.	3rd February 1908.	Nil.	Nil.	Police Station Mathra, 6 miles. No report of the affair was made till 9 a.m. the following morning. Consequently no steps could be taken towards intercepting the raiders. One raider was shot, and died subsequently in hospital.	Nil.	Nil.
11	Raid at Adezai	5th February, 1908.	Nil.	Nil.	Matanni Police Station, 2 miles. Raid took place at 1 a.m. Report was not made to Police Station, Matanni, till 5 a.m. Border Military Police at Fort Mackeson heard firing, and at once proceeded to try and cut off raiders at Toti Khan Talab, but saw nothing of them.	Nil. News was not received in Peshawar until 2 a.m., when it was too late to invoke Military assistance.	Nil.

PESHAWAR,
The 17th February, 1908.

(2.) *In the Kohat District (prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat).*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Serial No.	Raids, attacks, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid by whom, and to whom communicated.	The action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	The distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure.	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon it was invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
1	Raid on Samarai village.	5th October, 1907.	Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, received information of the intended raid from the Subadar-Major of Samana Rifles, who was in Tirah, 24 hours before the occurrence, and communicated to the Commandant, Samana Rifles. From subsequent enquiries it appears that the raiders had actually entered the district before the Deputy Commissioner received notice of the intended raid. They had in all probability concealed themselves on the Ghozar hill south of Hangu and Ibrahimzai.	The Commandant, Samana Rifles, and Border Military Police and Samana Rifles posts were warned to be on the look out for the raiding party. All the available men of the Samana Rifles and Border Military Police were turned out and held likely routes in to the district.	Border Military Police and Samana Rifles turned out, but did not come across with the raiders. The nearest post is Hangu, 13 miles distant from the scene of the attack. The time of the raid was 7 p.m., but information did not reach Hangu till 10 a.m. on the following morning, too late to admit of the raiding party being intercepted, although pursuit parties of Border Military Police and Samana Rifles were sent out from Hangu. The raiders apparently retreated with the greater expedition, crossing the border between the Muhammadzai and Alizai posts at an unexpected point, just missing the Border Military Police of Kohat and of the Muhammadzai Post, who were holding the Oblan Pass 2 miles or so to the north.	Not invoked.	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Serial No.	Raids, Attacks, &c.	Date of occurrence.	The first information received of the probability of the raid, by whom, and to whom communicated.	The action taken upon that information to prevent a raid where information was received prior to the raid.	The distance of the nearest Police post from the scene of the raid, the conduct of the Border or other Police at the time of the raid, and the action taken to intercept the raiders on their return, with cause of failure.	The co-operation of Military forces, how soon itwas invoked, and how soon it was made available.	The co-ordination of the forces available, and the efforts made to recover stolen property.
2	Raid at Lachi ...	13th November, 1907.	No information was received.	—	200 yards from Police Station, Lachi. The villagers, the Police, and a party of Border Military Police opened fire on raiders and dispersed them.	The 56th Rifles picketted the line near Hangu and shot one raider dead on their retreat.	Property worth Rs. 23–12–0 recovered through 56th Sikhs.
	The facts are as follow. The raiding party had probably been lying in the Khatak hills a day or so before they delivered their attack on Lachi. They had previously cut the wire between that village and Kohat, but the Post Master managed to get off a wire *vid* Bannu, which reached the Deputy Commissioner at 12 a.m. Meanwhile the raiders had looted a Hindu's shop, but were unable to do much damage, as they were hampered by a rifle fire directed against them from a commanding position by some of the villagers. Finally, withdrawing from the village, they proceeded up the road to the Manduri Bridge, where they were dividing the loot, when three tumtums containing Border Military Police drove up. These Police were going to Banda Daud Shah for a purpose unconnected with the Lachi raid, of which they were ignorant. The raiders stopped the first tumtum and shot dead three of the four men in it, wounding the fourth. The men in the tumtums behind them came up and engaged the raiders, who retreated after having possessed themselves of the four rifles of the men in the first tumtum. The survivors did not pursue the raiders partly owing to the darkness, and because they could not leave their wounded companion. As to the action taken to intercept the raiders. The nearest Border Military Police or Military station from Lachi is Kohat, 17½ miles off. Major Waterfield and the Commandant, Border Military Police, at once proceeded to the spot after the receipt of the Post Master's wire, and on arriving there at about 1 p.m. wired to the 56th Rifles at Hangu to hold the line of hills below Hangu ; also to the Military authorities at Kohat to turn out the Cavalry ; while the Kohat Border Military Police were directed to warn the nearest posts and to block the routes into Tirah. Parties of the Samana Rifles which were operating in the Khatak hills towards Samarai and Walai were warned, and directed to move in the direction of Samarai Kotal. Later on Mr. Donald organized a series of village *chighas* as far as Ibrahimzai. The raiders escaped the net drawn thus closely round them by breaking up into small parties and slinking through after nightfall ; but in doing so they lost one of their men, who was shot by a picquet of the 56th Rifles.						
3	Dacoity at Kachi Marai.	25th November, 1907.	Political Agent, Khyber, informed Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, of the intended raid two days before the occurrence. The information was of a very indefinite nature, being merely to the effect that 60 Zakka Khels intended to raid in the Kohat District. Nothing was said as to the probable objective.	A party of 15 Samana Rifles was sent to each of the posts at Marai and Kachi, and half troop of 23rd Cavalry to Marai and another half troop to Alizai. Villagers also were warned to turn out *chighas* if they heard firing.	The Samana Rifles, Border Military Police and Military drove the raiders back towards the hills west of Marai with the result of two casualties of raiders. One Pass-made Martini also was captured from the raiders.	See column 5	See column 5. The ornaments taken from the women were found in a leather bag which had been dropped by the raiders.
	The raiding party was first seen in the broken country between the Kachi and Marai posts. They were then engaged in looting some women of their ornaments. A Border Military Police sowar in *mufti* rode up to them, and on seeing what was going on turned and galloped to the Kachi Post. Information was sent from there to Marai, and the garrisons of both posts and a detachment of Cavalry which had been stationed at Marai, together with *chighas* from both villages, turned out in pursuit, and succeeded in cutting off some of the raiders, who would probably have been destroyed to a man had night not come on.						

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